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INTRODUCTION 
In the appendix to Nineteen Eighty-Four, George Orwell imagined a 
future society in which everyone accepted the official ideology, and in 
which punishment and terror were unnecessary. Instead, people were 
kept under control because they spoke, heard, read and wrote only a 
single, specially contrived language - the language of Newspeak. 
Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been 
devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English 
Socialism. It was expected that Newspeak would finally have 
superseded Oldspeak (or Standard English, as we should call it) 
by about the year 2050 .... 
The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a 
medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits 
proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of 
thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had 
been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical 
thought - that is, a thought diverging from the principles of 
Ingsoc - should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought 
is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to 
give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that 
a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding 
all other meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by 
indirect methods. This was done partly by the invention of new 
words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and by 
stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and 
so far as possible of all secondary meanings whatever. To give a 
single example. The word free still existed in Newspeak, but it 
could only be used in such statements as "This dog is free from 
lice" or "This field is free from weeds." It could not be used in its 
old sense of "politically free" or "intellectually free", since 
political and intellectual freedom no longer existed even as 
concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless . 
... A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language 
would no more know that equal had once had the secondary 
meaning of 'politically equal', or that free had once meant 
'intellectually free', than for instance, a person who had never 
heard of chess would be aware of the secondary meanings 
attaching to queen and rook. There would be many crimes and 
errors which it would be beyond his power to commit, simply 
because they were nameless and therefore unimaginable. [Orwell 
1976 [1949],917-18, 924]. 
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This passage is not without theoretical problems and equivocations, but 
it raises important questions about the relationship of language to 
thought. It also captures the spirit, if not the details, of the type of 
linguistic engineering which is the subject of this thesis: the attempt to 
re-make people's minds through a comprehensive, centrally controlled 
programme of linguistic engineering. 
Orwell's principal models were Nazi Germany and, more 
especially, the Soviet Union. The Newspeak of Nineteen Eighty-Four 
was his imaginative extension of the officially approved language of 
those societies (cf. Steinhoff 1976). But in the very year in which the 
novel was published, there came into existence a society in which the 
control of language was even more comprehensive - the People's 
Republic of China. There, more determined attempts were made to 
extend the use of politicized language into people's private lives, and to 
turn the whole population into 'thought police' who monitored words 
to detect 'incorrect' thought.1 These attempts reached their peak in the 
last ten years of Mao Zedong's rule, during the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976. China was the laboratory in which 
Mao conducted easily the biggest experiment in linguistic engineering 
in world history, and perhaps the most rigorously controlled.2 It is an 
ideal case study for scholars who are interested in the practice of 
linguistic engineering, and who wish to examine its effects on people's 
beliefs and ways of thinking. 
In a loose sense, the term 'linguistic engineering' can be applied 
to any attempt to change language in order to affect attitudes and 
beliefs. In this sense, linguistic engineering probably exists in all 
societies. Its current manifestations in the English-speaking world 
IOn linguistic engineering in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, see 
Young 1991. There is also relevant information in works like Zeman 1964 
(on the Nazi Germany) and Benn 1989 (on the Soviet Union). Whyte 1974, 
ch. 3, shows that in the Soviet Union small group rituals (a crucial agent of 
linguistic engineering) were not extended to the general population. 
2It is possible, of course, that there have been even more rigorous 
experiments in linguistic engineering, but they have not been sufficiently 
documented. Two cases which deserve investigation are North Korea and 
Pol Pot's Cambodia, although the existence of the latter was very brief 
(1975-79). Other possibilities, on a much smaller scale, include some 
religious sects and enclosed religious communities. 
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include new coinages and new applications of old words, as well as 
attempts to eradicate usages which are believed to underpin 'offensive' 
attitudes. So governments gloss over and excuse the deaths of civilians 
in war by describing them as 'collateral damage'; black Americans draw 
attention to their heritage by insisting that they be called 'African 
Americans'; those who have disabilities raise their status by becoming 
people with 'different abilities'; homosexuals escape 
medical/psychiatric definition and celebrate their lifestyle by becoming 
'gays'; prostitutes assert the legitimacy of their way of making money 
by referring to themselves as 'sex workers'; and feminists demand a 
whole battery of changes to 'man made language', including stopping 
the use of 'man' as a generiC term for human beings. In all these cases, 
linguistic innovation is intended to affect attitudes through what 
Deborah Cameron (1995) has called 'verbal hygiene'. In the case of 
disadvantaged minorities the goal is, more specifically, to introduce 
language which affords them respect, defined in their own terms, and 
to elevate their social status. As Dale Spender (1985, 6) says on their 
behalf, 'Investing the language with one's own different and positive 
meanings is a priority for all oppressed groups ... the language and its 
use has to be changed; there is no alternative if one seeks to throw off 
one's oppression.' 
This type of linguistic engineering is worth serious study, but it is 
less far-reaching than the linguistic engineering which is the subject of 
this thesis. Even the feminist attack on sexist language is modest in its 
scope and minor in its consequences compared with the changes made 
by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party in China. Linguistic 
engineering in non-totalitarian societies is not under the control of the 
state, and even when it has political backing people are free to criticise 
it and usually to ignore it. Linguistic change is effected almost entirely 
by persuasion and social pressure, not by coercion, and it is often 
accompanied by heated debate and the persistence of rival usages. 
Attempts to tamper with language often fail, as with the many reforms 
proposed by the General Semantics movement (e.g. Korzybski 1933, 
Chase 1943), and even when attempts succeed they are frequently not 
adopted universally. 
In China, by contrast, linguistic engineering was directed by Mao 
and the Communist Party, except during the early stages of the Cultural 
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Revolution when Mao dispensed with the Party. The changes in the 
Chinese language were immense, people were compelled to adopt them 
in all public contexts, and there were increasingly strenuous attempts 
to politicize private life and enforce the use of politicized language 
there as well. Linguistic engineering in China had two aspects: 
1. Reform of the lexicon and semantics. This involved teaching 
people the D1.,lmerous neologisms which were required for the 
'correct' expression of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. 
It also involved logocide - the suppression of words which were 
tied to 'incorrect' thought; seman ticide - abolishing old 
meanings and substituting new, revolutionary ones; and 
linguistic resurrection - the revival of traditional terms and their 
application to revolutionary contexts. These changes were not 
much different in form from those which occur as a result of 
piecemeal linguistic engineering in the West, but they reflected a 
single ideology and they were on a far grander scale. --
2. Enforcing the habitual use, in relevant contexts, of numerous 
fIXed expressions which embodied 'correct' attitudes or which 
had 'correct' propositional content People were compelled to 
use these linguistic formulae when speaking or writing because it 
was believed that their message would sink into their brains and 
guide their behaviour. Failure to use the formulae when required 
was taken as a sign of 'incorrect' thought, as was their use in 
inappropriate contexts. A systematic attempt was made to extend 
the range of appropriate contexts as a way of politicizing not only 
public life, but also the routines of daily life, so that Chinese 
speech became heavily formulaic. This form of linguistic 
engineering is analogous to the use of religious formulae as 
means of persuasion in Western countries, but only in sects or 
religious orders which cut their members off from the world do 
the formulae penetrate so deeply into people's lives. People can 
usually leave or escape from these communities, and no group in 
the West has the power to enforce the use of linguistic formulae 
throughout the entire SOCiety. It is normally even possible to 
avoid singing the national anthem, and some people never 
manage to learn all the words. 
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It can be seen that linguistic engineering in China expressed the 
totalitarian aspirations of the communist rulers who took power in 
1949. It involved the attempt to re-make people's minds by insisting 
that they participate more and more fully in revolutionary discourse, 
using revolutionary terms to say revolutionary things, participating in a 
discourse which was 'correct' both in form and in content 
The subject of this thesis is the revolutionary discourse created 
by linguistic engineers in Mao's China. Chapter 1 is an examination of 
theoretical issues in the linguistic and psychological literature which 
are relevant to linguistic engineering; chapter 2 traces the 
development of linguistic engineering in China down to the onset of the 
Cultural Revolution; chapters 3-8 examine different aspects of 
linguistic engineering during the Cultural Revolution, when 
revolutionary discourse was most rigorously enforced; chapter 9 
assesses the successes and failures of Mao's great experiment in 
linguistic engineering; and chapter 10 draws out the implications of 
the Chinese experience for the wider topic of linguistic engineering. 
A thesis on linguistic engineering is inevitably multi-disciplinary. 
From linguistics, it must incorporate insights and theory generated by 
scholars working on pragmatics, sociolinguistics and the relationship 
between language and thought; from psychology, it must utilize 
research relevant to language and attitudes conducted by cognitive, 
behaviourist and social psychologists; and from history and political 
sCience, it must take the skills required to trace the development of 
linguistic engineering in China, to place that development in its 
political and social context, and to assess the impact of linguistic 
engineering on different sections of the population at particular times. 
Such a thesis must also use a considerable range of sources on 
language, politics and society in China. In a sense, my research for this 
thesis started in my youth, for I was eighteen when Mao Zedong died in 
1976. Like other students of that era I was a product - albeit an 
imperfectly processed one - of linguistic engineering. The contextual 
knowledge which personal experience gives is invaluable, and memory 
can be a reliable source of information on matters which were part of 
the daily routine over many years. This, of course, includes many 
aspects of linguistic engineering, for the repetition of revolutionary 
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formulae, day in day out, was fundamental to the Maoist approach to 
persuasion. I can still recite parts of the 'Little Red Book', I can still 
remember all the common slogans, I still know the words of the song 
which accompanied the 'loyalty dance', and so on. For me, these were 
like the prayers, nursery rhymes and moral maxims of a Western 
childhood, and they are not easily forgotten, even by those who have 
abandoned the faith. 
I am acutely aware, though, of the fallibility of individual 
memory. I have never relied upon memory for matters on which it is 
notoriously unreliable, such as chronology. Where I have used it, I 
have checked my recollections with friends and family members, 
mostly older than myself. On some topics - such as the language and 
procedure of the Public Criticism Meeting - I conducted careful 
interviews until I was satisfied that I had the details right. At most 
points, I have been able to supplement my own recollections with 
written sources. I have frequently cited the autobiographies gf former 
Red Guards who have far more informative and reliable memories than 
I do of the Cultural Revolution'S early years, especially the crucial 
period of 'free mobilization' from 1966 to 1968. I have been struck by 
how consistent they are in their recollections of language, of ritual, and 
of the impact of the 'big events' of the Cultural Revolution. 
In dealing with language, I have been able to use original sources, 
selected to illustrate linguistic engineering in its diverse forms. They 
include the following: selected essays by Deng Tuo, together with the 
polemical attack on them by Yao Wenyuan which helped to popularize 
the interpretive assumptions which I analyse in chapter 3; a mass of 
Red Guard newspapers and leaflets collected in the multiple volumes of 
Red Guard Publications, which I found invaluable in chapter 5; the 
People's Daily, which was checked systematically between 1950 and 
1980 in an effort to quantify the rise and fall of the cult of Mao's word 
(chapter 6); dictionaries, which were analysed to demonstrate a 
marked increase in the pervasiveness of revolutionary discourse during 
the Cultural Revolution (chapter 6); the model revolutionary opera On 
The Docks, whose language is analysed in chapter 7; my collection of 
the textbooks used to teach English in Chinese schools during and after 
the Cultural Revolution, which is the basis of chapter 8; and, of course, 
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Mao's own works, including the 'Little Red Book', which were the source 
of so much revolutionary discourse. 
I have been fortunate to have the assistance of an excellent series 
of monographs on linguistic innovations in Mao's China produced by 
the Center for Chinese Studies at Berkeley from the 1950s to the early 
1980s (Li 1956a, 1956b, 1957a, 1957b, 1958, 1962; Serruys 1962; Hsia 
1961,1963,1964; Chuang 1967,1968,1970; Dittmer & Chen 1981). 
Empirically oriented, but with shrewd comment, they are based largely 
on a careful study of Chinese newspapers, which were a vital means of 
communicating official discourse to the cadres, who in tum 
disseminated it to the masses. These studies frequently jogged my 
memory, and on some points for the period before the Cultural 
Revolution they filled gaps in my knowledge. I have often given 
references to them even when they report linguistic usage which is 
familiar to all Chinese of my generation, so that readers can, if they 
wish, follow up the examples which they take from the Chinese press. 
A study which places linguistic engineering in its context and 
assesses its effectiveness must make extensive use of the voluminous 
secondary literature on politics and society in Mao's China. Most of the 
sources cited in this thesis are in English, because publication on the 
Cultural Revolution is still restricted in China. However, there is a 
growing scholarly literature in Chinese which provides valuable 
insights, and I have found it especially useful for chapters 3 and 5. I 
believe that the literature now makes it possible to assess the 
effectiveness of Mao's experiment in linguistic engineering. It has 
begun to grapple with the implications of the disaster of the Great Leap 
Forward for peasant attitudes towards collectivist discourse and the 
Communist Party; it can take into account the astonishing rapidity with 
which so many Chinese cast aside key tenets of revolutionary discourse 
once Deng Xiaoping achieved power and eased restrictions; and it can 
take advantage of the fact that Deng's rise has allowed people to speak 
relatively openly about their experiences under Mao's rule. It is 
pOSSible, at last, for those who lived through the Cultural Revolution to 
discover if their own experiences and their own views were typical. It is 
also possible to go beyond broad generalities about 'what people 
thought', and to distinguish between what particular groups thought on 
a variety of issues at differenttimes. At last, then, we are in a pOSition 
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to say something sensible about which aspects of Maoist discourse were 
accepted by which groups in which periods. This clears the way for a 
study of Mao's great experiment in linguistic engineering. It may also 
enable us to test some of the claims associated with Orwell's thesis that 
by controlling language we can control thought. 
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I 
PRELUDE 
CHAPTER 1 
LINGUISTIC ENGINEERING: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The Orwellian vision of a society in which Big Brother controls thought by 
manipulating language has intrigued countless people, and seemed 
plausible to many of them. It is sustained by three related beliefs about 
language and thought: 
1. The assumption that we think in the language which we speak, 
whether it be Chinese, English or Swahili. 
2. The proposition, associated in linguistiCS with Edward Sapir and 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, that the semantic categories and grammatical 
rules of the language which we speak determine or at least heavily 
influence the structure of our thought. 
3. The claim that we communicate through a common linguistic 
code which enables speakers to pair thoughts with phonetic signals 
according to ftxed semantic and syntactic rules, then lets addressees 
recover the thoughts simply by decoding the message. 
In this chapter I will set out the theoretical framework of the thesis by 
addreSSing these claims, using them as a starting point for discussing the 
many ways in which language can, and cannot, be used to manipulate 
thought. 
1.1 The Language of Speech and the Language of Thought 
In Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell rather hesitantly mentions a popular 
assumption which underpins the belief that by controlling language we can 
control people's thought: 
It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for 
all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought 
diverging from the principles of Ingsoc [English socialism] - should be 
literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on 
words. (Orwell 1976 [1949],917). 
The crucial assumption - that we cannot entertain a thought which we 
cannot put into words'- is expressed then quickly qualified by the caveat 'at 
least so far as thought is dependent on words.' Orwell did not follow up the 
implications of this caveat, beyond an indirect statement several pages later 
that thought without words would be 'vague' (Orwell 1976 [1949], 923). 
Few of his readers have even noticed his momentary doubt, in part because 
a good many of them actually believe, more firmly than Orwell did, that 
thought really is 'dependent on words'. That view was popularized by the 
founder of behaviourist psychology, John B. Watson (1930, cited GaIotti 
1994, 260), who asserted that when we think, we cannot do so ~ithout 
covert vocalization. More recently, the subordination of language to 
thought has drawn support from structuralist and post-structuralist 
emphasis on the priority of language, and from garbled versions of the 
Whorfian linguistic determinism discussed in the next section. Finally, 
some people have based their case on introspection, saying that when we 
try to 'inspect' our thoughts they appear to us in words. 
But what if thought is not dependent on words? What if we do not 
think in the language which we speak, or in a language completely 
dependent on our spoken language? In that case, linguistic engineering will 
at best have an indirect influence on our thoughts, and banning people 
from using heretical language will not automatically lead to the slow 
extinction of heretical ideas. And indeed, modern linguists have generally 
rejected the view that we can think only in languages like Chinese or English 
which we use for communication. They have come up with some 
compelling arguments. 
First, the claim that thought is merely covert vocalization has been 
refuted experimentally, at least in its Watsonian form. Smith, Brown, 
Toman and Goodman (1947, cited Gc;Uotti 1994, 260) conducted an 
experiment in which Smith was injected with a curare derivative which 
paralysed all his muscles. He had to be kept alive by a respirator, and 
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because his vocal chords no longer functioned he could not engage in covert 
speech. Could he still think? The answer was a decisive yes. He remained 
fully conscious and was able to report that his ability to think about and 
remember what was going on about him'was unimpaired. 
Second, if thought depends on the acquisition of the language which 
we speak, it is hard to see how we can acquire language in the first place. 
As J. Christopher Maloney has put it: 
To learn a language is to solve certain problems regarding what 
expressions mean and how they can combine with other symbols to 
form complex expressions. If this is what learning a language requires, 
then learning a language is a matter of thinking. Hence we must 
already be fluent in the mental language before we learn the 
languages which we speak. How else could we perform the mental 
computations necessary for learning the target language? [Maloney 
1989, xxi-xxii; for a similar argument see Fodor 1975, 55-f>4]. 
Third, there is now a mass of experimental evidence, modifying older 
views associated with Piaget (1952), that infants totally lacking in language 
can use concepts to reason about the world. (For surveys, see Spelke 1994, 
Baillargeon 1995). For example, it has been shown that children as young 
as two-and-a-half months can mentally represent 'objects and surfaces that 
they no longer perceive' and that they can 'operate on their representations 
so as to derive information about an event they have never perceived'. 
(Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber & Jacobsen 1992, 606). They can also 
perform elementary forms of addition and subtraction, keeping mental 
tallies of the number of objects which they see being hidden behind a screen 
or removed from behind it (Wynn 1992). Finally, very young infants can 
reason with concepts which relate to particular objects and classes of object, 
and can use more abstract notions of solidity, continuity, motion, cause 
and support. (Mandler 1988, 1992; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber & 
Jacobsen 1992; Baillargeon 1991). All this happens long before they have 
learned the phonetic symbols which represent the concepts which they use. 
Indeed, it is because infants acquire a rich store of pre-verbal concepts that 
they are later able to attach phonetic labels to them and acquire spoken 
language. 
10 
Fourth, even after we have acquired a language like Chinese or 
English, it is not the medium in which we think. Rather, we use that 
language to express our thought. There are several reasons for insisting on 
this distinction between thought and the language in which it is expressed: 
(i) The languages which we speak are packed with words which 
correspond to more than one thought. As a result, we are forced to 
express quite unambiguous thoughts in ambiguous words, so that our 
audience sometimes mistakes our meaning. This mismatch between 
unambiguous thought and ambiguous language could not arise if we 
thought in the language which we speak. (Pinker 1994, 78-9). 
(ii) We frequently use different terms to refer to the same person or 
thing. For example, I may mention 'the room in which I teach', then 
subsequently refer to it as 'the room' or as 'it'. The differ_~nce between 
the words (which are variable) and the concept (which is constant) is 
clear; and we think in terms of the unchanging concept, which is not 
tied to the variable linguistic form. (Pinker 1994, 80). 
(iii) That thought is largely independent of any particular spoken 
language is shown by the fact that languages are satisfactorily, if 
imperfectly, translatable. As Jackendoff (1993, 185) says, 'the same 
thought can be expresssed in English, where the verb precedes the 
direct object, and in Japanese, where the verb follows the direct 
object; hence the form of the thought must be neutral as to word 
order.' Similarly, concepts are neutral as to the phonetic symbols 
used to represent them in different languages. Even when languages 
conceptualize the world in different ways, detailed explanation in one 
language can explain how the concepts in the other language differ, 
and translation of the concepts can be simplified by borrowing foreign 
words or coining new ones. None of this would be possible if our 
thought were tied to the phonology, the grammar and the semantic 
structures of a particular tongue. 
(iv) People who speak only, say, English are aware that English 
dominates the conscious expression of their thought, and from this 
they often conclude that they think in English. People who are fluent 
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in more than one language, however, are less likely to jump to such a 
conclusion. If someone asks me whether I am thinking in English or 
Chinese, for example, I usually have to say that I simply don't know -
or rather, that I am not conscious of thinking in either language. It is 
only when I am trying to express my thoughts - as when I am 
clarifying them, writing them down, or rehearsing what I am about to 
say - that they present themselves to my consciousness in either 
English or Chinese. When that happens, the language in which they 
appear is the language of my intended audience, not the original 
'language of thought'. 
If the 'language of thought' is not to be identified with any spoken 
language, what form does it take? In answering this question, we are 
handicapped by the fact that, as Jackendoff (1987, Part IV) has argued, the 
inner processes of thought are not open to introspective exami~ation. We 
. must infer the nature of our mental language from its results and from our 
rudimentary knowledge of brain processes. Philosophers and psychologists 
like Fodor (1975), Jackendoff (1987,1992, 1993), Pinker (1989, 1994) and 
the contributors to Haugelund (1981) have used this approach, and their 
work suggests a number of conclusions: 
1. Our mental language must be representational, with concept symbols 
associated with particular patterns of neural activity. (For a 
connectionist model of the relationship between representations and 
neural activity, see Hinton, McClelland & Rummelhart 1986). 
2. In some ways, our mental language must be 'richer' than spoken 
languages, with two or more concept symbols corresponding to each 
word which has more than one meaning, and with a mechanism 
linking symbols which refer to the same thing (Pinker 1994, 81). 
3. In other ways, the language of thought must be 'simpler' than spoken 
languages, requiring no information on pronunciation or word order, 
and having no concept symbols corresponding to words like a, the, 
here and there which are meaningless except in the context of 
particular conversations or texts (Pinker 1994, 82). 
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4. The mental language must have a 'conceptual grammar' linked to 
our neurology - a grammar which governs the syntactic and semantic 
relations of individual concepts, making it possible to combine them 
into complex thoughts. (Jackendoff 1993, 188-9; Sperber & Wilson 
1995,172-4; Anderson 1983). 
5. The concept symbols must be capable of multiplication and 
modification in response to inputs from the spoken language and 
non-linguistic data supplied by the senses (cf. Jackendoff 1987, part 
Ill). 
If 'inputs from the spoken language' can influence the language of 
thought, then some degree of linguistic engineering may still be possible. In 
order to judge its potential for success, we need to be more specific about 
the effects of the spoken language. At this point, we will confi~e our 
discussion to effects discussed in the literature on the language of thought. 
First, as Jackendoff (1987, 323) suggests, when the underlying concepts of 
our mental language are related to the syntactical and phonological 
structures of spoken language, they are 'thereby stabilized in memory 
(probably both short-term and long-term).' The greater the extent to which 
concepts are linked with structures, the easier they are to remember, partly 
because they are subjected to extra processing during the linking process 
and partly because the structures provide cues which aid the retrieval of 
concepts from memory (Eysenck & Keane 1995, 134-38; Anderson 1995, 220-
29; Bower, Clark, Lesgold and Winzenz 1969). Spoken language therefore 
makes it possible for would-be linguistic engineers to stabilize politically 
useful concepts, just as it can stabilise concepts which suit those who do not 
want to be subjected to linguistic engineering. Spoken language, as such, is 
neutral. When it favours linguistic engineers, it is because they have 
acquired the power to enforce their chosen linguistic code. 
Second, spoken language helps us to differentiate concepts more 
clearly. As Jackendoff (1987,323) says, 'Two or more very similar concepts 
can be placed in registration with clearly distinct phonological structures 
and thereby be themselves kept distinct in memory and reasoning.' The 
contrasting phonology of the words force, power and momentum, for 
example, helps to differentiate the very similar concepts which these terms 
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symbolize, making it easier to remember and manipulate them (Jackendoff 
1987,323). Spoken language, therefore, is useful to would-be linguistic 
engineers who need to clarify the distinctions between closely matched 
concepts, just as it is useful to those whom they wish to control. As before, 
spoken language, in itself, is neutral. When it helps linguistic engineers, it 
is because they have the power to control it. When they lack that power, 
language can help clarify concepts used to attack them. 
Third, language greatly enriches our conceptual structure. Not only 
does it give us access to other people's concepts, but by stabilizing our own 
concepts and attaching them to phonological structure it makes it easier to 
subject them to introspective examination. Moreover, with the help of 
writing, we can link concepts to visual cues which help us to recall them 
and keep them in mind. All of this facilitates the processes of 
reclassification, recombination and inference which lead to th~: 
. development of higher-order concepts. The result, as jackendoff (1987, 324) 
notes, is that it 'becomes possible to have concepts about concepts and, 
through language, to stabilize the resulting abstractions. In turn, 
phonological expression of such higher-order concepts can again be 
introspected, re-expressed, stabilized, and combined with other concepts.' 
The intellectual benefits of this are obvious, and it creates a problem for 
would-be linguistic engineers. They are less interested in the creative 
development of political theory than in using language to keep people 
under control. So for them, the way in which language facilitates analYSiS, 
criticism and new thought has disturbing implications. It gives people 
intellectual capabilities which make it very difficult to reduce them to 
automata programmed by political formulae. In this sense, language lies at 
the root of heresy. 
1.2 Sapir, Whorf and the Categories of Thought 
The role of language in stabilizing concepts, marking their differentiation 
and aiding analysis points to one form of the influence which language has 
on thought, and it is a type of influence which has implications for 
linguistic engineering. More far-reaching, however, are the claims about the 
influence of language associated with the linguists Edward Sapir and 
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Benjamin Lee Whorf. Neither quite proposed that we actually think in the 
language which we speak, but both were convinced that the semantic and 
grammatical categories of our language exercise a profound influence upon 
our way of thinking. In a famous statement, Sapir (1949, 162) suggested 
that our perception of reality varies according to the particular language 
which we speak: 
Human beings do not live in the objective world alone nor alone in 
the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very 
much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the 
medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to 
imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of 
language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving 
specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the 
matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built 
up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever 
sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social 
reality. The worlds in which different societies live are dIstinct 
worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached. 
Whorf (1956,212-14) took up this theme and developed it even more 
explicitly: 
It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words, 
the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing 
instrument for VOicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, 
the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his 
analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade. 
Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational 
in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs, from 
slightly to greatly, between grammars. We dissect nature along lines 
laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we 
isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because 
they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is 
presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be 
organized by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic 
system in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, 
and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to an 
agreement to organize it in this way - an agreement that holds 
throughout our speech community and is codified in the patterns of 
or language. The agreement is, of course, an implicit and unstated 
one, BUT ITS TERMS ARE ABSOLUTELY OBLIGATORY; we cannot talk at 
all except by subscribing to the organization and classification of data 
which the agreement decrees. [Emphasis in original]. 
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Whorf summarised this line of argument in his Principle of linguistic 
Relativity (Whorf 1956, 221): 
the lllinguistic relativity principle!' ... means, in informal terms, that 
users of markedly different grammars are pointed by the grammars 
toward different types of observations and different evaluations of 
externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as 
observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world. 
In other words, the differences between languages cause non-linguistic 
differences in perception and cognition. Whether this amounts to a fully 
fledged theory of the linguistic determination of thought has been much 
debated (Schwanenflugel, Blount & Lin 1991; Kay & Kempton 1984, 65-6, 
74-7; Lucy 1992b). In the passages above, for example, language is 
described as the 'shaper', 'program' and 'guide' of thought, so that people 
who speak different languages are 'pointed' towards different ~bservations 
and evaluations and 'must arrive at somewhat different views of the world.' 
[Emphasis added]. This sounds deterministic, but in the first passage Whorf 
also says that differences in conceptual categories are only 'largely' 
determined by language. This implies that our concepts may sometimes be 
influenced at least in part by non-linguistic factors, such as inputs from the 
environment. And indeed, when discussing concepts of space, Whorf 
explicitly endorsed this view: 
There is no such striking difference between Hopi and SAE [Standard 
Average European] about space as about time, andprobably the 
apprehension of space is given in subs tan tially the same form by 
experience irrespective of language. The experiments of the Gestalt 
psychologists with visual perception appear to establish this as a fact. 
[Whorf 1956, 158-9, emphasis added; see Foley 1997, ch. 11, for 
discussion] . 
Whorf regarded concepts of space as exceptions to the Principle of Linguistic 
Relativity. He also believed that our numerical categories could represent 
the realities of nature when applied to 'real plurals' in the form of 
'perceptible spatial aggregates', as when we count 'ten men' and so on. It is 
only when we apply numerical terminology to 'imaginary plurals' or 
'metaphorical aggregates' - as when we carve up time into units which 
cannot be 'objectively experienced' - that we impose linguistic categories on 
the 'kaleidoscopic flux of impressions' which constitutes our raw sensory 
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experience (Whorf 1956,139; Lucy 1992b, 50-62; Foley 1997). So Whorf 
clearly exempted some of our categories from his generalizations about how 
languages 'shape', 'program' and 'guide' thought. It is not clear, though, 
how many exemptions he was prepared to make, and how far he was 
prepared to push his more deterministic formulations in relation to 
categories which he did not exempt. 
Whether Whorf was in some sense a linguistic determinist is an 
exegetical question which we do not need to resolve here. What matters is 
whether the doctrine of linguistic determinism is correct, for if it is, we will 
have to confront the Orwellian nightmare that Big Brother could reduce us 
to linguistically programmed robots. There are, in fact, compelling reasons 
to reject deterministic claims. In particular, linguistic determinism makes 
it impossible to explain how we are able to 'structure' experience and relate 
words to concepts so that we can acquire our first language; it}s refuted by 
the fact that people who speak the same language can use that language to 
express radically different concepts linked to different world views; and it is 
impossible to reconcile with the fact that groups which speak different 
languages can use those languages to express the same world view (Bright & 
Bright 1965); and it leaves us with no explanation for the undoubted fact 
that we can take concepts developed in one language and translate them 
into another language. Indeed, if linguistic determinism were true, Whorf 
could never have explained his views. He would never have been able to 
use the English language to explain concepts of time allegedly linked 
inextricably to the Hopi language (Whorf 1956,55,57,64,140,146,153, 
216-17). And although he argued that the word 'empty' led people to the 
mistaken belief that empty gasoline drums contained nothing dangerous 
(Whorf 1956, 135), the word still did not stop him and many others from 
uIldefstanding that such drums contain highly explosive vapour. 
If the strong, deterministic version of the Whorf hypothesis can easily 
be dismissed, there is a weak version which is consistent with Whorrs ability 
to explain Hopi concepts in English and to avoid being misled by the word 
'empty'. David Carroll (1994, 378) expresses that version as follows: 
[A] weak version of the hypothesis states that the presence of 
linguistic categories influences the ease with which various cognitive 
operations are performed. That is, certain thought processes may be 
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more accessible or more easily performed by members of one 
linguistic community relative to those of a different linguistic 
community. As Hockett (1954) expresses it, "languages differ not so 
much as to what can be said in them, but rather as to what it is 
relatively easy to say" (p. 122). 
This form of the hypothesis has been treated seriously by linguists and has 
generated important research. Some of that research has revealed the 
existence of linguistic universals such as the fact that all languages name 
the same basic shapes and spatial relations (Clark & Clark 1977), or the fact 
that there is a fixed hierarchy in the addition of terms for colours (Berlin & 
Kay 1969). Moreover, research has confirmed that people can distinguish 
and remember perceptual inputs even when their language has no words 
with which to describe them (Heider 1972; Heider & Oliver 1973; Rosch 
1973). This, however, does not rule out the possibility that the structure of 
some languages facilitates perceptions and thought processes Which the 
. structure of other languages makes difficult. In fact, there is accumulating 
evidence that this is the case. 
Several studies have shown that under some circumstances seman tic 
categories influence cognition. For example, Kay and Kempton (1984) 
have demonstrated that English speakers (who have separate terms for the 
colours green and blue) replicate the dichotomy in their language by 
exaggerating the distances between colours close to the green/blue 
boundary. By contrast, Tarahumara speakers (who do not have separate 
words for the colours) are not influenced by linguistically based 
dichotomies and show no tendency towards exaggeration. 
Other studies have investigated the relationship between different 
ways of naming numbers and children's understanding of elementary 
mathematical concepts. In Chinese, Japanese and Korean, the names of 
numbers explicitly follow a base-10 numerical system. For example, in 
Chinese the number eleven is called shi-yi ('ten-one'), twelve is shi-er ('ten-
two'), twenty is er-shi ('two-tens') and forty is si-shi ('four-tens'). In English, 
numerical names are not related to the base-10 system nearly as clearly, so 
using them does little to facilitate base-10 reasoning. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that young East Asian children are much more likely to use the 
base system than their American counterparts. Miura, Kim, Chang & 
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Okamoto (1988) gave coloured unit blocks and differently coloured tens 
blocks to socio-economically matched japanese, Chinese, Korean and 
American first-graders, then told them to use the blocks to build five 
different numbers. The fastest solution was always to use the base-10 
system to the maximum, while the slowest was always to build the number 
entirely from unit blocks. The quickest way to build the number 42, for 
example, was to use four tens blocks and two unit blocks, while the slowest 
way was to count out 42 unit blocks. When tested, 72 percent of japanese, 
81 percent of Chinese and 83 percent of Korean children used the tens 
blocks to the maximum on their first try at each number, achieving the 
fastest solution; by contrast, only 8 percent of the American children did 
this, the remainder almost invariably counting out the required number of 
unit blocks. When reminded that ten unit blocks were equivalent to one 
tens block then told to find another way of building the numbers, only 13 
percent of the American youngsters succeeded in finding two c9rrect ways of 
showing all five numbers: the counting out of unit blocks was the only 
method which most could use effectively. By contrast 98 percent of the 
Koreans, 79 percent of the japanese and 76 percent of the Chinese found 
two correct representations of all numbers. The American first-graders were 
even far outscored by a sample of children from a Korean kindergarten. 
(American children of kindergarten age could not be tested because pilot 
work indicated that they could not count well enough. Miura and her 
colleagues very plausibly relate this to the fact that English speakers have to 
learn more words to represent numbers than do speakers of East Asian 
languages. The latter simply learn the words for numbers one to ten, then 
can extrapolate the rest using a simple set of rules that reflect the written 
numerals). Other studies by Miura and her colleagues on matched samples 
of japanese and American first-graders have obtained similar results (Miura 
1987; Miura & Okamoto 1989). 
Non-linguistic variables common to the japanese, Chinese and Korean 
cultures, of course, may help explain why East Asian children are so quick to 
develop a facility in base-ten reasoning. It is certainly true that their 
attitudes towards mathematical and educational achievement are different 
from Western ones, with both parents and children setting higher standards 
and emphasising hard work rather than natural ability (cf. Stevenson, Chen 
& Lee 1993; Chen & Stevenson 1995). However, it is by no means clear that 
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these attitudes are sufficient to account for the East Asian children's 
superiority in base-ten reasoning at the outset of their school careers, or to 
account for the fact that Korean kindergarten children far outscore 
American first-graders. It seems very plausible to suggest that Asian 
children's performance was helped by the fact that they had been 
introduced to the base-l0 system as they learned to count in their native 
languages. It is also tempting to suggest that the East Asian languages 
promote an approach to numerical reasoning which enhances subsequent 
mathematical performance - especially since 'bilingual Asian-American 
students tend to score higher in math achievement than do those who 
speak only English' (Wade &Tavris 1993, 303, citing Moore & Stanley 1986). 
The striking superiority of East Asian students in international tests of 
mathematical performance may be less mysterious than it seems. 
Whorf was particularly interested in the effects of differep.t 
. grammatical structures on cognition, and a study by Bloom (1981) 
produced results which seemed to provide dramatic support for his 
intuitions. Bloom pointed out that English uses the subjunctive mood to 
express counterfactual conditionals - hypothetical statements positing 
states of affairs which never existed ('If Mao had died in 1964, the Cultural 
Revolution would never have occurred'). This grammatical construction 
indicates that Mao did not die in 1964 and that the Cultural Revolution 
did occur. There is, however, no equivalent construction in Chinese, so that 
hearers and readers must supplement the grammar with contextual clues 
before they can infer that the state of affairs is hypothetical. Since this 
involves a more complex form of reasoning, Bloom predicted that Chinese 
speakers would find counterfactual thinking more difficult than English 
speakers do. To test this hypothesis, he conducted several studies. The 
results indicated that Chinese students were far less likely than American 
ones to interpret stories counterfactually, even when a counterfactual 
interpretation was the only one which made sense. This seemed to 
vindicate his hypothesis that Chinese speakers have difficulty in reasoning 
coun terfactually. 
Bloom's conclusions, however, have been questioned by studies 
conducted by Au (1983, 1984) and Liu (1985). They alleged that the stories 
given to Bloom's Chinese subjects were ambiguous and not idiomatic. Au 
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(1983) revised Bloom's materials and found that the performance of 
Chinese students greatly improved, but Bloom (1984) replied that Au had 
simplified the materials and had tested students whose thought patterns 
had been affected by studying English for twelve years. In order to assess 
Bloom's response, Liu (1985) used abstract and complex materials to test 
Chinese students who had little or no exposure to English. She found that 
the students' ability to reason counterfactually increased markedly with 
age, and that the older students performed well. However, since she made 
no attempt to test English speaking students on translations of the Chinese 
material, her study tells us nothing about the comparative performance of 
the two groups. The controversy remains unsettled. As Carroll (1994, 386) 
comments, 'It would appear that a direct comparison of Chinese and 
English monolinguals on a reasonably complex, yet idiomatic, set of 
materials would be in order.' 
Stronger evidence for the influence of grammatical structures on 
thought comes from a comparison of Navaho and English by Carroll and 
Casagrande (1958). In Navaho, but not in English, verbs describing the 
handling of objects vary according to the objects' form (long and rigid, flat 
and flexible, and so on). Carroll and Casagrande hypothesised that Navaho 
children who spoke Navaho would pay greater attention to form than 
Navaho children who spoke English, and that they would therefore begin to 
group objects by form rather than colour at an earlier age. In other words, 
they expected the Navaho speakers to develop more quickly the adult 
tendency to see greater essential Similarity between a yellow rope and a blue 
rope than between a yellow rope and a yellow stick. When they tested the 
children, their prediction was fully confirmed. Since the two language 
groups came from the same reservation and lived under similar conditions, 
the influence of language on thought is probably confirmed. However, 
Carroll and Casagrande also discovered that white, English speaking 
children in a Boston suburb paid attention to form as early as the Navaho 
children on the reservation. This probably just indicates that language is 
not the only factor which affects cognitive development: the toys and 
puzzles of a suburban childhood can be as effective as the Navaho language 
in fostering attention to form. 
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Finally, Lucy (1992a) has researched the cognitive implications of the 
very different ways in which English and Yucatec Maya grammatically mark 
number. In English, plural forms are used for all discrete objects, whether 
animate or inanimate, but not for objects without definite boundaries. In 
other words, English speakers mark the plural for count nouns ('women', 
'chairs'), but not for mass nouns (we do not say 'flours' or 'milks'). Yucatec 
speakers, by contrast, disregard the count noun/mass noun division, 
substituting the animate/inanimate one. They use the plural only for 
animate objects, and even then it is optional. So grammatical number is 
far more important in English than in Yucatec. Lucy proposed that this 
would lead English speakers to be more attentive than Yucatec speakers to 
how many objects they were observing, especially in the case of objects 
which were both inanimate and discrete. To test this hypothesis, he showed 
English speaking Americans and Yucatec speaking Mayans line drawings of 
scenes from Yucatec life - scenes which always included variou§ numbers of 
a range of objects (two people, three hens, and so on). He then asked his 
test subjects to describe verbally what they had seen. As expected, the 
English speakers were Significantly more likely to say how many objects of 
various sorts were in the pictures. This tendency was especially strong in 
the case of discrete, inanimate objects, where English always marks the 
plural and Yucatec never does. This, of course, was entirely predictable on 
'weak Whorfian' principles. 
Lucy also noted that in Yucatec all nouns are semantically very like 
mass nouns in English: they refer less to the form of their referents than to 
their material or substance. For that reason, Yucatec nouns require 
numerical classifiers to provide information about the form of their 
referents, putting boundaries around their substance. This is the English 
use of classifiers to give form to the boundless substance of mass nouns 
('three bags of sugar', 'a loaf of bread'). It contrasts with the treatment of 
English count nouns (the vast majority), which require no classifiers because 
semantically they delineate the form of their referents. Lucy predicted that 
these linguistic differences between Yucatec and English would be reflected 
in cognitive differences: Yucatec speakers, with their linguistically directed 
focus on material or substance, would classify as similar objects which were 
made of the same substance but had radically different forms; and English 
speakers, with their linguistically directed focus on form, would classify as 
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similar objects which were made of radically different material but shared 
the same form. He tested this hypothesis by showing speakers of both 
languages a cardboard box, then asking them whether it was more like a 
plastic box of similar shape or a small piece of cardboard. The English 
speakers, as predicted, saw the two boxes as more alike, whereas the Yucatec 
speakers saw greater similarity between the cardboard box and the piece of 
cardboard. So judgments of similarity reflected the contrasting patterns of 
the languages. Again, a 'weak Whorfian' approach had been vindicated. 
Whorf's reputation amongst linguists is mixed. It has suffered because 
his name has been linked (rightly or wrongly) to indefensible doctrines of 
linguistic determinism, and because the quality of his fieldwork has been 
questioned. In particular, he seems to have misunderstood the Hopi 
concept of time, grossly exaggerating the extent to which it differs from 
Western views (Malotki 1983). He also contributed to what has_, been called 
'the great Eskimo vocabulary hoax': the snOW-balling estimates of the 
number of Eskimo words for snow - estimates which are the standard and 
inaccurate illustration of the way in which different languages 'impose' 
different systems of classification on reality (Martin 1986; Pullum 1991). 
However, none of this should be allowed to obscure the fact that there is 
mounting evidence in favour of a 'weak', non-deterministic version of 
Whorfs hypothesis: that the language which we speak influences our 
thought, making it easier for us to entertain some thoughts and harder for 
us to entertain others. 
The implications of this for linguistic engineering are clear. We need 
not fear an Orwellian world in which language is used as a technology for 
programming our thought, reducing us to ciphers of Newspeak. However, 
changing the language which we read, write, speak and hear can sometimes 
change the way in which we think. The grammatical structures which 
Whorf thought so important, however, are not the aspect of language most 
likely to be manipulated by linguistic engineers. Feminists might have ? 
made the world ~ for feminism by popularizing singular 'they' as a 
substitute for sexist 'he' when referring to a generic person (cf. Hyde 1984; 
Henley 1989), but this is a rare example of a politically motivated 
grammatical change. In part, the rarity of grammatical manipulation 
stems from the fact that most would-be linguistic engineers have only tacit 
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knowledge of grammar, so that it is often difficult for them to analyse its 
potential effects on thought. It also reflects the fact that extensive 
grammatical change would be enormously unpopular and disruptive. (This 
is one reason amongst many why the General Semantics movement is 
unlikely to succeed in its assault on the verb 'to be'). So most efforts at 
linguistic engineering are more likely to involve reform of seman tic 
categories, whose political and moral implications are easy to detect, whose 
manipulation is less disruptive, and which are widely known to change 
anyway. We shall see that this was very much the case in Mao's China, 
where new words were added to the lexicon, old words were given new 
meanings, but grammatical structures were largely untouched. The case of 
China also reveals that linguistic engineering can involve far more than 
tampering with semantic categories or grammar. It can involve the 
manipulation of established linguistic forms as well. The mechanisms 
through which such manipulation can sway our minds are' dis<;ussed in the 
. next two sections. 
1.3 Concepts, Schemas and World View 
Research by cognitive and behavioural psychologists demonstrates that 
linguistic engineering can influence our thought in ways almost entirely 
ignored in the debate over Whorf - a debate which has focused on the 
effects of semantic categories and grammatical structures. In this section, I 
will discuss the implications for linguistic engineering of schema theory, 
which was in trod uced to modern psychology by Sir Frederic Bartlett (1932). 
Schema theory was also taken up by Piaget (1967, 1970) as a way of 
conceptualizing changes in children's cognition, but it was not until the 
1970s that it became what Eysenck & Keane (1995, 262) have called 'a 
dominant interest' in cognitive psychology. It has remained popular, along 
with the very similar bodies of theory attached to the closely related 
concepts of 'frames' (Minsky 1975) and 'scripts' (Schank & Abelson 1977). 
As we shall see, schema theory gives us a framework for understanding how 
language can be manipulated to affect our concepts and schemas, and 
though them our beliefs and attitudes. 
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First, we need to clarify the crucial tenus 'concept' and 'schema'. 
A concept, we have seen, is a mental representation grounded in a 
particular pattern of neural firing in our brains. It can exist independently 
of any phonetic forms used to express it in spoken languages. But what is a 
schema? Cognitive psychologists have defined the term in a variety of ways, 
but the most useful definition for our purposes is that it is an 
interconnected and hierarchically organised complex of beliefs about any 
person or thing. At its apex, there is a central concept, while its base 
consists of the attributes associated with that concept. It can be 
represented diagrammatically as in Figure 1.1, where A1. .. A4 are some of 
the attributes linked to the concept in encyclopaedic memory. 
CENTRAL CONCEPT 
/ 
Al A2 A3 A4 
FIG. 1.1. Representation of a Schema. 
(Adapted from Fiske 1986, 45) 
The central concept can refer to an individual person (oneself, say, or 
Chairman Mao), to a group of people (Red Guards or capitalist roaders), to 
a place (the United States), to an event (the Long March) or to anything at 
all (animal, vegetable or mineral). The attributes of the concept can 
include any of its supposed instantiations and any properties thought to be 
linked to it by causal, semantic or other relations. A Chinese Marxist's 
schema for 'revolution', for example, might include the following amongst 
its attributes: 
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AI: It is caused by class struggle. 
A2: It is always opposed by imperialists. 
A3: It is usually violent. 
A4: It is instantiated by the Russian Revolution, China's Republican 
Revolution in 1911, China's Liberation in 1949, etc. 
Both the central concept and its attributes are sometimes associated 
with an evaluative response. Our hypothetical Chinese Marxist, for 
example, might give a positive evaluation to the central concept of 
'revolution', to the pleasingly materialist causal explanation in AI, to the 
justified violence in A3, and to the welcome instantiations of the central 
concept in A4. Her response to the imperialist opposition referred to in A2 
will no doubt be negative. We can incorporate this evaluative response into 
a diagrammatic representation of our Marxist's schema by adding positive 
or negative evaluative tags in the form of + or - signs as in Figure 1.2. 
CENTRAL CONCEPT + 
Al A4 
+ + + 
FIG. 1.2. Representation of evaluative responses within the structure 
of our hypothetical Marxist's schema for revolution. 
(Adapted from Fiske 1986,46). 
The central concept in one schema can, without contradiction, playa 
subordinate role as part of an attribute in another schema. For example, a 
schema for 'imperialists' might feature their opposition to revolution as one 
of their attributes. In that case, 'imperialists' will be the central concept at 
the top of this schematic pyramid and 'revolution' will be a subordinate 
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concept playing its part among the attributes which constitute the base. It 
matters not at all that in another schematic pyramid the hierarchy is 
reversed. 
Schemas are linked together in wider associative networks. For 
example, the schema for 'revolution' is linked by attribute Al with schemas 
for 'class struggle', 'contradiction', 'forces of production' and 'relations of 
production'; by attribute A2 with schemas for 'opposition' and 
'imperialists'; by attribute A3 with a schema for 'violence'; and by attribute 
A4 with schemas for the Russian, Chinese and other revolutions. These 
schemas are in turn linked by their attributes with still other schemas. So 
when our Marxist hears the word 'revolution', this not only activates her 
schema for the concept 'revolution' but through a process of associative 
priming it puts related schemas on call. This facilitates access to their 
contents through a process of spreading activation along well established 
. neural pathways. So people who have been primed by hearing the word 
'revolution' are better and faster than other people at recognizing and 
remembering words, concepts and assumptions linked to the concept of 
revolution through an associative network. Similarly, they are better at 
recognizing and remembering words, concepts and assumptions linked to 
such a priming stimulus than at remembering those which are not linked. 
(Research demonstrating these phenomena is discussed by Anderson 1983, 
86-125,171-214; and Anderson 1995, 150-54, 180-86,220-29. For a defence 
of spreading activation against rival explanations of associative priming, see 
McNamara 1992). 
Schemas and associative networks facilitate the storage of 
assumptions in memory. Material which is fitted into schemas and 
associative networks is much easier to remember than material for which we 
have no meaningful associations (Anderson 1995, 220-29). For example, 
Bower, Clark, Lesgold and Winzenz (1969) asked subjects to learn 112 words 
which had been grouped in schemas linked together meaningfully in four 
associative networks. They then compared their performance with that of a 
control group of subjects who were presented with the same words classified 
at random. At the first trial, after four minutes' learning, subjects who had 
been presented with the schematically organised material remembered an 
average of 73 words while those who had been presented with disorganized 
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lists remembered only 20.6 words. By the third trial, subjects who 
encountered the material in schemas and associative clusters all had 
perfect recall, whereas the control group still averaged only 52.8 words. 
~ 
Persuaders who can control our language are in a position to alter our 
concepts and schemas, thereby activating mechanisms which can transform 
our world view. They can do this through a technique of linguistic 
engineering which has been used in all the twentieth century totalitarian 
societies, but in none as systematically as in China. All they need to do is 
make people repeatedly read, hear and speak language~which ~is linked to 
conCepts and schemas embedded in the persuader's world view, while at the· 
same t!me forbidding people to use language which is linked to concepts 
arid schemas embedded in the old world view. Under these circumstances, 
, constant activation will make the persuader's concepts and schemas ~teadilY more accessible, while our old concepts and schemas Will gradually 
. 1JFcome less accessible through lack of activation and through the 
'ieterference effect' which new learning has on old learning (Anderson 1995, 
~86-7, 200-03, 211-13). And, once we begin to use the persuader's concepts 
.~d schemas, we begin to see the world differently. Three mechanisms 
underlie this change in world view: 
1. By creating expectations about the world, concepts and schemas lead 
us to explore our environment (including our linguistic environment) 
in particular ways. As a result, we pay attention to things which 
people equipped with different concepts and schemas would 
sometimes miss. We also use schemas to fill in gaps in our 
perceptions, and to supply interpretive assumptions crucial to the 
interpretation of discourse. So concepts and schemas influence our 
perception of our environment, introducing an element of 'top-down 
processing' into the way in which we encounter it (Neisser 1976; 
Bower, Black & Turner 1979; Eysenck & Keane 1995, 73-94, 320-23; 
Anderson 1995, 61-72, 211-19). 
2. We are far more likely to store and recall information which we 
organize schematically (Bower, Clark, Lesgold and Winzenz 1969; 
Anderson 1995, 220-24), and people with different schemas tend to 
remember different things. Moreover, much of what we think we 
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'remember' is not retrieved directly from memory, but inferred from 
assumptions and stereotypes associated with our schemas. (Anderson 
1995,211-19; Bower, Black & Turner 1979). So by influencing what we 
store in memory and what we recall or inferentially reconstruct from 
memory, schemas tend to 'skew' our developing versions of reality. 
3. Concepts and schemas affect the ways in which we categorize 
sensory inputs which come to our attention, and this process of 
categorization imputes 'meaning' to the inputs and links them to 
wider interpretations. This can be perfectly compatible with 
objectivity, as when a radiologist'S schematic knowledge enables her 
to see that shadows on X-ray pictures, which to me are merely 
shadows, are indications of tuberculosis. But concepts and schemas 
can sometimes commit us to particular evaluative frameworks - as 
when the Kuomintang's expulsion from the Chinese maipJand in 1949 
is categorized, according to the value-tagged concepts and schemas of 
different speakers, as either China's 'Liberation' or as the Nationalists' 
'strategic withdrawal' to Taiwan. 
In calling attention to these ways in which concepts and schemas 
influence our versions of reality, I am of course not implying that we are 
locked within them, seeing only what they lead us to expect. Nor am I 
implying that their influence is irrational. Rather, I am calling attention 
to what Ulrich Neisser (1976) has called the 'cycle of perception', in which 
our existing concepts and schemas direct our exploration of the 
environment and in which the environment in turn confirms some of our 
predictions but contradicts others - leading us, perhaps, to modify or 
replace some of our concepts and schemas. Figure 1.4 outlines this 
dialectic between concepts and schemas on the one hand and information 
available from the environment on the other. 
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Environment 
/ 
MODIFIES OF 
Existing concepts -----INFLUENCE----~) Exploration 
and schemas and interpretation 
FIG. 1.3. The cycle of perception. 
(Adapted from Neisser 1976, and Galotti 1994) 
Within this cycle, we neglect neither the influence of 'top-down processing' 
from our existing concepts and schemas nor the impact of 'bottom up 
. information' from the environment - whose importance has been amply 
demonstrated by researchers like Gibson (1966, 1979). Moreover, within the 
cycle, our concepts and schemas do not cancel our rationality but direct 
and empower it. They classify and integrate information gained from past 
exploration of the environment, and they do so in ways relevant to our 
purposes; they facilitate the storage and retrieval of that information; and 
they help to ensure that future exploration is not random, but proceeds in 
directions which our experience shows are most likely to be profitable. They 
thus introduce a 'bias' into our processing of information, but it is, on 
balance, a healthy bias. It may cause us to overlook or misinterpret some 
information which is relevant to our concerns, but without it we would be 
far more likely to look in the wrong places and would lack a tool vital to 
rational interpretation. Even concepts and schemas fed to us by the most 
cynical of propagandists will almost certainly be more useful to us in 
encountering the world than would the blank incomprehension of a mind 
with no concepts and schemas at all. So concepts and schemas contribute 
powerfully to our rationality, even as theyCJiannel it in specificdiTections . 
. Ailef a persuader who, through controlling our language, makes us more 
"'likely to use one set of concepts and schemas rather than another, does not 
{override our rationality but simply points it in new directions. 
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Linguistic engineering, then, can alter the outcome of rational 
information processing by affecting the conceptual and schematic 
apparatus through which we interpret our experience. In doing this, it 
would not reduce us to automata, and it would not be wholly effective. 
Concepts and schemas emphasised by linguistic engineers could still be 
rejected and modified because they made no sense of 'bottom up' inputs 
from our environment, and they could still be subjected to silent rational 
critique by people concerned about their consistency and implications. In 
other words, while schema theory does not justify fears that our thoughts 
could be linguistically programmed as in Orwell's fictional Oceania, it gives 
us every reason to believe that linguistic engineering could influence them 
through mechanisms closely linked to our rationality. 
1.4 Primitive Affective and Associational Processe~ 
Language can also be used to activate mechanisms of persuasion which 
have nothing to do with rationality - what Petty and Cacioppo (1986, 9) 
call 'rather primitive affective and associational processes'. Eight such 
processes will be referred to repeatedly in later chapters and require 
explanation here. Two of these processes involve nothing more than the 
repetition of words and propositions (mere exposure and repetition leading 
to the validity effect); two involve conditioning (higher order conditioning 
and operant conditioning); two involve the crucial role of language in 
imitative behaviour and group membership (modelling theory and 
reference group theory); and two of them involve the manipulation of 
discrepancies between people's verbal behaviour and their attitudes (the 
theory of cognitive dissonance and self-perception theory). Let us take 
them in order. 
Mere Exposure 
According to the theory of mere exposure, the more people are exposed to 
something, the more favourably they evaluate it. In a classic experiment, 
Zajonc (1968) showed that the more frequently students were asked to 
pronounce nonsense words, the more they liked them. Similar results have 
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been obtained in experiments exposing students to stimuli as diverse as 
Chinese characters, Pakistani music, Turkish words, irregular polygons and 
graduation pictures (Harrison 1977; Bomstein 1989; Perl off 1993, 58-9). The 
effect seems to be particularly strong when the target of the exposure is 
relatively complex, when it appears in a variety of contexts, and when each 
exposure is brief. Excessive repetition can lead to 'wear out', but most 
people still like the target better than they did at the first exposure 
(Bornstein 1989; Perloff 1993, 59.;61). 
The effects of mere exposure are manipulated by advertisers to secure 
brand acceptance. They also have important implications for linguistic 
engineering. They indicate that if people are repeatedly exposed to the 
name of a political leader or of a real or fictitious model of political virtue, 
they will view that name more favourably. They will probably also be more 
inclined to look kindly upon the person to whom the name re(ers. Mere 
. exposure can also make people accept and eventually like a new political 
vocabulary which they are made to hear, read and use regularly. 
The Validity Effect 
When we hear or read a statement two, three or more times, we experience 
what is known as the validity effect: we are more inclined to think that the 
statement is true than we were the first time we heard or read it. The effect 
occurs irrespective of whether the statement is true or false, and it extends 
to statements which are related to the statement which we originally 
encountered. It is not dependent on any attempt at persuasion: 
repetition of the statement is enough. (See Hasher, Goldstein & Toppino 
1977; Schwartz 1982; Arkes, Hackett & Boehm 1989; Arkes, Boehm & Xu 
1991; Boehm 1994). 
While the validity effect bears a resemblance to the phenomenon of 
mere exposure, it is not the same thing. It involves increased belief that a 
statement is true, not a greater liking for the statement; it requires only a 
couple of repetitions to achieve its maximum effectiveness, whereas mere 
exposure requires many more; and it seems to depend on a different causal 
mechanism (Arkes, Boehm & Xu 1991). However, like mere exposure, it has 
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important implications for linguistic engineering. Quite simply, it means 
that if we make people read or listen to politically correct statements, we 
increase the likelihood that they will accept them as true even if we offer no 
argument in their support. 
Higher Order Conditioning 
The study of higher order conditioning grew out of the discovery of classical 
conditioning by the great Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov and out of 
subsequent research by behaviourist psychologists like J.B. Watson (e.g. 
Watson 1925). Pavlov showed that if you regularly pair a neutral stimulus 
(say, a sound) with an unconditioned stimulus (e.g. a slap) which produces 
an unconditioned reflex response (pain), then the neutral stimulus (the 
sound) soon acquires the power to produce the response (pain). In other 
words, the neutral stimulus has been transformed into a conditioned 
stimulus which produces a conditioned response. 
The related phenomenon of higher order conditioning occurs when 
something elicits an emotional response through repeated association with 
words or things which have already been conditioned to elicit that 
response. This form of conditioning is one of the most important items in 
the toolbox of the linguistic engineer. It allows us to influence people's 
attitudes towards, say, a political cause by making people use words which 
systematically link that cause with the desired evaluative response, whether 
it be positive or negative. 
The effectiveness of higher order conditioning was experimentally 
demonstrated in two studies by Staats and Staats (1957, 1958). In the first 
study, the two researchers repeatedly paired one group of nonsense syllables 
with positive words like 'happy', then paired another group of syllables with 
negative words like 'sad'. They found that when people were exposed to the 
paired syllables, they gave a positive evaluation to the nonsense syllables 
paired with positive words and a negative evaluation to the nonsense 
syllables associated with negative words. 
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In the second study, Staats and Staats (1958) demonstrated that 
higher order conditioning could be used to affect attitudes towards the 
names of ethnic groups. For one group of subjects, they paired the word 
'Dutch' with positive words but paired the word 'Swedish' with negative 
ones. For a second group of subjects, they reversed the pairing, connecting 
'Dutch' with negative words and 'Swedish' with positive ones. They then 
tested attitudes towards the two nationality names and found that the 
group which had heard positive words in conjunction with 'Dutch' rated 
that term more favourably than 'Swedish', whereas for the group which had 
heard positive words in connection with the word 'Swedish' the ratings were 
reversed. It seems fair to suggest that the evaluative responses transferred 
to the words 'Dutch' and 'Swedish' were also transferred to the nationalities 
which were those words' referents. 
Higher order conditioning is a potent tool of attitude ch~nge. A 
. persuader who ensures that the word 'capitalism', for example, appears 
regularly in conjuction with words like 'exploitation' will have a good 
chance of establishing a negative emotional response to capitalism. This 
response can be obtained purely through manipulating the juxtaposition of 
words: it does not require that those words be linked syntactically so that 
the hearer can acquire an affective tag through understanding the 
propositional content of a sentence like 'Capitalism is based on 
exploitation. ' 
The persuasive effects of higher order conditioning are complemented 
by the process of semantic generalization, through which affective tags 
acquired though conditioning spread to related words and concepts. People 
who have acquired a negative emotional response to the word "capitalist", 
for example, will generalize that response to semantically related words like 
'profit' and 'stockmarket'. (Cf. Bern 1970, 43-5; Wade & Travis 1993, 204-5; 
Perloff 1993, 63-9). Such forms of verbal conditioning are a major source of 
our attitudes towards people and things. They are a fundamental tool of 
advertising and of political propaganda. They are also part of the stock-in 
-trade of the linguistic engineer. Their main limitation is that they work 
best when people do not know much about the subject (CaCiOPPO, Marshall-
Goodell, Tassinary & Petty 1992). 
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Operant Conditioning 
Most people have not needed modern behavioural science to tell them that 
there is merit in what psychologists call operant conditioning - modifying 
people's attitudes through reward and punishment. However, the research 
of B.F. Skinner (1938) and his successors has greatly increased our 
understanding of the way in which operant conditioning works and affects 
our attitudes. 
The relevance of operant conditioning to linguistic engineering has 
been demonstrated by studies which show that we can alter the attitudes of 
speakers and writers by making people praise or condemn them. For 
example, Scott (1957) got pairs of students to participate in a debate, then 
rigged the outcome, telling some that they had 'won' and others that they 
had 'lost'. Normally, getting people to argue a case tends to make them 
regard it more favourably (Cf. Perloff 1993,109-10,230-33). However, in 
this case only the students who were rewarded ('reinforced') by being told 
that they had won changed their attitudes significantly in the direction of 
the case which they had argued. The students who were punished by being 
told that they had 'lost' showed little attitude change. 
In a similar study, Bostrom, Vlandis and Rosenbaum (1961) got 
students to write essays in which they advocated views which they had 
hitherto disagreed with, then gave some of the essays 'As' and the others 
'Ds', The students rewarded with the 'As' shifted their attitudes towards the 
case which they had advocated significantly more than the students 
punished with the 'Ds', Finally, Insko (1965) showed that when interviewers 
responded positively to answers favouring one side of a controversy but not 
to statements favouring the other side, the subjects shifted their attitudes in 
the direction of the statements which had been reinforced by a positive 
response. 
Operant conditioning is a powerful tool in the hands of linguistic 
engineers who are in a position to direct patterns of verbal reinforcement 
and punishment, All they need to do is get people to make statements 
w1:ticlLe:XRr~~~~'correce attitudes, then ensure that these statements are 
i gr~~t~~ witl:t approval. Even people who do not initially agree with the 
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statements which they are pushed into making will feel the effects of the 
positive reinforcement: their attitudes will tend to shift in the direction of 
their statements, just like the attitudes of the students rewarded by 'As' in 
the experimental situation devised by Bostrom, VIand is and Rosenbaum. At 
the same time, wise linguistic engineers will ensure that all statements 
expressing 'incorrect' views are punished by verbal disapproval: dissidents 
will not only be discouraged from expressing their views, but will tend to 
lose confidence in them as well. 
Modelling Theory 
Research generated by modelling theory has vindicated and elaborated the 
age-old view that we can learn by example. Albert Bandura and his 
colleagues, especially, have shown that we can learn attitudes ~11 the 
. absence of direct reinforcement, simply by observing or listening to others. 
(See, for example, Bandura, Ross & Ross 1965; Bandura, Grusec & Menlove 
1966; Bandura 1971; Bandura 1973). Young people, especially, tend to 
adopt the attitudes modelled by the speech and behaviour of those who 
impress them. This has important implications for linguistic engineering. 
It means that if we have the power to control people's verbal behaviour, we 
can create a situation in which everyone models correct attitudes. It 
matters not at all that some people are secret heretics, for they are forced to 
model the very attitudes which they inwardly oppose. 
Bandura argued that successful modelling is most likely to occur 
when models capture our attention, when we mentally rehearse then act 
out the modelled behaviour, and when we see that it is rewarded. 
Linguistic engineers who are powerful enough to control what people say are 
powerful enough to ensure that these conditions of successful modelling are 
fulfilled. They can ensure that the verbal modelling of correct attitudes is 
so all-pervasive that it is repeatedly brought to people's attention; they can 
use the state propaganda apparatus to create leading models in a heroic 
mould, so that young people, especially, want to adopt their attitudes; 
they can make even young children learn and repeat the words uttered by 
the leading models; and they can ensure that people who express correct 
attitudes, whether in propaganda material or in real life, are praised and 
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perhaps given other rewards, so that those who observe them learn through 
vicarious operant conditioning. 
In Western societies, attempts to use role models to control young 
people's attitudes are frequently frustrated by a multiplicity of rival models 
glamourizing alternative values. Parents, schools, peer groups, churches, 
rock stars, sports personalities and the media frequently offer conflicting 
models of acceptable attitudes and behaviour. However, as Perloff (1993, 
73) notes, 'When all the socialization agents (parents, peers, schools, media, 
etc.) convey the same message, then the situation is rather simple: the 
child will probably internalize the position advocated by the different 
influence sources.' This unanimity can usually be achieved only when 
parents are lucky in their children's choice of friends and when they 
manage to shield their children from 'undesirable' films and television. 
In totalitarian societies, it is different. There, the rulers can destroy 
alternative models within the country, and they can censor reports about 
opposing models based overseas. Moreover, by making people act and 
speak in prescribed ways, they can force virtually the entire society to 
model the desired attitudes. In such societies, the centralised control of 
verbal modelling is one of the most powerful tools of linguistic engineering. 
It does not always succeed, as we shall see below, but it can make heretics 
feel totally isolated, and it can profoundly affect the attitudes of the 
younger generation. 
Reference Group Theory 
Reference group theory is closely related to modelling theory, but it has a 
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different focus. Modelling theory in its classical form emphasises the way in 
people tend to adopt the attitudes of individuals who impress them. It 
gives us important insights into the socialization of young people, but is less 
useful in explaining the attitudes of adults, who are less inclined to hero 
worship. Reference group theory, by contrast, directs attention to the way 
in which people tend to adopt the attitudes of groups whose acceptance 
they want - groups to which they referwhen deciding what to think. Since 
people of all ages feel the need to be accepted, reference group theory is 
equally valuable in explaining the attitudes of young and old. 
The influence of reference groups has been demonstrated in a number 
of studies. Kelley and Woodruff (1956), for example, asked students at a 
progressive teachers college to listen to a recording of a speech delivering an 
conservative, 'back-to-basics' message on education. The speech 
contradicted the views of most of the students, but the recordip.g made it 
. clear that it was warmly received by the original audience, whose members 
repeatedly interrupted it with applause. Half the students had been told ht 
the audience consisted of their fellow students, while the other half had 
been led to believe that the audience was made up of local townspeople - a 
group with which the students did not identify. The results showed that 
the students who believed that their own reference group had endorsed the 
speech were far more likely to waver in their support for progressive 
education than were the students who believed that the applause came 
from 'outsiders'. In other words, most students were prepared to modify 
their opinions to fit in with their reference group, but they largely ignored 
the views of people with whom they did not identify and whose acceptance 
they did not need. 
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In a classic study, Newcomb (1943) explored reference group 
behaviour at Bennington college. Two-thirds of the college's students came 
from conservative Republican families, but Bennington was a liberal 
institution whose tone was set by its Democratic faculty and the senior 
students whom they had influenced. Newcomb showed that new students 
progressively abandoned the republican politiCS of their parents in favour of 
New Deal liberalism. At the 1936 presidential election, for example, the 
Republican candidate was supported by 62 percent of the freshmen, 43 
percent of the sophomores, and just 15 percent of the juniors and seniors. 
In becoming Democrats, the women consciously abandoned their old 
reference group and identified with their new one. One student said: 
All my life I've resented the protection of governesses and parents. At 
college I got away from that, or rather, I guess I should say, I changed 
it to wanting the intellectual approval of teachers and more 
advanced students. Then I found that you can't be reacJionary and 
be intellectually respectable. [Newcomb 1943, 134, quoted in Bern 
1970,82]. 
But if Bennington, like most reference groups, rewarded those who accepted 
its norms, it also functioned as a 'frame-of -reference' group which gave its 
members new perspectives, new information and apparently compelling 
arguments for their political views (Bern 1970,83, citing Newcomb 1943, 
136-7). So the women's conversion to Democratic politiCS was in most cases 
genuine, and not merely tactical. When they graduated, most chose liberal 
friends and husbands, selecting new reference groups which reinforced their 
attitudes. As a result, 60 percent supported the liberal Kennedy over Nixon 
in the 1960 presidential contest and 90 percent supported Johnson over the 
arch-conservative Goldwater in 1964 (Bern 1970, 84-5, citing Newcomb, 
Koenig, Flacks & Warwick 1967,48-9, 61). 
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The Bennington case shows that most people will, when they can, 
choose a reference group which supports their attitudes. It also shows that 
even in pluralistic Western societies this is not always possible: the 
conservative young ladies who arrived at Bennington in the 1930s would 
rarely have done so if its liberal politics had been widely known at the time. 
In totalitarian societies, however, people's freedom to choose their own 
reference groups is far more limited, and political differences between 
reference groups are systematically attacked. The goal is a society in which 
every reference group mimics the political attitudes of the rulers, and a 
crucial means of pursuing that goal is linguistic engineering. Careful 
supervision of what people say and what they write ensures that virtually 
every reference group promotes the verbal formulae which express the 
official ideology. People can see that every group which they want to join 
apparently endorses that ideology, and that every group rewards those who 
promote it enthusiastically. They can see that anyone who w~nts to be 
. accepted, to belong, has to play the game and recite the political formulae 
which are the precondition of group membership. Nobody dares, however, 
to call it a game, and everyone seems utterly convinced by the formulae. 
So the fate of the secret heretic is alienation and isolation. Not surprisingly, 
most people shift their attitudes in the direction of the language which they 
have to use in order to be accepted by their reference group. Just as they 
did at Bennington. 
Cogni tive Dissonance 
The theory of cognitive dissonance, formulated by Leon Festinger (1957), has 
had a controversial, exCiting and extremely fruitful career in social 
psychology. It generates insights which, at first Sight, are counterintuitive, 
but which seem plausible once the theory has been grasped. It is also 
supported by some very convincing evidence and continues to generate 
original hypotheses and research. (See the excellent account of the evidence 
in Perloff 1993; see also Elliot & Devine 1992, and the debate in 
Psychological Inquiry, 1992,3(4), 303-56). 
Dissonance is a state of psychological discomfort which occurs when a 
person becomes aware of holding two cognitions (beliefs) which are 
40 
psychologically inconsistent, or of holding a belief which is psychologically 
inconsistent with his or her behaviour. Simple inconsistency between 
cognitions can cause dissonance by making us look and feel stupid, and by 
causing frustration when we have to make decisions. However, dissonance 
is strongest, and the motivation to reduce it greatest, under the following 
conditions (cf. Festinger 1957; Brehm & Cohen 1962; Aronson 1969; Steele & 
Liu 1981, 1983; Steele 1988; Wade & Tavris 1993,350-51; Stone, Wiegand, 
Cooper & Aronson 1997): 
1. The two cognitions are highly inconsistent and very important to 
those who hold them. 
2. The inconsistency in the cognitions is the result of behaviour which 
was voluntary, producing a feeling of personal responsibility for its 
consequences. 
3. The consequences of the behaviour are irreversible. 
4. Cognitions produced by the behaviour are inconsistent with 
cognitions embodying our idealized self-image, threatening our self-
image as honest, kind or decent people. 
According to Festinger (1957, 3), 'The existence of dissonance, being 
psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the 
dissonance'. When the dissonance is linked to behaviour which produces 
new cognitions inconsistent with our old ones, there are two obvious ways of 
reducing the discomfort. First, under some circumstances, we can eliminate 
the behaviour and many of the resulting cognitions. For example, if I am 
preaching a doctrine in which I do not believe, I can remove the 
psychological inconsistency and preserve my self-image as an honest person 
by ceasing to preach that doctrine (cf. Monteith 1993). Alternatively, I can 
change my beliefs so that they are consonant with my preaching. 
Dissonance theory predicts that if I continue voluntarily to preach the same 
doctrine, and if I want to think of myself as an honest person, I will start to 
believe in my own preaching. There is, in fact, a great deal of evidence that 
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this is what usually happens (e.g. Nel, Helmreich & Aronson 1969; Steele & 
Liu 1983; Steele 1988; Cooper & Fazio 1984). 
Dissonance theory also predicts that the less I am rewarded for my 
counter-attitudinal preaching, the more I will believe in it. The reasoning 
here is that if, say, I am preaching the false doctrine in order to stay out of 
trouble and keep my job, I will reduce the dissonance by telling myself 'I'm 
just doing it to stay out of trouble and keep my job - anyone would do the 
same.' Where this type of rationalization is available, then attitude change 
is likely to be minimal. If, on the other hand, I have no strong, vested 
interest in preaching the false doctrine, I cannot justify my behaviour in 
this way. To maintain my self-image as someone with as much integrity as 
most people, I will probably try to convince myself that what I have been 
telling everyone is not so untrue after all. I will thereby reduce dissonance 
by assimilating my convictions to my preaching. Again, there js strong 
. evidence that this often happens. (See the summaries in Perloff 1993, ch. 
10, and Beck 1983, 301-8). 
In cases of mild inconsistency between attitudes and verbal behaviour 
there may be little or no dissonance, and in that case dissonance theory has 
less to offer than self-perception theory, which I discuss below. However, 
there are situations in which discrepancies between what we say and what 
we think produces a great deal of dissonance because they are: 
(a) very large 
(b) important to us 
(c) the result of voluntary action on our part 
(d) the cause of irreversible harm to other people 
(e) highly threatening to our self-image as kind and honest people. 
(Wade & Tavris 1993, 350-1; Perloff 1993, 221-2, 245-9). 
In the case above, for example, it may be that I am preaching the virtues of 
policies which are causing immense suffering at present but which I am 
claiming will bring even greater rewards in the future. Dissonance theory 
predicts that, as the evidence of suffering in the present grows, so will my 
feelings of dissonance, and so will my need to reduce dissonance. It also 
predicts that, if I continue to promote the policies, I will reduce the 
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dissonance by believing ever more strongly that the policies will bring future 
rewards which justify the suffering in the present. 
Let us consider another scenario. Suppose an authoritarian 
government praises and rewards people who accuse their friends, colleagues 
and family of political crimes, praising such behaviour as a triumph of 
selfless revolutionary virtue over the selfishness of bourgeois attachments. 
Suppose, too, that this government also imprisons and tortures the accused, 
executes some of them, leaves others to die, then makes the remainder 
social outcasts for the rest of their lives. Under these circumstances, some 
people will summon up enough revolutionary idealism to denounce their 
associates. But what if, before making the denunciations, they go through a 
difficult internal struggle before putting the 'new' virtue of revolutionary 
selflessness ahead of the 'old' virtue of loyalty to family, friends and 
colleagues? Dissonance theory predicts: 
(a) That their decision to denounce their associates will arouse extreme 
dissonance because it is inconsistent with the 'old' virtue of loyalty. 
(b) That, because the revolutionary idealists cannot undo the 
consequences of their denunciations, they will reduce the dissonance 
by 'spreading apart the alternatives' - that is, increasing their 
commitment to the 'new' virtue which justifies what they did, and 
reducing their residual attachment to the 'old' virtue which they 
have betrayed. 
What if, too, those who denounce their colleagues think of themselves as 
good and kind people who would never inflict unnecessary suffering, who 
would never act unjustly towards others? Here, dissonance theory predicts: 
(a) That their decision to denounce their associates will arouse extreme 
dissonance because they know that it is certain to cause immense 
suffering. 
(b) That they will reduce the dissonance by putting aside their doubts, 
convinCing themselves that those whom they have accused are guilty 
of all their alleged crimes and that they deserve to suffer horribly. 
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(c) In convincing themselves that their associates deserve such terrible 
suffering, they will forget their good qualities and remember their bad 
qualities. They will probably dehumanize them and come to hate 
them. In short, they will reduce dissonance by blaming their victims. 
Finally, dissonance theory predicts a major difference between two 
groups of people. On the one hand, there are those who think of themselves 
as good and kind, and who abhor undeserved suffering. On the other hand, 
there are those who are sadists, who have a callous attitude towards the 
suffering of other people, or who pride themselves on being willing to break 
a lot of innocent eggs to make a revolutionary omelette. The act of 
denouncing colleagues is obviously more psychologically inconsistent with 
the cognitions of the first group than with the cognitions of the second. 
Dissonance theory therefore predicts: 
(a) That the act of denouncing associates will, other things being equal, 
arouse far more dissonance amongst members of the first group than 
amongst members of the second. 
(b) That the denunciations will produce a far greater attitude change 
amongst members of the first group than amongst members of the 
second. In particular: 
I. Members of the first group will experience a greater attitude 
shift in the direction of the doctrine of 'revolutionary 
selflessness' which justifies their actions. 
II. Members of the first group will experience a greater attitude 
shift away from the morality of 'loyalty to associates' by which 
their actions stand condemned. 
III. Members of the first group will experience a greater attitude 
shift in the direction of the belief that the accused are guilty as 
charged, that they are hateful, that they are less than fully 
human, and that they deserve their fate. 
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The implications of dissonance theory for linguistic engineering are 
clear. First, we can often persuade people to accept policies by engineering 
a situation in which they experience dissonance as a result of voluntarily 
advocating those policies. The need to remove dissonance will lead them to 
believe, more and more, in what they say. Thought will follow the word. 
Second, we can often change people's attitudes by engineering a 
situation in which they experience dissonance because they condemn other 
people for politically incorrect views or actions. The need to remove 
dissonance will make them more convinced than ever that such views and 
actions are reprehensible, and that those responsible for them are evil 
people who deserve punishment. It will also tend to convince them that 
doctrines of revolutionary morality which justify the betrayal of associates 
are correct, and that traditional codes of loyalty are wrong. 
Third, dissonance theory suggests that the attitudes of people who are 
idealistic and sensitive may in some ways be particularly susceptible to 
manipulation through linguistic engineering. Their idealism facilitates 
their recruitment to the revolutionary cause, which promises so much, and 
it tempts them to verbal acts which express their commitment. Their 
sensitivity then makes them experience extreme dissonance when they 
reflect on the consequences of their verbal acts. As a result, they are 
particularly prone to extreme attitude shifts which reduce dissonance by 
justifying their verbal acts. 
Finally, although I have described the workings of dissonance in 
general terms, using examples which are not specifically linked to a 
particular society, these examples are not purely hypothetical. They are 
based on events and processes in the real world. Linguistic engineering has 
produced dissonance and attitude change in many periods and places. It 
will become apparent later in this thesis that the examples which I have 
used are in fact generalised descriptions of what happened time after time 
in Mao's China. 
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Self-perception Theory 
The theory of cognitive dissonance had an enormous impact on social 
psychology in the late 1950s and 1960s because it very effectively 
challenged the assumption that our attitudes are entirely the product of 
classical, higher order and operant conditioning. In particular, it 
discredited the Skinnerian view that our attitudes will necessarily change in 
directions reinforced by extrinsic rewards. What Festinger and others 
showed was that dissonance produces attitude change precisely when there 
are no extrinsic rewards which subjects can use to explain why they are 
saying and doing things psychologically inconsistent with their existing 
attitudes. Because they are unable to reduce the dissonance by explaining 
their behaviour in terms of extrinsic rewards, they are forced to reduce it by 
making their attitudes more consistent with their behaviour. 
However, just as the dissonance theorists demonstrated that the 
dominant behaviourist tradition had pushed its claims too far, so they too 
had to admit that dissonance was not as pervasive as they had thought. 
One of their most effective critics was Daryl Bern (1965,1967,1970,1972), 
whose self-perception theory was originally put forward at a comprehensive 
alternative to dissonance theory, but which is best seen as a complementary 
theory which offers a superior explanation of some phenomena which the 
dissonance theorists once claimed as their own. Both self-perception theory 
and dissonance theory appear to be correct within their 'proper domain of 
application' (Fazio, Zanna and Cooper 1977). 
Self-perception theory pOints to mechanisms which operate when we 
advocate a position which departs only slightly from our existing attitudes, 
and not in a way which we think important. These mechanisms are 
particularly likely to playa part when our attitudes are ill-formed and 
somewhat uncertain. Under these circumstances, we will probably not even 
become fully aware of the discrepancy between our existing views and the 
position which we have advocated, let alone feel the discomfort associated 
with dissonance. Instead, our best guide to what we 'really' think is what 
we have said: 'I must believe it. Why else would I have said it?' As Bern 
(1970,57) puts it, we 'infer [our] own internal states by observing [our] own 
overt behaviour.' 
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As with dissonance, self-perception is most effective in producing 
attitude change when the behaviour is voluntary. If I am forced to say 
'Chairman Mao is the red, red Sun in my heart', I won't be tempted to infer 
my attitudes from my statement. I will tell myself that I only said it 
because I was forced to. By contrast, if I am present at a rally where other 
people are shouting slogans of Mao worship, and find myself shouting 
spontaneously along with them, I will be inclined to infer my attitudes from 
my behaviour and conclude that I love Chairman Mao just like everyone 
else. In this way, my verbal behaviour can crystallize attitudes which are 
not fully formed, and it can shift attitudes which are slightly discrepant 
from the view which I have expressed. 
Bern (1970, 66) argues that 'changing an individual's behaviour is one 
of the ways of causing change in his beliefs and attitudes. His _new 
. behaviour provides a source from which he draws a new set of inferences 
about what he feels and believes.' He is talking about verbal behaviour, as 
well as other forms of behaviour, so the implications for linguistic 
engineering are clear. By encouraging, but not forcing, people to say 
politically correct things which are slightly discrepant from their existing 
views, we can produce successive small attitude shifts by taking advantage 
of their propensity to infer their thoughts from their verbal behaviour. 
Moreover, where people's attitudes are not well formed, we can put words in 
their mouths which tell them what they think, crystallizing their ideas in a 
politically correct form. The effects of self-perception on attitude change 
might not be as dramatic as those produced by dissonance, but they are 
just as real. 
Persuasive Mechanisms and Linguistic Determinism 
All of these mechanisms create opportunities for linguistic engineers. 
However, they give us no reason to believe that we might one day be 
reduced to automata programmed by Orwellian Newspeak. In the first 
place, while all of these mechanisms are effective in a statistical sense, not 
one of them can be guaranteed to produce attitude change in everyone. 
Instead, there is considerable variability in the extent to which individuals 
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are susceptible to these mechanisms, and the mechanisms are more 
effective in some contexts than in others. Consider the following: 
1. Higher order conditioning, as a derivative of classical conditioning, 
works best on people who know little about the person or thing which 
they are being conditioned to love or to hate (Cacioppo, Marshall-
Goodell, Tassinary & Petty 1992). 
2. The validity effect is greatly reduced in subject areas in which people 
claim little knowledge (Arkes, Hackett & Boehm 1989). 
3. The effects of mere exposure are much diminished when the number 
of exposures goes beyond a certain point (Perloff 1993,59-61). 
4. People sometimes reduce dissonance, not by changing th~ir attitudes, 
but by changing their behaviour, or by apologising for their behaviour 
and trying to restore their self-image by reminding themselves of their 
virtues in other areas (cf. Steele 1988). Moreover, under some 
circumstances people can mistakenly attribute the unpleasant 
arousal associated with dissonance, not to their inconsistency, but to 
some other factor. In that case, attitude change does not occur 
(Perloff, 1993,242-5). 
5. We have seen that self-perception theory, like dissonance theory, 
works poorly when people say things under compulsion. Moreover, . 
even when there is no compulsion, people by no means always infer 
their attitudes from their statements. They are quite capable of 
saying 'Well, that's what I said. But now that I think about it, I don't 
really believe it.' 
6. Young people do not always choose the role models whom their 
educators and persuaders place before them, and even in a society 
with totalitarian aspirations it is impossible to ensure that everyone 
is a worthy role model. 
7. Some people remain inwardly, and perhaps outwardly, alienated 
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from what are supposed to be their reference groups. This was the 
case at Bennington College (Bem 1970, 82-3), and we shall see that it 
was also the case in China. Moreover, while rulers with totalitarian 
aspirations might be able to ensure that all reference groups recite 
politically correct formulae, it is impossible to ensure that all do it in 
the right spirit. 
These considerations make it clear that the mechanisms of persuasion 
which we have discussed do not automatically produce persuasion. 
Whether they do or not depends on the context in which they operate and 
the characteristics of the individuals to whom they are applied. They are a 
powerful weapon in the hands of linguistic engineers, but they cannot 
produce the uniformity which Orwell feared or which some would-be 
totalitarian rulers have desired. 
1.5 Code, Context and Relevance Theory 
A fully-fledged Orwellian programme of linguistic engineering can only work 
if what Sperber and Wilson (1986) call the 'Code Model' of communication 
is correct. According to this model, languages pair thoughts with phonetic 
signals according to fixed semantic and syntactic rules. Knowledge of these 
rules enables the speaker to encode the message and the hearer to decode it. 
The Code Model implies that the link between the words and the message is 
strong and direct: if we know the conventions which link words to 
meanings and if we know the grammatical rules which govern the 
construction of sentences, we can encode and decode messages. In that 
case, the prospects of manipulating the contents of people's minds through 
manipulating language are good: if we ban the words which encode 
heretical ideas, those ideas cannot be communicated even if they can be 
entertained privately. Moreover, if we make people recite correctly coded 
political slogans, we can be sure that if they understand the code they will 
understand the slogans' message. The Code Model posits a strict, 
conventional link between phonetic symbols and syntactic structures, on 
the one hand, and the categories and structures of thought, on the other. If 
the Code Model is correct, this link should enable direct transmission of the 
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propagandist's message; it should also make it easier to use manipulation 
of the symbols as a mechanism for the control of thought. 
There is no doubt that the coding of utterances plays a part in 
communication, but coding on its own cannot account for communication. 
Retrieval of the speaker's meaning depends, not just on knowing the 
semantic and grammatical 'code', but on a wider process of inference. That 
process of inference includes the semantic representation(s) of the utterance 
amongst its premises, but the premises also include relevant contextual 
assumptions. Moreover, there is no set of rules, no algorithm, which 
speakers of a language can learn and use mechanically in selecting the 
relevant assumptions. So the Code Theory is untenable. As Wilson and 
Sperber (1986) put it: 
The speaker's intentions are not decoded but non-demonstratively 
inferred, by a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation 
which, like scientific theorizing and unlike grammatical analysis, has 
free access to contextual information. The hearer's aim is to arrive at 
the most plausible hypothesis about the speaker's intentions; but the 
most plausible hypothesis, in pragmatic interpretation as in science, 
may still be wrong. [Wilson & Sperber 1986, 585]. 
This has important implications for linguistic engineering: it means that 
control of words and their semantic meaning (the 'code') does not 
guarantee control of either the messages which those words are intended to 
convey, or of the messages which those who hear or read the words retrieve. 
The semantic representation of an utterance is only one clue to its 
pragmatic meaning; the remaining clues are provided by assumptions in 
the context of interpretation. 
We can illustrate the importance of contextual assumptions with 
respect to four aspects of utterance interpretation (cf. Wilson & Sperber 
1986; Sperber & Wilson 1995). First, contextual assumptions are required 
to flesh out the semantic representation of the sentence into a fully fledged 
explicature. Consider the following sentence: 
( 1 ) She was too cold. 
so 
The hearer must use contextual information to determine the referent of 
the pronoun 'she', to determine whether 'cold' means 'low in temperature' 
or 'unfriendly', and to clarify what she too cold for. 
Contextual clues may also be required to determine the illocutionary 
force of an utterance, as in (2): 
(2) You're joining the party. 
The hearer must use contextual information to decide whether the 
utterance is intended as a statement, an order, or even (if the speaker is a 
New Zealander who ends statements with a rising intonation) a question. 
Hearers must not only flesh out the semantic representation of a 
sentence into an explicature, but they must recover intended ~mplicatures 
. as well. Consider this dialogue: 
(3) a. 
b. 
Yi Yuan: 
Chris: 
Would you like some more ice cream? 
I'm starting to get fat. 
In order to recover Chris's implicated refusal, Yi Yuan requires two 
contextual assumptions: 'Chris does not want to get fat' and 'Eating a lot of 
ice cream tends to make people fat'. 
Finally, it is the context which determines whether an utterance is 
taken literally, or understood metaphorically or ironically, as in (4) and 
(5) : 
(4) They will fight to the death. 
(5) You are so kind. 
Is (4) referring to actual physical combat and does it mean that someone is 
literally going to get killed? Or is it simply a metaphorical way of saying 
that the disputants will never agree to compromise? Only the context can 
tell. And is (5) intended Sincerely or ironically? Again, the semantic 
representation of the sentence is no help. We need to know the context if 
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we are to determine whether 'kind', pragmatically, means 'kind', or whether 
it means 'unkind'. 
The most powerful tool for relating utterances to the contextual 
assumptions which are required to interpret them is Relevance Theory, the 
creation of Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson (Sperber & Wilson 1986; second 
edition 1995). The theory corrects and greatly extends insights of the 
philosopher Paul Grice (1975), and it draws heavily on the information 
processing approach to human cognition. What follows is an attempt to 
give an explanation of Relevance Theory which is full enough to be 
understood by an intelligent general reader, but brief enough to serve the 
purposes of a thesis whose topic is linguistic engineering, not pragmatic 
theory. 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995, 46, 47,265-6), e,{olutionary 
. processes have fashioned us into 'efficient information processing devices' 
whose 'cognition is aimed at improving the individual's knowledge of the 
world' or providing other cognitive benefits. Our biggest problem is that we 
have limited resources for short-term processing. We can cope only because 
we are wired to focus on environmental and linguistic stimuli which make 
the most cost-effective contribution to our cognitive goals, especially the 
acquisition of knowledge. So we have no interest in messages which tell us 
only what we already know for certain, or which convey information which 
we cannot relate to anything in our representation of the world (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995,48). Rather, we scrutinize messages for assumptions which 
interact with our existing assumptions to increase our knowledge or 
enhance our cognition in other ways. 
When an assumption conveyed by a message combines with our 
existing assumptions in a way which 'contributes positively to the 
fulfilment of cognitive functions or goals', we say that it has positive 
cognitive effects (Sperber & Wilson 1995,265), It can have such effects in 
at least three ways (Sperber & Wilson 1995, 108-117,265-6): 
1. It may provide further evidence for, and hence strengthen, an existing 
assumption which is not already regarded as certain. 
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II. It may contradict an existing assumption, displacing it in whole or in 
part. 
III. It may have contextual implications: that is, it may combine 
with existing assumptions in a process of inference which produces 
new information. 
When an assumption conveyed by a message interacts in these ways with 
existing assumptions, we can say that it is relevant in that context. When it 
has some positive cognitive effect in one or more of the contexts accessible 
by an individual, we can say that it is relevant to that individual. In both 
cases, the degree of relevance is, other things being equal, directly 
proportional to the positive cognitive effects. (Sperber & Wilson 
1995,265; Wilson & Sperber 1986,588). 
The qualification 'other things being equal' is necessary because the 
degree of relevance, within an information processing framework, is also 
affected by processing effort. Say I ask two friends, 'What time is the party 
meeting?', and receive the replies in (6) and (7): 
(6) It's at eleven o'clock. 
(7) It's at eleven o'clock and the sun rose this morning. 
Intuitively, (6) is a more relevant answer than (7) in the context of my 
question, despite the fact that both answers supply information which has 
precisely the same positive cognitive effects in that context. What makes 
(6) more relevant than (7) is that the latter also supplies information ('the 
sun rose this morning') which has no effects in that context - information 
which indeed has no effects in any context which I am likely to access, since 
I already hold it as certain. So (6) is easier and quicker to process than (7) 
while yielding the same positive cognitive returns. From an information 
processing perspective, then, it is more relevant. We can express the general 
principle involved here as follows: the degree of relevance is, other 
things being equal, inversely proportional to processing effort. 
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Sperber and Wilson (1995, 260) sum up their argument that humans 
are wired to maximize cognitive benefits and minimize processing costs in 
what they call the First (or Cognitive) Principle of Relevance: 
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of 
relevance. 
If humans are geared to maximize relevance, a communicator can claim an 
audience's attention only because the attempt to communicate conveys an 
implicit presumption of relevance. In part, this means that every attempt 
to communicate comes with a guarantee that the ostensive stimuli (words, 
gestures, or whatever) are relevant enough to be worth processing. However, 
as dedicated relevance-seekers, we prefer stimuli whose positive cognitive 
effects far outweigh the costs of processing. This means that 
communicators who want our full attention must convey the presumption 
. that they will be as relevant as they reasonably can. These considerations 
give rise to what Sperber & Wilson (1995, 270) call the Presumption of 
Optimal Relevance. It is a presumption that: 
( a) The ostensive stim ulus is reI evan t enough for it to be 
worth the addressee's effort to process it. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one 
compatible with the communicator's abilities and 
preferences. 
The Presumption of Optimal Relevance underpins what Sperber & Wilson 
(1995, 158, 260-61) call The Second (or Communicative) Principle of 
Relevance: 
Every act of ostensive communication communicates the 
presumption of its own optimal relevance. 
In other words, the Second Principle of Relevance asserts that all attempts at 
communication involve a guarantee that the ostensive stimulus is worth 
attending to and is as relevant as can reasonably be expected. This 
guarantee may prove worthless because, as Sperber & Wilson (1995,158) 
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note, 'the world is full of bores' who manifestly but falsely 'intend their 
audience to believe that they are worth listening to.' Moreover, we need to 
remember that not everyone who speaks or writes is trying to communicate. 
Sometimes people deliberately try to avoid being understood, and 
sometimes the audience's attention is irrelevant, as in the case of a 
filibuster (Sperber & Wilson 1995,157,159). The point remains that 
genuine communicators intend their audience to believe that what they 
have to say is optimally relevant. Most failures to achieve optimal 
relevance are unintentional. 
The Second Principle of Relevance is the key to understanding 
communication. Briefly, when addressees disambiguate ostensive stimuli, 
they act in accordance with the Presumption of Optimal Relevance which is 
conveyed by the attempt to communicate: they look for the optimal 
relevance which has been promised to them. They are geared ~o pass over 
interpretations whose positive cognitive effects are not sufficient to justify 
the processing costs. Indeed, if they cannot find any interpretation which 
yields positive cognitive effects worth proceSSing, their presumption of 
optimal relevance prevents them from coming to any conclusion about 
what interpretation was intended by the communicator. They are simply 
unable to understand what the utterance means. What happens, however, 
if there are interpretations worth processing? In that case, the addressees 
are geared to zero in on the interpretation which is most relevant - on the 
interpretation which maximizes positive cognitive effects relative to 
processing effort. It is that interpretation which best fulfils their 
presumption that the communicator is trying to be as relevant as she 
reasonably can. 
The Second Principle of Relevance underlies all ostensive 
communication, whether by words, gestures or significant glances. However, 
we do not consciously assess ostensive stimuli with the principle in mind, 
nor do we need to know anything about the principle in order to act in 
accordance with it. We take it for granted that people who are trying to 
communicate with us are trying to be optimally relevant, and we act on 
that presumption as we interpret the ostensive stimuli which they direct 
towards us. Moreover, we do not set out, in a calculated fashion, to assess 
the relevance of the ostensive stimuli whose relevance we presume: our 
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minds are programmed to do that automatically whenever we presume the 
relevance of an act of ostensive communication. That is why we are able to 
interpret most utterances and other ostensive stimuli almost 
instantaneously. 
In trying to be optimally relevant, communicators choose ostensive 
stimuli which are going to maximize positive cognitive effects relative to 
processing effort. Usually, the appropriate stimuli will be linguistic, for 
language is the most precise and efficient way of conveying all but the 
simplest assumptions. It is relatively precise and efficient because it is a 
code. As Sperber and Wilson (1995, 167) put it: 
A coded stimulus gives immediate access to a highly determinate set 
of concepts: the code itself determines which concepts are activated, 
and moreover assembles them into a logical form which can be 
directly used as an assumption schema. The context proyides ways of 
completing these assumption schemas into full hypotheses. 
I will illustrate the relationship between the coded stimulus and contextual 
assumptions with an example which I adapt from Wilson & Sperber (1986, 
584,589): 
(8) a. Peter: Ozzy Osbourne's coming to dinner. 
b. Mary: I'll bring a bat. 
The coded stimulus 'bat' is capable of activating several concepts, including 
those designated by the following descriptions: 
(9) a. A hitting instrument used in table tennis. 
b. A furry, flying rodent. 
Which of these interpretations of the word 'bat' is chosen depends on the 
context. If Mary and Peter are mutually aware that Peter has lost his table 
tennis bat, and that Ozzy likes to play table tennis to work up an appetite 
before dinner, then she will no doubt expect him to choose (9a) as the 
referent of 'bat'. But if, on the other hand, Peter has recently told her that 
Ozzy is a rock star famous for biting the head off a live bat during a 
performance, she will expect him to choose (9b). She uses the word 'bat' 
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confident that, in the interpretive context most readily available to Peter, it 
will not be ambiguous. 
What, however, if Mary is mistaken about Peter's assumptions? In 
that case, Peter will misinterpret Mary or be unable to work out what she 
means. The responsibility will be Mary's. As Sperber and Wilson (1995, 43) 
say: 
It is left to the communicator to make correct assumptions about the 
codes and contextual information that the audience will have 
accessible and be likely to use in the comprehension process. The 
responsibility for avoiding misunderstandings also lies with the 
speaker, so that all the hearer has to do is go ahead and use whatever 
code and contextual information come most easily to hand. 
We can illustrate the effects of a miscalculation about the audience's 
assumptions using our present example. What if Peter, contrary to Mary's 
expectations, has equally ready access to assumptions about Ozzy's liking 
for pre-prandial table tennis and to assumptions about his passion for bat 
cocktails? In that case, both interpretations will spring to mind more or less 
simultaneously and Peter will be unable to disambiguate the word 'bat'. 
Mary will have failed in her responsibility to use an ostensive stimulus 
which activates the correct interpretive assumptions: instead of merely 
saying 'bat', she should have said 'live bat' or 'table tennis bat' to remove 
the ambiguity. 
The importance of interpretive assumptions means that 
communicators must continually adjust to the limitations of what Sperber 
and Wilson call the 'mutual cognitive environment' which they share with 
their audience. An individual's total cognitive environment, as Sperber and 
Wilson (1995, 39) define it, is 'the set of all the facts that he can perceive or 
infer ... It consists of not only all the facts that he is aware of, but also all 
the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of '. When the 
communicator and the audience are both capable of knowing that they 
share some part of their respective cognitive environments, we call the part 
which they share their mutual cognitive environment It is the existence of 
mutual cognitive environments which enables communicators to make 
rational guesses about the codes and contextual assumptions to which the 
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audience has access, and about which words or other ostensive stimuli will 
activate just those codes and contextual assumptions necessary for correct 
interpretation. 
The way in which Relevance Theory does justice to the respective roles 
of linguistic codes and interpretive contexts has important implications for 
linguistic engineering.' One major implication is negative: control of 
language does not give control of pragmatic meaning. The meanings which 
audiences infer from utterances vary not only with the linguistic code but 
also with uncoded contextual assumptions. These assumptions are not a 
context given in advance of the act of communication, but are recovered 
during the process of interpretation in accordance with the Second Principle 
of Relevance. Communicators and linguistic engineers will sometimes guess 
wrongly about the assumptions which particular audiences will use to 
interpret utterances, so they can never be sure that people wh9 are being 
'programmed' by the endless recitation of political or religious formulae are 
interpreting those formulae as intended. The idea that if we completely 
control language we can dictate people's thoughts is as fanciful as the Code 
Model of interpretation on which it depends. 
However, Relevance Theory does have lessons for linguistic engineers 
who are willing to settle for less than total control of thought. To begin 
with, it suggests that they should supplement their attempt to impose a 
uniform linguistic code with an attempt to homogenize the cognitive 
environments which people bring to the task of interpretation. They will 
not, of course, succeed completely, for each person's cognitive environment 
is the product of experiences, memories, circumstances and cognitive 
abilities which have an inescapable element of particularity. However, a 
powerful and determined totalitarian regime can increase the overlap 
between people's cognitive environments in several ways. It can 
supplement linguistic engineering with a programme of social engineering 
which reduces diversity and imposes a common education system, common 
customs, common rituals and common experiences on the whole 
population. It can also homogenize and re-orient people's cognitive 
environments by transforming parts of their material environment. In 
particular, it can destroy all monuments, architecture, ornaments and art 
which remind people of the diversity of past ages; and it can ensure that 
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people are constantly exposed to monuments, statues, flags, banners, 
pictures and posters linked to the assumptions of the new ideology. Under 
these circumstances the mutual cognitive environment enabling 
communication between rulers and ruled will be greatly enlarged. The 
result should be more accurate communication and more uniform 
interpretation of linguistic drills intended to programme the minds of the 
ruled. 
Relevance Theory also suggests ways in which rulers can manipulate 
language in order to get their message across more effectively. In particular, 
it confirms the wisdom of all linguistic innovations which make 
propagandistic messages easier to process. One such innovation is the 
introduction of 'Newspeak' in the form of a technical vocabulary which 
codes the concepts of the official ideology. That ideology can almost 
certainly be expressed in the old language, but talking about it.will be 
. difficult because it will often take many words to express a single, 
commonly used concept. In other words, the concept is not 'codable' in the 
old language, and this makes it difficult to use (cf. Brown 1958). The 
processing advantages of codability are exemplified by our tendency to 
shorten or 'code' words or expressions which we use frequently - a tendency 
manifested in Ziprs law, which holds that the more frequently a word is 
used, the shorter it tends to be (Zipf 1935, cited Carroll 1994, 379). So 
linguistic engineers need to ensure that the basic concepts of the new 
ideology are highly codable, then make everyone proficient at using the 
code. This will reduce the processing costs of ideological pronouncements 
and thereby increase their relevance. 
One way of making sure that the whole population knows the code is 
to embed its key terms in linguistic formulae which encapsulate the new 
ideology, then compel everyone to recite the formulae on appropriate 
occasions. However, formulae - set phrases habitually used in specified 
contexts - are not simply a means to learning a code. They themselves 
contribute to the efficiency of communication. On the one hand, they save 
the speaker the trouble of thinking up something original which is 
appropriate to the context - a great advantage when there are pressures on 
short-term memory, or when originality can lead to punishment for 'saying 
the wrong thing'. On the other hand, formulae reduce the processing effort 
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of the hearer, who expects to hear them in appropriate contexts, and who is 
able to process them even before the speaker has finished saying them. (On 
formulae, see Coulmas 1979,1981; Kuiper & Haggo 1984; Kuiper & Tillis 
1986; Kuiper & Austin 1990; Ji, Kuiper & Shu 1990). So any effective 
programme of 'Newspeak' is likely to use formulae, in part because they 
reduce processing effort and increase relevance. 
There is another mechanism, too, by which linguistic engineers can 
use formulae to increase the relevance of propaganda. When people are 
made to speak in formulae which encapsulate the new ideology, they 
repeatedly activate schematically stored assumptions linked to that 
ideology. This facilitates retrieval of those assumptions, making it easier to 
combine them with new assumptions conveyed by propaganda, and to 
generate still more assumptions through processes of inference. When this 
happens, positive cognitive effects multiply and relevance is ep.hanced. 
When formulae which embody the new ideology are recited over and 
over again, they become so ingrained that they are never forgotten. This 
makes concepts linked to them key nodes in the network of schemas which 
integrate assumptions linked to the new ideology. It is not too much to say 
that they help to structure and stabilize the whole associative network. 
Effective associative networks, we saw in section 1.3 above, enhance people's 
memories, enabling them to acquire a far wider range of assumptions likely 
to interact with the assumptions conveyed by ideological communications. 
In that way, the recitation of formulae indirectly enhances the relevance of 
such communications, facilitating their interpretation and enhancing their 
impact. 
Finally, Relevance Theory pOints to another persuasive mechanism 
which can be activated by linguistic manipulation: retroactive 
strengthening (cf. Sperber & Wilson 1995, 115-117). All linguistic engineers 
need to do is manipulate communicators into saying or writing things 
which make sense only in the context of assumptions which the linguistic 
engineers want the audience to accept. Every time that happens, the 
audience becomes aware that the communicator takes the truth of those 
assumptions for granted. When the communicator is trusted, this can have 
powerful persuasive effects, particularly when other communicators are 
60 
saying or writing things which are not relevant unless the assumptions in 
question are true. In other words, Relevance Theory shows that it is possible 
to pressure people to accept propositions which are not explicitly asserted, 
but whose truth is taken for granted when they are invoked as the 
interpretive context for utterances which would otherwise be unintelligible. 
The theory might have finally discredited the view that control of language 
enables us to dictate pragmatic meaning, but it gives some hope to 
linguistic engineers with more modest pretensions. 
1.6 A Framework for Multi-factorial Persuasion: Information 
Processing and the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
The study of linguistic engineering inevitably spans several disciplines. To 
start with, it necessarily embraces several specialisms within lipguistics: 
. descriptive lexicology and semantics, to deal with the abolition of old terms, 
the introduction of new ones, and changes of meaning; pragmatics, to 
explore the interaction of the linguistic code with the assumptions which 
form its context of interpretation; sociolinguistics, to relate the language to 
its social context, which in China is also a political context; and 
anthropological linguistics, which provides comparative data which bear on 
the relationship of language to thought. 
At its margins, linguistics merges with other disciplines which are 
essential to the understanding of our topic. Social psychology points to the 
role of language in producing modelling effects and reference group 
behaviour, and behaviourist psychology invites us to consider the place of 
language in higher order conditioning and operant conditioning. Most 
obviously, though, linguistics cohabits fruitfully with cognitive psychology, 
which has produced a body of research on the relationship of spoken 
languages to the language of thought, and which has identified mechanisms 
through which what we say can influence what we think. In particular, 
cognitive psychologists have shown how language affects thought by 
changing the relative accessibility of our concepts and schemas, by creating 
dissonance which demands reduction, by making it possible for us to infer 
what we think from what we say, and by activating the validity effect and 
the phenomenon of mere exposure. 
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The approach of this thesis to linguistic engineering is not only multi-
disciplinary, but multi-factorial: language affects cognition, n()t tbrol.lgh a 
single mechanism, but through nlaIii This may be unsatisfactory to those 
who are looking for a single, overriding cause, but it is a fact. However, it 
may lessen this dissatisfaction if I can put these diverse mechanisms within 
a single theoretical framework. As it happens, there is such a framework: 
the information processing approach to cognition. We have seen already 
that Relevance Theory is an avowed variant of the information processing 
approach. It is easy enough to show how the other mechanisms can be 
related to this approach, for they can all be fitted into the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model of persuasion, which operates within the information 
processing paradigm. 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model, developed by Petty & __ Cacioppo 
_ (1986), proposes that there are two routes by which persuasive messages 
change attitudes: a central route, which involves careful thought about the 
issue-relevant arguments contained in a message, and a peripheral route, 
where the focus is on cues peripheral to message content (authority of the 
speaker, applause from the audience, positive images which accompany the 
message, and so on). People tend to use the central route when (a) they are 
sufficiently highly motivated to incur heavy processing costs in trying to 
come to the correct conclusion, and (b) when they have the ability to 
process the message intensively because, for example, they possess the 
relevant knowledge and are free from distractions. They use the peripheral 
route when they can see too little payoff for incurring the processing costs of 
hard thinking, or where they lack the ability to process the message 
intensively. 
When people 'elaborate' or think carefully about the issue-relevant 
arguments contained in persuasive communication, any shift in attitudes 
will be relatively persistent and resistant to counter-arguments. This is 
because elaboration involves intensive information processing which 
integrates the resultant attitudes and supporting assumptions into stable 
schemas, which are in turn linked to wider associative networks. When 
attitudes are formed as a result of attending to peripheral cues, however, 
they tend to fade when the peripheral cues are withdrawn, and they are 
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likely to crumble when attacked. This is because, for lack of extensive 
elaboration, they are not integrated with supporting assumptions in a 
coherent framework of schematic knowledge. 
It is easy to relate the persuasive mechanisms discussed in this 
chapter to the Elaboration Likelihood Model. Perhaps the most crucial 
mechanism, in terms of this model, is that discussed in section 1.3 above: 
the manipulation of language to make the concepts and schemas linked to 
the new world view more accessible than concepts and schemas linked to 
the old world view. When we change the schemas which people use in 
analysing arguments and experiences, we alter the workings of the central 
route processing mechanisms which they use in elaborating ('thinking 
carefully about') persuasive messages. Their new schemas predispose them 
to look for arguments which support the new world view, for we have seen 
that people tend to elaborate persuasive messages and other iJ)formation in 
. ways which are schema-consistent. (Cf. also Petty & Cacioppo 1986, 19, 
111-15). We saw in section 1.3 that there is nothing inevitable about this 
process; however, we are often resistant to altering our schemas when we 
encounter mildly recalcitrant information. As a result, schemas made 
accessible by linguistic engineering can affect the way in which we process 
information by the central route. The result of central route processing can 
be enduring(Petty & Cacioppo 1986, 173-95). 
Of the other persuasive mechanisms which we have mentioned, the 
only one likely to involve central route processing is the reduction of 
cognitive dissonance. Getting rid of dissonance does not necessarily involve 
extensive elaboration, but it often does. When people are strongly 
motivated to change deeply held beliefs which are inconsistent with what 
they have said, they can engage in a great deal of elaboration as they talk 
themselves into believing that what they have said is right. Strenuous 
rationalization involves extensive elaboration (Petty & Cacioppo 1986, 222). 
The remaining persuasive mechanisms are all peripheral route 
processes which involve little elaboration. Indeed, we have seen that they 
are what Petty & Cacioppo (1986, 9) call 'rather primitive affective and 
associational processes'. Higher order conditioning and operant 
conditioning are not only effective on rational humans, but on slugs and 
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snails; mere exposure and the validity effect involve no issue-relevant 
argument at all; modelling effects and reference group effects are generated 
by social imperatives, not issue-relevant considerations; and attitude 
change as a result of self-perception involves only slight cognitive effort, 
none of it issue-relevant. The implication of the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model is that attitudes based on these mechanisms, and nothing more, 
should be relatively easy to change. This in fact seems to be the case (Petty 
& Cacioppo 1986, 173-95). 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model does not suggest that linguistic 
engineers should focus exclusively on central route processing. Rather, it 
suggests that they should pursue both central route and peripheral route 
strategies of persuasion. On the one hand, they should use linguistic 
engineering to tamper with people's schemas, then give them incentives to 
put their new schemas to work in elaborating propagandistic ~essages. On 
. the other hand, they need to recognize that people will often be deterred by 
the processing costs of extensive elaboration, and will resort to peripheral 
cues as a more economical way of deciding what to think. In that' case, the 
peripheral cues need to be carefully engineered and plentiful. In 
information processing terms, a dual strategy is likely to be by far the most 
effective. 
1.7 Timeless Theories and Empirical Case Studies 
All of the persuasive mechanisms mentioned in this chapter show a 
significant statistical effectiveness, but that does not mean that they 
necessarily affect all people in all circumstances. In fact, they do not. 
Some people, we have seen, are more resistant to them, and under some 
circumstances their effects are weak. This means that we cannot simply 
assume a certain level of effectiveness, then project it onto a particular case 
of linguistic engineering like the Cultural Revolution. Instead, we have to 
use the theory, rather tentatively, as a heuristic, combining it with solid 
research into the actual historical record. We need to discover which 
techniques of linguistic engineering were used, under what circumstances 
and with what effect. In short, we need to draw on the findings and 
emulate the skills of the historians and political scientists who have written 
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about China and the Cultural Revolution. Theory is not a substitute for 
research into actual historical cases, but its complement. 
If the large body of theory discussed in this chapter is soundly based, 
it will serve as a heuristic which illuminates the case of linguistic 
engineering during the Cultural Revolution. It will tell us what to look for, 
without making it a foregone conclusion that we will find it. It will suggest 
to us mechanisms which explain the patterns which we detect. It will even 
allow us, tentatively, to fill small gaps in the historical evidence. But the 
theory will not go unchecked. Despite gaps in the record, the sources are 
abundant and they give us a record of attitudes and behaviour which is 
independent of the theory discussed in this chapter. As a result, if the 
theory is not soundly based, it will at many points fail to make sense of the 
historical evidence. We could find, for instance, that techniques of 
linguistic engineering had few effects on people's schemas, that_.people 
. experienced extreme dissonance without acting to reduce it by changing 
either their attitudes or their behaViour, or that the people who were most 
susceptible to higher order conditioning were those who were best informed 
rather than those who were most ignorant. Any of these discoveries would 
cast doubt upon some aspect of the theoretical approach outlined in this 
chapter. If, however, we were to find that most people adopted the 
schematic knowledge structures drilled into them by linguistic engineering, 
that those who experienced dissonance changed either their attitudes or 
their behaviour, and that those most swayed by higher order conditioning 
were the least well informed, this would constitute a vindication of relevant 
parts of the theory. We could say that these aspects of the theory not only 
make sense of what happens in the laboratory, but of what happened in 
China during the Cultural Revolution. 
The emphasis in the chapters which follow is on the great experiment 
in linguistiC engineering in Mao's China, especially during the Cultural 
Revolution. The theory will be used to cast light, where it can, on the 
Chinese experience. At the same time, it will be possible to test aspects of 
the theory, and to say something about the general phenomenon of 
linguistic engineering. These wider concerns are present, but implicit, 
throughout the historical chapters of the thesis. They are addressed 
explicitly in the final chapter. 
6S 
CHAPTER 2 
LINGUISTIC ENGINEERING 
BEFORE THE CUL TURAL REVOLUTION 
1.1 Origins of Linguistic Engineering in China 
The policies of linguistic engineering which were implemented 
throughout China after 1949 did not emerge from nowhere. Some of 
their features fitted easily into Chinese tradition, some were borrowed 
from the theory and practice of thought control in the Soviet Union, 
and some drew on ideas which Mao had developed when working as a 
political agitator in the 1920s. The whole package of policies, more or 
less, was trialled in the revolutionary crucible of Yan'an from the late 
1930s and especially during the rectification of Party members in 1942-
44. 
While there were no real precedents in Chinese tradition for 
Mao's policies of linguistic engineering, there were beliefs and practices 
which made those policies easier to accept. One was the Confucian 
claim that many aspects of people's character were not fixed parts of 
human nature, but could be modified by education. This fell well short 
of the Maoist doctrine that when someone matures 'The kind of person 
he grows up to be depends entirely on the kind of education given him 
by his objective environment.' (Munro 1977,83, citing Wen Wei, China 
Youth, 7 May 1962). It did, however, justify the belief that intensive 
education was an effective means of changing people very much for the 
better. So people in China were less likely than people in many other 
countries to attach weight to unalterable features of human nature, or 
to believe that individual temperaments and abilities are fixed by 
karma, by fate, or by genetic endowment. This made it easier to be 
optimistic about the possibility of creating 'new people' by 're-
educating' them through programmes of linguistic and social 
engineering. 
More directly relevant to linguistic engineering was the 
traditional Chinese emphasis on rote learning, not simply as a method 
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of acquiring knowledge, but as an aid to virtue. Children in imperial 
China were made to recite moral maXfms in 'the belief that 'repeated 
memorization and chanting aloud would, with time, imprint the moral 
message indelibly in the mind.' (Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984,76). This 
was also the rationale for testing candidates for imperial office on their 
ability to remember the classical Confucian texts, which were held to 
contain 'the Truth concerning virtue.' (Unger 1982, 68-70). It was 
believed that when magistrates educated in this way carried out their 
duties, the appropriate passages would come readily to mind and guide 
their decisions. This was a far less systematic and far-reaching 
anticipation to the linguistic engineering of the communist era, when 
the chanting of slogans and the constant repetition of Mao's words was 
used to make 'correct' thought sink into the Chinese people's minds. 
An important aspect of linguistic engineering under Mao was that 
people were not only required to say certain things but to use exactly 
the right words when saying them. This rigid relationship between 
content and form was grossly exaggerated under Mao, but it was an 
exaggeration of something far stronger in Chinese culture than in 
Western culture: the idea that many sentiments should be expressed 
using set verbal formulae as a mark of propriety and earnestness. As 
Perry Link (1992, 10) observes, 'To a Westerner, these formulations 
may seem to be cliches - indicative of unoriginality and even hypocrisy 
in those who repeat them. But in China, people often repeat the 
standard phrases with sincerity, to signal true feelings and moral 
commitment.' So the formulaic nature of Maoist Newspeak, while 
constricting to the Chinese, was for them less alien than for most 
Westerners. 
While it is possible to find traditional antecedents of some 
aspects of Mao's linguistic engineering, it would be a mistake to stress 
them. The fact remains that in traditional China there was nothing 
approaching the centralized manipulation and control of language 
which was forced on the Chinese people under Mao. The traditional 
Chinese state was too weak and penetrated only lightly into society, so 
it was incapable of implementing radical policies of linguistic 
engineering even if it wanted to. In the cities, people had a large 
degree of independence of the state, their lives dominated by families, 
clans and guanxiwang - social networks based on the reciprocal giving 
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of favours. In the villages people were more independent still. Indeed, 
as Sun Yat-sen lamented in 1924: 
The Chinese people have shown the greatest loyalty to family and 
clan with the result that in China there have been family-ism and 
clan-ism but no real nationalism. Foreign observers say that the 
Chinese are like a sheet of loose sand. [Whyte 1974, 1]. 
Mao all but destroyed the clans, he subordinated the family to the 
state, and he extended the state's power into the most distant villages. 
Under him, the Chinese people ceased to be 'like a sheet of loose sand' 
and began to act together, taking orders from the centre. It was this, 
not Chinese tradition, which laid the foundation of a programme of 
large-scale linguistic engineering. 
Mao's linguistic engineering owed more to the example of the 
Soviet Union than to Chinese tradition. Marx had assumed that with 
the abolition of class society the natural goodness of human beings 
would flower. The Bolsheviks, however, had to sway people's minds in 
order to bring about the revolution, and they knew the power of crude 
slogans. 'People for the most part ... don't know how to think,' said 
Lenin in 1913, 'they only learn words by heart.' (Young 1991, 208). 
After the revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks abolished the old class 
system but there was still no sign of the society of virtuous 
revolutionaries which they had hoped for. So they resorted to 
systematic and aggressive attempts to remake people's minds (Munro 
1977, 8-15). Control of language was central to their approach. Lenin 
stated that the Communist Party's most critical task was 'the selection 
of language', while Stalin saw language an 'an instrument of struggle 
and development of society' - an instrument which was inseparable 
from thought (Young 1991, 126, 211). L.O. Reznikov summed up 
Soviet orthodoxy thus: 'Marxism teaches us that language reasserts 
itself not only as a means of communication ... but also as a powerful 
tool which can be used to affect thoughts, feelings and especially 
behaviour, as well as, ultimately, the material reality.' (Young 1991, 
211). 
The Soviet model was well known to Chinese Marxists, as were 
Stalin's views on linguistics. Indeed, as Paul Serruys (1962, 17) has 
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observed, 'in China probably more than in any other Communist 
country, the articles and letters of Stalin concerning the true Marxist 
views on language remained the fundamental handbook of directive 
norms and principles for linguistics.' In particular, Chinese linguists 
accepted Stalin's doctrine that language and thought are inseparable. 
Serruys (1962, 60-61) summarizes the views of the leading Chinese 
linguists, based on their reading of Marx and Stalin: 
Language is the immediate reality of thought (Marx). Ideas 
cannot exist separate from language. The true nature of thought 
is that it is realized in and with language. Unless thought has 
been fixed and recorded in language it cannot exist. Pure "naked 
thought" is non-existent (Stalin). 
In other words, we think in the language which we speak, or at least we 
cannot think without that language. 
Long before Stalin began to make his pronouncements -on 
linguistics, however, the Chinese communists were learning the power 
of words through their own experience of propaganda work and 
ideological struggle. In his 1927 'Report on an Investigation of the 
Peasant Movement in Hunan', for example, Mao noted that communist-
organised peasants' associations had made 'mass meetings' and 'simple 
slogans' an effective means of propaganda: 
"Down with imperialism!" "Down with the warlords!" "Down 
with the corrupt officials!" and "Down with the local bullies and 
bad gentry!" - these political slogans are flying about 
everywhere, entering into the heads of adults, youngsters, old 
men, children and women in countless villages, and coming out 
of their mouths ... From now on we should utilize every 
opportunity to enrich the content and clarify the meaning of 
those simple slogans. [Mao 1927, 49-50]. 
Mao also recommended that people who had committed minor political 
offences be induced to write self-criticisms - a standard language-based 
technique of thought reform which activated counter-attitudinal 
assumptions (d. Mao 1927,36). The main themes of Mao's writings in 
these years are the mobilization of popular revolutionary consciousness 
and the rectification of ideological errors by Party members. It is clear 
that 'he was deeply concerned with the problem of propaganda, 
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agitation, and ideological reform, and that he was constantly 
experimenting with methods or techniques of political persuasion.' (Yu 
1964,45). 
The techniques of persuasion which Mao and his lieutenants had 
perfected were put into practice during the Communist Party's long 
exile in Yan'an (1935-47). Mao had become Party Chairman in January 
1935, and linguistic engineering was one of the tools which he used to 
consolidate both his position within the Party and the Party's standing 
amongst the peasants. He made Yan'an into a 'student city' with some 
34 institutions for the education and re-education of Party, military 
and government cadres, and he used these institutions to create a 
revolutionary 'discourse community' united and empowered by a 
---------
. special language, uniformity of theory and the universal acceptance of 
---____ ~ __ ~ ____ ~ __ e ____ ~_~_ •• _ < __ 
Maoistmyths (Apter & Saich 1994, esp. chs 3, 4, 7-9 and appendix). 
Members of that community used the language as they learned, told 
and retold carefully scripted stories which led up to Mao's eniergence 
as China's guide and saviour: the story of China's imperial decline, the 
story of the battle between the Communist Party and the Guomindang, 
and the story of Mao's triumph over misguided or treacherous 
opponents within the Party (Apter &Saich 1994, ch. 3). AtYan'an, new 
recruits learned the language of Marxist philosophy - 'universals and 
particulars', 'ideas and representation', 'materialism and idealism', 
'reflection and reality', 'concrete and abstract', 'theory and practice', 
'unity of opposites' and so on (Apter & Saich 1994,227-8; cf. Mao 
1937a, 1937b). They also learned the language of class analYSiS, so 
that they could differentiate the compradors from the national 
bourgeoisie, assess the revolutionary potential of the petty bourgeoisie, 
distinguish the proletariat from the semi-proletariat, exploit the 
dissatisfactions of the lumpen-proletariat, plot the dispossession of the 
landlords, reassure then betray the rich peasants, co-opt the middle 
and upper middle peasants, and mobilize the poor and lower-middle 
peasants. (For most of this terminology, see Mao 1926, 1933). 
} 
,1fn Yan'an, the cadres learned the new language and the Maoist 
scripts through lectures, personal study, and incessant discussion, both 
formal and informal. Much of that discussion took place in small 
groups inspired by the 'cells' which Lenin had developed in the 
Bolshevik Party (Whyte 1974, 23-24). In those groups, the cadres went 
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through a process of 'exegetical bonding' produced by the intensive 
analysis in small groups of prescribed Marxist and Maoist texts (Apter & 
Saich 1994, ch. 8). They had to speak in the language of the texts, 
\apPlY them to their own lives, and submit to the group detailed and 
loften humiliating critiques of their own past behaviour. This whole 
\process of 'criticism and self-criticism' was carefully supervised, deviant 
Ijnterpretations were corrected, and those who stood out against the 
! 
pfficialline were isolated and attacked. Only when they confessed their 
I ~rrors with every appearance of sincerity were they accepted back into 
the group. 'Exegetical bonding' reached a peak during the Party 
tectification campaign of 1942-44, when it was supplemented by terror 
I 
in. the form of a so-called 'Rescue Campaign' directed at alleged spies 
\ 
and traitors. At th~J~~IJci()f it all, the cadres spoke the new language, 
t~¥all embraced outwardly and usually inwardly the assumptions 
lirked to that language, and they rejoiced in their acceptance as 
'comrades' by other members of the group. They felt 'both a sense of 
r~lief at having "passed the test" and pride at being admitted' into the 
n~w order.' (Apter & Saich 1994,274). The transformation was 
I 
profound: 
the last reserves of individualism were wiped out, completing the 
conveyance of self to collectivity ... People felt themselves 
transformed from within, by their own efforts as well as the 
efforts of those around them. Yan'an changed drastically from 
an essentially voluntaristic community into something much 
more rigoristic, a discourse community in which structures were 
more higlllyJnstitti.fiQnallzed, norms internalized, and behaviour 
soCiciHzed. [Apter & Saich 1994, 263-64]. 
The exegetical bonding which re-made the Yan'anites' minds was 
effective partly because they were searching for a transcendent truth 
and wanted to be converted. However, its power also stemmed from 
the fact that the discourse generated by the texts activated the entire 
pantheon of persuasive mechanisms discussed in the last chapter. That 
discourse modelled 'correct' thought, its universal use subjected the 
Yan'anites to powerful reference group effects, i_t reinforced schemas 
which gave a r-evoilltionary slant to the interpretation of experience, it 
reinforced 'correct' assumptions through retroactive strengthening, it 
promoted conditioning by its deployment of positive and negative 
terms, it led people to like the new political jargon through 'mere 
exposure', it made unsupported statements sound plausible through 
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rhe validity effect, and it led people with unformed views to infer what 
ii/they thought from what they said. Finally, because the whole process 
iff exegetical bonding was so intense, so painful, it gave most who 
I\survived it a life-long commitment to the cause. They simply could not 
(,bear the dissonance which would result if they recognized that all their 
\ 
study, all their suffering, had produced, not truth, but illusion. 
It was the Yan'anites who, under Mao, dominated the Party until 
the Cultural Revolution. They were the ones who supervised the vast 
programme of linguistic engineering in China as a whole after 1949. 
They were well equipped to do this, for in Yan'an they had acquired 'a 
meta-language embodied in key texts'. This language used the 
grammar of standard Chinese, but it had a specialized vocabulary 
linked to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and 
it had an extensive array of formulaic responses embodying 'correct' 
thought on history, theory, the revolutionary situation and norms of 
personal conduct. Its use in appropriate contexts could actiVate 
powerful persuasive mechanisms; it 'provided a 10gicaigridforJhe 
cellective interpretation of experience';-anuTfdirected 'the ways in 
which people would encounter, mediate, and share knowledge and 
experience in order that identities would be redefined and the 
discourse community become one's primary affiliation.' (Apter & Saich 
1994, 265). The task of the Party leaders and veteran cadres after 1949 
was to teach this meta-language to the host of new cadres who were 
recruited to run the country, and to translate it into simplified slogans, 
formulae and narratives which they could present to the Chinese 
masses. This was fundamental to their task of linguistic engineering. 
202 The Institutional Basis of Linguistic Engineering 
As Apter & Saich (1994, 244) have noted, 'Mao knew perfectly well that 
his was a discourse community, and if the discourse somehow eluded 
his control, the leakage and erosion of power would be great.' This was 
why he was so concerned to control those with the power to promote 
alternative discourses, especially intellectuals and others with access to 
the media. It also explains why, when he extended the discourse 
community from Yan'an to the whole of China, he secured Communist 
Party dominance over newspapers, journals, books, radio, cultural 
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productions, mass organizations and the educational system. This 
apparatus of control was fundamental to Mao's rule. It was also a pre-
requisite of linguistic engineering. 
As the Communist Party established effective control after 1949, 
the manipulation of public opinion at a national level became the 
special responsibility of the central Propaganda Department in Beijing, 
headed by Lu Dingyi. This department supervised ideological 
research, newspapers, journals, radio, literature, art and culture, 
schools and universities, and the indoctrination of cadres. It 
monitored and sometimes directed the extensive propaganda work 
carried out by other central agencies of the Party and the state, such as 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, the New China News 
Agency, the Party Press Commission and the Publications Commission. 
The central Propaganda Department was technically the servant 
of the Party's Central Committee and in practice responsible--to the 
Party's highest leaders in the Politburo Standing Committee and the 
Secretariat (Lieberthal1995, 158-62). It formed the apex of a massive 
propaganda hierarchy which was integrated with the Party organization 
at every level. The Party Committee in each province had its own 
propaganda department, and below that the Party Committee in each 
county and city had a propaganda department as well. At the very 
bottom of the hierarchy, each Party branch had its own propaganda 
committee. While lower levels of the hierarchy were expected to show 
initiative in discovering better ways of carrying out their instructions, 
they had no freedom to deviate from them and the whole system was 
tightly controlled. Local Party branches, for example, were not free to 
choose the slogans used during mass, nationwide campaigns, but had to 
make sure that people shouted slogans approved by the central 
Propaganda Department in Beijing (Yu 1964, 74). 
In the early years after the revolution, intermediate levels of the 
propaganda hierarchy produced 'propaganda outlines' to tell Party 
members what they should say on particular issues. They also 
provided more detailed 'propaganda handbooks' which not only told 
propagandists what issues to stress, but also gave them background 
information, material for inclusion in 'wall newspapers' or 'blackboard 
newspapers', cartoons which could be reproduced by local artists, songs 
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for use in mass meetings, and advice on propaganda methods. From 
the mid-1950's, however, these handbooks were phased out, and their 
functions were taken over by Party newspapers, magazines, and 
instructions to propagandists broadcast over the radio (Yu 1964, 76-8). 
In 1951, Party committees at every level set up propaganda 
networks consisting of Party members, members of the New Democratic 
Youth Corps, model workers, people in responsible positions and 
revolutionary activists. These propagandists were responsible for 
ensuring that the people in their charge knew and accepted what the 
Party wanted them to believe. They organized group discussions and 
newspaper reading groups, kept propaganda bulletin boards supplied 
with new material, put up posters, encouraged people to listen to radio 
broadcasts and attend meetings, and engaged them regularly in 
propaganda-laced conversation. These propaganda networks fulfilled 
an important function in the early years of Communist rule, but after 
1953 they atrophied as their functions were taken over by work units, 
neighbourhood committees, village cadres, mass organizations and 
teams of agitators associated with the never-ending political campaigns. 
(Yu 1964,78-89; Liu 1971,115-17). 
In the cities, people's lives were closely supervised. In residential 
areas, they came under the watchful eye of neighbourhood committees, 
most of them dominated by middle-aged or old female cadres. The 
most powerful agent of Party control over most people's lives, however, 
was the work unit (dan wei) attached to every place of employment, 
whether it be a factory, government office, educational institution, 
hospital or shop. The work unit was headed by a Party committee 
under a Party secretary, and it assumed all the functions of the old 
clans, and more. It ensured the education of the young, provided 
medical care and retirement pensions, controlled employment, 
allocated housing, arranged domestic repairs and dispensed ration 
coupons. People could not travel without the unit's permission and 
without its co-operation in providing a letter of introduction to other 
units where they would require accommodation. Like the old clans, the 
unit was entitled to interfere in people's private lives. It could inspect 
incoming mail, and it arbitrated disputes, provided informal marriage 
counselling, and sometimes influenced the choice of marriage partner. 
Ideally, it was able to provide accommodation next to the workplace, 
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and a wall could be built around the perimeter to mark the unit's 
identity. 
Through the work units, especially, and the neighbourhood 
committees, the Party was able to organize meetings, disseminate 
propaganda, monitor interpretation of the message and supervise 
behaviour. It was also able to set up political study groups, newspaper 
reading groups and radio listening groups, and to establish processes of 
criticism and self-criticism insmall groups (xiao zu). Under these 
circumstances, the Party had no difficulty in implementing policies of 
linguistic engineering - ensuring that all city dwellers learned the new 
revolutionary language and, at least in public, used it in appropriate 
contexts to say prescribed, politically correct things. It was less 
successful at ensuring that people used that language within the family 
and amongst close friends. As Dittmer (1987,58) has observed: 
Language itself became bifurcated: the heroic public language 
was used to satisfy ever more probing demands for evidence of 
thought reform, whereas the private language preserved the 
traditional norms that kept friendship and ties alive. The two 
discourses were kept apart as a result of conflicting social 
demands, but each could be used in its appropriate context. 
In the villages, the principal agencies of control were Party 
committees-headeaby a Party secretary. Communist Youth Leagues 
were set up to recruit and train promising members of the younger 
generation, while in some periods Poor and Lower-Middle Peasants' 
Associations were organized to consolidate the prestige, pride and 
nominal leadership of the class which provided the Party with its 
strongest support. Party organization in the villages was strong enough 
to enable considerable linguistic engineering, but there were 
difficulties: the illiteracy of many peasants handicapped attempts at 
instruction; cadres were often illiterate or of low quality; the isolation 
of many villages created problems, especially in the earlier years; and 
the prevalence of local dialects meant that many peasants were unable 
to understand radio broadcasts originating in the major centres. 
Because of these obstacles, the institutional basis of linguistic 
engineering was weaker than in the cities. Political meetings were 
frequent, but newspaper reading groups, study groups, and small 
groups for purposes of criticism were uncommon. In some villages 
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such groups were not organized until the Campaign to Study and Apply 
Mao Zedong's Thought in 1964-66, while in others they did not appear 
until the Cultural Revolution entered its institutional phase after 1968 -
and even then only sporadically (Whyte 1974, 135-66; Uu 1971). 
It was the Party's determination to spread its message which 
inspired its literacy campaigns and policies of language reform. In 
1952, the government set up a committee to direct reform of the 
language. Its first measure was to publish a list of the 1,500 most 
frequently used characters, urging publications intended for popular 
consumption to use characters from the list wherever possible. The list 
included many more words related to the lives of workers and peasants 
than earlier lists, as well as many words related to politics and class 
structure (Serruys 1962, 70; Uu 1971, 17). Then in 1956 the State 
Council set about making the written language easier to learn by 
abolishing some old characters and beginning the process of 
simplifying many more. The initial list of 486 simplified characters 
showed an average reduction from sixteen strokes per character to 
eight strokes (Lehmann 1975, 46). A much longer list of simplified 
characters was issued in 1964, and the number of 'radicals' - basic 
components used to classify characters - was reduced from 214 to 189. 
This reform caused a lot of anguish to many older, literate Chinese, and 
it has sometimes been interpreted as an attempt to ensure that 'The 
Chinese classics, and to some extent all the ancient modes of thought 
they embody and inculcate, would therefore be inaccessible to peasants 
who could read only the new script.' (Young 1991, 205). However, the 
reform does not seem to have been motivated by a desire to destroy 
China's classical heritage, for in this period the Party continued to 
approve publication of classical works in the belief that it could teach 
people to detect and reject the false ideology which they contained. It 
was only during the Cultural Revolution that the goal of obliterating the 
past, rather than criticising it, took hold under the influence of 
youthful Red Guards and the more extreme Maoists. 
The final aspects of language reform were the introduction of 
pinyin, an alphabetic form of writing, and the promotion of a 
putonghua or 'common language' based essentially on the Beijing 
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variant of the North Chinese dialect 1 which is spoken by perhaps two-
thirds of the population. The two reforms were linked, because pinyin 
could be used as a guide to pronunciation and was therefore very 
handy in teaching putonghua to speakers of other forms of Chinese. 
The development of putonghua was essential if people throughout 
China were to be able to listen to the same propaganda broadcasts and 
understand visiting cadres without the aid of an interpreter. It also 
helped centralized manipulation of the spoken language, avoiding the 
need for constant translations into local dialects. Unfortunately for the 
linguistic engineers, older Chinese speakers of regional dialects were 
slow to learn the new 'common language', although the introduction of 
putonghua into schools produced many competent speakers amongst 
the younger generation. (In general, see Serruys 1962; Lehmann 1975, 
48-54; Liu 1971, 17-21). 
Communication of the Communist Party's message was hindered 
by widespread illiteracy, estimated at 80 or even 90 percent -of the 
population in 1949 (Liu 1986, 310). In an effort to produce a rapid 
turnaround, the government sponsored numerous adult literacy 
campaigns. Some of them claimed amazing results, which proved on 
investigation to be fictitious. In 1964, Guo Moruo, Director of the 
Academy of Sciences, wrote: 
For more than ten years, we have been trying to eradicate 
illiteracy among the people. But our motherland is still a nation 
with masses of illiterates and semi-literates. Some counties once 
claimed that they had become literate counties. Yet soon they 
lapsed back into being illiterate counties. [People's Daily, 3 May 
1964, quoted in Liu 1971, 23]. 
More solid results came from the massive expansion of the education 
system, with the number of primary schools increasing from 346,800 in 
1949 to 1,681,900 in 1965, and the number of secondary schools 
growing from 5,216 to 80,993 over the same period. As a result, 
1 I use the term dialect in its Chinese sense. The Chinese word is fangyan 
which means, literally, 'region speech' or 'place speech'. It refers to all 
regional or local varieties of speech used by the Han people, as distinct 
from the 'common language' (putonghua). Western scholars, of course, use 
the term dialect in a variety of other senses, none of them suited to a 
discussion of the rise of putonghua. 
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illiteracy amongst the younger generation steadily declined, so that 
only 23.5 percent of the population over 12 years of age was classified 
as illiterate or semi-illiterate in the mid-1980s (Uu 1986,310; Nathan 
1986,161). 
Language reform and literacy campaigns were intended partly to 
increase the effectiveness of the system of mass communications 
through which the Party tried to ensure the penetration of its message 
into every part of the country and into all sections of society. A vital 
part of that system was the press, which was used to communicate with 
Party committees and crucial literate minorities throughout the 
country. Through it, the Party kept people with power and influence 
up to date with party policy, it provided them with propaganda 
material, and it taught them the new concepts and slogans to be used in 
the manipulation of language. The press played a crucial role in 
linguistic engineering and under Communist Party rule it expanded 
rapidly, with the combined circulation per issue of all newspapers 
increasing from 3 million copies in 1950 to almost 21 million in 1959 
(Uu 1971, 134). This circulation was still small, relative to the total 
population, but the number of people who were directly influenced by 
the press was considerably higher because work units, neighbourhood 
committees and some village cadres organized newspaper reading 
groups. In these groups stories were read aloud and then discussed, 
enabling even illiterates to know what was in the newspapers. However, 
these groups were more an urban phenomenon than a rural one, 
although attempts were made to establish reading groups in villages 
during mass campaigns (Uu 1971, 139-42; Nathan 1986, 157-62). 
Many newspapers were published directly by the Party at 
national, provincial and local levels, and the rest were controlled by the 
Party. Their content and language were strictly monitored and 
received direct input from the centre. This input came partly from the 
New China News Agency, supervised by the State Council, which 
distributed selected foreign news to all Chinese newspapers and 
national news to all regional and local newspapers. Direct input also 
came from the People's Daily, the official organ of the Central 
Committee, from the Liberation Army Daily, organ of the General 
Political Department of the Ministry of Defence, and from the official 
Party journal, Red Flag. Editorials and articles from these 'two 
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newspapers and one journal' were reprinted by publications lower in 
the hierarchy, and the terminology and slogans which they used to 
discuss particular issues were copied by journalists at lower levels. 
The Party also controlled the publication and distribution of 
books. At the national and regional levels, People's Publishing Houses 
produced books on 'political theories, policies and current events', 
while specialized companies were given the task of publishing works in 
other fields. By 1956 there were 40 national and 101 r~gional 
publishing houses, and the number of titles had grown from 966 in 
1950 to 14,070 in 1956. The books were distributed through the Party-
controlled New China Bookstore, which had a monopoly (Liu 1971, 147-
9,197-8). Books were, of course, even less accessible to most people 
than newspapers until the Cultural Revolution compelled even illiterate 
peasants to carry a symbolic copy of the 'Little Red Book'. 
Radio was also controlled by the Party. At the top of tfie 
hierarchy there was the Central People's Broadcasting Station (Radio 
Beijing), the voice of the Central Committee. Below that were provincial 
and muniCipal People's Broadcasting Stations, controlled by the 
propaganda departments of the Party committees at each level. The 
number of such stations increased from 54 in 1951 to 141 in 1962 (Liu 
1971, 118-20, 187). At the local level, Party-controlled radio stations 
were established in every county seat. Because few peasants had 
radios, these stations were linked by wires to the villages, where 
loudspeakers proclaimed their message in market places, workplaces, 
recreation halls, dormitories and sometimes even in private homes. 
The number of these 'wired' stations increased from a mere eight in 
1949 to 1,975 in 1964, while the number of loudspeakers grew from 
500 to 6,000,000. By then, it was claimed, 95 percent of the counties 
and towns had been linked to this network, although it is not clear how 
thoroughly it penetrated into the villages. (Liu 118-29; Yu 1964, 123-
136; Nathan 1986,163-4). 
After taking power, the Communist Party destroyed the existing 
film industry, then built a new industry under its own control. Its 
purpose, said the People's Daily, was 'to educate the people in 
patriotism and socialism' and 'to lift people's cultural standards.' 
(Quoted Liu 1971, 159). Chinese-made feature films increased from 
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one in 1951 to 77 in 1959, while the number of newsreels and 
documentaries increased from 36 to 155. They were supplemented by 
dubbed versions of 'progressive' foreign films and documentaries, 
many of them from the Soviet Union until the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 
made them 'revisionist'. The number. of cinemas grew from 596 in 
1949 to 2,000 in 1964, but the most spectacular growth was in the 
number of mobile projection teams, which leaped from 100 in 1949 to 
12,000 in 1964. These teams travelled from village to village, often on 
foot, with a horse or a donkey to carry their equipment. Since many of 
the films were incomprehensible to peasants who knew only the local 
dialect, the teams were expected to explain to the peasants what was 
going on. The films were supplemented with propaganda sheets and 
information provided over loud speakers, and they were followed by 
discussion. As a result of the teams' efforts, by 1964 the average 
peasant was reported to see five movies a year. (Details from Liu 1971, 
157-73, 199-202). 
How effective was the Party in ensuring that people heard its 
message? Some suggestive data were collected by Paul J. Hiniker in a 
survey of some 400 former mainland residents in Hong Kong in 1964 
and 1965 (Hiniker 1966, cited in Liu 1971,168). National projections 
based on this data give the following rates of reception of four major 
forms of communication - meetings, films, radio and newspapers: 
Meetings: 96% Films: 70% Radio: 58% Newspapers: 40% 
These patterns of reception are not surprising in a predominantly rural 
and illiterate society. Newspapers may have played a vital role in 
keeping cadres and the literate elite in tune with the latest political and 
linguistic trends, but even newspaper reading groups did not make 
them the most important direct source of information for most people. 
Radio had not yet achieved the astonishing coverage of the mid-1970s, 
when on one estimate there were 141,000,000 loudspeakers reaching 
into 95 percent of production brigades and teams and 65 percent of 
rural households (Nathan 1986,163). The large audiences which I) 
attended films were a tribute to the dedication and effectiveness of the I.! 
mobile projection teams, consisting mainly of young women. What is f! 
most striking, though, is the Party's effectiveness in reaching virtually til 
the entire population through a never-ending succession of meetings, 
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some large, some small, some with extensive audience participation, 
some dominated by speakers on a stage. This form of direct, oral 
communication was admirably suited to the needs of a largely illiterate 
population, and it was well within the power of a Party whose power 
touched virtually everyone. It had the advantage, too, that it brought 
everyone into contact with the cadres and with other comrades -
contact which was both political and personal. 
It was personal contact and supervision which made possible the 
Party's techniques of linguistic engineering. People were not just 
bombarded with propaganda and left alone to reform themselves. 
Rather, they were persuaded or pressured into political participation. 
In many contexts, they were expected to contribute, and most did so in 
order to avoid being labelled pOlitically backward. To participate, they 
had to know the terminology, they had to know the oral formulae, they 
had to know the 'correct' things to say. And what they knew, they had 
to apply. So in all political contexts - which increasingly meant all 
public contexts - they had to use the new language of revolution to say 
the appropriate revolutionary things. In this way they were drawn into 
active participation in the Chinese Communist Party's great project of 
linguistic engineering. What that meant and what effects it had before 
1966 is the subject of the remaining sections of this chapter. 
2.3 Formulae, Codability and Processing Efficiency 
Any government which wants to convert people to a new world view 
and a new political, social and economic order is in the business of 
imparting information - a great deal of information. If it is to succeed, 
it must try to minimize the effort of processing that information. One 
way of doing this, which is especially useful in a largely illiterate 
society, is to code the information in formulae. The formulae can be 
learned by heart, serving as a reminder of other information; and, 
once they are learned, they become a standardised shorthand which 
makes communication swift and economical. I will illustrate this by 
analysing two types of formulae which were deliberately fostered in 
Mao's China: numerical terms and keyword slogans. 
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Numerical terms have a long history in China, where they have 
been a popular way of grouping together maxims, virtues, ideas or any 
items with qualities in common. In former times, any half-educated 
Chinese could identify the 'Four Books' and the 'Five Classics' which 
were the basis of the imperial civil service exams, and even uneducated 
people knew the 'Five Most Important Human Relationships' and could 
recite the 'Three Obediences' and the 'Four Virtues' which Confucian 
ethics prescribed for women. These formulae served two functions. 
First, they were an aid to memory, for they organized information 
schematically, linking the individual items to a central concept which 
provided a clue which assisted their recall. This was particularly useful 
in a society with a large number of illiterates who were unable to store 
information in written form and had to keep it in their heads. Second, 
once numerical formulae had been mastered, they were an aid to 
communication, for they 'coded' a number of sometimes lengthy items 
into two or three words, making it unnecessary to spell them out them 
every time they were mentioned. 
In Mao's China, numerical formulae were used on an 
unprecedented scale because never before had the entire population 
been expected to acquire so much new information. Many of the 
formulae were devised by the central Party leaders, but others were 
devised by local cadres and occasionally by ordinary peasants and 
workers as a way of coping with information overload. Formulae 
developed locally were sometimes picked up by the national media and 
publicised throughout the country as a whole (Li 1957a, 33-49). 
Numerical formulae devised by the Party leaders were often 
associated with national campaigns. Soon after coming to power, for 
example, the Party organized all Christians into the 'Three Selfs' (san 
ziji) movement, whose objective was to ensure that the Chinese Church 
was self-reliant in three ways: free from foreign funds, free from 
foreign influence, and free from Vatican control (Spence 1991, 534). 
Then the country was mobilized in support of two great, simultaneous 
campaigns: the 'Three-Anti' (sanfan) movement, which sought to purge 
the cadres of corruption, waste and bureaucracy; and the 'Five-Anti' 
(wufan) movement, which attacked capitalists for bribery, tax evasion, 
theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and stealing 
state economic information for speculative purposes. In the case of all 
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three campaigns, the numerical formulae were enriched by additional 
information supplied through the press, public meetings and study 
groups. In this way the formulae became the skeletal structure of a 
much wider body of schematically linked information which was easily 
remembered. 
In complex campaigns, numerical formulae proliferated as the 
Party struggled to communicate its message. During the massive 
Socialist Education Movement, for example, the Party promoted the 
'Four Cleanups' (siqing) to clean up accounting procedures, granary 
supplies, accumulation of private property, and abuses of the work 
points system. Unked to these 'Four Cleanups' there were 'Three 
Threes', which were the focus of sUb-campaigns: 
1. Promote the 'Three "Isms'" (san zhuyi): collectivism, patriotism, 
socialism. 
2. Oppose the 'Three Bad Styles' (san zhong huai zuofeng): the 
capitalist, the feudal, the extravagant. 
3. Implement the 'Three Necessities' (san bixu): building socialism, 
loving the collective, running communes democratically and 
frugally. 
All of these formulae had to be learned by heart and their implications 
explored, a process aided by their discussion at numerous meetings. To 
an outsider, they sound daunting, but they were built out of terms 
familiar to all Chinese and they had implications for people's lives. 
They were not needless jargon, but an effective way of helping millions 
of peasants to understand the huge range of issues involved in a 
campaign whose mission was nothing less than the renewal of socialism 
throughout rural China. (Cf. Baum & Tiewes 1968; Baum 1975). 
Keyword slogans became popular with the advent of the Great 
Leap Forward in 1958 (U 1962,27-37). They 'coded' each part of a 
longer expression into a single, monosyllabic 'keyword'. Recitation of 
the slogan had a powerful, staccato effect, and the coding reduced the 
processing effort involved in communication and interpretation. The 
slogans were frequently used to urge the people to greater efforts as 
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they sought to increase production and build socialism. For example, 
the slogan duo kuai hao sheng ('more, faster, better, more economical') 
was a coded version of Mao's statement that it was necessary 'to work 
more, work faster, work better, and work more economically to build 
socialism' (you duo, yue kuai, yue hao, yue sheng di jianshe 
sheh uizh uyi). 
Keyword slogans were also used to summarize information, with 
each monosyllabic word serving as a reminder of other things which 
had been learned. For example, Mao's agricultural policy was 
summarized and popularized in his famous 'eight-character 
constitution': 
tu, fei, shui, zhong, 
mi, baa, guan, gong. 
The English translation lacks the poetic rhyme and musical tones of the 
original: 
Earth, fertilizer, water, seeds, 
Density, protection, management, tools. 
We learned to recite the 'eight-character constitution' in school, and the 
Chinese peasants were made to learn it too, as a key to policies which 
were explained to them in detail - policies which Mao learned from the 
charlatans who helped to ruin Soviet agriculture. The peasants were 
told, for example, that 'earth' stood for deep ploughing (so deep that it 
ruined the topsoil); that 'water' stood for irrigation (which often led to 
salination or the hurried construction of dams which collapsed); and 
that 'density' referred to 'close planting' (which caused the crops to 
grow weakly or die). With the aid of the 'eight-character constitution', 
the peasants learned these policies only too well and the result, we shall 
see, was mass starvation. (Cf. Becker 1996). 
2.4 The Language of Class Analysis 
In 1951, only two years after the Communist victory, Professor Ye 
Chang-qing of the Chinese Catholic University was sent with other 
intellectuals to the countryside to reform his thought by participating 
84 
in the land reform programme. He was astonished to find that the 
peasants used the following words easily and naturally as part of their 
everyday conversation (cited Yu 1964, 91-2): 
mingjue 
lingdao 
douzheng 
yapo 
mubiao 
sixiang 
taolun 
ruodian 
jiji 
zhengce 
fengjian shili 
tongzhi 
biaozhun 
juewu 
yanjiu 
zongjie 
chedi 
renwu 
boxuejidu 
bufa 
wenti 
jiancha 
jiaoliu 
buchong 
kaizhan 
tuanjie 
zhengzhi weifeng 
baopi 
zhuyao 
genju 
youdian 
hefa 
heli 
to understand clearly 
to guide (v.), authorities (n.) 
to struggle 
oppression 
objective, goal 
ideology, view, thought 
discussion 
weakness 
active 
policy 
feudalistic forces 
control, rule (v. or n.) 
standard 
consciousness 
research 
conclusion 
thoroughly 
task, assignment 
system of exploitation 
illegal, unlawful 
problem, issue, question 
investigation 
exchange of ideas or experience 
to supplement 
to start, develop 
unity, unify 
political prestige 
accomplice 
most important 
according to 
advantage 
legal 
logical 
These terms were part of the technical vocabulary of Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and even the more familiar ones had 
new connotations. When the list was shown to twelve Chinese 
professors who had migrated to the United States, they said that only 
five of the 33 terms would conceivably have been used by male 
peasants before 1949: yapo (oppression), sixiang (ideology), wenti 
(problem, issue), heli (logical) and hefa (legal). In their view, none of 
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the expressions would have been used by peasant women (Yu 1964, 
92). 
The list was far from exhaustive. We could easily add to it a host 
of words and phrases which the new government introduced, 
popularized or modified in meaning. These have been surveyed in a 
series of excellent monographs published by the Center for Chinese 
Studies at Berkeley, (Li 1956a, 1956b, 1957a, 1957b, 1958, 1962; Hsia 
1961, 1963, 1964). Many are also included in the Center's Current 
Chinese Communist Newspaper Terms and Sayings (1971). I discuss 
here only those terms most relevant to the themes which I shall develop 
in later chapters on the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao Zedong knew that mastery of the linguistic code of Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was essential if cadres were to 
communicate effectively with each other and teach people to think in 
the categories of the new ideology. In March 1949, some six"months 
before the foundation of the People's Republic of China, he expressed 
his concern: 
In the past some of our high-ranking cadres did not have a 
common language even on basic theoretical problems of 
Marxism-Leninism, because they had not studied enough. There 
is more of a common language in the Party today, but the 
problem has not yet been fully solved. For instance, in the land 
reform there is still some difference in the understanding of what 
is meant by "middle peasants" and "rich peasants". [Mao 1949b, 
365-66]. 
Mao's comment pointed to the necessity for everyone to understand the 
language of class, for that language was vital to revolutionary 
transformation; it also underpinned the poliCies of social manipulation 
which Mao later used to consolidate his rule. 
'Class', in the language of the Chinese Communist Party, had little 
to do with the traditional Marxist concept of class, or with any other 
concept of class known to social science. Classes, for Mao, were not 
necessarily economically constituted groups, let alone groups with 
different positions in relations of production. Rather, they were groups 
divided according to the perceived likelihood thattheywoUlcfsuppoit 
or oppose the communist cause. The result was a system of 
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classification designed to consolidate the Party's rule - a system which 
affected both political status and chances of success under the new 
regime. This system assigned each person to one of over sixty 
categories, known as chengfen, based mostly on occupation, wealth and 
source of income in the three years before 1949, but sometimes on 
political or criminal records both before and after that date. These 
classifications were grouped into broader class categories Uieji 
chengfen), which were in turn ranked as 'good', 'middle' and 'bad' on 
the basis of their presumed orientation towards the revolution. The 
resulting class labels, which determined people's fates after 1949, can 
be summarized as follows (cf. White 1976; Kraus 1981; Kuhn 1984; 
Watson 1984):2 
1. 'Good' classes (chengfen haa): 
(a) 'Revolutionary cadres' (pre-Liberation Party members) 
(b) 'Revolutionary soldiers' (pre-Liberation soldiers) 
(c) 'Revolutionary martyrs' (communists who had died in the 
revolutionary wars, bequeathing elevated class status to 
their descendants) 
(d) Industrial workers 
(e) Poor and lower-middle peasants 
2. Middle classes (yiban chengfen): 
(a) The petty bourgeoisie, store clerks, etc. 
(b) Middle peasants 
(c) Intellectuals - professionals, teachers, clerks, etc. 
3. 'Bad' classes (chengfen buhaa) 
(a) Landlords 
(b) Rich peasants 
(c) Counterrevolutionaries 
(d) 'Bad elements' (common criminals) 
(e) 'Rightists' (a category added to include those who had 
criticised the Party or its policies during the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign in 1957). 
(f) Capitalists 
2See also the useful discussion in Unger 1982, 12-14, 254, n.l. Unger, 
however, uses the term jieji chengfen where I use the term ch ushen ('class 
origin' or 'family background'), which I discuss later. The Chinese 
themselves are often confused and inconsistent in their use of class 
terminology, and this has caused problems in academic discussions of the 
class system. 
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The five 'good' categories were termed collectively hongwulei - 'five 
kinds of red' or 'five reds' - while the landlords, rich peasants, 
counterrevolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists became known 
collectively as heiwulei - 'five kinds of black' or 'five blacks'.3 
This system of categorizing people into 'good', 'bad' and 'middle' 
classes almost turned the pre-revolutionary Chinese hierarchy on its 
head. Right at the top were the revolutionary cadres, soldiers and 
martyrs who had been branded as 'bandits' by the Guomindang during 
the civil war. Second only to them were the workers and 'poor and 
lower-middle peasants' who had been at or near the bottom of the 
traditional hierarchy. The intellectuals, formerly revered and 
traditionally associated with administrative power, were regarded as 
ideologically suspect and placed in the middle classes where they were 
watched carefully. Those classed as capitalists, although given credit as 
a 'national' bourgeoisie opposed to imperialism, were disliked, 
mistrusted and subjected to disabilities as one-time exploiters. And 
dispossessed landlords and rich peasants, the former elite of rural 
society, were ostracised and subjected to abuse along with 'bad 
elements' and 'counterrevolutionaries' at the very bottom of the 
hierarchy. The social pyramid had been almost perfectly inverted. 
In the creation of this inverted hierarchy, the new language of 
revolution was not merely reflective and passive - words were not 
simply invented and adapted to describe a new social reality imposed 
by force. Rather, people were manipulated into speaking in ways which 
--- -- -
helped to 'bring the inverted hierarchy into existence and~which helped 
19Sustain it in the years to come. This was a matter of deliberate 
policy, adopted precisely in order to bring about a revolution in 
attitudes - to ensure that the old hierarchy did not live on in peoples' 
hearts. Mao and the Communist Party could simply have used cadres 
3'Bureaucratic capitalists' who actively opposed the revolution fled as the 
communists advanced before 1949. Other capitalists were regarded as a 
'national bourgeoisie' not under the control of imperialism, and the 
Communist Party sought to entice them into a 'united front' against the 
Japanese and the Guomindang before 1949. As a result, they were officially 
seen as 'better' than other members of the 'bad' classes, and avoided formal 
inclusion in the 'black categories'. They were, however, 'exploiters' who 
within a few years were expropriated, and they remained objects of 
suspicion, discrimination and condemnation. 
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and soldiers to dispossess the landlords, rich peasants and capitalists, 
as the Bolsheviks had done in the Soviet Union. Instead, they mobilized 
the workers and the poor and lower-middle peasants to deliver 
judgment on their erstwhile oppressors. They did this to make the 
'revolutionary masses' participate in their own liberation and take 
responsibility for the fate of those whom they condemned. 
In the case of land reform, for example, Party cadres sought out 
people with grievances - the landless, the indebted, women, the 
frustrated young, or anyone wronged by a landlord or a clan leader. 
Their aim was to persuade these people that they had suffered at the 
hands of a ruling class, then get them to expose the crimes of their 
oppressors at public 'struggle meetings'. At these meetings, the accused 
were paraded helplessly in front of the villagers as their accusers 'spoke 
bitterness' against them, demanding redress and punishment. They 
were threatened, made to hang their heads, and faced with demands 
that they confess their wrongdoing and repent. The litany of real and 
alleged crimes was usually enough to persuade most who were present 
to join the chanting of slogans condemning the accused and calling for 
punishment. The whole process was intended to unmask the landlords 
as class oppressors and to secure their humiliation and condemnation 
through 'class struggle' at the hands of the villagers whom they had 
once dominated. It was only when this had been achieved that the 
redistribution of land took place. (For accounts of land reform, see 
Whyte 1914, 136-9; Vogel 1969, ch. 3; Crook & Crook 1959; Hinton 
1966; Yang 1959). 
The crucial thing to note about this process of 'class struggle' is 
that for most villagers it involved little more than oral participation. 
The struggle was underpinned by the Communist Party's power, but 
'speaking bitterness', shouting slogans, uttering threats and demanding 
punishment were symbolically vital, politically crucial and powerfully 
persuasive. Symbolically, they promoted the useful myth of the 'mass 
line' - Mao's doctrine that the Party's leadership involved taking the 
'scattered and unsystematic' ideas of the masses, refining them through 
study, then going back to the people and explaining the new ideas 
'until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and 
concentrate them into action' (Mao 1943, 290). Politically, the oral 
theatre of class struggle humiliated the village elite, establishing the 
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inferiority of the landlords and their associates to those whom they had 
exploited. In terms of persuasion, the condemnations transformed the 
outlook of many poor and lower middle peasants. The most powerful 
mechanism of attitude change stemmed from the fact that the majority 
of villagers had been manipulated into taking, more or less voluntarily, 
a revolutionary action: they had accused and reviled leaders whom 
they had previously respected and obeyed, endorsing their 
dispossession and punishment. Collectively, they had implicated 
themselves in the execution of perhaps a million members of landlord 
families (Spence 1990, 517), and in the terror and protracted suffering 
of millions more. Having legitimized all this, they were powerless to 
reverse it. They had to believe that their actions were justified or suffer 
the burden of dissonance. Words had made them revolutionaries, and 
words made them eager students as the cadres explained the new 
revolutionary doctrines which rationalized what they had done.! __ .. 
The same pattern occurred in the 'Five-Anti' (wufan) campaign of 
late 1951 and 1952, which subordinated the surviving capitalists to 
Communist Party dictates as a preliminary to their total dispossession. 
The 'Antis' which the campaign targeted were bribery, tax evasion, 
theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing 
state economic information for speculative purposes. Such practices 
had been common under the Guomindang, and they continued after 
1949 as capitalists sought to buy 'protection' from cadres and survive 
in the new environment of state control. The campaign involved the 
investigation of over 450,000 businesses in China's five largest cities, 
and it resulted in the execution of about 500 members of the 
bourgeoisie, the suicide of another 2,000, the imprisonment of 34,000 
and the imposition of heavy fines on many more (Schurmann 1968, 
318; Dittmer 1987, 47). During the campaign, work teams were sent 
into factories and offices to persuade the workers to 'speak bitterness' 
against their employers and managers, accusing them of unfair 
treatment, corruption and graft. The accusations then justified the 
work teams in having the owners and managers dragged before 
denunciation meetings to be attacked and humiliated by their own 
workers, forced to confess their crimes and beg the revolutionary 
masses for forgiveness (cf. Gardner 1969), Symbolically, this affirmed 
the leading role of the workers even in capitalist enterprises; 
politically, it established the dominance of the Communist Party over 
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the workers and over the way in which firms conducted their business; 
and ideologically, it contributed to the transformation of workers' 
attitudes. In particular, it shattered the emotional ties which often 
connected workers, managers and employers, especially in smaller 
firms. Workers had been manipulated into verbal behaviour which was 
psychologically inconsistent with their existing values - behaviour 
whose consequences could never be undone. The resulting dissonance 
could be reduced, however, if the workers accepted the new Marxist 
ideology, for that ideology attacked their emotional ties to employers as 
false consciousness and it justified their accusations as revolutionary 
acts. Many workers therefore had a powerful motive for ideological 
conversion. 
The same pattern of modifying attitudes by manipulating people 
into making damaging criticisms of others was followed in other major 
campaigns which targeted particular groups. During the Suppression of 
Counterrevolutionaries Campaign in 1950-51, for example, committees 
were set up in neighbourhoods allover China to flush out spies, and 
people were urged to inform on friends, family and neighbours who 
had been associated with the Guomindang or had opposed the 
Communists. This again was merely the prelude to 'struggle' meetings 
at which accusers bore witness against their erstwhile associates as the 
audience chanted slogans and demanded confession, penitence and 
punishment. Almost the entire country had been induced to enter into 
a discourse in which there was only one loyalty - to the Communist 
Party and its revolution. It was a discourse which served to justify the 
fate of those whom it condemned: seven to eight hundred thousand 
'counterrevolutionaries' were executed and millions more imprisoned 
(Dittmer 1987, 47). So words were weapons of terror with which the 
'revolutionary masses' consigned their victims to death or misery. 
Kindly people who had been manipulated into demanding punishment 
could easily experience extreme dissonance which they could reduce by 
convincing themselves that counterrevolutionaries deserved their fate. 
Once they came to believe that, they were committed to the revolution. 
Not all the campaigns were directed at members of the 'bad' 
classes. Party leaders, for example, mobilized the population against 
lower level corruption, malpractice or ideological backsliding in the 
Three-Anti Campaign of late 1951-52 and the Socialist Education 
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Movement of 1962-65. This preserved the fiction of the 'mass line', 
whereby the Party was supposed to learn from the masses. Even more 
important, centrally controlled mobilization of the revolutionary 
masses was a weapon which the Party leaders used to discipline the 
local cadres and rectify their ideology. This was crucial, because it was 
the local cadres who made sure that ordinary people participated in the 
centrally directed discourse through which they were manipulated. 
It was the desire to preserve the purity of the discourse, too, 
which explains the almost constant harassment of intellectuals under 
Mao's rule. In 1950 and 1951, huge numbers of intellectuals were 
subjected to intensive 'thought reform' courses lasting six months or so. 
They studied Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao, they were lectured on 
the revolution by veteran cadres, they engaged in criticism and self-
criticism in small groups, and they wrote 'autobiographies' in which 
they criticised their pre-revolutionary attitudes and actions, attributing 
them to their own selfishness, their sheltered existence, and the failings 
of their teachers and parents. As Jonathon Spence (1990, 564) has 
noted, 'This last requirement caused profound crises for many who had 
been brought up believing in the strict tenets of filial piety as derived 
from the Confucian tradition, and in general the entire process 
subjected the intellectuals to severe mental stress.' 
Mental stress caused by conflict between old attitudes and new 
verbal professions is, of course, dissonance, and it can be removed by 
abandoning the old attitudes. In some cases, this is precisely what 
happened. According to Robert Jay Lifton (1961, 400-401), a minority 
of those subjected to this type of re-education became zealous converts. 
Most of these were very young - in their late teens or twenties - and 
they were seldom 'higher intellectuals'. Rather, most were intellectuals 
only in the extended Chinese sense which includes all people with an 
education - even high school graduates. Their attitudes were relatively 
unformed, and they were eager to identify with the new regime which 
held the key to their future advancement. Another relatively small 
group consisted of resisters. They regarded thought reform as 
'suffocating' 'bad' and 'coercive', and they 'were apt to have been a 
good deal more sympathetic to Communism before their reform than 
after.' They had engaged in self-criticism purely to satisfy their 're-
educators' and colleagues, so they were able to neutralize dissonance 
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by telling themselves that their new professions were purely a response 
to pressure. The third and largest group became what Lifton terms 
adapters: they now knew what they were expected to say and believe, 
they had a better understanding of the new doctrines, and they were 
often more sympathetic to them. However, they did not become 
passionately committed to the new ideology and they were relieved to 
escape 're-education' and return to normal life. 
The failure of 'thought reform' to produce genuine enthusiasm 
for revolutionary ideology amongst established 'higher intellectuals' 
has a number of explanations, but two stand out. First, in nearly all 
cases, the self-criticisms and counter-attitudinal statements were made 
under heavy pressure. It was therefore very easy for the intellectuals to 
reduce dissonance by telling themselves 'I am only doing this because I 
am being made to.' Second, although they were made to participate in 
revolutionary discourse, that discourse was usually undermined 
because of countervailing evidence from other sources. Those who had 
studied overseas could not accept everything they were told about the 
capitalist West; those who came from landlord, capitalist, intellectual 
or Guomindang families knew that the 'correct' version of their parents 
was an inaccurate stereotype; experts in literature could easily pick 
holes in the crude analysis of Mao's Yan 'an Talks on Literature and Art; 
historians knew that workers and peasants were not always the moving 
force in history; and above all, higher intellectuals of all varieties were 
trained to appreciate evidence and argument, not dogmatic assertions 
from cadres less educated than themselves. In short, the Party was 
quite right to mistrust 'higher intellectuals': they might be sympathetic 
in general terms to the revolution, but their eXisting knowledge and 
habits of mind made most of them incapable of accepting the simplistic 
view of the world expressed by the revolutionary discourse of Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. (Cf. Vogel 1969, 196-7; and Wu 1993, 
for a personal account). 
The Party knew that many higher intellectuals remained 
unreformed, so it was soon mobilizing university teachers and students 
to condemn colleagues who had dubious pasts or who dissented even 
mildly from current Party orthodoxy (Wu 1993, 17-23,28-30,). This 
process reached a peak in 1955 after the veteran Marxist literary 
theorist and critic Hu Feng called for greater intellectual freedom. The 
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official reaction was swift: he was forced to confess his ideological 
crimes, his confession was rejected, he was denounced by fellow 
intellectuals at public meetings and small group study sessions, and 
there was a witch-hunt for 'Hu Feng elements' throughout the country. 
Soon the hysteria developed into a nationwide Campaign to Uproot 
Hidden Counterrevolutionaries during which 81,000 intellectuals were 
'unmasked and punished' and over 300,000 lost their civil rights 
because of their 'political unreliability' (Dittmer 1987,47-8; Wu 1993, 
34-46). 
The biggest disaster to befall China's intellectuals before the 
Cultural Revolution, however, was the Hundred Flowers Campaign and 
its tragic sequel, the great Anti-Rightist Campaign. From May 1956 Mao 
called, with increasing Vigour, for intellectuals to speak more freely. He 
asked them to criticize cadres and the Party constructively under the 
slogan 'Let a hundred flowers bloom together; let a hundred schools of 
thought contend.' Finally, in May 1957 some intellectuals began to 
take him at his word, and there followed a torrent of criticism of the 
Party's policies, personnel and methods. Many called for greater 
intellectual freedom, and a few even called for democracy. Mao and 
other leaders were shocked at the response and crushed their critics 
with the Anti-Rightist Campaign. 'The result', according to Fairbank 
and Reischauer, 'was to stigmatize and put out of action one-half to 
three-quarters of a million of China's educated elite' (1989,496). The 
labour camps swelled with intellectuals, who worked to exhaustion, 
studied Mao's Thought, engaged in criticism and self-criticism, said all 
the right things, and all too often starved to death in the terrible 
famine which soon followed (Wu 1994,73-175; Becker 1996, ch. 12). 
The Anti-Rightist Campaign employed the usual methods of 
popular mobilization, in which students and intellectuals were 
encouraged to prove their revolutionary fervour by informing on their 
teachers and colleagues, then condemning them at denunciation 
meetings. During the campaign the press, taking its cue from Mao, 
introduced a language of denunciation which matched the Party's claim 
that the Rightists, unlike most earlier class enemies, had operated in 
secret as they plotted the destruction of socialism. So they were 
identified with the colour black, a traditional metaphor for evil 
involving treachery or deception. They were accused of hiding their 
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evil natures with 'painted skin' (hua pi), described as evil spirits who 
disguised themselves as humans, and likened to savage animals, 
especially wolves (Li 1958, 53-79). This language of vilification was 
greatly enriched and far more common during the Cultural Revolution, 
and I will discuss it extensively in chapter 5. At this point, it is 
sufficient to note that in both periods it was used to dehumanize class 
enemies. 
What of the people who were repeatedly condemned? Did 
criticism, self-criticism and saying all the right things reform the 
Rightists, counterrevolutionaries, landlords, capitalists, rich peasants 
and bad elements? There is little evidence that it did. Indeed, as 
Robert J. Lifton (1961,412) has argued, 'thought reform is subject to a 
law of diminishing conversions. Repeated attempts to reform the same 
man are more likely to increase his hostility ... than to purge him of his 
"incorrect" thoughts. With each histrionic show of repentance, his 
conversion becomes more suspect.' This generalization is supported by 
the testimony of those sentenced to labour reform and labour re-
education camps. In these institutions, the inmates were compelled as 
far as possible to live within the new, revolutionary discourse, saying 
'correct' things in the 'correct' language, engaging in criticism and self-
criticism, and studying revolutionary writings. It seems rarely to have 
worked. Extensive interviews with former inmates led Martin King 
Whyte to conclude that forced re-education resulted in 'negligible or 
negative attitude changes.' (Whyte 1974,226-7). His conclusion is 
confirmed by the memoirs of former inmates like Wu Ningkun (1993), 
Harry Wu (Wu & Wakeman 1994), Zhang Xianliang (1994) and Pu Ning 
(1994), and by the torrent of demands for redress by former Rightists 
which followed Mao's death. I myself have never heard of anyone 
whose attitudes changed in the intended direction as a result of forced 
re-education, but I do know of people who were permanently 
embittered.4 
4Some reports indicate that political prisoners subjected to 'thought reform' 
in the early 1950s gave more appearance of sincerity in their self-
criticisms than their counterparts in later years. This was no doubt partly 
because political prisoners in the early years were not given fIxed 
sentences, but released when they showed evidence of reform. Moreover, 
in in the early 1950s many still naively believed that if they convinced the 
Party that they really had reformed they would have a promising future in 
the 'New China'. What we lack is any convinving evidence that their self-
criticisms were sincere. See the discussion in Whyte 1974, 193-4, 208-9. 
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The new discourse introduced by linguistic engineering did not 
convert everyone, but no one could remain untouched by it. This was 
particularly true of the language of class and class struggle, which 
affected even those who were born after 1949. The reason for this is 
that Mao kept class struggle alive by creating what amounted to a 
hereditary class system. Younger Chinese not only had a chengfen 
describing their own current role in society (,student', 'poor peasant', 
and so on), but a 'class of origin' or 'family background' (chushen or 
sometimes jiating chengfen) inherited from their fathers. Young males 
would in turn pass this class status on to their children. My father, for 
example, who was given the chengfen of 'student' in 1949 because he 
had not entered the workforce, inherited the chushen of 'poor peasant' 
(pinnong) from my grandfather, a landless rural labourer, and he 
passed this 'class of origin' on to me. We were both lucky, for people of 
'red' class origin were assumed to be revolutionary, while those who 
were of 'bad' class origin were politically suspect. My fathef-became 
an academic, and his chushen gave him a political security which his 
predominantly middle class and bad class colleagues lacked. For my 
part, I was always grateful that my 'good' class background meant that 
doors were not closed to me. At the same time, I knew that my 
mother's class origin somewhat blemished my 'red' credentials: she 
had inherited the chushen of 'landlord' (dizhu) from her father, my 
paternal grandfather's employer. I was also aware that while my 
official classification as a 'poor peasant' by origin gave me some 
political safety, it conferred little prestige, despite the 'leading role' 
which the workers and peasants were supposed to have in Mao's China. 
The children of 'revolutionary soldiers' ranked well above me, and the 
children of 'revolutionary cadres' were the true elite, envied by us all. 
This hereditary class system influenced everyone's behaviour. 
In Chen village, for example, former landlords and rich peasants were 
at the bottom of the status ladder, they were banned from political 
activities, they were shunned socially, and they were dragged out 
periodically for 'class struggle' in accordance with the slogan 'Never 
forget class bitterness!' (Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984,16,47,69; Unger 
1984). Children of the 'bad elements' were not regarded as class 
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enemies and were therefore allowed to participate in political activities, 
but because of their chushen they had little chance of political 
advancement and other children hesitated to associate with them. 
In urban areas, the social isolation of bad-class children could be 
less severe. In my school, in a university village where many students 
had undesirable backgrounds, academically oriented children of 'good' 
origins frequently made friends with similar children of 'bad' origins. 
However, in the school's numerous and prestigious political activities, 
bad-class students were severely disadvantaged, and such students had 
to adjust to some harsh realities. In periods when a strong class line 
was applied, political criteria often excluded them from further 
education (cf. Unger 1982; Lee 1978, 78-84); they had to watch less 
able people of 'good' origins get most of the desirable jobs; and their 
class backgrounds made them far less desirable as marriage partners, 
especially in the case of males who would transmit their chushen to 
their children (cf. Croll, 1981, 1984; Unger 1984). Theyalso'faced 
constant reminders of the crimes of their parents and grandparents. 
The new language of class and class struggle which the 
Communist Party introduced after 1949 at first promoted revolutionary 
transformation, but by the late 1950s its continued repetition was 
being used to keep old conflicts alive in people's hearts. It directed 
struggle against classes which no longer had any existence outside the 
discourse of class and class struggle. It fossilized attitudes, and it 
created the impression that the enemies of revolution were still a 
threat. This was very useful to a Party which could blame 'class 
enemies' for 'sabotage' every time its policies did not work, and which 
could claim that they were behind every protest. It was also, we shall 
see, very useful to Mao himself, who was able to identify his alleged 
opponents in the Party with class enemies from bygone days who were 
planning a comeback. A fictive discourse is a powerful weapon if 
people can be persuaded- of theftctlons.And, as the following chapters 
show,ma~y~p-eople were, for a time, convinced. Command of the 
discourse of class struggle, we shall see, was vital to Mao's success in 
launching the Cultural Revolution. 
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2.S Language, Love and Revolution 
The techniques of linguistic engineering discussed in the last section 
shattered the allegiance of large sections of the population to the 
traditional social order. In particular, they made large sections of the 
population active participants in the downfall of the landlords, the 
urban bourgeoisie and 'counterrevolutionary' elements associated with 
the Guomindang. T~ey shattered traditional bonds of deference, and--7 
by setting rich and poor members of the same clan against each other, I 
they helped to make class, rather than lineage, the focus of poor i 
people's loyalty (cf. Whyte 1974, 137). Class loyalty, in turn, was 
supposed to be inseparable from loyalty to the Communist Party, to 
Chairman Mao and to the revolutionary cause. 
This transference of loyalties was promoted also by social 
engineering. In the cities, the Party-controlled work units (danwei) 
assumed many of the functions of the clan and of the extended family, 
while in rural areas Party-controlled production teams and brigades 
created new vested interests and sources of solidarity (Chan, Madsen & 
Unger 1984, 31-5; Whyte 1979). As always, though, social engineering 
was complemented by linguistic engineering, as people were pressured 
and manipulated into talking in ways intended to shift the focus of 
their loyalties. 
Language had to reflect ideal revolutionary social relationships. 
So the terms xiansheng ('Mr') and taitai (,Mrs'), which had been used as 
forms of address amongst the respectable classes in the old society, 
were displaced bytongzhi ('comrade') in contexts where a title was 
appropriate. The new term, which meant literally 'common will', was 
applied to everyone except class enemies. In China before 1949, as in 
Taiwan to this day, a husband referred to his wife as wo (,my')taitai, 
and a wife to her husband as wo xiansheng. In Mao's China, however, 
the standard term for a husband or a wife became airen, which means, 
literally, 'love person'. This term had previously been used to refer to a 
lover, and its introduction in place of the obsolete xiansheng and taitai 
reflected the Communist Party's insistence that people must marry 
freely and for love, rather than having their marriages arranged to suit 
family interests. The term ai ('love'), however, when applied to true 
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love between revolutionaries, signified something quite different from 
'bourgeois' or romantic love. Elizabeth Croll (1984, 177) quotes a 1964 
booklet of advice to husbands and wives: 
In a socialist society love between a husband and wife is built on 
common political thinking and on the foundation of struggling 
together for the revolutionary cause. The relationship between 
husband and wife is first of all comradeship and the feelings 
between them are revolutionary. By revolutionary is meant that 
politically he should take her as a new comrade-in-arms, in 
production as well as in work, he should take her as a class sister 
and labour together, at home he should regard her as a life 
companion, besides that a couple should respect and love each 
other, help each other, and encourage each other so as to achieve 
progress together. 
In accordance with this, young people were supposed to assess the 
revolutionary commitment of prospective marriage partners. Indeed, 
in the early 1950s, and still in some areas in the mid-1950's, Jl1ere were 
frequently rules preventing people of 'good' class origin from marrying 
the 'former exploiting classes' (Croll 1984, 180). 
If revolutionary 'love' was supposed to be the basis of the 
relationship of husband and wife, it was also supposed to characterize 
other relationships within socialist society. Everyone was supposed to 
feel 'hot love' (re ai) for the Party and Chairman Mao, and to make sure 
that people knew what this meant the Party in 1958 launched a 
movement urging people to 'hand over their hearts to the Party' (xiang 
dang jiao xin). They were to do this by purifying their ideology and 
dedicating themselves to the revolution (Li 1962, 31-32). In the spirit 
of revolutionary love, cadres were asked to jiao zhixin pengyou 
('establish intimate relationships') with the labouring masses; they 
were told that they could turn for advice to comrades who were zhixin 
pengyou (,friends who know each other's hearts'); and, of course, 
cadres were officially loved by the peasants, who were supposed to use 
the language of popular love songs to call them zhixin ren ('the person 
who understands my heart') (Hsia 1963, 40). These ways of speaking 
expressed an ideal, and it was hoped that if people used them the ideal 
might become reality. They were also a useful means of disguising 
reality at a time when the cadres were enforcing policies which caused 
mass starvation. 
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If the language of love was appropriated and redefined by the 
Party, so was the language of family relationships. Traditional family 
loyalty was like traditional romantic love: it was an impediment to total 
revolutionary commitment. The Chinese emphasis on filial duty made 
family loyalty a dangerous rival to a Party which pressured children to 
denounce parents who were class enemies or guilty of serious political 
errors. In response, the Party devised strategies designed to redirect 
family loyalties towards itself, the revolutionary masses and the 
revolutionary cause. One way of doing this was to supply many of the 
services formerly provided by the family and the clan. Another way 
was to extend the language of family relationships to the relationship 
between individuals and their revolutionary comrades, so that love of 
family was submerged in a greater love. 
Traditionally, the term qin ren ('relatives') was used only in its 
literal sense, applying strictly to blood relatives. After 1949; however, 
the Party-controlled media popularized figurative uses of the term, so 
that the revolutionary masses as a whole became one's qin reno 
Similarly, the term xiongdi ('brother', 'brothers') was now applied 
figuratively to all comrades and added as a prefix or a suffix to words 
denoting any groups which belonged to the revolutionary family: 
xiangdi xuexiaa ('fraternal schools'), nongmin xiongdi ('peasant 
brothers'), and xiongdi guojia ('fraternal nations' - i.e. socialist ones). 
Young people all became haa ernii ('good sons and daughters') of the 
Communist Party and Chairman Mao, and children called members of 
the People's Liberation Army their jiefangjun shushu ('uncles') (cf. Li 
1957a, 17-22). 
The extension of the language of love and kinship to the Party, 
the masses and the revolutionary peoples of the world was intended to 
promote the transfer of emotional attachments to revolutionary objects. 
It probably succeeded to some extent. If nothing else, higher order 
conditioning would have tended to make revolutionary objects more 
attractive through their association with positively evaluated words. At 
the same time, we should note that this tendency towards more positive 
evaluation had to compete with opposing tendenCies, like that 
produced by the Party's role in causing mass starvation during the 
Great Leap Forward. In that case, the repeated application of positively 
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evaluated terms to the Party may in many cases have done no more 
than soften a catastrophic decline in its popularity. It may even have 
made some people hate the Party more because they objected to 
enforced professions of love for cadres who had been responsible for 
so many deaths. I shall say more on this in the final section of the 
chapter. 
We should also remember that when the language of love and 
kinship was applied to revolutionary subject matter, it did not evoke 
the same emotions as it did in other contexts. Chinese of my 
generation learned to say, without embarrassment, and even without 
emotion, that we loved Chairman Mao and the Party. What we still 
could not do was say fWO ai ni' ('I love you') to those whom we loved 
romantically: the words were simply too emotionally charged. We 
showed our love by looks, gestures, deeds and allusive words, but we 
could not express it directly. So there were, after years of linguistic 
engineering, still two kinds of love, the romantic and the revolutionary. 
We used the word ai for both loves, but that simply shows that the . 
word had acquired two meanings: its traditional, sacred meaning, 
which remained intact because we needed it to designate the emotion 
which we felt; and its new, revolutionary meaning, which we needed to 
express the very different emotion which we felt - or pretended to feel -
for the Party and our hundreds of millions of revolutionary comrades. 
No doubt there was interaction of meanings, with romantic love adding 
connotations to revolutionary love and vice versa, but interaction is not 
identity and the two meanings remained separate. 
2.6 The Discourse of Collectivization 
The language of love acquired some currency in the countryside, 
because most peasants were easily won to the broad thrust of early 
1950s Maoist discourse. trhe land reform of 1950-52 suited their 
economic interests; the tkchniques of popular mobilization implicated 
them in revolutionary discourse and caused dissonance which 
encouraged them to accept its message; and the new discourse elevated 
the status of the 'poor and lower-middle peasants' by inverting the 
social pyramid and describing them as a leading class, along with the 
workers and revolutionary cadres.' Most important of all, the discourse 
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as yet said almost nothing about the Party's plans for confiscating the 
peasants' individual holdings, replacing them with vast, Soviet-style 
collective farms ruled by cadres. 
In 1955, however, Mao insisted that the Party force the peasants 
to join relatively small cooperatives of 30 to 50 households, then in 
1956 he decreed that they should join 'higher stage cooperatives' or 
'collectives' of 200 to 300 households. They were to pool their 
resources and farm nearly all the land collectively under the direction 
of cadres, leaving no more than 5 percent of the land as private plots 
under family control. Maoist discourse now identified a new target: 
'individual peasants' (geti nongmin) , 'do it alone peasants' (dangan 
nongmin) and 'do it alone households' (dangan hu) - in other words, all 
those who stood outside the cooperatives (Li 1957a, 29-32). The 
discourse described the cooperatives as 'advanced' (xianjin) and it 
condemned individual peasants as 'backward' (luohou), 'selfish' (zisi) 
and 'capitalistic' (zibenzhuyi de). The poorest members of niral society 
often initially saw advantages in the pooling of resources, but many 
peasants - including my paternal grandparents - were reluctant to 
hand over land which they had been given only a few years before. As 
a result, many had to be forced to join, and many slaughtered their 
draught animals and sold the meat rather than surrender them. The 
formation of cooperatives was followed by widespread defiance of the 
Party and a reversion to family farming. Indeed, although by the end 
of 1956 about 96 percent of peasants nominally belonged to 
cooperatives, some 20 percent had formally withdrawn from collective 
farming. Most of the remaining peasants put as little effort as possible 
into collective labour, saving their energy and night soil for the tiny 
private plots from which they produced as much as 20-30 percent of all 
farm income. At the same time, grain yields from the collective farms 
plummeted and there was widespread famine. (On collectivization, see 
Friedmann, Pickowicz & Selden 1991, chs 7-8; Becker 1996, ch. 4; Zhou 
1996,46-48; Spence 1990, 549-51). 
The Party used the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 to purge 
doubters within its ranks and to suppress what Mao described as 'the 
counterrevolutionary activities of landlords and rich peasants' - a 
standard formula used to misrepresent the broadly based opposition to 
collectivization (cf. Friedmann, Pickowicz & Selden 1991, 209). This 
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political movement paved the way for the elimination of private plots 
and the emergence of Party-controlled 'people's communes' - gigantic 
amalgamations embracing an average of 4,600 households (calculated 
from Spence 1991, 579). The collectivist discourse which was applied to 
the commune was summed up in a song taught to the peasants in 
Raoyang County, Hebei Province: 
Communism is heaven. 
The commune is the ladder. 
If we build that ladder, 
We can climb the heights. 
[Friedmann, Pickowicz & Selden 1991].5 
The reality was that agriculture was now at the mercy of commune-level 
cadres who were ignorant or neglectful of the realities of farming, but 
who were determined to preserve their own positions by obeying the 
Maoist ideologues at the top. Mao, the chief ideologue, was determined 
to maintain the discourse of collectivism at any cost. One 'cost' was 
much of the good will of the peasants, who overwhelmingly resented 
the loss of their land and of the power to make decisions about crops 
and agricultural techniques. They now took orders on agricultural 
matters from the cadres. The result was the tragedy of the Great Leap 
Forward - a tragedy which destroyed the remaining credibility of 
collectivist discourse in most of rural China. 
2.7 Discourse of the Great Leap Forward: 
From Martial Language to Disillusionment 
The discourse of collectivization was accompanied by the 
popularization of a vast array of military terms amongst all sections of 
the population. This militarization of language is not surprising. After 
its break with the Guomindang in 1927 the Communist Party, savaged 
and pursued, was forced to become a Party-Army. Its leaders, including 
Mao, were involved for over two decades in the wars with the 
Guomindang and the Japanese. Their military experience left a deep 
impression on them, and it combined with Leninist and Stalinist 
influences to suggest models of mobilization and social control which 
51 learned a very similar song at school in Tianjin. 
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they applied to the wider society. It is not surprising that the 
terminology which they used to describe those models drew heavily 
upon the language of military organization and the language of war. 
Moreover, after 1949, when they achieved power over China as a whole, 
they applied a remarkable range of military metaphors to the business 
of everyday life. The Chinese language had been notably lacking in 
such metaphors, for the country had been ruled by scholar-
bureaucrats, not the warrior aristocracies who for so long dominated 
Europe. Mao's soldier-ideologues, however, made the language of 
everyday life probably the most militarized in the modern world. 
At no time before the Cultural Revolution was military language 
more all-pervasive than during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-61, 
which was supposed to make China rich and lay the foundations for a 
rapid transition to the paradise of communism. Consider the following 
metaphors, ably catalogued and explained by T.H. Hsia (1961), which 
were applied routinely to the tasks of production: 
1. Zhanshi (a fighter) 
[a production worker] 
2. Zhandou (to fight a battle) 
[to work hard in production] 
3. Zhanxian (a battle-line) 
[a workplace] 
4. Gangwei (a sentry post) 
[a revolutionary's appointed position in society] 
5. Da jun (a great army) 
[a large group of people organized for some project of 
socialist construction] 
6. Qian jun wan ma (a great host of mounted and foot 
soldiers) 
[a huge number of people engaged in production] 
7. Duitian xuanzhan (to declare war against heaven) 
[to overcome the obstacles which nature poses to 
production] 
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8. Zhangwuo diqing (to get hold of information about the 
enemy) 
[to secure information relevant to production, as when 
subjecting iron or to chemical analysis before smelting] 
9. Jinjun (to stage a march) 
[to advance towards a specified goal] 
10. Xiaoxing yundongzhan (small-scale, mobile warfare) 
[work which can be done bit by bit, as time allows] 
11. Tuji (to attack by storm) 
[to make a concerted effort in production] 
12. Da zhanyi (a major battle) 
[a major productive undertaking] 
13. Qjanmiezhan (a battle of annihilation) 
[an important productive undertaking assured of complete 
success] 
Such terminology was used, for example, in the great 'battle of 
annihilation' to exterminate China's sparrows. In Beijing, according to 
the People's Daily, the battle was fought by 'three million brave 
warriors with a single heart.' Led by President Liu Shaoqi, they formed 
shock brigades (tujidUl), mobile units (jidongdui), scattering and 
chasing units (honggandUl), slingshot units (dangongdui), noise-making 
units (yinxiangdui) and searching and capturing units (soupudui). 
'Everywhere defence was set up, at every pace was a sentinel mounted.' 
(Hsia 1961, 12-13, quoting People's Daily 24 April 1958), With so 
much heroism and such formidable military organization; the sparrows 
did not stand a chance. The unintended result was plagues of insects 
which the sparrows would once have eaten. These, it is said, did more 
damage to crops than the sparrows had ever done. 
Mao was always anxious to enlist the past in the service of the 
present, so the Party-controlled press resurrected legendary Chinese 
heroes to flatter the worker and peasant heroes of modern times. An 
exceptionally strong and fast worker could be called a Wu Song after a 
fictional hero renowned for his physical prowess; a hard-working old 
man could be referred to as a Huang Zhong after a famous old warrior 
of the Three Kingdoms period; a hard-working woman could become a 
Mu Gui-ying, recalling a mythical woman general of the Song dynasty; 
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the heroism of women workers could be celebrated by organizing them 
into 'Mu Guiying shock teams'; workers and peasants with knowledge 
and intelligence were identified with the legendary general, prime 
minister and royal adviser Zhuge Liang, and when they gathered 
together to advise cadres, they did so,at a 'Conference of the Zhuge 
Liangs' (Zhugeliang hui). 
The military metaphors were matched by a degree of actual 
military organization of society, for which there was of course 
appropriate military terminology. During the Great Leap Forward, 220 
million people were said to have been organized into a people's militia, 
30 million of them armed (Spence 1991, 581). Peasants marched to the 
fields behind red flags and took their weapons with them. They lived 
and worked in communes which 'were run as militarized units intended 
to be effective both in war and peace.' (Becker 1996, 144-5, plate). 
Above the communes there towered a chain of command centred in 
Beijing; below them were brigades (iii), then production teanls whose 
workers were organized into companies (lian), platoons (pai), squads 
(ban) and other units with military styles (Spence 1991, 580; Hsia 
1961, 25; Becker 1996, 108-9). 
This military organization and military language was intended to 
have two quite specific effects. It was supposed to teach individuals to 
show soldierly initiative in finding new ways to carry out commands 
from above, but to subordinate themselves utterly to the leaders who 
issued those commands; and it was supposed to transfer the urgency, 
the diScipline and-the heroism of wartime struggles to the task of 
building socialism in a time of peace. The attempt to use language to 
achieve these effects was soundly based, particularly in the case of the 
second. Higher order conditioning can certainly achieve emotional 
transference from the language of war to the activities of peace time, 
and there is some evidence that early in the Great Leap Forward it did 
exactly that. Encouraged by the militaristic and triumphalist rhetoric, a 
lot of people were at first willing to gamble that the Party was right in 
claiming that with one herculean effort China could overcome millennia 
of poverty. Their spirits buoyed by a splendid diet - they had been 
encouraged to eat all their reserves of food in the expectation of record 
crops - they often worked long hours out of enthusiasm as well as 
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compulsion (Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984,124-5; Chang 1992, 294-96; 
Friedmann, Pickowicz & Selden 1991,218-9,227,232). 
As the Great Leap Forward developed, however, the peasants 
learned that they were being given O1;ders originating from people who 
in agricultural matters were simple idiots, and no amount of 
conditioning could convince them otherwise. At Chen village, for 
example, the peasants refused to plant the next year's crops because 
they were compelled to use techniques which did not work, and 
because they knew that if they produced anything it would be taken 
from them. They preferred to scavenge from nearby hillsides or reduce 
their need for food by doing as little as possible (Chan, Madsen & 
Unger 1984, 25-6). All over China starving peasants came to loathe 
cadres who continued to enforce unworkable policies, who confiscated 
grain then left people to die, and who brutally punished anyone who 
protested (Becker 1996). The only cadres who retained the peasants' 
respect were those who suffered with them and, to the best of their 
ability, helped them to avoid the worst consequences of the policies 
handed down from above. There were many such cadres at the local 
level, but they were powerless to change the policies. Armed rebellions 
erupted in five provinces and had to be put down by the PLA; law and 
order broke down in some regions; cannibalism occurred in the worst 
affected areas; black markets started to flourish; lineage organizations 
re-emerged to provide necessities; the authority and morale of local 
cadres crumbled; and when work teams arrived to 'rectify' the cadres, 
they found the peasants angry and dissatisfied (Teiwes 1993, ch. 10; 
Becker 1996; Friedman, Pickowicz & Selden 1991, chs 9-10; Chang 
1992,291-317,555-7; Chen 1969; Lewis 1963,235-38; Ahn 1973; 
Whyte 1974,144-5; Vogel 1969, 255-6). 
People are easily enough persuaded by a discourse when it is 
consistent with their hopes and with what they know. However, a 
discourse which is massively contradicted by accumulated experience 
begins to look misdirected at best, ludicrous at worst. By 1959, the 
discourse of martial enthusiasm which had inspired the Great Leap 
Forward had begun to look ludicrous - at least to people in the 
countryside. The peasants in a particular province may, or may not, 
have believed the propaganda about record harvests in other 
provinces; but they knew that they were starving and that the Party 
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was only making their personal situation worse. In many rural areas, 
people were beginning to die, and in the next three years the deaths 
multiplied. In all, perhaps 30 million perished as a result of the famine 
(Becker 1996). The Party retained control of the rhetoric of public life, 
but it subjected rural China to a trauma which destroyed its credibility. 
A culture of resistance emerged, in which people spoke privately a 
language which expressed the realities of their lives, rather than the 
fictions of official discourse. In Hubei Province, a peasant jingle 
mocked the ignorance of cadres who pretended they knew better than 
the farmers: 
Cadres are subjective pigs; 
Wanting to change the way of farming. 
For the sake of good appearances, 
they would impose cotton growing on bad land. 
[Quoted in Zhou 1996,48]. 
Friedman, Pickowicz & Selden (1991, 240, 241, 248, 253, 26~) have 
collected some of the sayings and ditties which expressed the cynicism 
of peasants in Hebei province. One expressed resentment at the way in 
which commune officials arrived at harvest time to make the villagers 
repay credit and fulfil quotas: 
First round: return loans. 
Second round: deliver state grain. 
Commune members share the leftovers. 
Another justified stealing: 
Lower rations, 
Squash and greens instead of grain, 
Who doesn't steal gets what he deserves. 
A third satirized the power of officials whom all had to please: 
Higher-ups let out a fart, underlings try to look smart; 
Leaders move their lips, commune members run off their hips. 
A fourth expressed resentment at those who played the game best: 
Flatter shamelessly: eat delicacies and drink hot stuff. 
Don't flatter: starve to death for sure. 
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And a fifth condemned the communes: 
[T]he commune is not as good as the co-op and the co-op was not 
as good as going it alone. 
In the cities, the Party fared better. People there received 
priority in grain supplies, and while hunger and malnutrition were 
widespread, actual deaths were relatively uncommon. Moreover, the 
Party's control of the media ensured that most people remained 
unaware of the scale of the disaster in the countryside. When 
eventually it was admitted that there were 'problems', city dwellers 
lacked the peasants' first-hand knowledge of the Party's role in causing 
them. They were in no position, either, to doubt the official 
explanation of the food shortage: three years of unprecedented 
droughts and floods, together with Soviet demands that China repay 
her loans immediately and do so in food. They did not know that most 
of the 'debt repayments' were actually food exports designed to 
demonstrate the success of the Great Leap Forward; nor, in a vast 
country with many micro-climates, were they in a position to doubt 
what they were told about the bad luck with the weather. Even today, 
few realize that 'Compared to most other years during Mao's rule, 
there were fewer natural disasters during the famine.' (Becker 1996, 
279-283). 
Lies and censorship, however, could not disguise the fact that 
something had gone wrong. Even the inhabitants of privileged Beijing 
knew that the Great Leap Forward had not delivered the prosperity 
which had been promised, and that the martial rhetoric of productive 
victories did not match the facts. Language which had once seemed 
inspiring now rang hollow. In 1961, the Great Leap Forward was 
declared a 'success' to mask its failure, then brought to a close. In the 
period of reconstruction which followed, Mao's storming approach was 
abandoned. Moral incentives and calls for sacrifice were emphasised 
less, and material incentives and rational planning were emphasised 
more. The communes, whose powers had been cut back, allegedly 
continued to 'advance' (Hsia 1964, 73-4), but there was now no talk of 
imminent victory, and the more exaggerated military metaphors were 
quietly put to rest. 
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2.8 Emerging Mao Worship: 
Prelude to the Cultural Revolution 
The reverence for Mao Zedong within the Communist Party began in 
the Yan'an period. In 1940 Liu Shaoqi was already telling Party 
members: 'Only the Thought of Mao Tse-tung is able to inspire us to go 
from victory to victory .... Mao Tse-tung is the great revolutionary 
leader of all the people of China, and we should learn from him. ' 
(Dittmer 1974, 22). However, it was the Rectification of 1942-44 which 
consolidated Mao's power within the Party, and it was the Victory over 
the Guomindang in 1949 which set the seal on his dominance and 
guaranteed an audience for his Thought throughout China as a whole. 
In the early years of communist rule, Mao shared with the Party 
the credit for improvements in China's condition. Indeed, as Dittmer 
(1987,22) notes, 'charismatic infallibility was to a considerable degree 
-
"collectivized," and the Party as a whole basked in the glow of 
revolutionary herOism, all the way down to the local cadres.' Mao was 
greatly revered, but he was not worshipped, and his Thought was often 
referred to as one part of a greater unity - Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought. People spoke, increasingly, in political formulae, but 
they did not feel compelled to quote Mao at every opportunity, to 
justify their every statement by citing holy writ. My own survey of the 
first two pages of the People's Daily on the first day of every month, for 
example, shows that from 1950 to 1957 Mao was quoted on average 
only once every 5.6 pages, a tiny fraction of the rate of quotation 
achieved during the Cultural revolution (see ch. 6). Indeed, in the 
1950's, quotations from the Marxist-Leninist classics appeared more 
often than quotations from Mao. 
It was the disaster of the Great Leap Forward which 
'decollectivised' charismatic infallibility. In rural areas, especially, the 
Party's credibility plummeted, for people knew the role which its 
poliCies had played in causing the devastation. Mao's image suffered, 
too, but far less than the Party's. There were three reasons for this. 
First, Mao's own directives had been characteristically vague, so it was 
easy to believe that his subordinates had misinterpreted him, or 
botched the execution of his plans. If the policy of 'close planting' had 
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not worked, maybe it was just because local cadres had insisted that the 
peasants plant too closely. If 'deep ploughing' destroyed shallow soils, 
this was no doubt the cadres' fault, because Mao had never said 
specifically that the policy should be implemented under all conditions. 
If the cadres diverted agricultural labour to steel production so that 
they could meet their quotas, leaving crops to rot in the fields, this was 
their decision, not Mao's. If dams collapsed because of poor 
construction, that was the fault of the fault of cadres who insisted that 
they be built hastily, without proper technical assistance. 
Second, Mao's remoteness helped to preserve him from blame. 
Did Mao know that the Party was forcing peasants to persist with 
agricultural practices which had failed? Had anyone told him that the 
cadres were taking food from people's mouths so that they could justify 
their boasts of record surpluses? Did he know that people were 
starving to death? Many people believed that he did not know these 
things - that his subordinates were hiding the truth from him. They 
thought that if he knew the real situation policies would change (cf. 
Becker 1996, 268, 285; Friedman, Pickowicz & Selden 1991, 273). 
Third, when at length Party leaders like Liu Shaoqi, Deng 
Xiaoping and Chen Yun persuaded a reluctant Mao to acknowledge the 
crisis and import grain for emergency relief, the Party propaganda 
machine gave Mao the credit. The result was that, in many people's 
eyes, it was Mao who had saved them from death when those lower 
down the Party hierarchy had caused a catastrophe. Even in 1994, 
when Jasper Becker travelled China conducting interviews about the 
famine, an old woman in Henan told him that only 80 out of 300 
people in her village had survived, and that all would have perished if 
Chairman Mao had not sent troops with grain to rescue them (Becker 
1996,5). My own grandmother, who lived in one of the worst hit 
provinces, told me the same story: half the people in her village had 
starved to death, and but for Mao's intervention the rest would have 
died too. 
It was Mao who had been the driving force of the Great Leap 
Forward. At first, he did not know that nervous subordinates were 
feeding his expectations by lying to him, but later he did not want to 
know. When Peng Dehuai told him at Lushan in 1959 that people were 
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starving, Mao launched a violent verbal attack, dismissed him from his 
position as Minister of Defence and started a witch-hunt for 'Right-
opportunists' who sympathised with Pengo Then, to spite his critics, he 
re-doubled his commitment to his policies (Becker 1996, ch. 6). This 
damaged his reputation with most other leaders of the Party, because 
they knew what was going on, but it was the Party itself whose 
reputation suffered most in the eyes of the Chinese people. What was 
left of charismatic infallibility now resided in Mao alone. 
Although the Party's standing improved as Liu, Deng, Chen Yun 
and others set about restoring the economy, it could not regain its 
former standing. Mao's reputation, however, soared, for the cult of 
Mao and his Word had begun. There was nothing spontaneous about 
this Mao-cult. It was promoted by Lin Biao, the Defence Minister, whose 
strategy for personal advancement was to flatter Mao outrageously and 
encourage the worship of his Thought. Lin began the process of 
sanctifying Mao's word in his own sphere, the People's Liberation Army. 
At his instruction, soldiers were made to learn and discuss quotations 
from Mao's works. From May 1961 these quotations were printed in 
the Liberation Army Daily, then in 1964 they were published in a 
pocket-sized book - Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong - which was 
distributed throughout the PLA (Yan & Gao 1986,191). 
Once the cult of Mao's word was well established in the armed 
forces, Mao called upon the whole country to 'Learn from the PLA'. He 
accompanied this call with a battery of closely linked ideological 
campaigns. Their purpose was to reassert the brilliance of the ideology 
which had guided the Great Leap Forward, and more generally to make 
Mao's Thought the arbiter of right and wrong and the inspiration of all 
action. There was the Learn from Dazhai Campaign, in which the 
peasants were instructed to emulate a model brigade which had 
allegedly produced astonishing yields by adhering to strict socialist 
principles and following Mao's 'eight-character constitution' for 
agriculture. There was the Learn from Daqing Campaign, which 
peddled the doubtful claim that Mao's policies of 'self-reliance', moral 
incentives and dependence on workers and peasants had been 
responsible for the discovery and development of the massive oilfield 
at Daching. And there was the Campaign to Learn from Lei Feng, a 
model soldier whose life of revolutionary self-sacrifice, as revealed in a 
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fictitious diary written in his name by PLA propagandists, was based on 
total dedication to Mao's Thought (cf. Spence, 1991,597). The slogans 
'Learn from the PLA!', 'Learn from Dazhail', 'Learn from Daqing!' and 
'Learn from Lei Feng!' were on everyone's lips, summarizing a host of 
maxims which everyone had to learn, .recite and apply. 
The principle underlying all these slogans was expressed in one 
massive campaign which summed up Mao's strategy - the Campaign to 
'Study and Apply Chairman Mao's Thought'. This began in March 1964 
and continued until the Cultural Revolution. In schools, factories, 
offices, neighbourhoods and villages, teachers, cadres and special Mao 
Zedong Thought counsellors helped people to learn Mao's words, study 
them and apply them to their lives. In Chen village, for example, 
educated young people from the cities, who had been sent to serve the 
revolution in the countryside, were recruited as Mao Thought 
counsellors. They were made to learn by heart Mao's 'three constantly 
read articles' - essays dealing with the socialist virtues of servrice to the 
people, communist internationalism and perseverance in the face of 
difficulties. They were also instructed on how to present those essays 
to the peasants. Chan, Madsen and Unger (1984, 76) give one 
counsellor's recollection of their technique: 
We first had the peasants memorize quotations. Then we had 
every party member, every Communist Youth League member 
and every Mao thought Counselor [sic] memorize the entire 
articles. After that all the peasants had to memorize the articles 
too. But their level of literacy was really too low. The peasants 
weren't able to memorize the whole thing. In other localities the 
people had to get up in front of others and recite the articles 
from memory; or whole families would have to memorize them 
together; or a whole production team would memorize them 
together. These sayings of Mao were used like the Holy SCripture! 
This rote learning was complemented with intensive study sessions 
during which the articles were explained and discussed, and the 
peasants were taught how to make self-criticisms in the light of their 
teaching. It was hoped that whenever they had to make a decision, 
they would think of a relevant Mao-quote and act in accordance with its 
principles. At times, this was exactly what happened. One production 
team head recalled: 
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Some peasants did use what they were taught. If some member 
of my team lazily stopped working, some other peasant might 
ball him out, 'Hey, you're selfish. Chairman Mao tells us to work 
selflessly for the collective.' ... Some peasants patterned 
themselves on the quotes. [Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984, 80]. 
Learning entire articles was less efficient, cognitively, than learning 
slogans which summarized important points, but it had a similar effect. 
Constant repetition ,of the essays meant that key phrases sank into the 
peasants' minds, and intensive discussion turned those phrases into 
headings for schematically organized knowledge about the essays' 
practical implications. Moreover, the rote learning had one other very 
important consequence: it set Mao's writings above all others, 
reinforcing Lin's message that Mao's word was sacred, an infallible 
guide, the arbiter of right and wrong. 
The group most susceptible to emerging Mao worship was the 
school students. Unlike the workers and peasants, they spent most of 
their days in institutions which specialized in education and 
indoctrination. Moreover, except for the youngest and the slowest, they 
were literate, and this helped enormously when it came to learning and 
reciting passages from Mao's works. Most students were in fact highly 
motivated to learn, for the education system was deliberately geared to 
producing political conformists. Students' prospects of going on to 
senior high schools and universities depended not just on their 
academic performance and class origin, but on their political 
performance as well. And a good 'political performance' meant doing 
and saying all the right things with at least apparent enthusiasm and 
sincerity. Emulating Lei Feng, ambitious and idealistic students looked 
for ways of helping others, and they willingly participated in routines 
which subjected them to linguistic engineering. They learned the 'three 
constantly read articles', they tried to quote Mao at appropriate times, 
they wrote diaries filled with stock phrases of revolutionary 
commitment, and they sang 'Father is close, Mother is close, but neither 
is as close as Chairman Mao'. Often the most enthusiastic were children 
of middle class background, for students from the 'red' classes 
sometimes took it for granted that they would be numbered amongst 
the politically virtuous, while students from the 'bad' classes usually 
knew that it was no use trying. (Chan 1985, chs 1-2; Unger 1982, chs 
1-5). 
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Two quotations from Mao focused the students' activity. One was 
'Serve the people', a rallying cry which appealed to their idealism. The 
other was 'Never forget class struggle!' In part, this latter slogan 
directed attention to the past; it kept alive the memories of people who 
had suffered at the hands of landlords and the Guomindang, and it 
evoked the sometimes fictitious stories of past injustice with which the 
Communist Party justified its rule. But the slogan also linked the past 
with the present, summoning the revolutionary masses to eternal 
vigilance against the re-emergence of class enemies within socialist 
society. Such enemies included unreformed members of the 'bad 
classes' who were alleged to be plotting the dispossession of the workers 
and peasants and the restoration of capitalist, landlord and imperialist 
tyranny. Most of these, of course, were outside the Party. However, 
from 1959, when Peng Dehuai questioned the direction of the Great 
Leap Forward, Mao claimed that 'bourgeois elements' and 'petty 
bourgeois elements' had infiltrated the Party. These were people who 
had joined the Party 'organizationally', but who had not done so 'in 
terms of their thought.' (Schram 1984, esp. 40-45). Mao believed that 
they lacked enthusiasm for the ideals of the Great Leap Forward and 
were committed to preserving and extending private production and 
relaxing the controls on cultural discourse. From January 1965 he 
began to warn against 'Party persons in authority taking the capitalist 
road', even at high levels, and he directed the Cultural Revolution 
specifically at these people. The emphasis on class struggle during the 
campaign to study and apply his Thought was an important influence 
on the paSSionate attacks by Red Guards and revolutionary workers on 
Party leaders during the Cultural Revolution. 
The Campaign to Study and Apply Chairman Mao's Thought also 
prepared the way for the Cultural Revolution by making Mao's Word 
the sole criterion of right and wrong. Once that assumption was lodged 
securely and prominently in Chinese discourse, the Party's legitimacy 
depended upon its conformity to his Thought. It had no independent 
authority: its job was simply to 'study and apply' principles and 
instructions emanating from its leader. If Mao, as the definitive 
expositor of his Thought, attacked the Party for departing from it, then 
within the terms of the discourse it was impossible for the Party to deny 
the charge. Moreover, there were many millions of Chinese who had 
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grudges against individual cadres or the Party as a whole. Once they 
had Mao's backing, they were delighted to vent their frustrations by 
attacking it in his name. The discourse of the campaign to study and 
apply his Thought gave them total justification. 
As the discourse of Mao-worship developed, Party leaders 
grumbled privately about the 'vulgarization' of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought (Dittmer 1987, 38). They could not, however, make 
their misgivings public, for they knew only too well that to challenge 
the emerging discourse was to challenge Mao - a course of action which 
would result in their own destruction. They probably knew, too, that 
amongst the masses, the ritualized language of Mao-worship was taking 
hold. As we saw in chapter 1, the 'primitive affective and associational 
processes' activated by a discourse are most effective when more 
reliable sources of knowledge are not available. So making people read, 
hear, learn and recite the formulae which praised Mao, a remote figure 
known only through his writings and the discourse of worship, was far 
more effective than making them sing the praises of the Party, whose 
vices, no less than its virtues, were the subject of daily experience. 
In the villages, the language of Mao-worship took root, especially 
amongst young people. They were more likely to be literate, so they 
found it easier to learn off quotations, and they were often given the 
job of leading Mao study sessions. A young peasant in Chen village 
recalled: 
The youths truly believed in Mao's thought. In their hearts they 
really felt this Mao Zedong was something, thought every one of 
the quotations made sense. Everyone felt more progressive and 
public spirited. [Later], during the Cultural Revolution, we felt 
proud hearing the rumour that our Chairman Mao was now a 
leader of the world, that even the foreign visitors praised and 
worshipped Mao Zedong when they returned to their own 
countries. [Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984, 80-81]. 
Most young people in the cities also responded. On the one hand, the 
'three constantly read articles' and the slogan 'serve the people' evoked 
an idealistic response which focused on the inspirational leadership of 
Mao himself. On the other, the slogan 'Never forget class struggle', 
which was constantly linked to gruesome stories of life before 
Liberation, was used to focus feelings of intense class hatred. So 
116 
uniform was the discourse of class bitterness that lung Chang only once 
heard an adult say anything which contradicted it - and that adult was 
Deng Xiaoping's stepmother, who before the Cultural Revolution could 
perhaps afford to be a little loose with her tongue. When she said that 
Guomindang soldiers 'didn't always loot' and 'were not always evil', her 
words hit lung Chang 'like a bombshell', shocking her so deeply that 
she never told anyone (Chang 1992, 348-9). Most young people heard 
only authorized scripts detailing Guomindang atrocities and landlord 
opporession, and they were effective. In Anita Chan's interviews, for 
example, few students felt compassion for the suffering of class enemies 
(Chan 1985, 107-8). If these young people later behaved brutally 
towards those labelled as class enemies during the Cultural Revolution, 
it was because they had already been taught to hate them. In its 
lessons of class hatred, no less than in its lessons of self-sacrifice and 
worship of Mao, the Campaign to Study and Apply Chairman Mao 
Zedong's Thought was a school for the Cultural Revolution. 
2.9 Linguistic Engineering in China before the 
Cultural Revolution: an Assessment 
Linguistic engineering had some impressive results in China before the 
Cultural Revolution. The most striking was the fact that, by 1966, the 
discourse of Maoism was hegemonic. People used its technical 
vocabulary as a matter of course in their daily lives; they increased 
their communicative efficiency by mastering its coded formulae; they 
shouted its revolutionary slogans on cue; they knew what to say, when 
to say it, and what words to use when saying it; and, just as important, 
they knew what not to say. People might drop the formalities of the 
discourse within the family and amongst close friends, but few people 
apart from angry peasants said anything inconsistent with it. In the 
cities, especially, errors could bring betrayal from false friends, and 
they also brought reproof from loved ones who knew the danger. When 
jung Chang told her father that her new year resolution for 1965 was 'I 
will obey my grandmother' - a traditional way of promising good 
behaviour - her father shook his head: 'You should not say that. You 
should only say "I obey Chairman Mao.'" (Chang 1992, 348). By 1965, 
the Mao-cult was well advanced and the discourse had room for just a 
single source of authority. 
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There are three striking pieces of evidence for the hegemonic 
power of Maoist discourse by the time of the Cultural Revolution. The 
first arises out of a comparison of the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 
1957 with the Cultural Revolution. In both cases, Mao told the Party to 
stand back and accept criticism from outside its ranks. In the case of 
the 'Hundred Flowers', what this demonstrated was that many 
intellectuals had not accepted revolutionary discourse: their criticisms 
did not, as Mao had hoped, usually arise from revolutionary premises. 
Instead of suggesting, say, that cadres should heighten their 
revolutionary consciousness by doing regular manual labour alongside 
the workers and peasants, they complained at Party control of what 
they taught and what they wrote, at their intimidation by semi-literate 
cadres, at the savagery of campaigns directed at alleged class enemies, 
at the bans on so much foreign literature, at the slavish imitation of the 
Soviet Union, at problems caused by collectivization, at the farcical 
nature of elections in which the outcome was pre-determined~ and even 
at the Communist Party's monopoly of power (Spence 1990, 570-73). 
These complaints did not belong to the discourse of Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Zedong Thought, but to the discourse of 'bourgeois Rightists'. 
When Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966, however, 
the dominance of Maoist discourse in the public domain was absolute. 
The lesson of the Hundred Flowers Campaign and of the persecution of 
the Rightists which followed was that only a single discourse would be 
tolerated. Moreover, a further nine years of linguistic engineering had 
consolidated the power of the discourse amongst the younger 
generation, particularly in the cities, and focused it on the god-like 
image and Thought of Mao. So when in 1966 Mao again called on 
people to criticise the Party, the criticism was based entirely on Maoist 
assumptions and was expressed entirely in Maoist language. Even 
though the discourse was no longer policed by the Party, it remained 
hegemonic: people used the approved language to say things which 
were based on Mao's words or Maoist propaganda. We shall see in later 
chapters that different groups interpreted this Maoist discourse in 
contradictory ways, giving it startlingly diverse referents, but this in no 
way alters the fact that they all spoke Maoist language, based their 
criticisms on arguably Maoist assumptions, and defended ostensibly 
Maoist goals. 
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The second piece of evidence arises from the behaviour of the 
Party when it was under attack. Its leaders might try to defend 
themselves in public or appeal to Mao in private, but they always did so 
within the terms of the discourse, even when it was being used to 
destroy them. Inwardly, they might believe that Mao was a tyrant gone 
mad, but they could never say this in public. They had to accept that 
Mao's Word was the criterion of correct thought, and when they 
defended themselves they had to use Maoist language to say Maoist 
things. The model defence, which has become part of Chinese political 
folklore, was given by Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister. Confronted by his 
accusers at a public meeting, he asked all those present to open their 
copies of Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedongat page 271. When 
they did so, they found themselves staring at a blank page after the last 
printed quotation. Looking at the page, and quoting words once 
spoken by Chairman Mao, Chen Yi recited, 'Chen Yi is a good comrade.' 
His critics fell silent. 
Third, there is abundant evidence that by 1966 Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought supplied the most accessible categories 
of political expression and social analysis, especially amongst younger 
Chinese. Franz Schurmann, who interviewed many former mainlanders 
in Hong Kong, found amongst them a good many 'anti-Communist 
refugees whose way of thinking and acting is still essentially the same 
as it was on the Mainland.' In particular, they retained the 'special 
categories and language' of Maoist thought (Schurmann 1968, 48-9). 
Martin King Whyte discovered something similar when he interviewed 
Chinese students who arrived in Hong Kong between 1962 and 1968: 
Students of various motivations and degrees of activism 
generally phrased much of their discourse in ideological terms. 
Nobody felt hypocritical about using lofty words about class 
struggle or serving the people to characterize and justify his 
ordinary daily activities. This language had become the accepted 
form of discourse. Whatever the alteration in students' 
underlying attitudes, the fact that they at least analysed 
situations and actions in ideological terms must be considered an 
important kind of thought reform. [Whyte 1974, 124]. 
This matches perfectly my own childhood memories, the recollections 
of older friends, and the unanimous testimony of autobiographies 
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written by those who participated as young people in the Cultural 
Revolution (Chang 1992; Gao 1987; Min 1993; Liang & Shapiro 1983; 
Zhai 1992; Bennett & Montaperto 1971; Ling 1972). Younger Chinese, 
and many older ones too, found that the language of revolution tripped 
easily off the tongue. They used it without embarrassment, whether 
debating theoretical questions or discussing the political implications of 
the details of everyday life. This situation was a direct result of the fact 
that they used the language day in day out. 'Mere exposure' made it 
seem natural, and even attractive, and constant repetition ensured that 
the concepts and schemas to which it was linked were more accessible 
than any alternatives. When the Red Guards began their own 
newspapers during the Cultural Revolution, from the very start they 
applied the categories of Mao's Thought with great facility. This change 
in the 'natural' categories of thought was one of the most impressive 
results of linguistic engineering. 
When a discourse becomes hegemonic, it not only affe-cts the 
concepts and schemas which we use in the rational interpretation of 
experience, but it activates a multitude of sub-rational persuasive 
mechanisms: 
II» It turns everyone into a model of 'correct' thought, making 
dissidents feel totally alone, even leading them to doubt their own 
judgment. 
• It means that participation in the discourse is a condition of 
acceptance by virtually every reference group in the country, 
subjecting doubters to strong reference group effects. 
• It makes orthodoxies which are supported by no evidence sound 
more plausible, because their constant repetition activates the 
validity effect. 
• It deploys positive and negative terms in ways which facilitate 
higher order conditioning, with friends systematically 
associated with positive terms and enemies systematically associated 
with negative ones. 
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GIl Participating in the discourse can bring rewards, while non-
participation brings punishment, and both rewards and punishment 
can affect attitudes through operant conditioning. 
CD The discourse leads people to make statements which are relevant 
only in the context of politically correct assumptions, consolidating 
those assumptions through retroactive strengthening. 
• It leads people with unformed attitudes to make politically correct 
statements from which, as self-perception theorists hold, they 
can then infer what they think. 
• It leads people with 'incorrect' views to say things inconsistent with 
those views, producing unpleasant feelings of cognitive 
dissonance which can motivate the adoption of 'correct' views. 
These mechanisms help to explain why the introduction of a new 
and ultimately hegemonic discourse in China had some very real 
successes. Its most spectacular early success was in provoking 
dissonance which led workers and peasants to turn rapidly against their 
traditional superiors. However, the discourse was equally effective in 
swaying attitudes when people had no alternative sources of 
information. Most people were easily persuaded to worship Mao 
because they knew him only through the discourse; most were easily 
persuaded to believe fictions about the outside world because they had 
no other sources of information; and younger Chinese were easily 
persuaded to adopt a distorted view of pre-Liberation China because 
they were too young to know that the reality was more complicated. 
It was when the discourse contradicted people's experiences or 
well-supported beliefs that it had its biggest failures. The discourse of 
the Party's superior wisdom did not persuade intellectuals to agree with 
the cadres who told them what to write, teach and think; the discourse 
of socialism did not make the peasants love full-scale collectivization or 
the communes; the discourse of abundance during the Great Leap 
Forward did not deprive people of the knowledge that they were 
starving; and constant repetition of the slogan 'Ours is a great Party, a 
correct Party, a glorious Party' could not hide from the peasants the 
121 
fact that in promoting the Great Leap Forward the Party had blundered 
calamitously. 
Linguistic engineering was equally unsuccessful in persuading 
landlords, capitalists, counterrevolutionaries, rich peasants, bad 
elements and Rightists to accept the official view of themselves. They 
knew too much to see themselves as the discourse described them - as 
one-dimensional embodiments of evil. Their children were not 
persuaded, either. They were pressed to denounce their parents, but 
few did. Victims of discrimination, they often grumbled amongst 
themselves and developed their own sub-culture. One bad-class 
interviewee told Anita Chan, 'If we became red we were degrading 
ourselves' (Chan 1985, 119). When the discourse came up against self-
interest and self-knowledge and self-respect, its effectiveness was 
limited. 
Both the successes and the failures of linguistic engineering 
prepared the way for the Cultural Revolution. The inability of official 
discourse to repair the Party's image problem after the Great Leap 
Forward made it much easier for Mao to persuade the 'revolutionary 
masses' to attack it during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time, 
the success of linguistic engineering in persuading young people to 
worship Mao, to love socialism and to hate class enemies enabled him 
to use student Red Guards as 'shock troops' in his assault on the Party 
and on China's traditional culture. The establishment of a hegemonic 
Maoist discourse was a precondition of the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao had enormous faith in discourse and in the linguistic 
engineering which sustained it. When he launched the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966, he gambled everything on the power of discourse. 
In turning the Red Guards against the Party, he was destroying the 
institution which had hitherto been the main basis of his power. He 
still had in reserve the perhaps doubtful loyalty of the PLA, but his 
strategy was to try to direct events primarily by manipulating 
discourse. What happened when he embarked on this extraordinary 
course of action is discussed in Part II of this thesis. 
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II 
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 1966-68: 
MASS MOBILIZATION, 
LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION 
CHAPTER 3 
LANGUAGE, CONTEXT AND INTERPRETATION: 
MAO'S MANIPULATION OF MEANING 
DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
3.1 Background to the Cultural Revolution 
The Cultural Revolution had its origins in the Communist Party's response 
to the failure of the People's Communes and the Great Leap Forward. Faced 
with incontrovertible evidence of disaster in late 1960 and early 1961, Mao 
was persuaded by his deputy Liu Shaoqi, Party secretary Deng Xiaoping and 
others that a change of course was necessary. The biggest reversal of policy 
affected the communes, which survived in theory but with few actual 
--
functions. The right to make economic decisions and receive payments was 
. given to local production teams, strengthening the link between rewards 
and individual effort; small plots of land were 'lent' to the peasants for 
private cultivation; rural free markets were allowed to re-emerge; and the 
hated communal mess halls were abolished. There were matching reforms 
in industry, there was renewed emphasis on academic achievement at the 
expense of ideological indoctrination, and restrictions on intellectual debate 
were eased. All these changes were embodied in directives from the Central 
Committee and endorsed by Mao himself (Teiwes 1993, 345-56, 369-71; 
Baum 1975,162; Becker 1996,242-3; Goldman 1981,19-21; Lii 1993,13-49). 
Unlike Liu and Deng, however, Mao never conceded that the 
communes and the Great Leap Forward were fundamentally misconceived, 
nor did he abandon his unorthodox views on agricultural techniques. In his 
eyes, the attempt to convert China into the world's first full Communist 
society had failed only because he and other leaders had made mistakes, 
because over-enthusiastic 'left adventurists' had misinterpreted his Thought, 
and because 'right opportunists' had undermined his poliCies (Becker 1996, 
235-254; Teiwes 1993, 311-18, 324-7, 335-56). He may also have believed the 
fiction, devised by his Party's propagandists for public consumption, that 
the crops had failed for three successive years largely because of bad 
weather. What we know is that Mao brooded about the frustration of his 
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frustration of his plans and tried to create the conditions in which he could 
succeed with a second attempt at a transition to full socialism as the 
prelude to the nirvana of communism. 
The failure of the Great Leap Forward laid the seeds of the Cultural 
Revolution because it sharpened the rift between determined ideologists like 
Mao and pragmatists like Liu and Deng. Mao was prepared to let the 
pragmatists dismantle some of his policies as a temporary measure to 
eliminate mass starvation, for he himself could suggest no alternative. But 
in some regions officials desperate to end the starvation permitted practices 
outside the letter of the Central Committee's directives, including eveQ an 
unofficial reversion to family farming (Zhou 1996,48-51). Mao therefore 
began to view the reforms as 'the breeding ground for rampant revisionism 
in the Party and the precursor to capitalist restoration in China as a whole.' 
(Joseph 1984, 76). He became especially suspicious of those like Liu and 
Deng, who had urged the reforms and supervised their implementation. His 
suspicions were encouraged by Jiang Qjng, Lin Biao, Kang Sheng and others, 
. who resented the power of Liu and his supporters within the Party. These 
people had regular contact with Mao, and he was all the more ready to 
listen to them because he had retired from the 'first line' of policy making 
and was no longer discussing policy with Liu and Deng on a regular basis. 
he began to complain that he was not sufficiently consulted, accusing Deng 
of never seeking his advice and treating him like a 'dead ancestor' at Party 
meetings (Joseph 1984, 262 n.65). As for Liu, by 1962 Mao was accusing 
him of establishing an 'independent kingdom' in policy matters (Teiwes 
1993, 375, 393). 
Mao's suspicions of Liu, at least, were largely without foundation. 
Indeed, in accordance with Mao's wishes, Liu used the Socialist Education 
Movement to suppress covert resumption of family farming and excessive 
reliance on private plots. But Mao no longer trusted him, and by January 
1965 he had decided to remove him from his leading position (Teiwes 1993, 
xli-xliv, 399-445; Lii 1993, 145; Jin 1995, 128-9,254).1 Convinced that the 
1 Some Western historian have argued that Mao did not decide to topple Liu 
Shaoqi until he 'failed the test' by mismanaging the Cultural Revolution. 
This view is decisively refuted by Chinese historians, who do not doubt that 
by January 1965 Mao had decided to remove Liu from the leadership. This 
is what Mao himself said; it is what Zhou Enlai said; it is supported by the 
fact that from early 1965 Mao took a series of steps which prepared the way 
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Party was riddled with 'capitalist roaders' - by which he meant everyone 
who doubted the fundamental soundness of the communes and the Great 
Leap - he also decided to purge other highly placed leaders like Deng 
Xiaoping and Peng Zhen, the mayor of Beijing. And, to ensure that those 
who replaced them could be trusted to preserve the communes and 
implement another Great Leap, he decided to purify the whole Party. 
How was this to be done? How could an impure party be trusted to 
purify itself? If asked to conduct a massive purge, with themselves as its 
principal victims, might not Liu and other leaders unite against him? And 
how could Mao get rid of the 'capitalist roaders' for good, when the 
established Party procedure was to retain the services of leaders who 
confessed their errors and promised reform? Mao's solution to these 
problems was to take the whole reform process out of the Party's hands and 
tum it over to the Chinese people. He would ask the people, who had been 
taught to worship him, to purify the Party, scrutinizing the words and 
actions of its members against the mirror of his Thought. He Would give the 
. party what he called a 'shock', subjecting it to the trauma of the Cultural 
Revolution (Teiwes 1993,466). And in the process he would raise the 
revolutionary consciousness of 'the masses' by making them his agents in 
the struggle. So the political purge would be part of a wider process of 
ideological and cultural transformation. 
Mao's first task was to create a gap between his Thought and the 
Party's practice, putting the Party clearly in the wrong. His problem was 
that the Party, despite his suspicions, had generally followed his line closely 
(Teiwes 1993; Jin 1995, 84). What is more, nearly everyone thought that 
the Party, despite mistakes and the lapses of individual members, had tried 
to be his faithful servant. So to convict the Party of wrong-doing, Mao had 
to change people's assumptions about what his Thought involved, then get 
for his attack on the Party; and it is supported by the argument of this 
chapter that the only 'test' which Mao set Liu was one which Liu would 
inevitably fail when Mao trapped him by switching the context of 
interpretation. However, although Mao plotted Liu's downfall well in 
advance, it seems that he did not originally intend to let him fall so far -
handing him over to the Red Guards, allowing him to be framed as a class 
enemy, and leaving him to die, his illnesses untended. On this last point, 
see Dittmer 1974; for the views of Chinese historians, see Lil 1993, Jin 1995, 
Yan & Gao 1996, and also the reports of conversations with Chinese 
historians in Teiwes 1993, xli-xliv. 
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them to reinterpret the words and actions of the Party's members in the 
context of those assumptions. He did this in three stages, taking care not to 
alert the Party too early to the fact that it was his ultimate target. 
In the first stage, he used the Party media, which were always sensitive 
to his explicitly expressed wishes, to popularize the new interpretive 
assumptions in a campaign directed at writers who had praised the reforms 
of 1961-62, and who had thereby indirectly criticised the mistakes of the 
Great Leap Forward. Since the campaign was directed at the peripheral area 
of culture, the Party as a whole had no reason to be alarmed. It supported 
the campaign against the writers, teaching the new assumptions to the 
Chinese people, never realizing that Mao would one day use those same 
assumptions to reinterpret the words and actions of the Party leaders 
themselves. 
In the second stage, Mao spread what had been a purely 'Cultural 
Revolution' to the schools and universities, calling on the stud~nts to use 
the new interpretive assumptions to root out 'anti-socialist' elements in 
educational institutions. Again, people like Liu Shaoqi had no reason to feel 
threatened, especially since Mao entrusted to them the task of supervising 
the Revolution. They sent out work teams to ensure that students were 
thoroughly indoctrinated with the new assumptions, while taking care that 
they were not turned against the Party itself. 
In the third stage, having used the Party to whip up youthful 
enthusiasm for the Revolution, Mao accused Liu and other leaders of using 
the work teams to suppress it. He demanded that the masses be allowed to 
mobilize freely, using the new assumptions to criticise the Party itself. The 
Party, once the organizer of the Cultural Revolution, was now revealed as its 
main target. Even worse, Mao now introduced yet a new interpretive 
assumption: that everyone who had attempted to direct the Revolution, 
rather than allowing the masses to mobilize freely, was a counter-
revolutionary. So the whole Party had sinned, and Mao called upon the 
masses to deliver judgment upon it and mete out punishment. The result 
was the virtual destruction of the Party in late 1966 and early 1967. 
This chapter will use the framework provided by Relevance Theory to 
show how Mao and his supporters were able to manipulate the context of 
interpretation by introducing the new assumptions. In this way, they led 
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the 'revolutionary masses' to adopt new readings of what people had said 
and done during the reform period in 1961-62 and during the early stages 
of the Cultural Revolution. So words which had once been understood as 
supporting socialism were now construed as anti-socialist, and those who 
had uttered them were attacked in Mao's name. 
The chapter will also show how the new interpretive assumptions 
could be used to attribute counter-revolutionary sentiments to anyone at 
all. My task, again within the framework provided by Relevance Theory, 
will be to show how other assumptions led them to single out particular 
groups of people for attack. I will also show how contrasting assumptions 
held by people with different class backgrounds produced divergent 
interpretations of Mao's message. This led to the emergence of different 
factions of Red Guards and workers, all fighting each other in Mao's name. 
Finally, the chapter will describe how Mao, having created a new set of 
interpretive assumptions to bring about the Cultural Revolution in 1966, 
. lost control of the context of interpretation during 1967 and early 1968 as 
the country plunged into chaos. He then abandoned some of the 
assumptions which he had used to initiate the Revolution, and in mid-1968 
used the People's Liberation Army to restore order and enforce yet another 
set of interpretive assumptions. Within this new context of interpretation, 
the words and deeds of the revolutionary students who had served his 
purpose by sweeping away the Communist Party were seen as counter-
revolutionary. 
For most Chinese, Mao was a god with great authority and even 
greater power. His authority meant that most people believed whatever he 
told them. He could also use his power to make people say things, whether 
or not they believed what they said. And whenever they wrote or spoke, he 
could frequently change the meaning of their words by manipulating the 
context of interpretation. It was Mao's dominance of the word and his 
ability partially to determine meaning which was the basis of his power 
during the early months of the Cultural Revolution. And, we shall see, it 
was his eventual inability to control the context of interpretation 
undermined his control of meaning and forced him to resort to force to 
restore order. 
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3.2 The Protagonists: Mao's Supporters and their Victims 
In launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao relied upon two groups. The first 
was the People's Liberation Army (PLA), under the Defence Minister Lin Biao. 
Since Mao first began to doubt the loyalty of senior ministers in 1962, Lin 
Biao had won his favour by displays of constant sycophancy, by promoting 
the study of Mao's Quotations and by orchestrating the personality cult 
which led many millions of young Chinese to think of their Great Leader as 
a god. Then, in the months leading up to the Cultural Revolution, the PLA 
took an important role in promoting an intensified Mao-study campaign. 
This laid the basis for Mao's strategy of mobilizing the population to 
scrutinize the Party in the light of his Thought (Baum 1975, 138-9, 143, 145-
6; Dittmer 1987, 79,118; Jin 1995, 134-7). Moreover, when Mao moved 
against the Party in 1966, both Lin Biao and the PLA gave him consistent 
support. And, as the Party crumbled, the PLA grew in influence and power. 
Mao's second group of supporters consisted of his wife Jiang Qjng, her 
long-time supporter Kang Sheng and a group of radical intellectuals whom 
she had gathered around her. The most notable of these were the Shanghai 
intellectuals Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao. Jiang Qjng and her group 
had at first no institutional power, but they had Mao's support, they had 
the full cooperation of Lin Biao and the PLA, and they had ready access to 
the Liberation Army Daily and radical Shanghai newspapers. Moreover, 
with Mao's backing they could publish their views in other outlets. They 
worked very closely with him in launching the Cultural Revolution, working 
out strategy, giving him drafts of articles for comment and approval, and 
consulting him on all major issues. It was their writings which articulated 
the successive shifts in the context of interpretation which gave the 
Revolution its momentum. And, as the Party collapsed under the assaults 
which they orchestrated, their power grew. 
Mao's strategy was calculated to weaken the Party's position, while 
giving no indication that he was preparing a full scale assault. What he did 
was to focus his attack on the party's vulnerable cultural policy, giving no 
hint that he intended to cause an upheaval in the Party as a whole. To do 
this he chose as his targets three writers who had enthusiastically supported 
the reforms of 1961-62. Equally important, they were linked to the central 
Propaganda Department, to the Ministry of Culture, to the Beijing press and 
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to Peng Zhen - the Mayor of Beijing, an influential formulator of cultural 
policy and in Mao's mind a leading 'capitalist roader'. If these writers could 
be discredited, then with skilful management the issue could be used to 
justify a purge of their protectors. Mao could then nominate replacements 
who were loyal to him, rather than to the Party, and strengthen his position 
for a more extensive attack. 
The three writers who served Mao's purpose were the historian, 
essayist, playwright and vice-mayor of Beijing, Wu Han; the historian, 
journalist and member of the secretariat of the Beijing Party Committee, 
Deng Tuo; and the writer Liao Mosha, a prominent member of the Beijing 
Party Committee and the central Propaganda Department. Wu Han was an 
expert on Ming history whom Mao admired and invited for private talks 
about his research. He had written a series of articles and a play on the 
upright Ming official Hai Rui, who was dismissed from office after fighting 
the peasants' oppressors and boldly criticising the emperor for dogmatism 
and foolish policies. His most specific targets were almost the excesses of the 
Great Leap Forward and Mao himself (Pusey 1969), but he expressed himself 
in allegories which could be interpreted in more general ways.2 Amongst 
those who preferred a more general interpretation was Mao himself, who in 
1963 and 1964 protected Wu Han from attack by Jiang Qjng, Kang Sheng 
and their circle. More important for Mao's purposes, Wu Han was also 
protected by Peng Zhen and the Propaganda Department, so if he lost Mao's 
favour they were in danger. (Goldman 1981, 118, 130; Teiwes 1993, lxi, 461; 
Jin 1995, 139-41; Yan & Gao 1996, ch. 1). 
2 Chinese historians, anxious to defend victims of the Cultural Revolution, 
deny that Wu Han made Mao and the Great Leap his targets. (See, for 
instance, Jin 1995, 139-41, and Yan & Gao 1996, ch. 1). These historians 
take at face value Wu Han's public criticism of 'right opportunist elements', 
suppressed by Mao, who might think of themselves as Hai Ruis dismissed for 
speaking out about the Great Leap. Western historians, by contrast, have 
seen Wu Han's criticism as not only a matter of common prudence, but as 
evidence that he saw the connection between the 'right opportunists' and 
Hai RuL He may even have used the criticism as a politically correct way of 
advertising the connection (Pusey 1969). Whatever the merits of this last 
point, my own view is that Wu Han,. like most in his circle, sympathised 
with the views of the 'right opportunists'. His criticisms of 'right 
opportunists', even when allegorically defending them, were the price of 
survival in Mao's China. 
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Wu Han, Deng Tuo and Liao Mosha attracted the attention of the 
Jiang Qjng and her radical intellectuals with a series of essays in the Beijing 
journal Frontline published between January 1961 and September 1962 
under the title 'Notes from Three-Family Village'. Some of the essays were 
subtle allegories criticising aspects of th~ Great Leap Forward and extreme 
Left policies and thinking. Distasteful as these essays were to Jiang Qjng 
and her circle, nearly everything in them was perfectly in line with official 
Communist Party policy. Mao himself recognized that Leftist errors had 
caused problems and he criticized them, even where they were based upon 
enthusiastic interpretations of his own earlier pronouncements. Moreover, 
as we have seen, Mao went along with the emasculation of the communes, 
the partial restoration of private production and free markets, attempts to 
raise academic standards, and the easing of restrictions on intellectual 
debate. He even advocated better relations with 'revisionist' Russia and 
sanctioned the rehabilitation of some officials who in 1959-60 had been 
criticized as 'right opportunists' but whose skills were now needed to 
stabilize the economy (Teiwes 1993, 312-18, 325-7, 345-56, 369·:73; Joseph 
1984,82-119; Baum 1975, 162). It was only in August 1962, when the 
spectre of mass starvation had begun to fade, that Mao let it be known that 
the reform process which he had endorsed had gone too far and should be 
rolled back. And, obediently, most members of the Party did exactly what 
they thought he wanted. Deng Tuo immediately stopped writing 'Evening 
Chats at Yanshan', Wu Han said nothing more about Hai Rui, and 'Notes 
from Three Family Village' became totally innocuous. They knew Mao's 
power, and as good communists schooled in democratic centralism, they 
toed the new Party line. 
This did not save them during the Cultural Revolution, for Mao's aim 
was precisely to purge those who had welcomed the policies which he 
himself had reluctantly backed between January 1961 and August 1962. 
The three writers exemplified the sort of people whom he no longer trusted. 
However, to justify their fate, Mao had to construe their words and actions 
in the period January 1961-August 1962 as deliberate attacks on his policies 
and on those of the Communist Party Central Committee which he 
dominated. How was this to be managed? Simply by insisting that 
everyone accept a Revised Version of what Mao and the Central Committee 
had said and done at the time - a version which falsely denied Mao's 
complicity in the policies which he now condemned. This Revised Version, 
we shall see, was part of a radically new context of interpretation which 
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enabled attempts to defend socialist principles in 1961-62 to be 
reinterpreted as attempts to destroy it. 
3.3 Mao's First Shift in the Context of Interpretation: 
the Campaign against Wu Han 
When Mao decided to get rid of Liu Shaoqi in January 1965, it took him 
only a few months to set in train a course of events which would not only 
topple Liu but all the other Party leaders whom he suspected of betraying 
his Thought. He took the first step when he commissioned Jiang Qing and 
her group to prepare a critique of Wu Han's play Rai Rui Dismissed from 
Office. Yao Wenyuan wrote the critique, but it went through nine drafts, 
was extensively discussed, and Mao himself went over it three times (Jin 
1995,139-41). The article accused Wu Han of praising feudal values, and of 
allegorically criticizing the Great leap Forward and collective ownership of 
land. It also hinted that he was calling for the reinstatement of the 'right-
. opportunists' whom Mao had dismissed for criticizing the Great Leap 
Forward in 1959. The critique was trenchant, but Wu Han was addressed as 
'Comrade' to indicate that although he had committed errors he was not 
considered an opponent of the Party (Pusey 1969). 
When the article first appeared in a Shanghai newspaper, it brought 
predictable protests from the Beijing Party Committee, led by Peng Zhen. 
What angered them was that Yao Wenyuan had broken Party norms by 
attacking someone under the jurisdiction of another municipal committee 
and that he had by-passed the central Party group headed by Peng Zhen 
whose task was to oversee the reform of culture. However, once Mao let it be 
known that the article had his blessing, Peng Zhen took steps to publicize it 
widely. Then Mao set his trap, putting Peng Zhen in charge of the criticism 
of Wu Han while letting him believe that the latter's offence was relatively 
minor. He let Peng Zhen think that a couple of months of academic 
criticism was all that was required and even assured him that Wu Han 
could continue as vice-mayor after the criticism had concluded. So Peng 
did what he thought Mao wanted, and on the basis of his assurances about 
Mao's attitude the central Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Culture, 
the People's Daily and the Central Committee itself all endorsed a mild 
prosecution of Wu Han, defending him from the most serious charges. (On 
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the above, see Teiwes 1993, xliii-xliv, lx-lxi, 460-67, 505 n.l08, 510 nn.167-70; 
Lu 1993, 193-204). 
In all of this, Mao was being deliberately deceitful. As Jiang Qjng put 
it, 'Peng Zhen was risking his life to protect Wu Han. While the Chairman 
was well aware of this, he didn't want to say it openly.' (Teiwes 1993, 462; 
Lu 1993, 197). Then on 28 March 1966 Mao dropped his bombshell, 
declaring with his full authority that Wu Han was anti-socialist, that Hai 
Rui did indeed represent the right-opportunists, and that the play was an 
attack on the Central Committee and Mao himself. He accused the Party's 
cultural officials of ignoring instructions to deal with people like Wu Han 
and declared that the central Propaganda Department 'is literally lithe 
imperial court of Hades,1I and we are duty-bound to overthrow it.' (Jin 1995, 
149; Goldman 1981, 130). He viciously attacked Peng Zhen, falsely but 
plausibly accusing him of defying his wishes and of misleading the Central 
Committee about the correct attitude to Wu Han. So Mao had tricked Peng 
Zhen, the central Propaganda Department, the cultural officials and the 
People's Daily into appearing to defy him (cf. Jin 1995, 144). He had done 
this, moreover, using what was to become his standard tactic during the 
Cultural Revolution: he had 'framed' his victims by using his 
unchallengeable authority to change the context of interpretation. By 
revealing his 'true' attitude towards Wu Han and by misrepresenting what 
he had said to Peng Zhen, Mao had supplied to the Central Committee a 
new set of interpretive assumptions: 
1. Wu Han had deliberately attacked socialism, the Central 
Committee and Mao himself. 
2. Mao had indicated to Peng Zhen that Wu Han should be attacked as 
an anti-Party element, rather than given mild academic criticism as a 
comrade who had committed errors of thought. 
3. Peng Zhen had ignored Mao's instructions. 
4. Peng Zhen had deceived the Central Committee about Mao's 
wishes. 
These assumptions did not affect the Central Committee's view as to what 
message Peng Zhen had intended to convey, but they radically changed its 
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interpretation of (a) what he really thought and (b) what he was trying to 
achieve by conveying that message. Once the new assumptions were 
accepted, Peng Zhen's report to the Central Committee had to be construed 
as a dishonest attempt to protect an anti-socialist, anti-Party element from 
criticism, and as defiance of the authority of the leader of the Central 
Committee - Chairman Mao himself. The inevitable conclusion was that 
Peng Zhen, like Wu Han, was an anti-Party element, as were the propaganda 
department and others named by Mao as Wu Han's protectors. 
However, Mao's attack on Wu Han's alleged anti-socialist protectors 
was carefully limited in scope, for his fourth interpretive assumption let 
most members of the Central Committee off the hook, allowing that it was 
only because Peng Zhen had deceived them that they had been content with 
a campaign of mild academic criticism against Wu Han. So by making 
excuses for the Central Committee, Mao gave it a chance to redeem itself. 
Its members could save their own necks by enthusiastically following its 
Chairman's line. This meant that Mao was able to use its power and that of 
. the central Party organs to bring down Peng Zhen and the Beijing Municipal 
Committee, and to purge the central Propaganda Department, the Ministry 
of Culture and the People's Daily. In every case he was able to replace 
disgraced officials with allies obedient to his will. He was also able to get 
the Central Committee to set up a Cultural Revolution Group whose key 
members were his own secretary, Chen Boda, his wife Jiang Qjng, her old 
patron Kang Sheng and her group of radical intellectuals. He had thus 
gained total control of the media, propaganda and culture, as well as giving 
his closest supporters a position of institutional power mandated by the 
Central Committee itself. But all of this took about two months, and to 
hasten the process and prepare the ground for a full scale attack on the 
Party leadership, Mao executed two further shifts in the context of 
interpretation. These are the subjects of the following two sections. 
3.4 Mao's Second Shift in the Context of Interpretation: 
the Campaign against Deng Tuo and 'Three Family Village' 
Mao's onslaught against Peng Zhen was the signal for a greatly intensified 
blitz against Wu Han. From the beginning of April until 8 May the People's 
Daily published no fewer than 64 articles attacking him for his 'political 
crimes', his 'academic errors' and his bourgeois background (Pusey 1969, 50, 
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58-9). Most of the articles were very long. But after 8 May, criticism of Wu 
Han was almost entirely subsumed by a wider campaign against 'Three-
Family Village', whose other residents were his colleagues Deng Tuo and Liao 
Mosha. Deng Tuo, as secretary of the Beijing Party Committee and founder 
and editor of its theoretical journal Frontline, was the senior member of the 
group and very much the principal focus of criticism. The critiques covered 
not only his part in producing 'Notes from Three-Family Village' but his 
other writings - including a history of famine relief in China and, especially, 
a column which he wrote under the title 'Evening Chats at Yanshan'. The 
attacks twisted his words and ruthlessly distorted the context in which they 
were written, using techniques developed by Kang Sheng during the Party 
Rectification of 1942-44. (An example of Kang's technique is reproduced in 
Dai 1994, 146-55). 
The campaigns against Wu Han and 'Three-Family Village' overlapped 
for a time, for the latter had been initiated on 8 March by none other than 
Jiang Qjng, writing under the pen-name of Gao Ju in the Liberation Army 
Daily (Chuang 1970, 19). Basing itself squarely on the Revised Version of 
Party history which denied Mao's complicity in the reforms of 1961-62, her 
article bore the title 'Open Fire at the Black Anti-Party and Anti-socialist 
Line!' It described Deng Tuo as 'the manager of the Three-Family Village 
"gangster inn" run by Wu Han, Liao Mosha and himself, then called for a 
crusade: 
Deng Tuo's 'Evening Chats at Yenshan [Yanshan]' is couched in one 
hundred per cent gangster double talk which is directed against the 
Party and against socialism. We must identify it, see through it and 
uncover it, ridding it of its disguises and exposing the ugly anti-Party 
and anti-socialist features of Deng Tuo and his clique to the light of 
day. [Quoted in Chuang 1970, 19]. 
In the wake of Jiang Qjng's onslaught, criticism of 'Three-Family Village' was 
carefully orchestrated, reaching a crescendo in May and June when the 
official newspapers spent at least one page every day denouncing Deng Tuo 
alone (Chuang 1970, 19). This literature of denunciation played an 
important role in spreading the interpretive assumptions which are the 
focus of this chapter. These assumptions were used to justify Mao's claim 
that highly placed members of the Party had abandoned socialism, they 
were used to give new meanings to the words and actions of countless 
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others, and they helped to give the Cultural Revolution its capricious and 
terrible character. 
To uncover these assumptions, I will use the framework provided by 
Relevance Theory to examine the most famous attack on the writings of 
Deng Tuo, Wu Han and Liao Mosha: Yao Wenyuan's 'On "Three-Family 
Village" - The Reactionary Nature of Evening Chats at Yenshan and Notes 
from Three-Family Village'. This essay was first published in two Shanghai 
newspapers on 10 May 1966, and its essential parts have been translated 
into English and published under the title 'Destroy the "Gangster Inn" Run 
by Deng Tuo, Wu Han and Liao Mosha' (Yao 1966). It is important for our 
purposes not only because Yao was such a close associate of Jiang Qjng, but 
because it was republished all over China, studied with great attention, and 
became a model for the interpretation and criticism of literary texts and 
even spoken remarks during the Cultural Revolution. The principles of 
interpretation which it lays down and the purportedly factual· assumptions 
which it puts forward help to explain why the Cultural Revolution caught 
. such vast numbers in its net. These principles also help to explain why 
those who were accused were powerless to correct misinterpretations of their 
words. 
Yao's reading of the writers associated with 'Three-Family Village' was 
based on certain very specific assumptions. The best way to discover what 
they were is to look at some of his interpretations and see what assumptions 
are required to make sense of them. Take, for example, his discussion of 
Deng Tuo's essay 'Guide Rather than Block': 
On April 13, 1961 Teng T'o [Deng Tuo] demanded in his essay "Guide 
Rather than Block" that "everything" should be "actively guided to 
facilitate its smooth development." "Blocking the path of the 
movement and development of things" is "doomed to failure." 
"Everything," please note, including those dark, reactionary things 
that are anti-Party and anti-socialist. If we are to persist in the 
socialist road, we have to block the road to the restoration of 
capitalism ... To clear the way for the tide of revolution, we must 
dam the tide of reaction. By demanding that instead of blocking we 
should "facilitate the smooth development" of "everything", 
including anti-socialist things, was not Teng T'o clearly demanding 
that we should practise bourgeOis liberalization and bend and 
surrender to the ill winds which were blowing at the time, the winds 
of "going it alone" (Le. the restoration of individual economy) and of 
the extension of plots for private use and of free markets, the increase 
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of small enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profits and 
losses, and the fixing of output quotas based on the household? 
"Guiding" meant paving the way, and these men styled themselves 
"the vanguard paving the way" - for the capitalist forces. [Yao 1966, 
99-100]. 
The context of Deng Tuo's article, of course, was the retreat from the 
Great Leap Forward which Mao had endorsed. That retreat saw attacks on 
the error of "voluntarism" - the belief that revolutionary fervour, effort and 
will power could transcend the limitations supposedly imposed by nature 
and objective social conditions (Joseph 1984, 87-8). By contrast, there was a 
return to a more orthodox Marxist position, forgotten in the euphoria of the 
early stages of the Great Leap, that 
The transition from socialism to communism is a course of objective 
historical development not influenced by the will of the people. After 
we have recognized and grasped the objective laws of development, we 
may develop our subjective capacity to accelerate the course of 
historical development. We cannot change these laws ae-random on 
our own subjective whims, nor can we bypass this historical 
development stage and leap into communism. [China Youth, 1959, 
no. 1, quoted in Joseph 1984, 88]. 
Repeated warnings against voluntarism and a renewed emphasis on 
the laws of historical development were an important feature of the mutual 
cognitive environment of Deng Tuo and his readers in 1961. In that context 
most readers would easily have understood his warning that 'Blocking the 
path of the movement and development of things' is 'doomed to failure'. 
He was criticizing the 'voluntarist' errors committed during the Leap, as Mao 
himself had done (Joseph 1984, 69), and reminding his readers of the 
elementary Marxist principle that humans cannot, by acts of will, defy the 
laws of nature or of historical development. 
And what about Deng Tuo's statement that 'everything' should be 
'actively guided to facilitate its smooth development'? Another part of the 
mutual cognitive environment which he shared with his readers was 
knowledge that the Party was trying to stimulate productive development 
by calling for stronger central planning and the rational allocation of 
resources (Joseph 1984, 101-2). This was a reaction against the poor 
planning and uncoordinated mass action of the Great Leap, and in 1961 
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Mao, like almost everyone else, saw it as a healthy reaction. Deng Tuo's 
readers would not have misunderstood his reference. 
Yao Wenyuan, however, took advantage of the sweeping nature of the 
pronoun 'everything' to argue that beca.use Deng Tuo said that 'everything' 
should be 'actively guided to facilitate its smooth development' he was 
giving people coded advice to promote the 'smooth development' of 
capitalism. Reading his article in 1961, probably no one would have 
interpreted it in this way. People knew, of course, that the Party, with Mao's 
approval, was carefully supervising the reintroduction of restricted markets 
and some private production (using family labour, not wage labour), and 
some may well have thought that this was one of the changes which Deng 
Tuo thought should be 'actively guided' rather than allowed to develop 
chaotically. But no one loyal to the Party's line would have believed that 
this policy was aimed at the restoration of capitalism, and no one who 
thought that Deng Tuo was supporting this policy would have believed that 
he was seeking to destroy socialism. The reason is simply tharthey shared 
-with him a cognitive environment in which the following assumptions were 
readily accessible: 
1. Full socialism is possible only at a high level of development of the 
productive forces, which China has not yet reached. 
2. At China's current stage of development, the productive growth which 
is necessary for socialism requires the temporary and partial 
reintroduction of private sector economic activity. 
3. The Communist Party, under Chairman Mao's guidance, is allowing 
this temporary expansion of the private sector to create the material 
pre-conditions for socialism. 
This was totally orthodox technological determinist Marxism. It had 
been eclipsed during the Great Leap Forward, when Mao 
had tried to transcend these alleged laws of historical development by 
sponsoring mass effort to boost production within the framework of the 
communes. But the attempt failed and orthodox Marxism re-emerged to 
justify the expansion of the private sector which seemed the fastest way of 
cleaning up the mess. This orthodox Marxist justification for private sector 
activity was part of the mutual cognitive environment of Deng Tuo and his 
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readers in 1961. It ensured that no one who read his article as an 
endorsement of the Communist Party's expansion of the private sector 
would think that he was advocating the restoration of capitalism. 
But Yao Wenyuan, in 1966, was determined that the Chinese people 
should adopt a very different reading of Deng Tuo's essay - a reading which 
saw it as one of a series of 'direct attacks on the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, on Chairman Mao and the General Line [of building 
socialism by achieving ever greater results]' (Yao 1966, 108). To sustain this 
interpretation of Deng Tuo's essay, Yao had to replace the context of 
interpretation which I have sketched above with a radically new one. It 
had four crucial assumptions: 
1. Chairman Mao's enemies often cunningly express their anti-socialist 
message in allegories and codes, and the anti-socialist message is often 
conveyed by what appear to be the most innocent of statements. 
2. The Great Leap Forward was a resounding success, and to attack any 
aspect of the Ultra-Left philosophy which had inspired it was to 
attack its architect, Chairman Mao, and the very idea of socialism. 
3. Mao and the Central Committee had consistently opposed the steps 
towards privatization, restoration of markets and liberalization which 
occurred in 1961-62. 
4. The expansion of the private sector was not a temporary measure 
in tended to promote economic recovery and the growth of the 
productive forces necessary for the transition to socialism. Rather, it 
was the first stage in a conscious attempt to restore a fully fledged 
capitalist system. 
The first of these assumptions helped to make more plausible Yao's 
otherwise far-fetched analysis of what Deng Tuo was referring to when he 
used the pronoun 'everything'. The second assumption justified Yao's belief 
that Deng Tuo's implicit criticism of the 'voluntarism' and lack of careful 
planning which occurred during the Great Leap Forward was an attack on 
Chairman Mao and a smear on SOCialism. The third assumption allowed 
him to interpret support for the expansion of the private sector as an 
attempt to sabotage the policies of Mao and the Central Committee. And 
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the fourth assumption enabled him to see any endorsement of such 
expansion as a declaration of support for the restoration of capitalism. 
All of these assumptions were used with devastating effect during the 
Cultural Revolution to 'prove' that perf~ctly innocent people had opposed 
Mao and sought the restoration of capitalism. But the effects of the first 
assumption - that the enemies of socialism hide their message by using 
allegories and codes - were particularly pernicious and wide-ranging. 
Consider how Yao uses this assumption to detect the hidden meaning of 
another of Deng Tuo's essays, which he discusses in connection with Wu 
Han's essay 'On Waves': 
Two articles typified how Three-Family Village sized up the situation 
during this period [of rampant revisionism on the Soviet model]. The 
first, "On Waves" by Wu Han, appeared on January 1 1962. With 
irrepressible fanaticism he hailed the "wave" that had been pounding 
society "during the past half year and more." He joyously declared 
that "this is a really big tidal wave," advertising the counter-current 
against the Party leadership and the dictatorship of the proletariat as 
one of its achievements. He predicted that this "tidal wave" would 
grow "bigger and bigger." ... Shortly afterwards, on February 4, in his 
article "This Year's Spring Festival" ... Teng T'o wrote even more 
explicitly, "The bitter cold of the north wind will soon come to an 
end. In its stead a warm east wind will blow and a thaw will soon set 
in on this earth." Was not "thawll one of the terms in the out-and-
out counter-revolutionary vocabulary used by the Khrushchev 
revisionist clique against Stalin? Blinded by inordinate ambition, this 
gang now predicted that by 1962 socialist New China would "soon 
come to an end," that the dictatorship of the proletariat would be 
toppled by the anti-socialist adverse lItidal wave ll ••• Comrades, you 
can see how eagerly this group wished China to have a revisionist 
lIthaw!" [Yao 1966, 105]. 
The interpretation of Wu Han's essay 'On Waves' as an anti-Party and 
anti-socialist document, of course, is based on assumptions three and four 
above, which assert falsely (a) that Mao and the Central Committee had 
opposed the policies which Wu Han applauded and (b) that these policies 
were aimed at the restoration of capitalism. But the key to Yao's 
interpretation of Deng Tuo's innocuous essay on lIThis Year's Spring Festival" 
is the first assumption: that the anti-socialist message is often concealed in 
allegories and codes. The essay looks forward to the coming year, 
associating the 'warm east wind' with the better times ahead. Deng Tuo 
may well have believed that the improvement would be the result of the 
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Party's new policies and that those policies would make further progress 
over the next twelve months, but he does not say this. So Yao is forced to 
rest his case that Deng Tuo is talking about a coming counter-revolution 
entirely on the fact that the essay uses the word "thaw" - a word which the 
arch-revisionist Khruschev once used to. describe a possible improvement in 
relations with the. capitalist West. 
Without the first assumption about the prevalence of codes, Yao's 
interpretation appears nonsensical. Deng Tuo uses the word 'thaw', very 
appropriately, in a totally different context to describe what happens in the 
northern Chinese spring as the winds sweeping down from Siberia begin to 
fade and warmer winds from the east (or more precisely the south-east) 
melt the ice and snow. A more kindly disposed critic, conducting a forced 
search for deep allegorical meaning, might ask why Deng Tuo refers to the 
east wind, rather than making a more literally accurate reference to the 
south-east wind. The answer, such a critic might suggest, is that the east 
wind is the conventional symbol for Mao's revolutionary communism, while 
. the north wind over which it prevails is the symbol of the revisionist 
country from which north wind blows. In that case Deng Tuo could be seen 
as forecasting the triumph of revolutionary Maoism over Soviet revisionism. 
Such a reading is unlikely, but it has two merits: it is based on well known 
symbolism and it explains a literal inaccuracy in Deng Tuo's text. Yao's 
reading has no merit at all, except that it serves his political purpose of 
convicting Deng Tuo of marching to the tune of Soviet revisionism while 
using cunning codes to communicate with fellow conspirators. But in 
China, politiCS was all. Yao had Mao's backing and his critique of Deng Tuo 
and his colleagues became a model for the detection of 'hidden messages'. 
Millions of students studied Yao's polemic in the hope that they 
could imitate it, using the assumptions and the methods of analysis which 
it employed to unmask 'capitalist roaders' and 'revisionists'. As they 
studied Yao's text, most acquired the four assumptions which we have 
already discussed - assumptions which they used to help determine what 
message speakers and writers intended to convey. But they also acquired 
two more assumptions which took the process of interpretation a step 
further - assumptions which they used to help determine what the speaker 
or writer was trying to achieve by conveying that message. One assumption, 
the fifth in our series, enabled the critics to explain away anomalous 
statements by their victims. It can be expressed as follows: 
140 
5. If revisionists make statements which praise Mao or defend socialism, 
those statements are mere camouflage for anti-socialist goals. 
Yao put this assumption to work, for example, when trying to explain why 
'Notes from Three-Family Village' featured an article which expressed 
approval of 'Comrade Mao Tse-tung's policy of self-reliance'. Since 'self-
reliance' was a key policy of the Great Leap Forward, the content of the 
article seemed difficult to reconcile with Yao's claim that Deng Tuo and his 
colleagues consistently opposed the socialist line. But Yao was not so easily 
taken in. The anti-socialist clique associated with Three-Family Village, he 
explained, feared exposure, so they praised Mao insincerely 'in order to 
cover their retreat.' (Yao 1966,110-111). So the residents of Three-Family 
Village, like so many later victims of the Cultural Revolution, could cite 
nothing which they had said or done in their defence: if they spoke or 
acted like true revolutionaries, it was simply because their were covering 
their tracks. As a widely used slogan of the Cultural Revolution put it, they 
were 'Waving Red Flags to oppose the Red Flag.' 
The final assumption which operated throughout Yao's essay was 
equally damaging to those criticized. It can be expressed thus: 
6. If revisionists make self-criticisms, then they are insincere; they are 
simply trying to avoid punishment so that they can live to fight 
another day_ 
Yao employed this interpretive principle freely. For example, when the 
magazine Frontline and the Beijing Daily attacked their former columnists 
from Three-Family Village and carried an editorial self-criticism, Yao 
denounced their recantation as 'a gross lie' and a 'huge swindle'. They were, 
he said, 'making a fake criticism in the hope of slipping by'; they were 
'simply putting on a show of criticism to resist the instructions of the 
Central Committee of the Party.' (Yao 1966, 91-3). In denouncing their self-
criticism, Yao expressed Mao's unrelenting determination to destroy 
everyone associated with Deng Tuo, for the secretariat of the Central 
Committee (which Mao controlled) had itself declared the self-criticism of 
Deng Tuo's former colleagues to be feigned (Lee 1978, 15-16). This refusal to 
believe in the sincerity of self-criticisms had important consequences later 
in the Cultural Revolution, for young Red Guards who took their principles 
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of interpretation from Mao and Yao could never be convinced that those 
whom they accused had seen the error of their ways. As a result, their 
victims were denied the traditional method of securing re-acceptance 
through the 'correction' of their thought; they could do nothing to show 
that they were loyal 'comrades' who h~d merely made a mistake. Their fate 
was to be condemned as 'enemies' of the people. Probably between one and 
a half and two million such 'enemies' had been killed as 'landlords' or 
'counterrevolutionaries' at the Party's direction since 1949 (see ch. 2.4 
above). During the Cultural Revolution, classification as an 'enemy' 
sometimes had equally dire consequences. 
Mao's standing within China was such that once his endorsement of 
Yao's polemiC was known it was reprinted in all the major newspapers and 
magazines, then distributed for study. The response was carefully organized 
by the Party, and almost instantaneous. China Youth, the official paper of 
the Communist Youth League, announced that within two weeks of the 
publication of Yao's article it had 'received more than thirty-nine thousand 
letters from young people in various areas unanimously attacking the black 
gang of Three-Family Village' (Chuang 1970, 2). Yao's polemic also inspired 
a mass of imitative journalism, as writers and editors sought to protect 
themselves by showing their acceptance of the new, more extreme line. This 
torrent of words was based entirely on the assumptions in Yao's article. It 
helped to effect a 'paradigm shift' in the cognitive environment which 
people used - publicly at least - when assessing whether an utterance was 
pro-Party or anti-Party, socialist or anti-socialist. 
That shift in the mutual cognitive environment of public discourse 
not only facilitated communication of the new message, but it had 
profound persuasive effects. It was not simply that the media, backed by 
Mao's immense authority, asserted that the Revised Version of Party history 
and Yao's other assumptions were factual. What was more important was 
the way in which every organ of opinion assumed that they were true, 
making repeated statements whose meaning could be recovered only in the 
context of Yao's assumptions. Even the standard slogan 'Condemn the 
black, anti-Party, anti-socialist line' could not be disambiguated and 
assigned a definite reference in isolation, for it was simply a linguistically 
encoded representation in which the adjectives 'black', 'anti-Party' and 
'anti-socialist' were semantically incomplete. What was 'black', 'anti-Party' 
and 'anti-socialist' depended upon assumptions about party policy which 
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were contested and which changed over time, so the slogan was 
unintelligible to anyone lacking access to the particular set of assumptions 
to which the speaker was appealing. The slogan is a classic case of words 
which provide what Blakemore calls 'only a very skeletal clue as to the 
explicature the hearer is intended to recover'; and, as she stresses, the 
process of developing the semantic representation of those words into an 
explicature 'depends heavily on contextual information.' (1992, 59; also 
Sperber and Wilson 1995, 176-83). That contextual information was 
provided by Yao's assumptions, which asserted that the policies 
implemented in 1961-62 had been opposed by Mao and the Central 
Committee and had been intended to restore capitalism. 
All over China, many times a day, speakers and writers produced 
political statements and imperatives which came with a guarantee of 
relevance - a guarantee which was fulfilled only when their words were 
disambiguated and assigned reference through being processed in the 
context of Yao's interpretive assumptions. Every time meaning was 
recovered in that context, the addressee was made aware that the writer or 
speaker intended him to accept Yao's assumptions as true; and if the 
addressee trusted the writer or speaker, that trust could strengthen his faith 
in those assumptions through what Sperber and Wilson have called a 
process of 'retroactive strengthening' (1995,115-7). What made retroactive 
strengthening such a powerful weapon of state-directed persuasion was that 
almost the entire Chinese population was manipulated into making 
repeated statements which were relevant only in the context of Yao's 
assumptions. This meant that almost all communicators seemed to accept 
those assumptions as true and to expect their audiences to do likewise. 
People who inwardly rejected the assumptions could imagine that they were 
the only unbelievers in the whole country. As time went on, they could 
begin to doubt their own memories about what Mao and the Central 
Committee had actually said in 1961-62; and they could lose faith in the 
official ideology of those years which explained that the partial reversion to 
private enterprise was a temporary expedient designed to raise the 
productive forces to a level at which full socialism could be introduced. 
When almost everyone seemed to take Yao's assumptions for granted, 
younger sceptics, especially, were swayed by strong modelling effects. When 
virtually every reference group consisted entirely of people who wrote and 
spoke as if the assumptions were true, secret dissenters felt at odds with 
those to whom they customarily looked for a lead, fearing exposure by those 
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whose acceptance they needed. As long as they harboured doubts, they felt 
like social isolates. Only when they became true believers could they 
belong; and only then, as social beings, could they be happy. 
When the writing and speech of a whole society took the assumptions 
embodied in Yao's essay for granted, only the strongest could stand against 
the tide, appearing to believe but maintaining strong inward dissent. By 
controlling what everyone said, Mao's propagandists were able to destroy 
old assumptions and manipulate new ones into existence. In the process 
they shattered the mutual cognitive environment which had bound Deng 
Tuo and his readers together before September 1962, ensuring that his words 
would not be seen as anti-Party or anti-socialist. Now, with the help of the 
new cognitive environment, essays which had been read as properly 
revolutionary were seen as nothing more than 'poisonous weeds' designed to 
destroy the revolution. Deng Tuo had become a pariah. Millions of voices 
denounced him in unison, attributing to him views which he had never 
held, demanding his destruction. He was misunderstood, but completely 
. powerless to remedy the situation, for it was Mao Zedong, not he, who 
controlled the context of interpretation. Shunned by his friends, a source of 
humiliation and terror to his family, Deng Tuo would lead a life of torture 
until Mao or his successors decided that Yao Wenyuan's assumptions should 
be abandoned. He would not live to experience that release, for only eight 
days after the publication of Yao's article he was dead - perhaps driven to 
suicide, perhaps murdered, and only the first to die when left guilty and 
defenceless by a cruel switch in the context of interpretation during Mao's 
Cultural Revolution. 
3.5 Mao's Third Shift in the Context of Interpretation: 
Nie Yuanzi's Big Character Poster 
By late May 1966, Mao was on the brink of bringing to a formal conclusion 
the rout of his enemies in the Beijing Party Committee, the central 
Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Culture. He was also in a 
position to widen his attack to the education system, which was especially 
vulnerable for three reasons. First, it overlapped with the cultural sphere, so 
extension of the Cultural Revolution to educational institutions would cause 
neither surprise nor great alarm amongst senior Party leaders. Indeed, the 
directive written by Jiang Qjng which Mao had forced through the Central 
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Committee on 16 May had listed education, without emphasis, amongst the 
fields in which criticism should occur. Second, the students had already 
been extensively mobilized by the Party during the campaign against 'Three-
Family Village', and at a signal from Mao they could easily be directed to 
search for 'Black Gangs' in the schools and universities. Third, the 
education sector had been heavily influenced by Peng Zhen and his 
associates in 1961-2, adopting policies which emphasised academic 
performance. Mao had gone along with these at the time but he now 
regarded them as anti-socialist. 
In opening his attack on the education system, Mao again 
took care not to alarm the bulk of the Party's leaders, lest they unite against 
him while they still had sufficient strength. So he acted circuitously, 
making Beijing University his initial target. That institution had three 
characteristics which made it vulnerable. First, it was closely linked with 
the doomed Beijing Party Committee. Second, its president Lu Ping was an 
old comrade of Peng Zhen who 'had come to see the universitY as a place for 
academic study rather than political struggle' and had blocked criticism of 
Wu Han early in 1966 (Goldman 1981, 134). Third, it had a number of 
radicals on its staff led by Nie Yuanzi, the Party secretary in the Philosophy 
Department, a radical with a record of conflict with senior professors and 
the university administration. She had long been demanding that the 
university place more emphasis on political ideology, and in 1964 Lu Ping 
had incarcerated her in a Beijing hotel for seven months while she was 
interrogated about her activities (Goldman 1981, 134). She was the staff 
member who had tried to organize criticism of Wu Han, and she was perfect 
bait for the trap which Mao intended to set for Lu Ping. 
It was Kang Sheng's wife, Cao Yiou, who sought out Nie Yuanzi, 
encouraging her and a group of radical associates to prepare a wall poster 
which linked the university's administration to Peng Zhen and accused its 
Party Committee of suppressing the Cultural Revolution. Some sources state 
that Cao Yiou even helped Nie Yuanzi and her allies to write the poster 
(Kwong 1988, 6). When the poster went up, Lu Ping did not guess that Mao's 
intimates were behind it, and after consulting the new secretary of the 
Beijing Party Committee he had it torn down and organized mass criticism 
of Nie Yuanzi and her cohorts. He had reacted exactly as his past suggested 
he would and fallen into the trap. Now all Mao had to do was change the 
context of interpretation so that Niche's poster ceased to be an attack on the 
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authority of the Party committee and became instead a revolutionary act 
challenging a 'Black Gang' opposed to the Cultural Revolution. Mao simply 
telephoned Kang Sheng and ordered him to publicize the poster with official 
support. That night, Kang Sheng read out the entire poster on the radio, 
then the following day it was published in the People's Daily with 
commentaries explaining its implications. Everyone now knew that the 
poster had Mao's blessing. So for the third time in the Cultural Revolution, 
Mao had used his unchallengeable authority to 'frame' his victim by 
changing the context of interpretation. Lu Ping's fate was sealed, as was that 
of the entire Beijing university administration, the university's Party 
Committee and all the staff and students who had criticized Nie Yuanzi. 
But the ramifications of Mao's switch in the context of interpretation 
were much wider. Because Mao had endorsed it, Nie Yuanzi's poster was 
taken as proof that 'Black Gangs' had infiltrated to the very highest level 
within the country's educational institutions, and with the newspapers' 
encouragement students elsewhere began to scrutinize their teachers, 
. administrators and Party committees. The affair also appears to have been 
the signal for the final stage in the purge of the Beijing Party organization. 
The day after the poster was published, Peng Zhen was formally dismissed 
and the Beijing Party Committee was re-organized, packed with Maoists. 
Four days later, Frontline, the Party Committee's theoretical journal which 
Deng Tuo had edited, was closed down, and the editors of Beijing's two 
newspapers were replaced. Mao had completed his conquest of China's 
capital. 
3.6 Putting the New Interpretive Assumptions to Work 
in the Schools and Universities 
The students who were to be the spearhead of Mao's Cultural Revolution 
were taught Yao's six interpretive assumptions during the campaign against 
the writers associated with 'Three-Family Village'. Day after day they heard 
their teachers recite official condemnations of the 'Gangster Inn'; day after 
day they studied newspaper commentaries by Yao Wenyuan and others on 
the 'poisonous weeds' composed by Deng Tuo and his colleagues; day after 
day they competed to see who could paint the largest number of big 
character posters reviling the 'black gang' which had infiltrated the 
country's cultural elite. But most took some time to become proficient at 
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using Yao's six interpretive assumptions and develop the required sensitivity 
to allegorical attacks on Mao, the Party and socialism. Gao Yuan, for 
example, recalls in his autobiography that at first he found Deng Tuo's 
essays 'witty and engrossing, so I needed the newspaper commentary to help 
me understand what was wrong with them.' Without such assistance, he 
would never have guessed that an essay on the benefits of drinking plain, 
boiled water was 'a smear on the Party's economic policies.' (Gao 1987,36). 
But after weeks of study and weeks of writing big character posters (dazibao) 
condemning 'Three-Family Village', he and his classmates learned how to 
seek out Mao's enemies themselves. He describes how the breakthrough 
came when they cracked the anti-revolutionary code on the cover of the 
May 1966 issue of China Youth, the official magazine of the Communist 
Youth League: 
One afternoon when we were making dazibao, Little Mihu came 
running into the classroom waving a magazine and shouting, "Big 
discovery, big discovery!" ... He jabbed his figure at the back cover, a 
scene of young people carrying bundles of wheat in baskets slung on 
long poles. Behind them stretched a golden ocean of wheat. 
"Look at the red flag in the background," Little Mihu said 
excitedly. "It's fluttering toward the right. On the map, right is east 
and left is west. So the wind must be blowing from the west. 
Chairman Mfl.o says the east wind should prevail over the west, but 
here the west is prevailing over the east!" 
That was not all. Little Mihu turned the back cover sideways 
and traced his finger through the wheatfield, pointing out some light-
coloured streaks. "Here are four characters, do you see?" "Oh my!" 
somebody gasped. "Long live Kai-shek!" I saw it too, the veiled 
message in praise of Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek. The 
magazine passed from hand to hand. We were shocked that the 
enemies of socialism would be so bold as to issue a public challenge 
and amazed that they had figured out such a clever way to do it. 
Now we understood why the newspapers were warning us that 
counterrevolutionaries had wormed their way into the very heart of 
the Party's cultural apparatus. Nothing could be taken for granted 
anymore. [Gao 1987, 39-40]. 
After that, said Gao Yuan, 'Everyone was on the lookout for fresh evidence, 
and every day fresh dazibao reported the latest findings.' Some thought 
that a shadow in the portrait of Lenin in the classroom was a snake running 
down the side of his nose; others believed that a painted beam above Mao's 
head in a photo was a 'sword' about to drop; and still others alleged that 
the portrait of Mao at the front of the classroom, which showed him facing 
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slightly to the right, was a deliberate attempt to make him appear 
deformed by showing only his left ear (Gao 1987,40). None of these 
interpretations went unchallenged, but students who disputed them could 
seem to lack revolutionary consciousness. There was, as Anita Chan has 
pOinted out in another context, 'a built-in momentum throughout the 
nation towards "ultra-leftism'" (Chan 1985, 95), and even the students who 
argued that Mao's missing ear was a matter of artistic realism were heavily 
outvoted. 
As the search for revisionism spread, 'Nothing was immune from 
suspicion.' (Gao 1987, 40). Taking their cues from the newspapers, 
students scrutinized poems, short stories, novels, plays and movies. They 
began to put up xiaozibao, 'small character posters', on which they wrote 
essays exposing the counter-revolutionary content of works which they had 
hitherto regarded as entirely innocent. Many of the essays imitated, quite 
deliberately, Yao Wenyuan's prose style and method of analysis. And, after 
the publication of Nie Yuanzi's poster on 2 June, they began to- focus on the 
- education system. Students began to look critically at textbooks and 
teaching methods, and at the attitudes, behaviour and backgrounds of the 
teachers themselves. Gao Yuan's English teacher, for example, was 
condemned for the following passage in an ode to the lotus which he 
published in a provincial literary magazine: 
Though rooted in stinking mud, 
Your body is smooth and clean; 
Though you drink bitter water all your life, 
Your flowers are fresh and fragrant; 
In summer, you please us with your beautiful blossoms; 
In autumn, you wither and leave us your delicious roots. 
The students concluded that the phrase 'drink bitter water all your life' was 
'a slur on socialist society' (Gao 1987, 42). The interpretation seems 
ludicrous, but it is easier to understand why the students should have 
advanced it when we remember that they had as a model the newspapers' 
attacks on Deng Tuo's essay about the virtues of plain, boiled water. 
In choosing their victims, the students received little help from Nie 
Yuanzi's poster and the newspapers, for these sources of guidance simply 
inveighed against 'the "Black Gangs" who oppose Chairman Mao and his 
thought.' (Zhai 1992, 56). This left unanswered the crucial questions. Who 
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were the 'Black Gangs' in the educational institutions? And how could 
revolutionary staff and students identify the 'bourgeois academic 
authorities' and 'revisionists' said to be associated with them? These 
semantically incomplete terms could be assigned references only when 
fleshed out with the aid of contextual assumptions. This meant that a good 
deal of the responsibility for reference assignment lay with Mao's audience, 
for initially there was no firm guidance about which assumptions were 
relevant. Some students would regard as 'revisionist' anyone who valued 
academic excellence, others would apply the label to those with bad class 
origins, and still others would apply it to all Party committees which had 
carried out official Party policy by allowing only academic criticism of Wu 
Han before Mao demanded his head. Worst of all, 'class enemies' and 
people with grudges might use Yao's principles to make the 'revisionist' cap 
fit anyone at all, putting even the 'reddest' Party secretaries in danger. The 
result would be chaos, with malicious and uncontrolled criticism ruining 
the lives of many teachers, and perhaps even sweeping away school 
administrations and Party committees. To the Party leaders, sllch wholesale 
. attacks must have seemed a danger, but Mao's shift of the responsibility for 
reference assignment onto his audience meant that the Party leaders had no 
way of knowing that such attacks were exactly what he wanted. 
In many schools and universities, students began to put Yao 
Wenyuan's principles to work almost immediately after the publication of 
Nie Yuanzi's poster. Some teachers were condemned for a hitherto 
acceptable 'bourgeois' manner of dress, some for having emphasised 
academic subject matter at the expense of Mao Zedong's Thought, and some 
for having exercised 'bourgeois dictatorship' over students by reprimanding 
them. Others were accused simply because students feared that if they did 
not criticise their own teachers they would be suspected of lacking 
revolutionary consciousness (Zhai 1992, 63-4, 68-71). Many of the 
accusations were poorly supported, or were substantiated by free use of Yao 
Wenyuan's first principle of interpretation, that 'Chairman Mao's enemies 
often cunningly conceal their message in allegories and codes'. At Yunnan 
university, for example, students scrutinizing a linguistics text written by 
and 'old intellectual' decided that the sentence 'The sun is setting behind 
the hill' was an anti-revolutionary reference to the fall of Chairman Mao, 
who in revolutionary symbolism was the 'sun' in the Chinese people's hearts 
(Kwong 1988, 10). 
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Far worse, from the Party's point of view, was the fact that in some 
schools groups of students challenged the legitimacy of the Party 
committees. Sometimes these students were disgruntled or exceptionally 
radical individuals of red class background, but at other times they were the 
products of middle class or bad class families. Their attacks led many Party 
committees to defend themselves by mobilizing support from the main 
stream of Party members, Youth League members and the children of cadres. 
They also asked higher Party units to despatch work teams to manage the 
Cultural Revolution, arguing that it should not be turned into a counter-
revolution by 'anti-Party' forces (Lee 1978, 27-31). In some schools and 
universities even the students, unsure of what they should be doing, asked 
for work teams to direct their efforts. 
Uncertain of how to respond to the situation, Liu Shaoqi and Deng 
Xiaoping flew to see Mao, who was watching events from Hangzhou. They 
asked Mao to return to take charge of the Cultural Revolution but he 
refused, saying 'You do as you see fit' (Zhai 1992, 61). So they returned to 
Beijing, where an urgent meeting of the Politburo decided to send work 
teams to 'control the movement and maintain order in universities and 
schools.' Liu, anxious to avoid displeasing Mao, told him of the decision by 
telephone, and obtained his consent (Zhai 1992, 61). So from 5 June the 
central Party authorities despatched work teams to many schools and 
universities. 
Once on the ground, the work teams faced the same problem of 
interpretation as the students. How could they identify the 'Black Gangs'? 
The criterion, obviously, was fidelity to Mao's thought, but Yao Wenyuan's 
six principles of interpretation made it possible for them to 'prove' that 
almost anyone was guilty of major infidelity, either overt or secret. But Mao 
and the Central Committee had repeatedly said that a large majority of the 
cadres were 'good' or 'relatively good', and he had stressed that the aim of 
any campaign should be to get 'more than 95 percent of our people and 95 
percent of our cadres' to unite against the five percent who were attempting 
to restore capitalism - a view echoed repeatedly in Party documents (Jin 
1995,349; Baum & Teiwes 1968,66, 73, 78, 84-5,93, 111-12, 119, 123). And 
who were the obdurately anti-socialist five percent? Mao's standard answer 
was well known. In 1958, for example, he had summarized an oft-repeated 
view by saying: 
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The unreformed landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad 
elements, and Rightists resolutely oppose communism. They are the 
Chiang Kaishek and the Guomindang of the present day, they are the 
enemy class ... If you add up all these people, they come to roughly 5 
percent of the population ... This is a hostile class, and still awaits 
reform. We must struggle against them ... If we succeed in 
transforming 10 percent of them, this can be accounted a success ... 
[Schram 1984, 38]. 
In 1962, Mao returned to the theme: 
Those whom the people's democratic dictatorship should repress are 
landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionary elements, bad 
elements and anti-communist Rightists. The classes which the 
counter-revolutionary elements, bad elements and anti-communist 
Rightists represent are the landlord class and the reactionary 
bourgeoisie. These classes and bad people comprise about four or five 
percent of the population. [Schram 1984, 4]. 
So for Mao, the five percent or so of the population who were bent on 
restoring capitalism were mainly the 'five black categories' and-"in some 
"contexts the 'reactionary bourgeoisie' - unrefomed capitalists - as well. 
Mao's views on this matter were firmly lodged in the officially cultivated 
cognitive environment of the Chinese people, for his speeches were read 
carefully by all Party members and were set for study by the entire 
population. Even the illiterate heard his words when they were broadcast or 
read aloud, and their implications were frequently explained. Moreover, 
Mao's message about the most appropriate targets had been driven home by 
social practice, for everyone had seen the 'five blacks' and many former 
capitalists hauled out regularly for criticism during previous campaigns and 
struggle meetings. So the well-rehearsed principles of Mao Zedong's Thought 
ensured that the People's Daily's call for a war against the 'Black Gangs' was 
taken as the signal for a campaign directed largely at the 'five black 
categories' and the 'reactionary bourgeoisie'. In this way Mao himself bore 
direct responsibility for our seventh principle of interpretation, which we 
can add to the six assumptions which I have extracted from the work of Yao 
Wenyuan: 
7. Anything said or written by people who are from bad class 
backgrounds is particularly likely to express reactionary 
sentiments. 
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In accordance with this principle, the work teams sought the 
cooperation of students and teachers from red class backgrounds and 
'pointed the arrow downwards' towards the five black categories and the 
bourgeoisie. At Ken Ling's school, for instance, the work team made public 
the files of teachers who had 'historical problems' such as past connections 
with the Guomindang, then told the students 'Let's see what stand you 
take. ' About forty or fifty of the schools' 187 staff were rounded up, 
harangued, humiliated and tortured. The class background of their 
tormentors was clear: 
Those who immediately took up sticks and applied the tortures 
were the school bullies who, as children of party cadres and army 
officers, belonged to the five red classes ... Coarse and cruel, they 
were accustomed to throwing their parents' weight around and 
brawling with other students. They did so poorly at school that 
they were about to be expelled and, presumably, resented the 
teachers because of this. [Ling 1972, 19]. 
In most schools, as in Ling's, the attack was led by the children of 
. cadres. They saw themselves as a superior stratum, as the natural heirs to 
the communist revolution, and they were accustomed to taking the lead in 
political matters. They were given privileged admission to the best schools 
and universities, but as a group they got worse results than the 
academically more committed children of the 'bad classes' and the middle 
classes - especially the intellectual middle class. They often resented 
teachers who tried to get them to work hard or who criticised their lapses 
from revolutionary virtue, especially when the teachers were not party 
members or had dubious family backgrounds. They took pleasure in 
proving their revolutionary spirit by using Yao Wenyuan's interpretive 
assumptions to 'prove' that such teachers held anti-revolutionary views and 
that they glorified academic excellence at the expense of redness (Chan 
1985,126,135; Unger 1982,105,111-16). They were often supported by 
politically active middle class children, anxious to prove that they were 
'red' in their hearts if not in their ambiguous family heritage, and by the 
children of workers and peasants. At my own university and its attached 
schools, the staff suffered most at the hands of the children of workers who 
lived in the university village, where they performed maintenance and 
other tasks. In a highly competitive environment dominated by the sons 
and daughters of middle class or bad class academics, working class 
children had always felt inferior, and now they got their revenge. 
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In this context, our seventh interpretive assumption - that bad-class 
people are especially likely to express reactionary sentiments - was activated 
time after time to guide the interpretation of texts and utterances. In Gao 
Yuan's school, for instance, the deputy-principal, Lin Sheng, was the son of a 
landlord, and a book of essays which he had written was singled out for 
special criticism. In one essay he recalled how his father had set him on the 
path of learning, but the students twisted his words to accuse him of 
bragging about his landlord origins. 'In the old society,' they said, 'old 
people from the exploiting class, like Lin Sheng, could afford to go to school. 
How many workers or poor or lower-middle peasants went to school? Most 
of them could not even dream of such a thing!' (Gao 1987, 56). Gao Yuan 
himself 'rather liked' Lin Sheng's writing, but felt no urge to dispute the 
analysis of its reactionary nature. 'The mere fact that Lin Sheng was the son 
of a landlord', he said, 'was incriminating enough.' (Gao 1987, 56). The 
influence of our seventh assumption could hardly have been more clearly 
manifested. 
The situation of members of the bad classes, which had always been 
wretched, became even worse during early stages of the Cultural Revolution 
as the cadres' children sought to entrench their position as leaders of the 
Revolution by elaborating the doctrine of 'natural redness' (zilai hong). 
This doctrine stated that children from red-class families were natural 
revolutionaries, while those from bad-class families were natural 
reactionaries. This would continue from generation to generation. Well 
known verses with which red-class children taunted their inferiors made the 
point: 
A dragon begets only dragons, 
A phoenix begets only phoenixes, 
A rat's descendant knows only how to dig holes. 
A hero's child is a brave man, 
A reactionary's child is a bastard. 
[Gao 1987, 113; Zhai 1992, 79-82; Chan 1985,133-36]. 
These verses were not Maoist orthodoxy, for they neglected Mao's insistence 
that people could sometimes change their attitudes. Instead, they isolated 
and took to an extreme Mao's favouritism towards the red categories and 
his mistrust of people with bad-class origin. They envisaged a China 
divided forever into hereditary 'good' and 'bad' castes, and they had 
profound implications for the interpretation of the relationship between the 
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meaning of statements made by bad-class people and the opinions which 
such people actually held. Indeed, they embodied something far stronger 
than the mistrust of the bad classes which we found expressed in 
interpretive assumption seven. What they implied was the dogmatic 
universalism of assumption eigh t: 
B. People with bad class origins are incapable of genuine revolutionary 
consciousness. 
This assumption made it impossible for people with bad class backgrounds 
to get a hearing. No words which they used could communicate their inner 
conviction that they were committed revolutionaries or persuade their red-
class tormentors that they had seen the error of their ways. We shall see in 
the next chapter that this had profound implications for their treatment at 
the hands of Red Guards from the 'good' classes during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
If the red-class students began by humiliating, beating and torturing 
teachers with dubious backgrounds, they soon began to look for other 
targets. The most obvious were fellow students who were unpopular or who 
were suspected of counter-revolutionary sentiments - and again this 
generally meant those with bad class backgrounds. In many schools, these 
'Sons of Bitches' were forced to study the works of Chairman Mao while 
being harassed by bullying supervisors, they were forced to make repeated 
self-confessions, and they were compelled to denounce their parents 
incessantly. They were also sometimes beaten or given a 'yin-yang head' 
with the hair shaved off one side to signify their outcast status. This 'Red 
Terror', as those who carried it out proudly termed it, was supported by the 
Party's work teams, which sometimes gave the cadres' children access to the 
official dossiers on bad-class students. (Chan 1985, 134-6; Lee 1978, 57-8; 
Zhai 1992,104-9,116-17). 
In attacking the 'class enemy' in the schools, most students from the 
red classes were completely confident that they were doing what Mao 
wanted. The work teams and the Party leaders, for their part, were doing 
their best to interpret his will. Mao had made their task a formidable one 
by refusing to take charge himself or to give direct instructions. Moreover, 
he had always described the Cultural Revolution'S targets using semantically 
incomplete terms like 'Black Gangs', 'revisionists' and 'representatives of the 
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bourgeoisie'. Dissident students and staff who saw these terms as referring 
primarily to school or university administrations and Party committees 
were interpreting Mao's words using assumptions which to other students 
and staff seemed utterly perverse. For most, the obvious context of 
interpretation was provided by Mao's own writings, which unambiguously 
identified members of the bad classes as the principal targets. So in 
'pointing the arrow downwards', the Party and the work teams were not 
merely deflecting the qttack from themselves, but acting upon a sincere and 
entirely predictable interpretation of Mao's will. 
3.7 Mao's Fourth Switch in the Context of Interpretation: 
Entrapping Liu Shaoqi and Declaring War on the Party 
Within the Communist Party, everyone knew that Mao wanted to root out 
'powerholders within the Party following the capitalist road'. Indeed, 
middle and higher level cadres had seen a directive from the C-entral 
Committee dated 16 May 1966, written by Jiang Qing in accordance with 
Mao's instructions, which said that it would be necessary to criticise 
'representative of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party' in order 
to purify the cultural, intellectual and educational spheres (CCP 
Documents, 27-8). This was neither new nor particularly alarming, for the 
detection of such people had been a goal of the Socialist Education 
Movement since January 1965 (Baum 1975, 128-9). Most cadres probably 
thought that the directive implied only a limited purge of people associated 
with Peng Zhen, the central Propaganda Department and the cultural 
sphere, for they took for granted Mao's dictum that most members of the 
Party were 'good' or 'comparatively good'. And, since most had red class 
backgrounds, they did not dream that they were the intended object of a 
campaign against 'representatives of the bourgeoisie'. Mao's class prejudices 
were well known, and in 1963 he had explicitly identified the 'bad people' 
who had 'wormed their way' into the Party as unregenerate members of the 
petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals and the 'sons and daughters of landlords 
and rich peasants.' (Quoted in Schram 1984,45). 
One person who seemed to have no immediate cause for worry was 
Liu Shaoqi. Since January 1965, we have seen, Mao had been plotting his 
downfall, but Liu as yet knew nothing of it. He remained Mao's deputy and 
heir-apparent, the Maoist-controlled media continued to give him 
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favourable publicity, and Mao had placed him in charge of the Cultural 
Revolution and approved his decision to send the work teams into the 
schools and universities (Baum 1975, 200 n.84; Zhai 1992, 55, 61, 66-7). 
Moreover, he had directed the Revolution at precisely those people whom 
Mao himself had previously identified as the main source of danger. 
Liu's world began to fall apart only on 18 July when Mao, who had 
been observing his conduct of the Cultural Revolution from Hangzhou, 
returned to Beijing to spring his trap. He did to Liu what he had done to 
Deng Tuo, Peng Zhen, Lu Ping and all his previous victims: he introduced a 
new principle of interpretation which transformed Liu's attempt to promote 
the socialist revolution into an attempt to suppress it. Mao had stood by 
while Liu, in accordance with established Party policy and a totally 
predictable reading of his leader's wishes, had used the work teams to direct 
the Cultural Revolution against intellectuals and people with bad class 
backgrounds. He had stood by while Liu, to prevent malcontents and 
'Rightists' from causing havoc by using Yao Wenyuan's interpretive 
principles to attack good Party members, had authorized the suppression of 
criticism which seemed unjustified or which challenged the authority of the 
Party. Now, however, Mao returned to Beijing in a fury, telling Liu that the 
main goal of the Cultural Revolution was not, as he had thought, the 
purification of the intellectual, educational and cultural spheres, but the 
destruction of the 'capitalist roaders' in the Party. He accused Liu of using 
the work teams to prevent criticism of the Party and to suppress the 
Cultural Revolution. And he introduced three new interpretive assumptions 
designed to discredit Liu, destroy his power and tum the Cultural 
Revolution against the Party. 
Mao made the new assumptions public through three measures. First, 
dismissing Liu's protests, he withdrew the work teams from the schools and 
universities. Second, he himself wrote a big character poster for Beijing 
University under the title 'Bombard the Headquarters', criticizing the work 
teams and saying that 'some leading comrades ... have enforced a bourgeois 
dictatorship and struck down the surging movement of the great cultural 
revolution of the proletariat.' (Lee 1978, 65). Third, after a fierce debate, he 
narrowly persuaded the Central Committee to adopt his famous 'Sixteen 
Points' which declared openly that 'The main target of the present 
movement is those within the Party who are in authority and are taking the 
capitalist road.' The document said that such people 'are extremely afraid 
of being exposed by the masses and therefore seek every possible pretext to 
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suppress the mass movement'; and it accused them of 'shifting the targets 
for attack and turning black into white in an attempt to lead the 
movement astray.' (CCP Documents, 44-6). The document called for their 
dismissal. And, while it did not identify them by name, references to the 
work teams' 'counter-attacks against the masses' left no doubt that the 
principal capitalist roaders were Uu, Deng and the other Party leaders 
whom Mao had charged with supervising the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao's actions were intended to communicate three very definite 
assumptions which were designed to influence the interpretation of what 
members of the Communist Party said and did. One of these, the ninth in 
our series, can be stated as follows: 
9. Anyone who fears, criticises or suppresses the free mobilization of the 
masses is opposing the Cultural Revolution, attacking socialism and 
following the capitalist road. 
-So when the Party, advancing the slogan 'Sweep out all obstacles to the 
Cultural Revolution', attacked dissident students as 'freaks and monsters' 
(Lee 1978, 29), it was not defending the Cultural Revolution but suppressing 
it. The tenth assumption was equally damaging: 
10. Anyone who fails to make capitalist roaders within the Party the main 
target is guilty of 'shifting the target of attack' and following the 
capitalist road. 
This assumption ensured that through their words and actions Uu, Deng 
and almost the entire Party stood accused. They had made many 
statements which directed the students' attack towards the 'usual suspects' 
- 'bourgeois intellectuals' and members of the bad classes - and in doing 
this they were seeking to guide the Cultural Revolution in the direction 
which they thought Mao favoured. Now, however, their words were to be 
reinterpreted as an attempt to shift the target of attack. 
Mao must have expected that Uu and the other Party leaders would 
interpret his calls for them to expose the 'Black Gangs' in the context of the 
readily accessible assumptions which he had drilled into them over many 
years. Now they were left guilty and helpless, for Mao with his immense 
authority had suddenly declared those assumptions outmoded. And while 
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in inner Party conclaves, fighting for their lives, they might argue furiously 
with Mao that his sudden shift of assumptions was monstrously unfair, they 
had no public voice because the Maoists had gained total control of the 
media in their purges of the central Propaganda Department and the Beijing 
Party Committee. Moreover, had Liu or others opposed Mao in public, they 
would have been swept away, for their efforts to promote the image of their 
Great Leader had worked only too well. The worship of Mao's Thought 
which Lin Biao had orchestrated in the period immediately preceding the 
Cultural Revolution had merely put the finishing touches to his leader's 
god-like status as the sole source of the Party's legitimacy. 
Mao's deification meant that the 'Sixteen Points' and the newspapers 
were able to assume and assert our eleventh interpretive principle: 
11. The legitimacy of the Communist Party derives entirely from its 
faithfulness to the Thought of Chairman Mao Zedong, and Party 
members who say anything at variance with that Thought are 
attacking socialism and following the capitalist road. 
To give people plenty of opportunity to use this interpretive principle, the 
Sixteen Points confined the Party's role in supervising the Cultural 
Revolution largely to encouraging criticism of its own record in the light of 
Mao Zedong's Thought. The document exhorted the Party 'to arouse the 
masses boldly', encouraging criticism of 'the shortcomings and errors in the 
work of the persons in charge'. In this way the Party would put 'proletarian 
politics in the forefront and Mao Zedong's thought in the lead.' (CCP 
Documents,44). Mao undoubtedly intended the masses' criticism to result 
in the dismissal of people like Liu Shaoqi whom he thought had led the 
Party astray. He also intended to give the whole Party a shock, intimidating 
it into stricter conformity with his Thought. More than that, he seemed 
determined to reduce the Party's power on a longer term basis, making it 
responsive to elected 'cultural revolutionary groups, committees and 
congresses', modelled on the Paris Commune. These were not to be 
'temporary organizations but permanent, standing mass organizations.' 
(CCP Documents, 49-50). At the same time, the 'masses' who were to sit in 
judgement on the Party were to elect revolutionary committees and 
congresses, responsive to their will, based on the model of the Paris 
Commune. These new institutions were to be a permanent feature of 
Chinese society (CCP Documents, 44, 49-50,53-4). Mao, it seemed, was going 
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to put the Communist Party for ever more under the watchful eye of 
institutions subservient to the revolutionary people. So while Mao did not 
intend to destroy the Party, by commanding it to submit itself to the 
judgement of the 'revolutionary masses' he was taking away its power, 
humiliating it and exposing it to devastating criticism. For when the 
masses sat in judgment, there seemed to be little doubt of the verdict. By 
successive switches of the interpretive context Mao had framed his own 
Party, and this should have ensured that the words and actions of loyal 
cadres would inevitably be construed as anti-socialist. The only Party 
members who could have any confidence that they would be found 
innocent were those who had betrayed the Party and conspired against it in 
Mao's name: Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qi-ng and their followers. Or that, 
at any rate, was Mao's plan. It did not happen at first, because the red-class 
students who at that stage led the agitation mostly misinterpreted his 
message. For the first time in the Cultural Revolution, but by no means the 
last, Mao lost control of the context of interpretation. 
3.8 Rogue Assumptions in the Context of Interpretation: 
the Red-Class Red Guards Misread Mao's Message 
Liu Shaoqi and other Party leaders had no doubt that Mao was installing 
the revolutionary masses as judge and jury in the case of Chinese 
Communist Party vs. Mao Zedong, and they had little doubt of the verdict. 
Liu reportedly fought bitterly against his fate, repudiating Mao's criticisms 
and declaring that 'he was not afraid of the five consequences - dismissal, 
expUlsion, divorce by his wife, imprisonment, or being beheaded.' (Lee 1978, 
65). He saw the 'Sixteen Points' for what they were: an indictment of the 
Party's leadership of the Cultural Revolution and a call to the masses to 
bring in a guilty verdict and deliver judgment. He must have been 
surprised that at first those who dominated the mass movement did no 
such thing. Instead, they continued to 'point the arrow downwards' 
towards the 'bourgeois intellectuals' and the bad classes. In order to 
understand why this happened, we must examine the class background of 
the dominant faction of revolutionary students, for that background gave 
rise to the assumptions which led them to misinterpret Mao's message. 
The mass movement in August and September was based on 
university and secondary school students, dominated by the red classes. 
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The red-class students considered themselves the natural leaders of any 
revolutionary movement, and they were accepted as such by students of 
middle class and bad class backgrounds. Most had been courted by the 
school Party committees, and the work teams had sought them out to seek 
their co-operation. Then in early August 1966, they were the ones whom 
the Party encouraged to form first Red Guard units in Beijing. Their 
example was soon followed by students in other centres, and again 
membership was confined to the red classes. Almost invariably, their 
leaders were the children of cadres, often high ranking ones. Middle class 
students, although often desperate to join, were relegated to the status of 
hangers-on in what was called the Red Outer Circle, while bad-class students 
continued their customary roles as victims and class enemies (Chan 1985, 
132-3; Unger 1982, 118-21; Lee 1978, 85-6, 101). 
It is undoubtedly true that many of these students would have been 
reluctant to lead a revolution against their own families if they had thought 
that was what Mao wanted. There is, however, convincing evidence that 
. very few of them interpreted his call for them to 'Bombard the 
Headquarters' in this way. Accounts of those who observed the Cultural 
Revolution and the recollections of those who participated in the mass 
movement are unanimous that in this period the Red Guards worshipped 
Mao and were desperate to know and carry out his wishes. There is not the 
slightest indication that they felt torn between the desire to do his will and 
the desire to defend their families. When the children of cadres ignored the 
Party and continued to attack intellectuals and members of the bad classes, 
they were convinced that they were doing Mao's will. It was a clear case of 
misinterpretation, and one which Relevance Theory can elucidate. 
As Sperber and Wilson (1995) stress, communication does not 
succeeded when members of the audience simply recognize the linguistic 
meaning of an utterance. Rather, it succeeds when they infer the speakers' 
meaning from the linguistic meaning - when they recover the speaker's 
communicative intention. And, in inferring the speaker's meaning from an 
utterance, the audience makes use of precisely those interpretive 
assumptions which maximize relevance - those which maximize positive 
cognitive effects (additions to knowledge) and minimize processing effort. It 
is the responsibility of the speaker to make correct judgments about the 
accessibility of contextual assumptions to her audience and to choose 
exactly those words which (in accordance with the principle of relevance) 
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will bring to the hearer's mind the assumptions required for the recovery of 
the speaker's meaning. As Sperber and Wilson (1995, 43) put it: 
It is left to the communicator to make correct assumptions about the 
codes and contextual information that the audience will have 
accessible and be likely to use in the comprehension process. The 
responsibility for avoiding misunderstanding also lies with the 
speaker, so that all the hearer has to do is go ahead and use whatever 
code and contextual information come most easily to hand. 
When speakers or writers are mistaken about which assumptions are 
most accessible to their audience, misinterpretation or incomprehension 
occur. This was Mao's problem with the red-class Red Guards whom he 
hoped would carry the attack against the Party as he had urged in the 
'Sixteen Points'. He made incorrect assumptions about the contextual 
information most accessible to them. Indeed, at several stages in the 
'Sixteen Points' he activated precisely the assumptions which would lead to 
misunderstanding, making these 'rogue' assumptions even more accessible 
and ensuring the misinterpretation of his message. 
When Mao called on the 'revolutionary masses' to make 'those in 
authority who are travelling the capitalist road' the main target of the 
Cultural Revolution, there is no doubt that the Red Guards understood the 
linguistic meaning of his appeal. What most failed to do was recover the 
speaker's meaning. This was because the assumption which Mao was 
attempting to convey produced no positive cognitive effects. It thereby 
never became relevant and was never recognised as Mao's intended 
meaning. Most Red Guards simply did not understand that he wanted 
them to attack prominent members of the Party and demand the heads of 
Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and the work teams. 
In order to understand how this happened, let us recall the three 
ways in which an assumption which a speaker intends to convey may have 
positive cognitive effects and hence achieve relevance: 
1. It may provide further evidence for, and hence strengthen, an existing 
assumption which is not already regarded as certain. 
II. Having been accepted as true, it may be combined with existing 
assumptions to produce contextual implications. 
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III. It may contradict an existing assumption, displacing it in whole or 
in part (Sperber and Wilson 1995,108-54). 
The assumption which Mao intended to convey produced no positive 
cognitive effects because it contradicted assumptions which the Red Guards 
already held as almost certain on Mao's own authority. These assumptions 
were so deeply entrenched that it was impossible for most Red Guards to 
believe that what Mao said was what he mean t. So they attributed to him a 
meaning consistent with their existing assumptions. The most important of 
these were: 
1. That the Party, except for a small minority of perhaps five percent, 
fervently supports socialism, the Cultural Revolution and the Thought 
of Mao Zedong. 
2. The main opposition to SOCialism, to the Cultural Revolution and to 
the Thought of Mao Zedong comes from bourgeois inteltectuals and 
especially from the bad classes. 
These assumptions had guided the behaviour of most red class students 
during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution, and they were held with 
utter conviction. So when the 'Sixteen Points', with Mao's authority, 
proclaimed that 'The main task of the present movement is those within 
the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road', most Red 
Guards were in a dilemma. The purportedly factual assumption implicit in 
this injunction and in the rhetoric which surrounded it was as follows: 
3. The main danger to socialism, to the Cultural Revolution and to the 
Thought of Mao Zedong comes from the Party, not from bourgeois 
intellectuals and the bad classes. 
Assumption 3 clearly contradicted assumptions 1 and 2. For Party leaders 
like Uu Shaoqi, there was no problem of interpretation here. They were all 
too well aware of Mao's fallibility and simply rejected assumption 3 and the 
injunction associated with it: Mao's message had no positive cognitive 
effects and was irrelevant. What he did communicate to Uu and his allies 
were two related assumptions: 'Mao is saying that we are the main danger 
to socialism' and 'Mao is saying that we are the main target of the Cultural 
Revolution'. These assumptions had enormous positive cognitive effects 
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and they required little processing effort. They were therefore highly 
relevant and quickly grasped as the speaker's meaning. 
For most red-class students, interpretation was not so simple. They 
held assumptions 1 and 2 as virtually certain, and because of this they 
could not accept assumption 3. Their problem was that, unlike Uu, they 
regarded Mao as virtually infallible. They could resolve the dilemma only 
by denying, to themselves and to others, that Mao was trying to 
communicate assumption 3 and its associated injunction. They simply 
could not attribute to Mao a view which they were convinced was wrong. So 
they understood the 'Sixteen Points' with the aid of interpretive 
assumptions from which they derived explicatures and implicatures 
consistent with assumptions 1 and 2 and totally inconsistent with 
assumption 3. Indeed, some of those interpretive assumptions were 
reiterated and thereby made more accessible by the 'Sixteen Points'. I cite 
the main ones as assumptions 4-6, quoting the words from the 'Sixteen 
Points' which expressed them. The first two of those assumptions are as 
. follows: 
4. The 'great majority' of cadres are, in ordinary situations, 'good' and 
'comparatively good'. They include only a 'small number of anti-
Party, anti-socialist Rightists.' (CCP Documen ts, 48-9). 
5. The aim of the Cultural Revolution should be to strike only at 'the 
handful of ultra-reactionary bourgeois Rightists and counter-
revolutionary revisionists' and to 'achieve the unity of more than 95 
per cent of the cadres and more than 95 percent of the masses.' (CCP 
Documen ts 1968, 46). 
We shall see later how these assumptions were used to derive explicatures 
and implicatures which supported the red-class students' misinterpretation 
of Mao's message. 
The 'Sixteen Points' also conveyed assumptions which could be taken 
to indicate that the 'anti-Party, anti-socialist Rightists' were to be found 
mainly where they had always been detected in the past: in the ranks of 
the bad classes. Take assumption 6: 
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6. 'The masses of the workers, peasants, soldiers, revolutionary 
intellectuals and revolutionary cadres form the main force in this 
great cultural revolution.' (CCP Documents, 43). 
So the 'masses' whom Mao named as his allies in carrying forward the 
Cultural Revolution were not the Chinese people as a whole, but the red 
classes, with the sole addition of 'revolutionary intellectuals' like Yao 
Wenyuan. And those red classes included 'revolutionary cadres'. From this 
the red-class students could derive implicatures as follows: 
Implicature I: 
(a) 'Revolutionary cadres' are a major force in carrying through the 
Cultural Revolution. (Entailed by assumption 6). 
(b) The vast majority of cadres are revolutionary. (A standard Maoist 
assumption, expressed in the 'Sixteen Points' as assumptions 4 and 5 
above». 
(c) Therefore the cadres must be regarded far more as supporters of the 
Cultural Revolution than as its targets. 
Implicature II: 
(a) The red classes and revolutionary intellectuals are the 'main force' 
of the Cultural Revolution. (Assumption 6). 
(b) It would be perversely paradoxical to identify as the 'main force' of 
the Cultural Revolution the classes which contain most of the 'anti-
Party, anti-socialist Rightists' who are its targets. 
(c) Official Communist Party documents are not given to perverse 
paradox. 
(d) Therefore the targets of the Cultural Revolution must come largely 
from the other classes - the middle and bad classes. 
These two implicatures, so congenial to the class prejudices of red-class 
students and so consistent with Mao's previous pronouncements, combined 
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to convince them that Mao did not intend them to start putting up 
banners denouncing the work teams and the Party leaders who had sent 
them into the schools. Indeed, they were able to derive a further 
implicature from the 'Sixteen Points' which justified their lack of action: 
Implicature III: 
(a) 'In certain schools, units and work teams of the cultural revolution, 
some of the persons in charge have organized counter-attacks against 
the masses who put up big-character posters against them.' ('Sixteen 
Points', CCP Documents, 48, emphasis added). 
(b) This entails that there were schools, units and work teams where the 
persons in charge did not organize counter-attacks against the masses. 
(c) In our school, the persons repressed were not members of the 
masses, but counter-revolutionaries drawn from or allied· with the 
bad classes. 
(c) Therefore the 'persons in charge' in our school, unit or work team 
safeguarded the Cultural Revolution, did not suppress it, and 
should not be made the target of attack. 
As far as higher Party leaders were concerned, the red-class Red Guards 
were able to derive the following implicature from the 'Sixteen Points': 
Implicature IV: 
(a) 'The main target of the present movement is those within the 
Party who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road.' 
('Sixteen Points', CCP Documents, 46). 
(b) The Party contains only a 'small number of anti-Party, anti-socialist 
Rightists'. (From assumption 4 above). 
(c) Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party Committee, the central Propaganda 
Department, the Ministry of Culture, as well as many editors of Party 
newspapers and intellectuals, have already been exposed, attacked 
and dismissed. 
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(d) Hence the number already exposed is already a rather large 'small 
number'. 
(e) Therefore capitalist roaders in the Party who have not yet been 
exposed must be few in number., 
The 'Sixteen Points' also served to direct Red Guards with a standard 
'red class' context of interpretation away from the Party in other ways. 
Take, for example, the following extract: 
Large numbers of revolutionary young people, previously 
unknown, have become courageous and daring pathbreakers .. . 
their main orientation has been correct from the beginning ... It is 
the main direction along which the great proletarian cultural 
revolution continues to advance. [CCP Documents, 43]. 
The difficulty with this passage is that the term 'revolutionary young 
people' is semantically incomplete. It can be assigned a referepce only with 
the aid of contextual assumptions. So students whose protests against the 
Party committees had been crushed by the work teams, reading it in the 
context of Mao's criticism of the work teams, interpreted it as a vindication 
of their orientation. But other 'revolutionary young people', who 
dominated the movement in the schools and cooperated with the work 
teams, did not read it that way. They interpreted the statement in the 
light of assumptions (a) and (b) to infer the explicature in (c): 
(a) We are young, and everyone recognizes that we are revolutionary 
because of our red class origins, our ideology and our actions. 
(b) We have dominated the activities of young people throughout the 
Cultural Revolution, and the 'Sixteen Points' often praise and never 
criticize those activities. 
(c) Therefore we are the 'revolutionary young people' whose 
orientation is praised by the 'Sixteen Points' as 'correct from the 
beginning' . 
Having thus developed the semantically incomplete term 'revolutionary 
young people' into an explicature with themselves as its referent, they were 
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in a position to combine assumption (c) with assumption (d) to derive the 
implicature in (e): 
(d) Our revolutionary orientation has been directed primarily towards 
attacking 'bourgeois intellectuals' .and members of the bad classes. 
(e) Therefore, according to the 'Sixteen Points', the Cultural Revolution 
should be directed primarily against 'bourgeois intellectuals' and the 
bad classes. 
Mao's approval of the Red Guards' orientation seemed to be 
confirmed at a rally in Tiananmen Square on 18 August when he allowed a 
young Red Guard to pin a red arm band - the insignia of the Red Guards -
to his sleeve. By doing so, he symbolically accepted leadership of the 
movement and seemed to give his blessing to its past and present direction. 
At the same rally Mao's new deputy, Lin Biao, seemed to legitimize 'pointing 
the arrow downwards' when he placed less emphasis on rooting out 
. capitalist roaders in the Party than on destroying the Four aIds: 
We will vigorously destroy all the old ideas, old culture, old 
customs and old habits of the exploiting classes ... We will sweep away 
all vermin and remove all obstacles! 
We will make vigorous efforts to establish proletarian 
authorities and the new ideas, new culture, new customs and new 
habits of the proletariat. [Lin 1966, 377]. 
The campaign against the Four aIds, which reflected the Maoist assumption 
that a revolution in ideology could transform society, had been articulated 
in the People's Daily on 8 June 1966 and reiterated in the 'Sixteen Points'. 
Now, with Lin Biao's appeal ringing in their ears, the Red Guards picked up 
the message and transformed it into a mass movement which absorbed 
most of their energies. Unlike the call to focus on capitalist roaders in the 
Party, Lin's message was highly relevant, for it was consistent with easily 
accessible eXisting assumptions and could be combined with them to form 
implicatures suggesting a wide range of very congenial targets for attack. All 
of these targets were located, not in the Party which had been trying to 
create a New Society, but amongst the classes left over from the old society. 
So 'bourgeois intellectuals' and the bad classes were again victimized. And 
naturally enough, the Red Guards were assisted by the Party organization, 
which took the opportunity to divert attention from itself and supplied lists 
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of bad-class people in every neighbourhood. The result was a devastating 
extension of the Red Terror, in which the Red Guards entered the homes of 
bad-class people, seizing 'old' books - which meant in effect almost 
everything apart from the works of Mao, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Lu Xun 
(whom Mao had praised). The Red Gu~ds also seized or destroyed 
furniture, ornaments, musical instruments and anything else which could 
be labelled 'bourgeois'. Consumed with hatred of the class enemy, they 
vandalized temples and monuments, ransacked libraries and interrogated, 
humiliated, assaulted, tortured and sometimes killed their victims. They 
even tried to drive all members of the 'four black categories' out of Beijing 
into labour camps in the countryside, so that they would no longer 
contaminate the nation's capital (Zhai 1992, 91-100; Lee 1978, 86-90). 
In all of this, the Red Guards were doing what they thought Mao 
wanted. They were right, of course, up to a point, for he did want them to 
wage class war against the Four Olds; but they were wrong in thinking that 
he wanted them to make the campaign against the Four Olds a substitute 
. for what he had tried to designate as their main task - the denunciation of 
capitalist roaders in the Party. Within a few weeks, Mao and his allies 
realized that for the first time the Cultural Revolution had gone off course, 
and from the beginning of October they set about changing its orientation. 
The People's Daily and Red Flag accused capitalist roaders within the Party 
of manipulating the campaign to divert attention from themselves to the 
masses, attacking Red Guards who had cooperated in this strategy. They 
also banned use of the term 'black categories' and denounced the theory of 
'natural redness', describing the speeches of the Red Guard leader, Tan Lifu, 
its most articulate exponent, as 'poisonous weeds'. In this way they directly 
attacked the assumptions about the class identities of revolutionary and 
reactionary forces which had guided the red-class students' 
misinterpretation of the 'Sixteen Points' (Lee 1978,110-16). 
Faced with this attack on their position, the pro-Party Red Guards 
were bewildered. When Red Flag announced the 'new' line, they could not 
believe it, but when they asked for clarification they were informed by Lin 
Qje of the Central Cultural Revolution Group that 'The editorial of this issue 
is written in accordance with the instructions of Chairman Mao and his 
close comrade-in-arms, Comrade Un Piao.' (Lee 1978,114). When they 
complained to Premier Zhou Enlai, he told them bluntly: 
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You are hoodwinked and influenced by them [the Party committees]. 
Get rid of their influence and rectify yourselves. Those who are 
influenced most deeply are you, the so-called majority faction, who 
supported the work teams ... (Lee 1978, 116). 
The red-class Red Guards' misinterpretation of Mao's message had 
been corrected, leaving them thoroughly bewildered. 'Why,' they asked, are 
the Party and the CYL [Communist Youth League] members in our colleges 
mostly on the conservative side?' . 'How can it be possible that the sons of 
cadres, who constituted the creative and vital forces of the revolutionary 
organizations in the middle schools, are conservative?' (Lee 1978, 92). Some 
of them, forced to choose between the Maoist line and the Party, chose the 
latter. The Xicheng Inspection Team, for example, the elite Red Guard unit 
which had policed the activities of other Red Guards, formed itself into a 
paramilitary organization defending the government ministries from attack. 
This was not the sort of 'free mobilization of the masses' which the Maoists 
had wanted, so the public security forces were used to suppress the 
'conservative' Red Guards, as they were now called. Those arrested included 
-Song Binbin, the Red Guard who had pinned the red arm band to Mao's 
sleeve at the rally of 18 August. 
Most of the conservative Red Guards did not defy the Maoist 
leadership openly. Indeed, they remained eager to do Mao's will. They 
were therefore able to re-emerge under new labels to participate in the 
Cultural Revolution. It is clear, though, that their class-based assumptions 
continued to influence their interpretation of instructions from the Maoist 
leaders. They did attack the Party, but tried to limit their attacks to 
particular individuals. Those whom they singled out fell largely into two 
categories: 
1. Senior Party leaders who had been identified by the Maoist-controlled 
newspapers as appropriate targets and whose downfall was inevitable. 
2. Cadres in technical positions, rather than political ones, who were 
often of middle class or bad class backgrounds. 
Red-class cadres in leading positions were ignored, where possible, and 
attempts were made to preserved the Party's organizational integrity (Lee 
1978, 312-22). This restraint reflected the class-based background 
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assumptions with which the conservative Red Guards complemented the 
interpretive assumptions given to them by Yao Wenyuan and the 'Sixteen 
Points': the latter assumptions, which could be used to 'prove' that almost 
anyone was a capitalist-roader, were to be applied selectively, directed 
mainly at non-red targets. 
By late 1966, however, the conservatives were not the only Red 
Guards. They were not even in the forefront of the Cultural Revolution. 
New 'Rebel' Red Guards had emerged, largely from non-red class backgrounds 
and with very different background assumptions. They had no inhibitions 
about using Yao's interpretive principles and the 'Sixteen Points' against the 
Party, and within a few months, backed by the Central Cultural Revolution 
Group and by Mao himself, they had swept the Party almost entirely away. 
3.9 Mao Finds an Audience with the 'Correct' Context of 
Interpretation: Rise of the 'Rebel' Red Guards' 
Some red-class students had fallen foul of the work teams, but they were a 
small minority. In general, students from good class backgrounds had been 
eager to co-operate with the work teams. And they had been flattered when 
the work teams, in accordance with traditional Maoist assumptions, sought 
them out and placed them at the forefront of the Cultural Revolution. 
When the work teams 'pointed the arrow downwards', again in accordance 
with traditional Maoist assumptions, most red-class students saw this as the 
correct revolutionary strategy. They relished the chance to show their 
revolutionary fervour at the expense of the bad classes. 
Middle class students were mostly 'followers' in political matters, 
fearful of challenging the 'red' students' ascendancy and anxious to adopt 
the revolutionary orthodoxy of the moment. Most admitted that there was 
some truth in the doctrine of 'natural redness' and accepted the standard 
Maoist assumption that anti-revolutionary elements were to be found 
principally in the bad classes (Chan 1985, 120, 139). So only a minority 
had 'pointed the arrow' at the Party and been suppressed by the work 
teams. What rankled with many middle class students, alienating them 
from the work teams, was the way in which the teams endorsed the class 
prejudices of the 'red' students and excluded nearly all other students from 
revolutionary committees and other leading positions. In other words, the 
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work teams robbed the middle class students of the chance to show 
exceptional revolutionary fervour, relegating them to the role of 'hangers on' 
- assistant persecutors of the bad classes (Chan 1985, esp. 128-9, 132-3). 
Students with bad class backgrounds 'complained among themselves 
privately' at their outcast status, and few were able to bring themselves to 
denounce and renounce their families - the only way in which they could 
achieve even partial redemption. During the work teams' rule, they had 
suffered under the 'Red Terror' imposed by the 'red' students and their 
middle class adjutants. Far more than the middle class students, they 
resented the 'class line' which Mao and the Party imposed, and their agony 
was intense when the struggle intensified during the early phases of the 
Revolution. Although most were too fearful to become politically active, 
once the work teams were withdrawn a small minority joined the student 
revolt, revealing interpretive assumptions which differed radically from 
those of red-class students. (Chan 1985, 119, 129, 139; Raddock 1977). 
When the work teams were withdrawn, students who had been 
suppressed for criticizing their activities or challenging the Party committees 
felt vindicated. They had frequently been condemned by the work teams 
and most red-class students as 'anti-Party Rightists', but they had never 
accepted that label. So, no matter what their class background, they could 
instantly retrieve all the assumptions required for the following self-
justifying explicature of the 'Sixteen Points" condemnation of certain work 
teams: 
(a) 'In certain schools, units and work teams of the cultural revolution, 
some of the persons in charge have organized counter-attacks against 
the masses who put up big-character posters against them ... In this 
way it is inevitable that their blows will fall on some really 
revolutionary activists.' ('Sixteen Points', CCP Documents, 48, 
emphasis added). 
(b) We are members of the 'masses' and 'really revolutionary activists'. 
(c) The 'persons in charge' in our school (or unit or work team) organized 
counter-attacks against us for putting up big-character posters against 
them. 
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(d) Therefore the 'Sixteen Points' condemn the 'persons in charge' of our 
school (or unit or work team) and vindicate us. 
So they now had more reason than ever to attack the school 
authorities or work teams which had persecuted them. When they did 
so, they were generally opposed by a majority of red-class students, 
particularly the children of cadres, whose class-based interpretive 
assumptions had led them to a different explicature. However, middle 
class students, who resented the way in which the 'red' students and the 
work teams had marginalized them, overwhelmingly supported the 
rebels' explicature and began to rally to their support (Chan, Rosen & Unger 
1980; Lee 1978). 
Emboldened by the vindication of the rebels and by the declaration in 
the 'Sixteen Points' that capitalist roaders within the Party were the main 
target, a handful of middle class students sensed that the school Party 
. committees were about to become as vulnerable as the teachers had been. 
Often, says Jonathon Unger, they 'had no special grievances against their 
school Party committee, just as their earlier attacks on teachers had not 
normally been fuelled by concrete grievances.' (1982, 116-17). An interview 
by Anita Chan with the normally articulate former deputy-commander of 
Canton's high school Rebel Red Guards bears this out. Asked why he had 
opposed the school committee, he was lost for words: 
Actually ... hm ... the basic problems with the Party committee 
weren't big. I thought it done some wrong things ... (pause) ... such 
as something bureaucratic ... (pause) The school principal was lazy, I 
thought ... (pause) ... Actually, when talking about him or the Party 
committee, there weren't many concrete problems ... (pause) ... but 
how could we know that inside the committee there were no 
problems? Especially after reading the 16 Points I was convinced ... At 
the time the spearhead was pointed against the teachers instead. I 
thought that was wrong, that it should be against the Party branch. 
So I criticized the workteam [and implicitly the good-background 
youths and League] for making a mistake in direction. [Quoted in 
Unger 1982, 117]. 
So he was able to attack the school committee and the work team using 
the sudden switch in interpretive assumptions with which Mao had 
trapped the Party in late July and August. Those who wanted to prove 
their revolutionary credentials by attacking the Party in the schools 
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had been given the perfect weapon. 
In some schools, resentment of the 'class line' imposed by 
red-class students led to a backlash against party stalwarts. When the 
work team left Ken Ling's school, he lost his fear and felt that the 
Cultural Revolution 'had now become a student affair': 
In the new circumstances, I felt that I had to name a few power 
holders as "reactionary academic authorities" and "cow ghosts and 
snake demons." ... In particular I named people with peasant or 
worker backgrounds who had since "changed character" - abused their 
new authority as members of the five red classes. I did so to avenge 
my family - grandfather, father and uncles - who had lost their 
considerable property and jobs and land because of such scoundrels. 
Altogether I named more than twenty people. I avoided naming 
teachers I respected or members of the five black classes ... I 
sympathized with them because we shared the same fate, although 
my father was considered middle class - my father had been a bank 
manager. I was strongly opposed to those in my class with a "5 red" 
background who pOinted out that this was "intentional dass revenge"; 
but these classmates were overruled, and we kicked them out of the 
class on the charge of betrayal ... The overwhelming majority of 
students in our school were of the five black classes; this was one of 
its exceptional characteristics. [Ling 1972, 22-3]. 
In the hands of someone like Ling, the switches of interpretive context 
engineered by Mao and Yao Wenyuan could be used to prove, to the 
satisfaction of anyone who wanted 'class revenge', that even the reddest 
of 'S-red' teachers and cadres had been following the capitalist road. 
When Jiang Qing, Chen Boda and the Central Cultural Revolution 
Group attacked the doctrine of 'natural redness' in October and declared 
that all students with a correct revolutionary ideology should be able to 
join the Red Guards, middle class students enthusiastically formed their 
own units. A few bad class students joined too, as did dissident 
'S-red' students - especially young people from working class families 
who resented the arrogance and condescending ways of many of the 
cadre's children. The new units often had a red-class leader for 
the sake of appearance, but the power nearly always lay with their 
middle class members. It was these 'Rebel' Red Guards, composed 
principally of non-red students, who were the principal weapon which 
Mao and the Central Cultural Revolution Group used to humiliate the 
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Party (Lee 1978; Unger 1982; Rosen 1982; Chan 1985; Chan, Rosen & Unger 
1980). 
The students who joined the Rebel Red Guards' easily abandoned 
the interpretive assumptions which had blinded the red-class 'Royalist' 
Red Guards to Mao's message. Most of them had never liked the 
doctrine of 'natural redness' and they rejected extreme versions of it 
outright; but this was the very doctrine which underpinned the 
red-class students' conviction that it was the bad classes, not the Party, 
which was the main threat to socialism. When the 'Sixteen Points' 
demanded action at variance with the assumptions of the doctrine, 
middle class students understood the appeal far more easily than red 
class ones; and when the Central Cultural Revolution Group condemned 
all but the milder forms of the doctrine, they rejoiced that the 
disadvantages of non-red status had been diminished. Some even 
claimed that class origin should be disregarded altogether as a criterion 
of revolutionary virtue (White 1976; Kraus 1981). 
Some went further still, developing Mao's critical comments about 
bureaucratic tendencies in the Party into the far more radical theory 
that China had developed a new class structure in which the privileged 
elite consisted of revolutionary cadres and their families, who were 
nothing but a stratum of 'red capitalists' and a 'new-born bourgeoisie' 
(Chan 1985, 144-5). The cadre children therefore belonged to the 
oppressors, and students from middle class and even black families 
joined the workers and peasants amongst the oppressed. 
Once assumptions like these began to spread amongst the Rebels, 
calls for extreme action against the Party were both welcome and easily 
understood. The Rebels began to take seriously and literally the 
instruction in the 'Sixteen Points' that the 'revolutionary masses' should 
elect revolutionary groups, committees and congresses on a permanent 
basis, having the right to replace those whom they elected at any time. 
This instruction was based on the model of the Paris Commune, and it 
formed the context in which the Rebels heard and understood calls from 
the Central Cultural Revolution Group that they should seize power from 
the Party. They were joined by underprivileged workers, who 
answered the call to wrest control of their workplaces from the 
capitalist roaders who now seemed to be everywhere in the Party. Thus 
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occurred the 'january Power Seizure' in which, as Hong Yung Lee has 
put it, 'a so-called totalitarian regime governing a quarter of the world's 
population ordered its people to seize power from itself for the sake of 
revolution.' (Lee 1978, 140). It was at this point that Mao's strategy 
began to have consequences far beyond his original plan, or even his 
present desires. Mao, having manipulated the interpretive assumptions 
of the non-red students so that they would subject the Party to the 
purge and the shock which he desired, suddenly began to lose control of 
the context of interpretation. And once that happened, his ability to 
manipulate people's behaviour by controlling the meaning of what they 
said sharply declined. At his moment of greatest success he lost control, 
and the Cultural Revolution began its descent into chaos. 
3.10 Mao Loses Control of the Context of Interpretation: 
the Descent into Chaos 
The january Power Seizure severely damaged Mao's ability to 
communicate his message through his usual means: directives of the 
Central Committee, statements from the Central Cultural Revolution 
Group, and authoritatively worded editorials in official Party newspapers. 
And when he lost much of his ability to communicate his message, he lost 
control of the Cultural Revolution. 
The Power Seizure undermined Mao's power to communicate partly 
because it led to a change in policy which strained the Rebels' faith in his 
word. He had freed them from their parents, freed them from their teachers 
and freed them from control by the Party. He had seemed to offer them a 
permanent say in the government of revolutionary China through 
democratically elected groups, committees and congresses based on the 
model of the Paris Commune. The rebels foresaw a future in which they -
'the masses' - would rule, guided by the Thought of Mao Zedong. The Rebels 
worshipped Mao as their liberator, and they found the sudden rush of 
power and freedom intOxicating. One leading Rebel told Anita Chan: 
In the period just before the call of january 1967 to 'seize power', the 
weather was quite cold. But when I walked in the streets the wind 
seemed like a spring draught wafting toward me. I'd never felt so free. 
Ah, it was truly exhilarating. I felt myself so lucky to have been born 
at this time of history in China, born under the flag of Chairman Mao 
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- on the one hand to have been liberated by Mao Zedong, and on the 
other to have experienced such a sublime sense of freedom. [Chan 
1985, 124]. 
But when in the wake of the Power Seizure in Shanghai the victorious Rebel 
workers and students actually set up a Paris-style Commune, Mao opposed 
it on the grounds that 'if everything were changed into Communes, then 
what about the Party? ... There must be a Party somehow; there must be a 
nucleus.' (Chan 1985,' 145). He wanted to use the Party to discipline the 
masses, just as he wanted the masses to punish the Party for 'betraying' his 
Thought. If the masses defeated the Party and became supreme, he feared 
that there would be chaos. So he ordered that the Commune be replaced by 
a Revolutionary Committee consisting of the PLA, rehabilitated cadres and 
representatives of the new organizations representing the revolutionary 
masses. The cadres would keep the country running, while the army would 
make sure that the masses did not get out of control. For the first time 
since the 'Sixteen Points' Mao had disappointed the Rebels. Before long they 
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began to wonder if he always spoke with his own voice, or if he was 
, sometimes misrepresented or subjected to pressure. They were losing faith 
in the directives attributed to him which came from the Party Centre. As 
one former Red Guard put it: 
When our ideas were still fuzzy, the centre [Central Committee] had 
called on us in the Sixteen Points to 'believe in the masses, rely on the 
masses'. In the end when we came to realize that in a genuine 
socialist revolution this was the crucial point, suddenly the centre 
said they did not want this thing anymore! How could we then, 
because we had to obey the centre, give this thing up? We couldn't 
any more... At this point, everyone began to discover that he was a 
bit of a reactionary, reactionary by not listening to the centre. On the 
contrary, we expected the centre to direct us as it had earlier, in 
accordance with our aspirations, our hopes, our demands. [Chan 
1985, 147-8]. 
During 1967 and 1968, apathy and cynicism became rife, while drinking, 
smoking, vandalism and theft became commonplace. As another former 
Red Guard recalled: 
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Though I didn't, many others stole and broke things. Some would 
see a glass window, fling a stone at it and run. They just didn't 
know how to express their anger and disappointment ... We were 
just crazy. We felt changed ... We just felt we had nothing any 
more, those ideals we had, those expectations and enthusiasm to 
serve mankind. These seemed so unreal ... There was no more 
meaning. [Chan 1985, 148-9]. 
As these attitudes spread, directives from the Centre lost their power to 
persuade, or even to capture their previous audience. Mao himself was still 
not usually blamed for what had gone wrong, but his ability to control 
interpretation sharply diminished. People chose whatever interpretive 
assumptions they preferred and read Mao how they liked. 
Equally important, the January Power Seizure destroyed the unity of 
the coalition which had nurtured the Cultural Revolution and had brought 
the Communist Party to the brink of destruction. The Central Cultural 
Revolution Group split into a moderate faction and a radical <?ne. The 
former, associated with Kang Sheng and Yao Wenyuan, accepted the 
abolition of the Shanghai Commune and protected Zhou Enlai from attack. 
The latter, led by Qi Benyu, incited agitation against Zhou and sought to 
intensify the war against the bureaucracy. Most dangerous of all, the 
radical faction called for a purge of the PLAYs leaders and incited the Red 
Guards to raid arsenals and attack regional military commanders (Lee 1978, 
ch. 8; Kwong 1988, 94-5). 
With the Party Centre openly divided, some directives were vaguely 
worded compromises between different factions, and their implications were 
hard to discern. Other directives flatly contradicted each other. For 
example, in January 1967, the government called for reconciliation with the 
cadres, but five months later it told revolutionaries to 'hound the enemies 
to the end.' (Kwong 1988, 106). Even when the radicals were sacked in 
September 1967, it proved impossible to guarantee consistency in the signals 
sent from the Centre, let alone uniformity of interpretation amongst the Red 
Guards and the wider public. The effect of all this has been neatly 
summarized by Kwong: 
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These conflicting messages, compounded by the breakdown of 
mechanisms of social control, increased confusion that further 
undermined the government's influence. Sometimes the Red Guards 
openly defied central directives; at other times they used whichever 
directives suited them and ignored the rest, then accused their rivals 
who did likewise of disobeying central government orders. [Kwong 
1988, 106; also 107-27]. . 
In this context, Mao's words, while never openly questioned, became little 
more than a weapon for belabouring opponents. As Ken Ling later recalled: 
During the ensuing two years [from October 1966] I was never to hear 
my colleagues discuss how to defend Mao Tse-tung thought or the rule 
of the proletariat. All I heard was how to strengthen our own 
organization and weaken the opposing one. Sometimes my 
schoolmates would appeal to me: Old Ling, hurry up and find 
something in the Mao quotations that we can use to bat our 
opponents down. We'll use it a thousand times in our propaganda 
today. We know you remember more of them and know how to apply 
them. [Ling 1972, 131] . 
. Mao's Thought could be used to prove anything at all. It was no longer 
controlled by Mao, who had all but destroyed the Party which he had once 
used to disseminate his word and regulate its interpretation. Rather, it was 
controlled by the Red Guards - and it was they who selected, to suit 
themselves, the context of interpretation. 
Repeated calls by the Party Centre for the Red Guards to stop fighting 
each other, to be tolerant of cadres and not to attack soldiers went 
unheeded in the latter part of the Cultural Revolution. Every Red Guard 
organization paid lip service to these appeals - summed up in the slogan 
'great unity' - then selected a context of interpretation which neutralized 
their intended effect. The Middle School War Gazette, for instance, 
interpreted the slogan as an instruction that revolutionary organizations -
centres of 'great unity' - should not be disbanded but rebuilt, strengthened 
and supported (Kwong 1988, 111). The paper was thus able to turn the 
slogan round so that it became a recommendation that revolutionary 
organizations would gather strength for combat with anti-revolutionary 
enemies. 
Finally, to enforce peace, Mao mobilized the workers and the PLA 
against the students, sending them into the schools and universities to take 
charge. The 'Rebel' Red Guards resisted, suspecting that some 'black hand' 
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had mobilized the workers. So Mao summoned five nationally prominent 
student leaders - 'the five heavenly kings' - and with tears streaming down 
his face he told them: 
I am the 'black hand' [who has been ordering your suppression]. If 
you leave this meeting and try to say something different, I warn you 
that I am making a tape recording of the meeting and will make it 
public. [Lieberthal 1995, 115; cf. Goldman 1981, 155]. 
This personal appeal, with its explicit threat, was backed by the force of the 
PLA and by Workers' Mao Zedong Propaganda Teams which were despatched 
to school and university campuses. It brought the chaotic 'phase of the 
Cultural Revolution to a close. In a face to face encounter, at least, Mao was 
still able to get his message across, to correct any interpretive assumptions 
which led, or enabled, his audience to miss or evade his intended meaning. 
And with the establishment of a new hierarchy of coercion, his word was 
once again law. 
In 1982, a former Red Guard leader described what had happened 
during the Cultural Revolution: 'First the government [Mao] turned against 
the intellectuals, then the party members, then the students. We were all 
being used.' (Kwong 1988,131-2). Phrases like 'we were used', 'manipulated', 
'betrayed', 'nai've' recur time and time again in the recollections of former 
Red Guards (Chan 1985, 184; and personal conversations). Mao had used 
the campaign against Wu Han in order to trap Peng Zhen, the Beijing Party 
Committee, the Propaganda Department and the Ministry of Culture; he 
had used the Party to spread Yao Wenyuan's interpretive assumptions and 
to mobilize the students; he had used the red-class Red Guards to attack 
the intellectuals, brutalize the 'bad' classes and destroy the 'old' culture; he 
had used the 'rebel' students and workers to destroy the Party's power; and 
in the end he used 'non-aligned' workers and the PLA to bring Red Guards of 
all factions to heel, describing their mentality as 'basically bourgeois' 
(quoted in Liu 1986,49). Those whom he had used, he condemned and 
cast off. Most former Red Guards, including virtually all the 'Rebels', were 
exiled to the countryside to be 're-educated' by the peasants and live out 
their days as agricultural labourers. 
The most striking feature of Mao's strategy is that, from the beginning 
of the Cultural Revolution down to the Power Seizure of January 1967, his 
most effective weapon was a sudden change in interpretive assumptions 
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which transformed people who had hitherto been 'revolutionaries' and 
'socialists' into 'capitalist roaders', 'bourgeois intellectuals' or 'revisionists'. 
At first, this weapon was deadly, and Mao manipulated it with great skill to 
destroy the Party. However, when Mao continued to change the context of 
interpretation after January 1967, so that even the 'Rebels' became 
'hourgeois', the tactic lost its credibility. Mao had made too many people 
the victims of his carefully calculated changes in the 'correct' line, and 
ended up causing only suffering, confusion, disillusionment and cynicism. 
The outcome was the emergence of a 'faction of wanderers' (xiao yao pai) 
who opted out of politics and gave themselves up to dissipation, and the 
creation of a 'lost' and cynical generation of former 'Rebel' Red Guards (cf. 
Lee 1978, 287). So Mao's repeated manipulation of interpretive 
assumptions eventually undermined his goal of fashioning a society of true 
believers. As a savage lesson to the Party, the Cultural Revolution's chaotic 
phase had worked brilliantly. As an agency of revolutionary ideological 
transformation it was, after the initial stages, an utter failure. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REVOLUTIONARY CONFORMITY, 
PUBLIC CRITICISM AND FORMULAE 
4.1 'A Language after Mao': the Cult of the Word 
'Ever since the Communists came to power nineteen years ago,' wrote 
H.C. Chuang in 1968, 'every political campaign in China has been 
simultaneously a semantic campaign as well, introducing or reviving a 
plethora of shibboleths and slogans with such determination and 
concentration that it sometimes borders on verbomania or 
graphomania. Mao strikes one as a true believer of word magic, like 
the earlier Greek philosophers who held that "nothing, whether human 
or superhuman, is beyond the power of words.'" (Chuang 1968,47). 
At no time was this more true than during the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao never made the mistake of thinking that control of language was 
the only thing required to control thought, but he knew that it was 
vital. And even when, as we saw in the last chapter, he lost control of 
the context of interpretation, he retained control of the word. People 
wrote and spoke the language of Mao worship and revolution as never 
before, even as their interpretations of what that language meant 
diverged. 
Since Mao launched the Cultural Revolution partly to destroy 
those whom he suspected of deviating from his Thought, it is not 
surprising that the central text of the Cultural Revolution was a pocket 
compendium of ideological essentials, Quotations from Chairman Mao 
Zedong. It became the international symbol of the Cultural Revolution, 
known to the world as the 'Little Red Book'. It originated in the 
General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army and 
consisted of quotations from Mao's speeches, writings and directives 
which had previously appeared in the Liberation Army Daily. It first 
appeared in August 1964 and a slightly revised version was published 
in August 1965, its preface stating that Party Vice-Chairman Lin Biao 
had directed that copies be distributed 'like weapons ... to each and 
every person in our army.' (Chuang 1968, 2-3; Yan & Gao 1986,191). 
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Then in late 1966, with a preface written by Lin Biao, the book became 
available to the 'broad masses' of the Chinese people. It was an instant 
sensation, with a second edition published before the end of the year 
and a further 350 million copies being printed in 1967. By the middle 
of that year the book had been translated into no fewer than 22 foreign 
languages as the 'magic weapon' of Mao Zedong's Thought spread 
throughout the world (Chuang 1968, 1-2). Ultimately, about 2 billion 
copies were printed (Dittmer 1987, 38). In China itself, the book 
became indispensable, being quoted to support every point of view and 
every course of action, being waved to demonstrate revolutionary 
enthusiasm at mass rallies, and being clasped in the hand - often held 
across the breast - in a display of Mao worship and ideological 
rectitude. 
Mastery of the Little Red Book brought prestige. Students with 
exceptional memories and extraordinary determination were able to 
learn all 270 pages of the book by heart and recite any passa'ge, word 
perfect, on demand. One star performer visited my school and gave a 
stunning recitation. We were sure that she must be a dedicated 
revolutionary. Conversely, inability to quote the book could be taken 
as proof of reactionary politics. Red Guards sometimes tried to catch 
their opponents out, demanding that they quote particular passages. 
When Gao Yuan was interrogated by an opposing faction of Red 
Guards, they told him to 'Recite the quotation on page ten, paragraph 
two.' When at first he failed, his opponents gloated, 'No wonder you're 
such a reactionary; you don't even know Chairman Mao's works ... 
We're not going to let you stand up until you recite the quotation.' 
(Gao 1987, 332-3). With a little prompting from a former friend, Gao 
eventually passed the test, but not all were so lucky. Red Guards 
interrogating Liu Shaoqi demanded that he recite the first paragraph of 
the Little Red Book. His wife, Wang Guangmei, was sure that he could 
do it but Liu, 'stammering and hesitating, could not get any farther 
than "the force at the core leading our cause is," and, while saying that, 
he still forgot the words, "at the core.'" (Mainichi, 11 Jan. 1967, quoted 
Dittmer 1974, 102). Wang Guangmei herself suffered a similar 'trial by 
quotation'. 
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The Little Red Book and Mao's other works were also used to re-
educate and intimidate students from the five black categories. Zhai 
Zhenhua recalls that she and other Red Guards forced such students to 
sit at their desks using 'Mao Zedong thought to reform their own'. 
Then, 'When off duty, we Red Guards.would monitor how they were 
doing. We would walk cockily in front of them and at times stop before 
a student. She would be directed to recite a quotation from Chairman 
Mao's books or to report her progress in her own personal reform.' 
(Zhai 1992, 105). 
The Party newspapers and journals led the way in worshipping 
Mao's word. From about October 1965, as the Mao-cult intensified 
during the prelude to the Cultural Revolution, the People's Daily began 
to print quotations from Mao's works at the head of each issue. Other 
Party journals soon adopted the practice. During the Cultural 
Revolution proper, almost every article was packed with Mao's 
aphorisms, and for a time in late 1966 the quotations were printed in 
big, red characters (Chuang 1968, 10). Incessant exposure to Mao's 
word became an inescapable part of Chinese reality. People with a 
literary bent sometimes learned by heart all 37 of Mao's poems, gaining 
prestige by reCiting them on appropriate occasions. Quotation boards 
began to appear at intersections, street crossings and other places 
where people congregated, and walls, fences and the sides of buildings 
were festooned with Mao quotes. The 'Sixteen Points' officially 
declared the whole country a 'great school' of Mao Zedong's Thought, 
and from early 1967 'study classes of Mao Zedong's Thought' 
proliferated in which Mao's writings were discussed as sacred texts 
(Chuang 1968,44). Even the illiterate had no escape. They had the 
texts read to them at the study classes, they heard Mao's message 
constantly from radios and the ever-present loudspeakers, and they 
were taught quotation songs which made it easy for them to memorize 
his words. 
Mao's Thought was not confined to the official media and the 
classroom. People were required constantly to relate it to the details of 
everyday life. This could be taken to comical extremes. Gao Yuan 
recalls how one day he heard a housewife and a vegetable seller 
conduct an argument in quotations: 
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The housewife was choosing tomatoes with great care, examining 
each one, since they were expensive in the winter. The 
displeased sales clerk said, 'Fight selfishness and repudiate 
revisionism.' The housewife replied, 'We Communists pay great 
attention to conscientiousness.' They quoted back and forth 
until they were ready for a fight. Onlookers used quotations to 
stop them. (Gao 1987,319). . 
The banality of the subject over which the two women were fighting 
was unusual, but the practice of using quotations to win an argument 
was not. Indeed the phrase 'fight a quotation war' (da yulu zhang) 
became part of the Chinese language. Nor was the self-interested use of 
quotations unusual. Mao's language permeated daily life, even when 
those who used it were not motivated by revolutionary piety. 
A 'revolution to touch people's souls' required revolutionary 
nomenclature. It started in Beijing, where Red Guards 'launched a 
massive attack on those shop and place names which give oft a foul 
smell of decadent feudal and bourgeoisie ideology'; the aim was to 
'turn our capital into a extremely proletarian and revolutionized new 
city', to 'turn every industry, every shop and every unit into a school of 
Mao Zedong Thought and into a battle field for propagating and 
carrying out Mao Zedong Thought.' (Shoudu gongren xingdong qilai, 
jianjue zhichi geming xuesheng, 23 August, 1966. RGP, vol. 19, p. 
6110). Shops and theatres with unsatisfactory names had their signs 
pulled down and replaced with titles like 'Worker-Peasant-Soldier 
Wineshop', 'Red Guard Department Store' or 'Sun-facing Restaurant' -
in which the 'Sun', of course, stood for Chairman Mao. Streets were re-
named. A street with many western embassies became Anti-
imperialism Road, the street in which the Soviet embassy stood became 
Anti-revisionism Road, and hundreds of lesser thoroughfares sported 
new, revolutionary titles. The fashion spread to other cities. In my 
own city of Tianjin, many establishments piously adopted the title '813' 
- as in '813 Restaurant' - to commemorate Mao's visit to the city on 
August 13, 1958. In Chengdu, recalls Jung Chang (1992, 382), 
streets were shedding old names like 'Five Generations under 
One Roof (a Confucian virtue), 'The Poplar and Willow Are 
Green' (green was not a revolutionary color), and 'Jade Dragon' 
(a symbol of feudal power). They became 'Destroy the Old,' 'The 
East is Red,' and 'Revolution' streets. A famous restaurant called 
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'The Fragrance of Sweet Wind' had its plaque broken to bits. It 
was renamed 'The Whiff of Gunpowder.' 
People, too, sometimes took new names. Gao Yuan re-named himself 
Shijie Shu ('Changes in the World' - a phrase from Mao's poems). His 
less literary classmates took names like Bao Dongbiao ('Safeguard Mao 
Zedong and Lin Biao'), Chongmao ('Revere Mao'), Xiangdong ('Towards 
the East'), Jihong ('Inherit Red'), Yongge ('Forever Revolutionary'), 
Fanxiu (,Anti-revisionism') and Miezi ('Liquidate the Bourgeoisie') (Gao 
1987, 96). Some people whom I knew adopted names like Chang 
Fanxiu ('Fight Revisionism'), Xuegong ('Learn from the Workers'), 
Xuejun (,Learn from the PLA'), Naxin (,Take in the Fresh' - words from 
one of Mao's latest directives). This wholesale re-naming caused great 
confusion, however, and as a result many of the new names were soon 
dropped. Less ephemeral were the names given to children born 
during the Cultural Revolution. Names given to people whom I knew 
included Weidong ('Defend Mao Zedong'), Wenge ('Cultural _" 
Revolution'), Dongfang ('East'), Sixin ('Four News'), Yingzi ('Heroic 
bearing' - quoted from Mao's poem describing his wife Jiang Qjng) and 
Yan'an (location of the Communist Party's revolutionary base in the 
1940s). 
Because language was taken as a guide to thought, the 
consequences of linguistic error could be horrendous. People began to 
fear what was known as 'one character mistake' (yi zi zhi cha). One 
teacher wrote a poster criticizing Uu Shaoqi, putting three red XIS over 
the name of the name of the 'Number One Capitalist Roader'. 
Unfortunately, in one line he accidentally put red XIS over Chairman 
Mao's name instead and was branded a counterrevolutionary (Gao 
1987, 189). A female 'Rebel' Red Guard, while being questioned by 
'Loyalist' opponents, was so nervous that she accidentally said that she 
was trying to start a revolution against 'the proletariat' instead of 'the 
capitalists'. More than ten male 'Loyalists' ripped her clothes, sexually 
assaulted her and beat her so savagely that she had to be taken to 
hospital in an ambulance (Ling 1972, 80-81). People had to be very 
careful what they said to members of their own families, especially 
children, for unthinking words by a child could bring disaster to 
everyone (Chen 1978). My own family was lucky that no one 
discovered that I was the author of an anti-Lin Biao slogan which 
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appeared on a wall while Lin was still officially Mao's 'closest comrade 
in arms'. Others were less fortunate. At Nankai University, where I 
grew up, the four year old daughter of the Registrar unwittingly 
betrayed her own grandmother by repeating an unguarded comment. 
The old woman was savagely persecuted and one day I discovered her 
lifeless body dangling from a noose. She had hanged herself. The girl's 
father, already under pressure, killed himself soon after. Searching for 
meaning in the devastation, the little girl became a compulsive 
collector of Chairman Mao badges and slowly went mad. 
Under these circumstances, the safest course, and the most 
revolutionary one, was to speak and write in Chairman Mao's own 
words. Editors of newspapers and journals, fearing that the slightest 
deviation from Chairman Mao's revolutionary line would result in their 
dismissal, filled their columns with extracts from Mao's works, with 
articles stitched together around Mao-quotes, and with Party 
documents filled with phrases borrowed from Mao. This was the 
language of public life, and it infiltrated the language of personal 
communication as people resorted to safe formulae because they were 
uncertain about whom they could trust. 
The Cultural Revolution had an immense impact on the Chinese 
language. It was not that people learned a new Maoist-Marxist 
vocabulary which categorized reality in novel ways. It was not even 
that the language began to incorporate Mao's more distinctive personal 
expressions and usages. These processes were far advanced before the 
Cultural Revolution. What happened during the Cultural Revolution 
was that people began to write and speak in Mao's actual words on a 
grand scale. The result was a profound, if temporary, impoverishment 
of the Chinese language, which became repetitive, narrowly political 
and cliche ridden. Newspapers and journals which had once catered 
for intellectuals were now written in the language of political talks 
which Mao had given with the needs of illiterate soldiers and peasants 
in mind. Moreover, while Mao's original talks were often fresh and 
forceful, constant reiteration made even his most striking phrases 
sound hackneyed. And when his words were wrenched from their 
original context and applied to every situation they began to sound 
phoney and, to non-believers, grotesque. Overseas Chinese were often 
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appalled. As Chen Ruoxi, Taiwan-born but a resident in China from 
1966 to 1973, lamented: 'It was not Chinese as it used to be; it was not 
even Mao's language, but a language of his quotations, a language after 
him.' (Dittmer & Chen 1981, 29). 
This new 'language after Mao' was reinforced by changes in 
material culture as Red Guards went on the rampage during the 
campaign to 'Destroy the Four Olds'. Pagodas, churches, monuments, 
cemeteries, ornamental archways and almost all architectural remnants 
of the feudal era were defaced or destroyed. Raids on homes of the 
black categories and others suspected of hankering after the old order 
resulted in the destruction of countless pianos and violins (symbols of 
the bourgeoisie), playing cards and mah-jong tiles (associated with 
gambling), traditional musical instruments, calligraphic scrolls, 
antiques, paintings, lanterns, incense sticks, incense burners, idols, 
altar tables, charms and piles of paper money for the dead. Libraries 
and bookshops were sacked and many of their non-revolutionary 
holdings were burned. The damage to China's cultural heritage - the 
'old' - was irreparable (Leys 1977). 
The attack on the 'Four Olds' was complemented by a campaign 
to foster the 'Four News': new ideas, new culture, new customs and new 
habits. This led to radical changes in social organization, fashion and 
conventions. In accordance with the doctrine of 'natural redness', red-
class Red Guards drove people from the black categories out of Beijing 
into the countryside. They were attempting, they said, to 'make our 
capital purer and redder' (Tangling: Guanyu quchu sileifenzi de 
wuxiang mingling, 24 August 1966. RGPvol. 19, p. 6069). Card games 
and mahjong were suppressed, as were the tea houses in which people 
played these games and wasted time chatting and reading. This was all 
'bourgeois decadence' (the 'old') and people would now have more 
time to spend on revolutionary activity and the study of Mao's Thought 
(the 'new'). Those who wore narrow pants, skirts, high heels, pointed 
shoes, makeup, bracelets, or who had fashionable hairdos or even just 
long hair (the 'old') were stopped in the street and criticized. 
Sometimes their hair was cropped, their clothes were torn and their 
high heels were cut off on the spot. Everyone now had to adopt the 
'new' proletarian appearance except for those who, like the Red Guards, 
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wore uniforms. In the army, all insignia of rank were abolished in an 
expression of revolutionary egalitarianism, and the Red Guards even 
made an attempt to purge military drill of non-revolutionary content. 
'When we line up or when we do the militia exercises,' said one 
revolutionary publication, 'we must.dress left. We also suggest that the 
PLA should dress left, because we are the army of the revolutionary 
left.' (Shi zuo 'hongweibing' de jiangqiang houdun. RGP,vol. 19, p. 
6111). Traffic rules, too, were in need of reform, for since red was the 
colour of revolution and progress it was anti-revolutionary that red 
lights should tell people to 'stop'. Red Guards stood at intersections 
telling cyclists and drivers to 'go' on the red lights. And since the left-
hand side of the road was clearly the revolutionary side, people were 
told that they should no longer travel on the right but keep to the left. 
The result was several days of utter confusion until Zhou Enlai 
convinced the Red Guard leaders in Beijing to desist (Chang 1992, 382). 
Mao, Lin Biao and the Maoist press had not instructed-the Red 
Guards to reform the traffic laws. Nor had they said that the 
destruction of 'old culture' extended to material culture - that it 
required them to sweep away the art, architecture and ornaments of 
China's cultural heritage. These were interpretations of what Mao 
wanted which they arrived at themselves, and they were not 
undisputed. In Amoy, when Red Guards tried to destroy the beautiful 
Temple of the Goddess of Mercy of the Southern Seas, they were driven 
off by the monks, then attacked by club-wielding workers who 
threatened to kill them; and when the looted contents of people's 
homes were burned in the city square, some older people tried to save 
idols while most others stared into the fire grieving at 'the waste of it 
all.' (Ling 1972, 56-7). Such conflicts were not usually between people 
who supported and people who opposed Mao's Thought, but between 
people who accepted different versions of his Thought because they 
understood his word with the aid of different contexts of 
interpretation. To a large extent, these contexts of interpretation were 
linked to age. Consider Liang Heng's account of a conversation 
between his father, an ardent revolutionary who had divorced his wife 
when she was labelled a Rightist, and his older sister Liang Fang, a Red 
Guard who had just boasted about destroying temples, pavilions, 
monuments and inscriptions - 'Stinking poetry of the Feudal Society': 
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'How could you destroy the old poetry carved in the 
temples and pavilions? What kind of behaviour is that?' 
'What kind of behaviour? Revolutionary action, that's 
what.' ... 
'Who asked you to do these things?' Father demanded. 
'Father,' she answered with exaggerated patience. 'You 
really don't understand the Cultural Revolution at all, do 
you? We have to get rid of the Four Olds. That includes 
everything old. Don't you even read your own newspaper? 
You'd better keep up with things or you'll be in trouble.' 
Father protested, 'It's one thing to get rid of old customs 
and ideas, and another to go around smashing ancient temples.' 
'What good are they? They just trick people, make 
them superstitious. They're a bad influence on the young 
people.' 
'Whoever influenced you?' Father demanded. 'No one in 
your whole life ever asked you to believe in any Buddhas.' 
Liang Fang didn't have an answer, which irritated her. 
'Well, anyway, they're all old things. Why aren't there 
Revolutionary poems, Chairman Mao's poems, statues of 
people's heroes, workers, peasants, and soldiers?' _ 
Father despaired. 'It's allover! China's old culture is 
being destroyed.' He hit the table with his finger for 
emphasis. 'Such precious historical treasures. All those 
symbols of China's ancient culture gone in only a few days. 
You've wronged your ancestors.' (Liang & Shapiro 1983,70-
71). 
The argument betrayed the contrasting interpretive assumptions of 
different generations. Liang Heng's father, a journalist, had been 
educated to value what was good in the Chinese past and he could not 
believe that Chairman Mao, whose writings had many classical 
allusions, wanted the destruction of everything old. And indeed, 
semantically, 'old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits' made no 
clear reference to temples, pavilions, pictures and inscriptions. Liang 
Fang, however, was a true child of Mao. Her education had said 
nothing positive about China's old order, it had subordinated every 
value to correct politics, and it had taught her that all human activity 
was political. She could not draw a line between politiCS on the one 
hand and material culture on the other. So like many other Red 
Guards, she interpreted the phrase 'the Four Olds' to refer broadly to 
everything which conceivably reflected the ideology of feudal or 
bourgeois society. 
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Interpretation was also guided by assumptions related to social 
background. The Red Guard leaders during the 'Four Oids' campaign 
were nearly all the children of cadres, the most privileged stratum in 
Chinese society. They simply had no idea of the implications of their 
actions for many poor people. When. Jung Chang, the daughter of high 
cadres, went with other Red Guards to close down a teahouse, an old 
working class man refused to leave: 
I summoned'up my courage and pleaded in a low voice, 'Please, 
could you leave?' Without looking at me, he said, 'Where to?' 
'Home, of course,' I replied. He turned to face me. There was 
emotion in his voice, though he spoke quietly. 'Home? What 
home? I share a tiny room with my two grandsons. I have a 
corner surrounded by a bamboo curtain. Just for the bed. 
That's all. When the kids are home I come here for some peace 
and quiet. Why do you have to take this away from me?' His 
words filled me with shock and shame. This was the first time I 
had heard a firsthand account of such miserable living 
conditions. I turned and walked away. (Chang 1992, 3_?6). 
Most red-class Red Guards shared her ignorance, but few were as polite 
or as lacking in determination. When Ken Ling tried to close down a 
factory making paper money for the dead, he told the staff that they 
should 'no longer pay the piper for feudal superstition', but before he 
could finish, a young woman interrupted him in a shrill voice: 
'If we stop working, what do we eight hundred workers in this 
factory eat? And what of the thousands of others who depend on 
us to live? Do you want us to eat the northwest wind? All you 
people know is how to make rebellion against the dead. You 
don't do a thing for the living!' (Ling 1972, 54-5). 
Ling was shaken. 'Was this true? All my life I had known only my 
family and school. How could I possibly understand society?' But he 
persisted in his attempts to close the factory. He had a middle class 
background and, like the cadres' children, he could afford to believe 
that the workers would somehow cope. The workers, by contrast, could 
not imagine that Chairman Mao wanted them to starve, so they did not 
believe that the campaign against the 'Four Olds' was directed at their 
factory. 
The phrase 'Four Olds' was semantically open, having different 
referents for people with different interpretive assumptions, but 
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because Mao had supported the Red Guards just before their rampage 
of destruction it was difficult to oppose them. He probably did not 
expect that they would go as far as they did, but he said not a word to 
stop them. A man who careq little for loss of human life, who 
contemplated with equanimity the prospect of atomic war, he did not 
weep over the destruction of China's cultural heritage. What mattered 
was his vision of China's revolutionary future - a future of his own 
creation. And in this respect the actions of the Red Guards served him 
very well, for they provided a context of interpretation which made it 
clear that his call for a 'Cultural Revolution' was a call for a profound 
transformation. Even when they overstepped the mark, as in their 
attempts to revolutionize the traffic rules or wreck the Forbidden City, 
they were moving in the direction which Mao desired. And when, after 
their rampage, he described their actions as 'Very good indeed!' (Chang 
1992, 377) everyone understood that what he wanted was not just 
another rectification campaign but a fundamental revolution in 
ideology, customs, social organization and culture. The legacy of 
China's past was to be destroyed, for it embodied values which stood in 
the way of complete revolutionary transformation. The varied 
manifestations of traditional and foreign culture which had survived 
the Communist takeover were to be replaced by the uniformity of the 
new revolutionary culture. So the old idols were replaced by plaster 
busts of Mao; traditional paintings and wall hangings were replaced 
by portraits of Mao; people had to seek guidance, not from the varied 
maxims of traditional wisdom or the teachings of the world's religions, 
but from Mao's Thought; no one was to be allowed access to anything 
inconsistent with Mao's Thought; and the houses in which people 
lived, the places where they worked, the things which they owned were 
in no way to express the values of the pre-Mao era. Chinese customs 
and material culture were purged and impoverished, bringing them 
into line with the new, impoverished 'language after Mao' which was 
the official language of revolutionary China. From now on, there were 
to be just one culture and one language, both revolutionary. And there 
was to be just one god - Mao Zedong. 
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4.2 The Public Criticism Meeting: Discourse, Ritual and 
Formulae 
The language of the Cultural Revolution was highly ritualistic, with 
stock phrases and linguistic formulae prescribed for use on particular 
occasions, as well as more elaborate forms of linguistic ceremonial. 
Participation in linguistic ritual was essential to survival, and the 
nature of that ritual reflected the political and social character of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
A crucial institution in the attack on the old order was the 
'Criticism and Struggle Meeting' (pi pan hui), generally called in, 
'------~,~~,-"'" ---- "',~" English the 'Public-Criticism Meeting'. One of the central rituals of the 
Cultural Revolution, it was rich in oral formulae, and its words and 
actions were structured in a ritualistic discourse which epitomised the 
official ideology of the Cultural Revolution. In Ji, Kuiper & Shu (1990), 
I contributed to a first attempt to analyse the formulaic character of its 
language. The overall thrust of that analysis still seems to me to be 
sound. In what follows, I build on the argument of this earlier study, 
extending it to new material and modifying it in detail. 
We can trace origins of the Public Criticism Meeting to three 
principal influences. The first is the 'struggle' meetings which were 
widely used in the early years of communist rule in order to try, 
convict and pass sentence on 'class enemies' such as landlords, 
Guomindang agents and people who had tried to organize resistance to 
the Party (counter-revolutionaries in the narrow sense of the word). At 
these meetings, the accused had their hands tied behind their backs, 
they were subjected to verbal and physical abuse, they were formally 
denounced, and they were abused verbally and often physically by the 
audience. Except for the tied hands, this was very like the Public 
Criticism Meetings. There was, however, one major difference: struggle 
meetings were aimed not only at educating the audience but at 
eliminating class enemies. The accused were oJvy(lY~f()tlnd guilty, and 
at the end of the meeting they were sentenced - often to death. If 
condemned to die, they were then shot (Mu 1963, 160). By contrast, 
Public Criticism Meetings, for all the brutality which they sometimes 
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displayed, did not impose sentences. Their function was to educate the 
audience through criticism and class struggle. 
The second influence on the Public Criticism Meeting was the 
Chinese Communist Party's tradition of internal criticism and self-
criticism, in which comrades who had committed 'errors of thought' 
were verbally attacked, threatened with exclusion from the group, then 
welcomed back into the fold once they had made sincere self-criticisms. 
This tradition was based on the assumption of Party unity in pursuit of 
the socialist ideal; the criticism was aimed at the removal of personal 
faults and incorrect thoughts which threatened that ideal; and the end 
result was supposed to be the restoration of unity on a higher level. 
The whole process was summed up by the formula 'unity-criticism-
unity' (Dittmer 1974, 336-7). It influenced the Public Criticism 
Meetings to the extent that no death penalties were imposed and some 
of those accused were not regarded as class enemies. However, 
confession and repentance at a Public Criticism Meeting did not secure 
acceptance back into the fold. Instead, the accused were usually 
interrogated again, perhaps tortured, then dragged before still further 
meetings for criticism. The objective was to educate the masses 
politically through class struggle, not to reform the accused. Indeed, 
the Public Criticism Meetings played a crucial role in what Lowell 
Dittmer (1974, 351) has called the 'non-redemptive purges' of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
The third influence on the Public Criticism meetings was the 
growth of the Mao-cult during the prelude to the Cultural Revolution. 
In this period, the rites of Mao-worship became part of public life, and 
it was inevitable that they should be grafted onto the skeletal structure 
of the earlier struggle meetings. The result was a ritual whose 
individual parts and discursive structure had the dual function of 
unifying the revolutionary masses in worship of Mao and symbolically 
crushing those who ignored or defied his Thought. This dual function 
can be seen from even a brief outline of the Public Criticism Meeting's 
sequence. It commenced when the audience stood up, faced Chairman 
Mao's portrait and performed an act of collective Mao-"worship. Nearly 
always it centred on China's favourite hymn;~'T!te East is Red'): 
------~ -~~--. ---
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The East is Red. 
The Sun is rising. 
China has brought forth a Mao Zedong. 
He works for the well-being of the people. 
The great emancipator is Mao Zedong. 
It sometimes also included celebratory chants. In Chengdu, for 
example, 
A standard opening was to chant 'Ten thousand years, another 
ten thousand years, and yet another ten thousand years to our 
Great Teacher, Great Leader, Great Commander and Great 
Helmsman Chairman Mao!' Every time the three 'ten thousand's 
and four 'great's were shouted out, everyone raised their Little 
Red Books in unison. [Chang 1992, 439]. 
This chant appalled some traditional communists, for it put Mao on a 
level with the Chinese emperors who were addressed with the wish that 
they live for 'ten thousand years' (Chang 1992, 439). 
Once the Mao-worship was over, all present sat down. The 
accused were then brought onto the stage while the audience shouted 
slogans denouncing them and calling upon them to confess their 
crimes. Then the public criticism began, with speakers loudly reading 
indictments from texts carefully written in advance. The criticism also 
induded interrogation of the victim aimed at obtaining a confession 
and self-criticism. Both the interrogation and the indictments were 
punctuated by more slogans from the audience, which expressed its 
outrage at the revelations. The whole process could take many hours. 
Then, as soon as the criticism was over, the accused were usually taken 
off the stage while the audience stood up and gave another 
demonstration of revolutionary enthusiasm and Mao-worship. It 
normally included the chanting of slogans and perhaps also the 
recitation of quotations from the Little Red Book as a form of 'collective 
study of the sayings of Chairman Mao.' (Liang & Shapiro 1987, 121). 
Almost invariably, there was another song of Mao-worship, 'Sailing the 
Seas Depends on the Helmsman': 
Sailing the seas depends on the helmsman, 
Plants on the sun, 
Crops on rain and dew, 
And revolution on Mao Zedong Thought. 
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The emcee then declared the meeting closed. 
This discourse pattern (Mao-worship-->accused on-->shout 
intimidatory slogans-->criticism with slogans-->accused off--> Mao 
worship) admitted of minor variations, but its main elements rapidly 
became stabilized because they were rooted in wider conventions of the 
Cultural Revolution. Nearly all formal collective activity, be it the 
commencement of the school day or a celebratory party or even a 
wedding ceremony, started with an act of Mao-worship in which the 
singing of 'The East Is Red' was usually a highlight. To omit Mao-
worship at the beginning of such an important and formal gathering as 
a Public Criticism Meeting was unthinkable. Similarly, slogans 
expressing revolutionary fervour and hatred of class enemies were such 
a basic feature of Chinese collective life that they were bound to feature 
in a ritual confrontation with people accused of anti-revolutionary 
crimes. Finally, the Chinese people officially attributed every success 
to the inspiration of Mao Zedong's Thought, so when they ritually 
vanquished those who had sided with class enemies they naturally gave 
thanks to Mao, whose Thought had inspired their victory. In this 
context, 'Sailing the seas Depends on the Helmsman' was particularly 
appropriate, for it acknowledged that all revolutionary successes 
depended on Mao's Thought. 
Not only were the individual elements of the discourse 
important, but the ritual structure in which they were arranged was 
highly Significant. For example, the people being criticised could not 
be on stage while the audience sang the revolutionary songs, for that 
would have been considered profane. However, they had to be present 
when the audience shouted slogans for the first time, for the purpose of 
those slogans was to threaten the accused. Then when, at the end of 
the meeting, the accused were often led away before the Mao-worship 
began, this was again because their presence would have been 
considered profane: 'According to custom, the worst 
counterrevolutionaries had no right to listen to the sayings of 
Chairman Mao.' (Liang & Shapiro 1983). Even if the accused were 
allowed to stay, they had to remain kneeling with their heads down 
while the audience stood and worshipped Mao. They were unworthy to 
participate in the revolutionary activities of the people. 
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Within this framework, small variations were possible, but the 
discourse structure of the Public Criticism Meeting was fairly stable 
over time and from place to place in China. We can clarify that 
structure by re-writing it as a set of context-free re-write rules: 
Public Criticism Meeting --> worship 1 (inc!. song 1) + slogan shouting 1 + 
criticism/struggle + worship 2 (inc!. slogan shouting 2 & song 2) 
Song 1 -> 'The East Is Red' 
Slogan shouting 1 -> hatred + threats to the accused 
Slogan shouting 2 -> homage to Mao 
Song 2 --> 'Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman' 
It is instructive to compare this discourse structure with that of 
Christian revivalist religious meetings: 
Revivalist religious meetings --> worship 1 (inc!. hymn(s)l) + prayers 1 + 
criticism/struggle + worship 2 (inc!. prayers 2 + hymn(s) 2} 
The criticism/struggle is, of course, the criticism of sin and sinners in 
the sermon and, in some revivalist traditions, the struggle with Satan in 
the form of the casting out of devils. In these traditions, too, the 
congregation joins in the struggle with prayerful interjections whose 
role parallels that of the slogans which punctuate the criticising at a 
public criticism meeting. We can bring out the common discourse 
structure of the two rituals as follows: 
Maoist and Christian revivalist rituals -> group formulaic singing 1 + group 
formulaic speech 1+ criticism/struggle + group formulaic speech 2 + group 
formulaic singing 2 
Both religions, the Maoist and the Christian revivalist, unite the faithful 
by formulaic collective activity, consolidate that unity by condemning 
the enemy, then consolidate it again with more formulaic collective 
activity. Some techniques of consciousness building and persuasion are 
common to even the most antagonistic religions. 
Just as the discourse structure of revivalist meetings reflects 
worship of God and the struggle against Satan, so the discourse 
structure of Public Criticism Meetings reflected worship of Mao and the 
struggle against class enemies. Any significant departure from that 
discourse structure was a sign that something had gone wrong. When 
Nien Cheng, for example, was paraded before an audience of military 
men in 1969, she noticed that Lin Biao's portrait was next to Mao's on 
the stage. Even more surprising, the speeches criticising her were not 
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followed by Mao-worship but by speeches praising Lin Biao 'in the most 
extravagant flattery the rich Chinese language could provide.' (Cheng 
1986,248-51). The meeting was being observed by a high-ranking 
person, perhaps Lin or his son, and the display of Lin-worship reflected 
his ambition to succeed Mao. In some military circles there were now 
two gods in heaven (Yan & Gao 1996,302-35), and this situation was 
reflected in the structure of Nien Cheng's Public Criticism Meeting. 
Something had ind,eed gone wrong. However, Lin's subsequent fall 
from grace and the failure of his coup attempt ensured that such 
changes to the formula of Public Criticism Meetings never became 
common. Mao remained China's One True God. 
It was not just the discourse structure of the Public Criticism 
Meeting as a whole which was formulaic. Each of the parts was richly 
formulaic too, and their character rewards closer scrutiny. Let us start 
with the slogans used to intimidate the victims before the criticisms 
began. They were always carefully orchestrated, usually by the emcee, 
who would shout them first then be followed by the audience. They 
always came from the standard repertoire of Cultural Revolution 
slogans and many had the slogan-form Dadao NP ('Down with NP'), 
where 'NP' stands for a noun-phrase inserted in the appropriate slot. 
Consider some of the variations on this formula: 
(1) Dadao Liu Shaoqi 
'Down with Liu Shaoqi!' 
(2) Dadao diguozhuyi de zougou Liu Shaoqi 
'Down with the running dog of the imperialists, Uu Shaoqi! 
(3) Dadao diguozhuyi 
'Down with the imperialists!' 
(4) Dadao pantu neijian gongzei Liu Shaoqi 
'Down with the traitor, renegade, and scab, Uu Shaoqil' 
The purpose of these slogans, of course, was to threaten the victims and 
to express hatred of the class enemies associated with them. 
While most of the slogans which greeted the arrival of the victims 
were explicitly intimidatory, some meetings included at this point a few 
celebratory or pious slogans like 'Long live our Great Leader Chairman 
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Mao!' or 'Long live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!' (Cheng 
1986, 15). Semantically, such slogans seem inconsistent with the 
formula for this section of the meeting, which requires the expression 
of 'hatred + threats to the accused'. However, semantics were 
misleading, for the pragmatic function of these slogans was again 
intimidatory: they were shouted to show the imposing unity of the 
revolutionary people in the face of the 'capitalist roaders', 'revisionists', 
'spies', 'traitors' and 'monsters and demons' cowering on the stage. 
Occasionally the victims were made to sing on stage the self-
abusive songs which they were compelled to sing on many other 
occasions, including the parade through the streets which sometimes 
preceded the Public Criticism Meeting: 
I am a criminal, 
I am a criminal, 
I am a monster and demon ... 
No one thought that those who sang this enforced, formulaic self-
degradation actually believed what the words, semantically, said. Nor 
did anyone think that the singers wanted others to believe this. Rather, 
the message which the words conveyed pragmatically was 'I am 
helpless, I am afraid, I will do whatever you tell me.' In this way the 
song of the victims complemented the discourse of the slogans, 
testifying to their intimidatory power. 
Once the revolutionary people had proclaimed their power and 
ritually intimidated their victims, the formal criticisms began. 
Investigators, former colleagues, friends, even relatives mounted the 
stage to make their accusations. The speakers had been carefully 
selected, their speeches were always written in advance, and they had 
been told what to say. The language used was highly formulaic. For 
example, the first words always quoted Mao or echoed him, and they 
always referred pragmatically to the class struggle. Some people began 
with the famous quotation from the Little Red Book which wa~ the 
standard justification of violence during the Cultural Revolution: 
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(1) Geming bu shi qingke chifan, bu shi zuo wenzhang, bu shi 
huihua xiuhua. Geming shi baodong, shi yige jieji tuifan 
yige jieji de baolie xingdong. 
'A revolution is not a dinner party, it is not writing articles, it is 
not drawing pictures nor doing embroidery. Revolution is 
violence, it is the action of one class overthrowing another class.' 
Others quoted verses of Mao's poetry which would be interpreted 
pragmatically as referring to revolution and class struggle: 
(2) Sihai fanteng yunshuinu, 
Wuzhou zhendang fengleiji. 
'Four seas are turbulent, clouds and water are furious, 
Five continents are shaking, wind and thunder are violent.' 
Other common formulae were also taken directly from Mao's works or 
from Maoist newspapers which wrote in pidgin-Mao: 
(3) Bu po bu Ii. 
'Without destruction there can be no construction.' 
(A direct quote from Mao). 
(4) Di shi di you shi you, women bixu huaqing jieji jiexian. 
'A foe is a foe, a friend is a friend, we must clearly 
distinguish one from the other.' 
(Mao: 'Who are our enemies, who are our friends? ... To 
distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must ... ' [LRB, 
12]). 
(5) Na qi bi zuo dao qiang ... 
'Taking up the pen as a weapon I now expose ... ' 
(A stock phrase, Maoist in spirit, used as the opening words of a 
revolutionary song). 
( 6 ) Shijie zai dongdang zhong qianjin ... 
'The world advances amidst turbulence ... ' 
(Maoist in spirit, copied from the official press). 
(7) Dongfeng jin chui, jiebao pin chuan. 
'The east wind blows with mighty power, news of victory 
keeps pouring in.' 
(Mao: ' ... the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. 
That is to say, the forces of socialism have become 
overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.') 
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(8) Guaneiwai xingshi yipai da haa. 
'The overall situation is glowing and excellent at home and 
abroad.' 
(A standard formula, echoing Mao: 'The world is progressing, the 
future is bright .. .' [LRB, 70]. Also: 'Our achievements are great, 
problems are quite a few, and the future is bright' [quoted Tiewes 
1993, 311]). . 
(9) Dangqian quangua getiaa zhanxian xingshi yipian da haa. 
'Now a good situation prevails on all fronts in our country.' 
(Another variation on the same standard formula). 
The last three formulae, of course, were used at the beginning of 
speeches which indicated that although the situation was excellent, 
there were dangers from people like those on the stage, who would 
therefore have to be crushed. These formulae were the first ingredient 
of a standard three-part recipe for 'reporting on the current situation': 
First, add Revolutionary Optimism: 'The revolutionary situation 
is excellent' (or an equivalent statement such as 'The situation 
now is very good, not just good', or those in 7-9 above). 
Second, add Revolutionary Vigilance: 'There are still problems 
caused by class enemies or by comrades who have committed 
"errors of thought".' 
Third, combine to form optimistic, Revolutionary Conclusion: 
'The revolutionary masses must destroy the class enemies or 
correct those who have committed "errors of thought", so that 
the situation becomes even better.' 
This reCipe, copied from Mao (e.g. Mao 1927, 1949a, 1957), expressed 
the optimism and the revolutionary vigilance appropriate to 
revolutionaries guided by the Great Helmsman and armed with the 
'magic weapon' of this Thought. 
A striking feature of the nine formulae listed above is that they 
all include military terminology or martial metaphors. Even the 
apparently innocuous phrase 'the overall situation' in the last formula 
referred, pragmatically, to the situation in the class war; and no one 
would have missed the martial referents of the meteorological 
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metaphors in the second and seventh formulae. Such language 
encouraged militant action and symbolized the revolutionary might of 
the Cultural Revolution. 
If the opening words of the sp~eches were highly formulaic, so 
were the words which followed. Before describing and denouncing the 
accused person's crimes, for example, speakers always quoted Mao's 
words to show that the behaviour of the accused was criminal, making 
his Thought the standard of right and wrong. There was no 
independent criterion by which the victims were judged, and no one 
ever cited any law which they had broken. 'In Communist China, there 
was no law independent of Party policy' (Cheng 1986,444), and during 
the Cultural Revolution Party policy was legitimate only when it 
conformed to the Thought of Mao Zedong. 
Even when the speakers did not quote Mao, they tried to echo his 
words and to use the conventional language of the Cultural Revolution. 
That language included a high proportion of words whose meanings 
were vague, general and abstract - words which might be termed empty 
phraseology. The following are examples: 
Nouns: spirit, soul, revolution, class struggle, revisionism, 
enemy, destruction, construction. 
Adjectives: bourgeois, capitalist, indignant, militant, great, 
profound, revolutionary. 
The words 'spirit' and 'soul' had been co-opted from older religious 
traditions, and what they meant in the context of a revolutionary 
religion which was avowedly materialist and nominally atheistic was 
never explained. But Mao used these terms, so everyone else did too in 
a ritual display of linguistic conformity. Most of the other terms were 
'materialist', but there was no agreement on their referents. In the case 
of the term 'revolutionary', for example, we saw in chapter 3 how Mao 
himself repeatedly switched the contextual assumptions which gave it 
empirical content; then when he lost control of the context of 
interpretation, people gave the word different referents and fought 
each other in the name of 'the revolution'. Exactly the same problem 
surrounded use of terms like 'class struggle' (was it a struggle against 
the bad classes, or a struggle against the new class of powerholders?), 
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'revisionism' (were we the revisionists or were our opponents?), 
'destruction' (we all knew it was a good thing, but what did it refer to -
what were we supposed to destroy?) and 'construction' (we all 
approved of it, but our 'construction' was the object of other people's 
'destruction'). Everybody used these words, and used them repeatedly. 
People hurled them at their enemies, who hurled them back, giving 
them different referents. Clearly, the purpose of using these words was 
rarely to communicate. Rather, they were used ritually - they were 
formulae for showing a correct political attitude. They were words 
blessed by Mao, they represented the revolutionary fashion, and they 
were meant to demonstrate linguistically that one had repudiated the 
old world and was enthusiastically building the new. 
The linguistic formulae of the Public Criticism Meeting included 
traditional four-character idioms, which were converted to 
revolutionary purposes. Those used regularly by speakers at Public 
Criticism meetings included: 
bu huai haoyi 
'harbour evil designs' 
(Used with reference to opponents) 
bu gong dai nan 
'will not live under the same sky' 
(Used to indicate irreconcilable conflict with opponents) 
zuiwong zhiyi bu zai jiu 
'the drinker's heart is not in the cup' 
(Used to indicate that the accused had ulterior motives) 
zuo gu you pan 
'glance right and left' 
(Used by speakers to describe people who 'sat on the fence'. 
The crimes of the accused were used to convince such people 
to commit themselves to the revolutionary side) 
bao feng zhou yu 
'violent wind and gusty rain' 
(Used to describe the power and turmoil of the current 
political campaign) 
tu zhi muo fen 
'smear on rouge and powder' 
(Try to make one's crimes seem less serious) 
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The traditional idioms were supplemented by a large number of stock, 
four-character phrases of more recent invention. These usually had 
more transparent meanings: 
zui da eji 
'guilty of the most heinous crimes' 
zuie leilei 
'guilty of innumerable crimes' 
zui gai wan si 
'guilty of crimes for which one deserves ten thousand deaths' 
zuowei zuofu 
'tyrannically abuse one's power' 
zuozei xinxu 
'uneasy lies the head of one with a guilty conscience' 
danzhan xinjing 
'tremble with fear' 
daizui ligong 
'atone for one's crimes by doing good deeds' 
bu da zi zhao 
'confess without being pressed' 
(Reveal one's crimes unintentionally) 
bu ke kangju 
'irresistible' 
(Used with reference to Mao's Thought, the revolutionary 
masses, the Cultural Revolution, and so on) 
chixin wangxiang 
'wishful thinking' 
(Used with reference to those who thought they could oppose 
Mao, the Cultural Revolution, and so on) 
daoxing nishi 
'go against the historical trend' 
(Try to reverse the irresistible tide of revolution) 
All of these expressions had been used time and again in the official 
media and in political speeches before the Cultural Revolution. They 
provided a rich resource for those who wanted to show their 
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revolutionary spirit by using the correct political formulae on any 
public or private occasion. 
Towards the end of each criticism the speaker would begin to 
threaten the victim with intimidating formulae, including slogans. 
Once again, they were likely to include variations on the ubiquitous 
slogan-formula 'Down with NP!' Other concluding formulae included 
Dui fangeming fenzi jue bu shi renzheng! 
'Never mercy to counterrevolutionaries!' 
jue bu yunxu jiejidiren fangong daosuan! 
'Never allow the class enemy to retaliate!' 
Fang laoshidian! 
'You behave yourselfl' 
(To a victim who had confessed fully to all the charges) 
The audience did not remain silent throughout the sp~~ches but 
was expected to signify its outrage at the crimes of the accused by 
chanting slogans. Similarly, while the victim was being interrogated, 
the crowd was expected to assist with chants like: 
NP bixu tanbai jiaodai! 
'NP must confess his (her) crime!' 
NP bixu xiang geming qunzhong ditou renzui! 
'NP must hang his (her) head and admit his (her) guilt to the 
revolutionary masses!' 
NP bixu chedi tanbai jiaodai! 
'NP must make a clean breast of his (her) crimes!' 
Ditou renzui! 
'Hang your head down and admit your guilt!' 
Tanbai congkuan. Kangju congyan! 
'Leniency to those who confess their crimes. Severity to 
those who refuse to!' 
Fan dang fan renmin jue meiyou hao xiachangf 
'Those who oppose the people and the Communist Party will 
come to no good end!' 
Ni de muori jiu yao dao leI 
'Your doomsday is near!' 
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Bu touxiang jiu jiao ni mie wang! 
'Surrender to the people or die!' 
Rang ta si wu zang shen zhi di! 
'Let him die without burial ground!' 
All of these slogans were intimidatory. They were ritually intended to 
frighten the accused into confession. I say 'ritually' because it was not 
expected that they would in fact be the actual cause of any confession 
which was forthcoming. Many victims did confess, sometimes reading 
from prepared statements, but that was because they had already been 
broken by interrogation, false promises of release, threats to their 
families, deprivation of sleep, or torture. Victims who had not already 
given up the fight were unlikely suddenly to 'come to their senses' 
during a Public Criticism Meeting. 
Within the ritual formula of the interrogations, variations were 
possible. During the interrogation of the famous pianist Uu Shi-kun, 
for example, the crowd not only chanted slogans like 'Down with the 
Soviet Revisionist Spy, Down with Uu Shi-kun!' but it also sang a song: 
Liu Shi-kun you bastard, 
Now you can surrender, 
If you do not tell the truth, 
You may quickly die ... 
(Liang & Shapiro 1983,121). 
Singing at this point was unusual, and it was even more unusual to sing 
words specially composed for the occasion. However, the song was 
consistent with the ritual structure of the Public Criticism Meeting. It 
used conventional threatening formulae and, both semantically and 
pragmatically, it fulfilled the same intimidatory function as the slogans. 
What was said at the Public Criticism Meeting was supported by 
what was seen and what was done. The theme of Mao worship in the 
songs and slogans at the beginning and the end of the meeting was 
reinforced by the setting and ritual actions. There was always a large 
portrait of Mao on the wall behind the stage, and before and after their 
addresses all speakers bowed deeply twice, first towards the portrait 
and then towards the audience. Similarly, members of the audience 
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had to show their devotion to Mao's Thought by bringing their copies 
of the Little Red Book. During the Mao worship at the end of the 
meeting, they would hold their Little Red Books in their right hands as 
they shouted slogans. 
The theme of class struggle was emphasised by banners and wall 
posters condemning the accused and the class enemies with whom they 
had aligned themselves. The accused themselves had placards hung 
from their necks announcing their crimes, and often they were made to 
wear the tall dunces' hats with which the peasants of Hunan had 
humiliated their landlords during an uprising in 1927. (They learned 
this by reading Mao 1927), Some had one side of their heads shaved in 
a 'yin-yang' haircut, and many bore the marks of torture, beatings and 
maltreatment. That maltreatment continued during the Public 
Criticism Meeting. Some had their arms forced above their heads from 
behind in the excruciatingly painful 'jet plane' position; some were 
struck by their guards or had their legs kicked from under them when 
they refused to confess or needed to be 'taught a lesson'; members of 
the audience sometimes stoned them and even got close enough to spit 
at them, kick them or punch them. People were not supposed to be 
killed at the meetings, but in a few cases that happened too (Cheng 
1986, 252). 
The in~q_~_'!l!!Y_()fpower in this struggle between the 
\--- - -- -._--> 
revolutionary masses and their helpless victims was expressed in the 
custom of forcing the latter to hang their heads down as low as 
possible. In Chinese tradition, this was a sign of admitting one's 
mistakes and of being willing to receive criticism and punishment; it 
was also a sign of submission and obedience. Here, we find a case of a 
social custom that was taken over for revolutionary purposes. In pre-
revolutionary times it was the young and the workers and peasants who 
had to hang their heads. During the Cultural Revolution the roles were 
reversed, for such people were the least likely to be dragged before a 
Public Criticism Meeting. Those made to bow their heads were mostly 
intellectuals, cadres, members of the black categories, former capitalists 
and people whose foreign connections led to accusations that they were 
spies. These people had once enjoyed prestige or power, and Mao saw 
them as past or present obstacles to his vision of a revolutionary China 
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in which he had no rivals - a society in which everyone acted in 
accordance with his Thought. So he turned society upside down, giving 
power to those whom he thought could never challenge him. In the 
Public Criticism Meetings, they humiliated Mao's old enemies, the 
capitalists and the black categories, and his potential challengers, the 
intellectuals and the cadres. Such people were the principal victims of 
the Cultural Revolution. 
Both the individual rituals of the Public Criticism Meeting and its 
overall structure were part of the Maoist discourse which inspired the 
Cultural Revolution. That discourse deified Mao and made his Thought 
the sole arbiter of right and wrong. It divided the world into two 
classes of people: Mao's loyal followers, desperate to make revolution 
in his name, and those who aligned themselves with class enemies i~ __ ~ 
defiance of his Thought. In thus dichotomizing Chinese society into the 
good (revolutionaries) and the bad (anti-revolutionaries), the linguistic 
rituals of the Public Criticism Meeting owed more to the stru·ggle 
meetings of the early 1950s than to the Communist Party's tradition of 
internal criticism and self-criticism. They were the rituals of Mao-
inspired combat against the class enemy, not the rituals of comradely 
criticism, repentance and redemption. The audience at Public Criticism 
Meetings might have shouted 'Leniency to those who confess their 
crimes. Severity to those who refuse', but this was a threat, not a 
promise of forgiveness. Confession brought no forgiveness, but only 
further interrogation and perhaps torture. Victims were dragged 
before Public Criticism Meetings time after time so that the audience 
could internalize Mao's Thought by attacking those who had flouted its 
principles.l(rhe objective was to educate the masses politically, not to 
convert the accused. At the same time, criminals who were required for 
exhibition at Public Criticism Meetings could not be killed like the class 
enemies of the early 1950s. So the Public Criticism Meetings departed 
from the model of the struggle meetings, just as they departed from the 
tradition of redemptive criticism and self-criticism. In their rhetoric 
and in their practice, they were a unique product of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
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4.3 Conflict, Mao-worship and the Ideal World of the 
Formulae 
Mao's control of China was built on conflict. He divided the population 
into opposing groups, then he mobilized most of these groups in turn, 
getting them to purge other groups who in any way were suspected of 
straying from his Thought or from whatever policies he currently 
favoured. Before the Cultural Revolution, he had repeatedly mobilized 
the red categories against the black categories and the capitalists. He 
had mobilized those who had not spoken out during the 'Hundred 
Flowers' campaign against those who had, who henceforth constituted a 
new category liable to persecution - the Rightists. He used the 
prejudices of those who were merely 'red' (revolutionary but without 
other qualifications) against those who were 'expert' (scientists, 
technicians, and all manner of intellectuals). He used the Party to 
discipline the workers and peasants, then had the central Party organs 
despatch 'work teams' which pressured the peasants into exposing the 
faults and revolutionary shortcomings of local cadres. Then, when he 
no longer trusted the Party to control the country and reform itself, he 
launched the greatest conflict of all - the Cultural Revolution. 
It has often been pointed out that by instigating these conflicts 
Mao kept potential opponents divided. It has been less widely 
appreciated, however, that conflict provided a crucial mechanism for 
promoting competitive Mao-worship. Every group which mobilized did 
so in Mao's name, while those who were attacked had to defend 
themselves by profeSSing undying loyalty to their Great Leader. 
Moreover, the constant fear of attack led people to scrutinize their own 
activities, lest they be singled out during the next mobilization. This 
process of 'continuous revolution' plunged China repeatedly into 
political and economic chaos, but it produced ideological stability - a 
conflict-driven consensus that Mao was China's One True God and that 
his Thought was the criterion of right and wrong. 
Many verbal rituals of the Cultural Revolution, especially those 
embodied in the Public Criticism Meeting, expressed the unending 
conflicts of Chinese society. They did not, however, have the 'safety 
valve' function which Gluckman ascribes to the 'rites of rebellion' in 
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tribal societies where social tensions are ritually dramatized and 
ultimately diffused (Gluckman 1963, 110-36). In Mao's China, conflict 
was officially encouraged, for it was the mechanism by which class 
enemies were suppressed and all other sections of the community were 
made to confront their political mistakes and 'errors of thought'. So 
the rituals in fact promoted such conflict, integrated it into their 
structure, and provided a model for the suppression of class enemies 
and the punishment of those guilty of 'errors of thought'. At the same 
time, the rituals affirmed that loyalty to Mao was beyond qu~stion. 
They did not do this in order to '[cloak] the fundamental disharmonies 
of social structure' (Gluckman 1965, 265), but to express revolutionary 
commitment to the Great Helmsman who had ordained those 
disharmonies and in whose name they fought. The rituals celebrated 
Mao and the doctrines of class conflict which underpinned the 
competitive Mao-worship of people who feared attack if they 
worshipped less ardently than the most extreme zealots. The rituals 
were part of the system which kept the Chinese people subject as never 
before to a single emperor-god. 
The verbal rituals of the Cultural Revolution encoded the ideal 
power structure of Chinese society. That structure featured just three 
central players. At the top, there was the Great Leader Chairman Mao, 
whose brilliance, wisdom, benevolence and inspirational leadership 
were celebrated in countless formulae. Below him, the formulae 
focused on two groups: 'the people', devoted to Mao and guided by 
his revolutionary Thought, and 'the enemy' who plotted against him 
and resisted his message. The people and the enemy were locked in 
mortal combat, and the people were sure to win because they were 
armed with the 'mighty weapon' of Mao's Thought. 
In the world of the formulae, Mao was the only god. Only one 
other individual is mentioned by name - Mao's deputy and designated 
successor Lin Biao. His name occurs just once, and then only because 
he was Mao's 'close comrade-in-arms': 
Wishing our great leader Chairman Mao an infinitely long 
life, and his close comrade-in-arms good health forever! 
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Lin was the high priest of Mao-worship, who had won his leader's 
favour with sedulous sycophancy. In almost everyone's eyes, he was 
Mao's most devoted follower and, as he himself put it, Mao's 'good 
student'. Lin's high position was entirely conditional upon his 
unswerving loyalty to Mao's line. 
If the formulae mention hardly any individual except Mao, they 
pay only a little more attention to the Communist Party, which before 
the Cultural Revolution had formed a powerful intermediate stratum 
which interpreted Mao's word to 'the people'. Because Mao aimed the 
Cultural Revolution partly at 'persons in authority following the 
capitalist road' within the Party, calling upon the revolutionary masses 
to scrutinize the Party's fidelity to his Thought, it no longer served as 
the rallying point for his loyal followers. It still rated the occasional 
formulaic mention, as in the slogan 'Those who oppose the people and 
the Communist Party will come to no good end', but it was understood 
that this referred only to members who were true Communists, faithful 
to the letter and spirit of Mao's Thought. Most people solved the 
problem of the Party's ambiguous status by dropping all formulaic 
references to it, pledging allegiance instead to the Party Central 
Committee - the 'Party Centre' for short: 
lin gen Mao Zhuxi wei shou de dangzhongyang! 
'Follow the Chairman Mao led Central Committee!' 
Baoweidangzhongyang! 
'Defend the Party Centre!' 
Shisi baowei dangzhongyang! 
'Pledge to fight to the death in defending the Party Central 
Committee!' 
Mao was Chairman of the Central Committee, and in identifying it with 
Mao and making it the focus of their loyalty the Red Guards were not 
mistaken. In August 1966 Mao had persuaded the Central Committee 
to accept the Party's suicide note, the 'Sixteen Points'. Thereafter, his 
opponents ceased to attend its meetings, they were progressively 
purged, and the Committee itself for a time became moribund while 
Mao issued directives in its name. People whose only allegiance was to 
Mao could safely pledge themselves to the 'Party Centre'. 
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In the ideal world of the formulae, there was no fixed hierarchy 
between Mao and his revolutionary people: his Thought was the 
criterion of right and wrong, and everyone's fate depended upon 
fidelity to that Thought. The people, armed with the 'invincible 
weapon' of his Thought, were certain. to detect and destroy the 
'capitalist roaders', 'counter-revolutionaries', 'revisionists', 'spies' and 
'traitors' in high places who quoted Mao while betraying his 
revolutionary caus~. It was an 'ideal world' which bore only a 
tangential relationship to the real world, but the vision of society which 
it expressed motivated many millions of people to revolutionary 
activity. That vision was combined with the principles of interpretation 
given to the Chinese people by Yao Wenyuan and Mao Zedong which 
we discussed in Chapter 3, and the combination was lethal. 
'Revisionism' could be read into the words and actions of anybody at 
all, and even somebody who spoke only in Mao-quotes could be 
accused of 'waving the red flag to oppose the red flag'. No one was 
safe. The outcome, of course, was that those who were victiIfis of the 
Cultural Revolution were on the whole as loyal to Mao and his Thought 
as those who accused them. The self-serving Lin Biao, who manipulated 
the revolutionary formulae and the Mao/Yao principles of 
interpretation to eliminate his opponents and win Mao's favour, was far 
less loyal than people like Liu Shaoqi whom he helped to destroy on his 
path to the top. In that respect, the Cultural Revolution was an exercise 
in futility. What it did do, however, was make people more afraid than 
ever before that they might be suspected of anti-revolutionary thoughts 
or actions. So they polished their displays of revolutionary ardour and 
recited revolutionary formulae in an often futile attempt to keep 
themselves safe. Mao reaped an increased show of loyalty, although 
perhaps no more of the substance. 
4.4 Control, Self-Annihilation, Liberation and the 
Formulae 
Mao always professed to value the independent thinker, to admire the 
person who would stand up to the powerful and point out their errors 
and faults. He was fond of calling upon Party members to emulate Hai 
Rui, the courageous Ming dynasty official who criticised the emperor 
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and was dismissed as a result. Mao issued such calls, for example, at 
the Lushan conference which debated the Great Leap Forward in 1959, 
and had even given a biography of Hai Rui to the defence minister, 
Peng Dehuai, to encourage him to speak out. But to welcome criticism 
in principle was not to like it in practice, and Mao confessed privately 
that 'he feared he might not be able to bear criticism if it was offered.' 
(Teiwes 1993, liii). His fears were well founded, for while he could 
criticise himself he could never tolerate criticism from others. When 
Peng Dehuai wrote Mao a private letter praising the Great Leap Forward 
but respectfully pointing out that there were deficiencies in its 
implementation, Mao attacked him publicly, forced him to write an 
abject self-criticism, dismissed him from his position and had him 
placed under house-arrest. He then launched a purge of all those 
whom he thought might support Peng, branding them 'Right 
Opportunists' . 
At the 7,000 Cadres Conference in 1962, Mao again caned for 
'Hai Ruis' to come forward. This time the person foolish enough to 
respond was Liu Shaoqi, who praised the overall success of the Great 
Leap Forward, then angered Mao by attacking its shortcomings. Mao's 
confidence in Liu was seriously eroded. He preferred the sycophancy 
of Lin Biao, who told the conference, 'If we encounter any problems, 
any difficulty, it is because we have not followed the instructions of the 
Chairman closely enough, because we ignored or circumscribed the 
Chairman's advice.' Mao commented, 'What a good speech Vice-
Chairman Lin has made. Lin Biao's words are always so clear and 
direct. They are simply superb! Why can't the other Party leaders be 
so perceptive?' (Becker 1996, 244; Yan & Gao 1986, 190; Teiwes 1993, 
xxxix-xli, 374). 
If Mao was unable to tolerate dissent from his most senior 
colleagues, he was certainly not prepared to let people lower down the 
hierarchy think for themselves - unless, of course, they independently 
agreed with him on everything which mattered. It was Mao's insistence 
on absolute adherence to his Thought which underpinned the 
exceptional importance of formulae in China during his rule. 
Originality was dangerous, so people began to keep themselves safe by 
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quoting him, by using stock phrases which echoed his words, and by 
effusively repeating the standard formulae of worship. 
Use of the formulae had other important functions. One was 
legitimating Mao's rule. Since the formulae all glorified Mao, embodied 
his Thought or attacked his opponents, people who repeated them gave 
public approval to his supremacy, irrespective of their private 
opinions. When a whole nation recited the formulae in repeated acts of 
collective worship, China seemed to be what its official title proclaimed: 
a People's Republic with a revolutionary ruler loved and respected by 
all. Foreigners were supposed to be impressed, and some were. People 
in China were impressed, too. Anyone there who had doubts about 
Mao felt isolated, for everyone else seemed to adore him. 
Even those who hated Mao were forced to use the formulae and 
worship him. For these people, the formulae were an ongoing lesson in 
the realities of power. No matter what their views, they spoke the 
language of Mao-worship, becoming revolutionary role models for their 
children, their friends and everyone who respected them. The 
pervasiveness of the formulae ensured that even Mao's opponents 
engaged constantly in activities which consolidated his rule. 
Repetition of the formulae also helped Mao's cause by deploying 
positive and negative terms in ways which promoted higher order 
conditioning. The word 'Mao', for example, was always associated with 
titles and adjectives like 'Chairman', 'Great Leader', 'Great Helmsman', 
'the sun', 'love', 'long live', 'red', 'revolutionary', 'brilliant', 'infallible', 
'invincible', and so on. By contrast, the names of those being criticised 
were always slotted into formulae which linked them with words having 
the very worst connotations: 'Down with', 'capitalist roader', 
'revisionist', 'traitor', 'spy', 'monster and demon', 'black', 'futile', and 
the like. As we saw in Chapter 1, anyone or anything repeatedly 
associated with positive words will tend to be well regarded by those 
who exposed to the association, and anyone or anything repeatedly 
associated with negative words will tend to be poorly regarded. 
Oral formulae were an extremely effective method of spreading 
Mao's Thought in a population which still had a high percentage of 
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illiterate peasants and workers. The formulae could be learned from 
the loudspeakers which blared revolutionary messages in markets, 
workplaces and residential areas throughout most of China. Moreover, 
because they were short, stereotyped and easy to remember, they could 
be passed from person to person, then reinforced by ensuring that 
people used them as often as possible. The effect of constant repetition 
was that the formulae became well-drilled foci of a wider body of inter-
related political knowledge - the foci of schematic assumptions about 
Mao, Mao's Thought, revolution, SOCialism, capitalism, reVisionism, 
class enemies, and so on. As we saw in Chapter 1, use of any 
assumption in a schema tends to activate linked assumptions, putting 
them 'on call'. Repetition of the formulae therefore constantly 
activated the basic assumptions of Maoist political discourse, making 
them easier to retrieve and use in classifying and analysing people and 
events. Since the Chinese people were, as far as pOSSible, denied access 
to alternative assumptions, most began to see the world at least partly 
through the lens of the formulae and associated political concepts. 
Finally, adherence to the formulae ensured that the same 
message was delivered in the same words every time. After a while, 
speakers became so practised that they could compose and deliver the 
message when half asleep, and hearers could identify the formula and 
understand the message almost as soon as the speaker had started. 
Speaking in formulae therefore made fewer demands on the cognitive 
resources of both speaker and hearer than delivering the same message 
in different words every time. Since the messages of Maoist 
propaganda were generally simple, not to say simplistic, they could 
often be expressed in formulae. Because those formulae were used at 
every opportunity, proceSSing costs were reduced and relevance, in 
Sperber and Wilson's (1995) sense, was correspondingly enhanced. 
The more people could be made to speak formulaically and 
through that learn to think formulaically, the more they would become 
mere ciphers of the formulae. In the ideal world of the formulae, all 
individuality, all merely personal aspirations would be destroyed. 
Indeed, that is precisely what the official media preached. Self-
criticism (ziwo piping) had been part of the Chinese Communist 
tradition since the Yan'an days, but from early in the Cultural 
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Revolution it was supplanted by something far more drastic. In the 
pages of the official press the Chinese people were urged to proceed_ 
beyond mere self-criticism and to practise 'self-revolution' (ziwo 
geming): 
[We] should make ourselves th~ target of revolution, 
frequently engage in self-criticism, and incessantly wage 
revolution against ourselves. [People's Daily, 3 Nov. 1966, 
quoted Chuang 1967, 39]. 
In this context 'I', 'the self (wo) became a symbol of 'bourgeois 
egocentrism'. So everyone had to 'vanquish the word "I'" (dou dao wo 
zi) or even 'smash the word "I'" (ya sui wo zi), for 'if one could utterly 
ignore wo, one would dare to climb a mountain of swords and jump 
into a sea of fire'. (People's Daily, 2 jan., 15 April, 3 june, 2 Nov. 1966, 
quoted Chuang 1967, 39). Mao had told his followers, in words which 
they all knew by heart, 'first, fear not hardship; second, fear not 
death', and in that spirit they recited the formulae of revolutionary 
self-annihilation: 
Po si Ji gong 
'Renounce oneself to serve others' 
Dang de xuyao jiu shi wo de xuyao 
'The party's need is my need' 
Wei renmin liyi er si, jiu bi taishan hai zhong 
'To die for the people is far weightier than mount Tai' 
Tou ke duan, xue ke Jiu, geming jingshen bu ke diu 
'The head can be cut off, blood can be shed, but the 
revolutionary spirit cannot be forsaken!' 
What gave these formulae power was that they were linked 
schematically to assumptions drilled into all young Chinese by their 
education. In the classroom, in their storybooks, in magazines and 
newspapers, they had been exposed repeatedly to stories about models 
of self-sacrifice. They ranged from the poor soldier Lei Feng, who 
invariably subordinated his own interests to those of other people, to 
heroines who died by torture rather than betray secrets to the 
Guomindang or the japanese imperialists. The moral of this 
propaganda that the highest form of dedication to the revolution was 
to die a martyr's death, and some young people found the prospect 
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attractive. One former Red Guard, who had fought as a Rebel in Guilin, 
described his feelings of idealistic self-renunciation to Anita Chan: 
My friends and I likened life to a box of matches. If you light the 
matches one by one they give off only a small flame. But if you 
set afire the whole box it gives off a flare far bigger, even though 
the quantity of matches is the same. We felt that to die a hero 
would be like burning the whole box of matches. So we thought 
that if there was a grand occasion for which we could die, then 
dying would be transformed into a happy thing ... We talked 
about not leading a useless life ... It was best not to die of 
sickness. The best way was when surging forward on a 
battlefield, dying in a big way, a worthwhile cause .... Talking 
about it now, it was really mad to look at death so lightly. But 
during the Cultural Revolution we thought it was for defending 
Chairman Mao. [Chan 1985, 141-2]. 
This was life lived in the spirit of the formulae: when these Red Guards 
said 'Pledge to fight to the death to defend Mao Zedong's Thought!' 
they really meant it. 
It would be a mistake, however, to focus simply on the role of the 
formulae in constraining and persuading. Catherine Bell argues that 
ritual constructs 'relations of domination and participation', but that 
those relations 'empower those who may at first appear to be 
controlled by them.' (Bell 1992, 197,207). We may doubt whether this 
applies to all rituals or to all who take part in them, but it certainly 
applies to the people who participated voluntarily in the rituals of the 
Cultural Revolution. Participation in Public Criticism Meetings, for 
example, gave young Red Guards and Rebel workers both the feeling 
and the reality of power as they ritually and sometimes physically 
subdued those to whom they had once deferred - teachers, 
intellectuals, technical experts, managers, party cadres and the old. 
Chanting slogans in unison, they not only took courage from their 
comrades who shouted with them, but from their common devotion to 
Mao's Thought: 
Every one of us is an aweless hero. We fear neither heaven 
nor earth only because we have the invincible weapon of 
Mao Zedong's Thought, because we have the never-setting red 
sun - our great beloved Chairman Mao - in our hearts. 
Mao Zedong Thought is our lifeblood. [Shoudu Hongqi 
Chiweijun xuanyan. RGPvol. 19, p. 6084]. 
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This quotation is, like a million others which I could have chosen, a 
pastiche of cliches, and it contains two stock epithets for Mao's 
Thought: 'an invincible weapon' (buke zhansheng de wuqi) and 'our 
lifeblood' (sheng ming xian). In other constantly recurring phrases, 
that Thought was: 
dengta 
'a lighthouse' 
zhinanzhen 
'a compass' 
zhilu mingdeng 
'a bright lantern lighting up the road' 
wangyuanjing he xianweijing 
'a telescope and microscope' 
huochetou 
'a locomotive' 
zuihao de wuqi 
'the best weapon' 
jingshen yuanzidan 
'a spiritual atom bomb' 
Most commonly of all, it was a fabao (supernatural weapon, magic 
weapon). The term was borrowed from traditional popular fiction, 
where it designates 'a powerful, supernatural weapon that supposedly 
can easily defeat any well-equipped enemy or crush a whole army 
outright.' (Chuang 1967,36-7). During the Cultural Revolution, news 
reports were filled with stories of the miracles worked by Mao's 
Thought, some conveniently collected in The Miracles of Chairman Mao 
(Urban 1971), and there were repeated claims that soldiers in the 
People's Uberation Army believed that 'the best weapon is not 
airplanes, nor big cannons, nor tanks, nor atomic bombs; the best 
weapon is Mao Tse-Tung's thought.' (People's Daily, 3 Jan. 1966, 
quoted Chuang 1967, 37). According to the acting Chief of Staff, 'all 
the commanders and fighters of our army ... take Chairman Mao's 
works as the orientation for all work, the telescope and microscope for 
observing the world, the indispensable food, weapon and combat-wheel 
for life, work and combat, and the all-powerful magic weapon for 
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surmounting all difficulties and defeating all enemies.' (Guangming 
Daily, 2 August 1966, quoted Chuang 1967,37). So when Red Guards 
ritually recited quotations from the Little Red Book and shouted 
slogans proclaiming their faith in Mao, their words stood for concepts 
which were linked schematically to assumptions derived from a 
thousand reports about how Mao's Thought had helped achieve the 
impossible. The power of the slogans stemmed from the strength of the 
assumptions to wQich they were linked. 
The Red Guards' feelings of empowerment and liberation were, of 
course, promoted as well by a transformation in their position within 
the power structures of Chinese society. Once Mao had given them his 
support, few felt able to stand against them. They, under Mao, were 
the new lords of Chinese society. 'Red Guard masters!' shrieked one of 
their victims as she banged her forehead on the floor in a desperate 
kowtow. 'I swear I do not have a portrait of Chiang Kai-shek! I swear I 
do not!' (Chang 1992,406). Even Liu Shaoqi had to treat th-em as 
'masters', because they acted in Mao's name. As they swaggered astride 
their one-time superiors, their ideology and their language reflected 
their new-found dominance. Liu had told them that they should be 
'the docile tool of the Party', but once so many in the Party were 
unmasked as 'capitalist-roaders', this instruction was attacked as part 
of Liu's plan to use the Party to spread revisionism. Instead, the Red 
Guards relied upon a quote from a speech which Mao made in 1939, 
unknown until it was rescued from obscurity and published in the 
People's Daily when the Cultural Revolution made it useful (Chuang 
1967, 14): 
The tens of thousands of aspects of Marxism can be 
summarized with one sentence: It is right to revolt. 
Zaofan, the term for 'revolt', means literally 'to cause upsets'. 
Traditionally it had bad connotations, for it was linked with sedition 
and treason as well as simple revolt. After the Communists came to 
power it retained those connotations, and as late as 22 June 1966 the 
People's Daily published an article entitled 'Smash the Broken Trumpet 
that Incites the Reactionaries to Zaofan' (Chuang 1967,14). With the 
publication of the new quotation from Mao, however, the connotations 
of the term were transformed. Revolt suddenly became legitimate, 
218 
indeed mandatory when directed against reactionaries. By the 
beginning of 1967, zaofan had become synonymous with geming 
(revolution), and was sometimes combined with it to form the double 
compound geming zaofan (Chuang 1967, 14). 
As befitted those engaged in revolt, the Red Guards revelled in 
titles which expressed their courage, their independence and their 
historic role. Sometimes they were termed xiao jiang ('little generals'), 
at other times chuang jiang ('bold generals', 'daredevils') or xin ren 
('new people' - a revolutionary generation uncorrupted by life in pre-
revolutionary China) (Chuang 1967, 10-13). Their favourite self-
description, however, grew out of Mao's specification in 1957 of five 
criteria for geming jiebanren ('revolutionary successors' who would 
carry the revolutionary torch into the future). The red-class Red 
Guards, having been commissioned to create Mao's new socialist order 
by destroying the Four Olds and creating the Four News, naturally 
assumed that they had been chosen by Mao as his 'revolutionary 
successors' - an assumption reinforced by the self-serving doctrine of 
'natural redness' which so many of them accepted. Then when the 
'Rebel' Red Guards received their commission to safeguard the 
revolution by purging the Party, they assumed that theywere the 
chosen ones. As a result, all Red Guards, whatever their factional 
allegiance, gloried in the title 'revolutionary successors'. 
For the Red Guards, intoxicated with idealism, power and self-
importance, the formulae were more liberating than constraining. 
Even the demand to annihilate the wo, the'!', was used to inspire action 
which not only served 'the revolution' but expanded their own power 
as well. Such action made them feel worthy of the title 'revolutionary 
successors' and it won the admiration of those who wished they could 
be as brave. The formulae served Mao above all others, but they also 
served the revolutionaries who gained strength from them, who knew 
how to manipulate them and who controlled their pragmatic 
interpretation. 
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4.5 Reference Assignment, Victims and Mao's 
Responsibility 
Charged with the responsibility of making revolution in accordance 
with Mao's Thought, the 'revolutionary successors' sought motivation 
from the formulae. One formula consisted of the 'Five Dares' and the 
'Four Unafraids': dare to think, to speak, to do, to make revolution and 
to rebel; be unafraid of heaven, earth, gods and ghosts. Of these, 
'daring to speak' - or at least to speak independently - was by far the 
most difficult, for the Red Guards like everyone else were afraid to say 
anything which might conceivably be taken as a departure from Mao's 
Thought. So when they dedicated themselves to the Five Dares and the 
Four Unafraids, they often did so in speeches based on recent editorials 
in the People's Daily and Red Flag(cf. ling 1972, 38). 
When it came to 'daring to do', however, the Red Guards were 
less constrained and often not at all formulaic. The reason was, of 
course, that the formulae had no clear implications for action: they 
were multi-faceted, sometimes contradictory, and they had to be 
interpreted with the aid of contextual assumptions which varied from 
person to person. Only one thing was agreed: in the context of Mao's 
instructions, the formulae were rallying cries in a war against largely 
unspecified 'people in authority' and class enemies. This legitimated 
the Red Guards' conquest of new empires and their acquisition of vast, 
new realms of self-determination and freedom. 
For the victims of the Red Guards' conquests, the formulae had 
more damaging implications. They could interpret the slogans and 
quotations however they wished, but their interpretations did not 
matter. People more powerful than themselves had named them as the 
referents of the Cultural Revolution's formulae of condemnation: they 
were the 'capitalist roaders', the 'revisionists', the 
'counterrevolutionaries', the 'spies', the 'traitors', the 'monsters and 
demons'. They could, perhaps, derive consolation from a few formulae 
like 'fear not hardship ... fear not death', but this was psychologically 
difficult because they associated so many of the formulae with 
interrogation and intimidation. They had become victims of the 
Cultural Revolution because they had been unable to control the 
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process of reference assignment, and the formulae brought them no 
liberation, only oppression. 
Few of those accused believed that they had said or done 
anything which justified the criminal labels placed on them. The only 
important exception, and no more than a partial one, was 'people in 
authority' like Liu Shaoqi who confessed to 'errors of thought' - most of 
them errors constructed by Mao's repeated switches of the context of 
interpretation after August 1962. However, many others confessed to 
crimes which they knew they had never committed, worn down by 
interminable questioning, false promises, beatings and torture. Once 
Mao had died and the Gang of Four had been arrested it became at last 
safe to complain, and nearly all those who had been victimized stopped 
pretending that they accepted the judgment of their tormentors. They 
demanded rehabilitation and compensation, they revealed the petty 
motives which had often led to their selection as targets, they tried to 
fathom the 'madness' of the Cultural Revolution and they poured out 
their anger in the avalanche of 'wounded literature' which recounted 
their experiences (e.g. Barme & Lee 1979; Feng 1991). Incessant 
bombardment with the formulae of the Cultural Revolution had helped 
to intimidate them and make them conform, but it had not convinced 
them that what their captors said was true. 
While Mao lived, and often for much longer, few victims of the 
Cultural Revolution blamed him for their fate. Instead, they pointed 
the finger at those who had made false accusations, at those who had 
twisted and misinterpreted their words, at the Red Guards, at the 
Central Cultural Revolution Group, at Lin Biao, or at Jiang Qing and her 
court. Mao, they thought, did not know what sorts of things were done 
in his name. One reason they so seldom blamed Mao was that the Mao-
cult had done its work only too well. Mao was so remote from their 
lives that they knew him mainly through the formulae. They simply 
could not believe that their Great Leader, the red sun in their hearts, 
was responsible for such injustice. 
In one very narrow sense they were right: with the exception of 
Liu Shaoqi, whom Mao identified indirectly in his big character poster 
of 5 August 1966, no victim of the Cultural Revolution was publicly 
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singled out by Mao as a 'capitalist roader' or anything else. Indeed, 
only a relatively small number of very senior victims had their 
persecution specifically endorsed in the official press. The 
overwhelming majority of victims were singled out by those who bore 
them grudges, by those who wanted their jobs, by those who suspected 
them because they were intellectuals or had 'bad' class origins, by 
those who resented the cadres as a 'new class', by those who hunted 
down people connected with those already accused, by those who 
searched for opportunities to apply the Mao/Yao principles of 
interpretation, by those who detected something 'bourgeois' in their 
dress or lifestyle, or simply by those who wanted to avoid suspicion 
that they themselves lacked revolutionary ardour. 
Mao was directly responsible for none of these individual cases. 
His writings, his instructions and the formulae of class war which 
echoed his words named only the categories of criminals who had to be 
rooted out. Moreover, as we have seen, the terms used to specify those 
categories were semantically incomplete, and that made it necessary for 
the accusers to use their own interpretive assumptions in the process of 
reference assignment. Those assumptions, of course, usually varied 
according to the accuser's class background, personal loyalties and 
individual prejudices. The accused, however, rarely shared the 
assumptions which led to their identification as 'monsters and demons' 
or any of the other types of criminal listed in the formulae. Most never 
dreamed that they were the sorts of people who were Mao's intended 
victims, and they blamed their accusers for maliciously pinning false 
labels on them. So Mao was shielded from blame because the 
semantically incomplete nature of the formulae and the pragmatic 
nature of reference assignment ensured that others had to make the 
final choice of targets. 
The victims, of course, let Mao off too easily. He may not have 
named individuals, but he encouraged the process of persecution as a 
whole and sought to manipulate it for his own purposes. The witch-
hunt was essential to his goal of breaking the power of the Communist 
Party, and it was equally essential to his attempt at bringing about a 
revolution in the Chinese people's values through mass criticism, the 
destruction of the Old and the fostering of the New. If innocent people 
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were amongst those accused, he simply did not care: in the words of a 
formula of the Cultural Revolution, he was prepared to 'kill the monkey 
to scare the chickens'. As Dittmer has argued, the whole process of 
mass criticism 'entailed the distortion or fabrication of criticisms ... in 
order to teach lessons not always related to the views of the target.' 
(Dittmer 1974, 314). 
Mao also actively fostered many of the assumptions which were 
used in the process of reference assignment. As we saw in Chapter 3, 
Mao himself was responsible for the new interpretive assumptions 
which were used to accuse Liu and many other Party leaders of 
betraying socialism and suppressing the Cultural Revolution. We saw, 
too, how he was closely associated with the dissemination, through Yao 
Wenyuan, of principles of interpretation which could be used to accuse 
anyone of anti-revolutionary sentiments. We have seen that he himself 
deliberately fostered assumptions which made many people search for 
counterrevolutionaries amongst the black categories, the intellectuals, 
the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie. We have seen, too, that all of 
this was fundamental to his policy of dividing the Chinese people into 
groups which purged each other in his name. So if Mao did not 
determine that a particular accuser should use one set of damaging 
interpretive assumptions rather than another, he certainly did a great 
deal to ensure that there were so many damaging assumptions 
available for use in the first place. Similarly, while he may not have 
been responsible for the fact that a particular individual made a false 
accusation so as not to seem lacking in revolutionary fervour, he 
created the system of competitive revolutionary activism which placed 
enormous pressure on people to prove their revolutionary commitment 
and secure their own safety by criticiSing and 'exposing' others. Mao 
may not have named the people who became the targets of 
revolutionary formulae during the Cultural Revolution, but he ensured 
that they, or millions like them, would be condemned. Formulae which 
reflected his Thought provided the condemnatory labels, and he 
himself created the main features of their most important contexts of 
interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DICHOTOMIES, DEMONS AND VIOLENCE 
5.1 Linguistic Dichotomies: the Symbolism of Good and 
Evil 
The language of the Cultural Revolution was a language of worship, a 
language of hatred and a language of war. As a language of worship, it 
unified the people at the feet of the god-like Mao. As a language of 
hatred and of war, it drew a line between the people and the class 
enemy and used carefully scripted terms of abuse to humiliate and 
frighten the foe. It achieved all this partly through elaborating a series 
of interrelated dichotomies of good and evil. These drew upon the 
Communist Party's traditional imagery, but they adapted it and added 
to it the language of China's ancient tradition of curse sorcery. The 
result was a terrifying language of intimidation which influenced the 
attitudes of those who used it and devastated those who were its 
victims. 
The architects of the dichotomies were Mao himself, who 
originated some of the dichotomies and whose writings were mined for 
imagery; his wife, Jiang Qing, leader of the cultural radicals, who 
launched the attack on 'Three Family Village' in 1966 and for a time 
influenced PLA propaganda; Chen Boda, Mao's secretary and the 
Chairman of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, who wrote some of 
Mao's speeches, spearheaded the takeover of the People's Daily in 1966 
and had heavy responsibilities for superintending the press; Yao 
Wenyuan, whose attack on Wu Han had launched the Cultural 
Revolution; and Qi Benyu, radical historian, journalist and the main 
author of the attacks on the Beijing Municipal Committee and Uu 
Shaoqi. All of them, except for Mao himself, belonged to the Central 
Cultural Revolution Group. They controlled the People's Daily as well 
as the Party journal Red Flag, which had Chen Boda and then Yao 
Wenyuan as editor-in-chief. For a time, through Jiang Qing and Lin 
Biao, they also had ready access to the Liberation Army Daily. Through 
these 'two newspapers and one journal' they exercised indirect control 
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over the provincial Party press, which followed their lead for fear of 
taking an incorrect line. The provincial newspapers reprinted many of 
their articles and were in fact compelled to carry the title article from 
Red Flag on their front pages. As a result, the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group was in a position to dictate the language of the 
official press throughout the country. The independent Red Guard 
press, while difficult to control in matters of content, followed the lead 
of the official press, in its language. So the whole Chinese press used 
the same, centrally directed language of class war. (On the above, cf. 
Liu 1971,73,78-84; Dittmer 1987; Wang 1996). 
The rhetoric which these symbol-makers of the Cultural 
Revolution devised was formed around a fundamental dichotomy 
between words associated with the World of Li~~!~nd words associated 
with the World of Darkness (Dittmer 1977; 1987,80-90). The all-
pervasive metaphor of the forces of light was the colo,ur reef (hong), 
which derived its symbolic power from both traditioncDand·:> 
revolutionary associations. Traditionally, it was the colour of joy, 
success, popularity, good fortune and prosperity. Brides, for example, 
usually dressed at least partly in red, and red decorations were 
customarily present at weddings or at auspicious celebrations. After 
the communist victory, red acquired even more potent associations. In 
the Marxist tradition, it was the colour of socialism and the colour of 
sacrifice for the revolutionary cause. In China it became as well a 
symbol of love for Mao and of devotion to his revolutionary Thought. 
During the Cultural Revolution the cult of the colour red went to 
extr~mes. As mass enthusiasm swelled, people began to paint all walls 
red, creating 'a red sea' (hong haiyang) , although the practice was 
banned partly because the red areas became sacred and therefore 
unavailable for critical big character posters (CCP Documents, 146; 
Dittmer & Chen, 57). The colour red set the theme of all public 
functions. At a rally of 'revolutionary students and teachers' in Beijing 
in August 1966, for example, 
countless red flags waved in the breeze in Tiananmen square. 
Tens of thousands of Red Guards wearing red arm bands and 
carrying red-covered Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong 
sang with gusto 'Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman' and 
other revolutionary songs. The whole square became a surging 
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ocean of red. [People's Daily, 1 Sept. 1966, quoted in Dittmer 
1977,74, emphasis added]. 
The cult of the colour red was matched by the cult of the word 'red'. 
Mao's revolutionary line was the 'red line' (hongxian), his directives 
were 'red words' (hongzi), the power of the revolutionary masses was 
'red power' (hongse zhengquan) , their revolutionary action was a 'red 
storm' (hongse fenbao) or a 'red torrent' (hongse jiliu) , they inflicted 
what they proudly called a 'red terror' (hongse kongbu) on the black 
categories, and when they expelled them from Beijing their objective 
was to make the capital 'purer and redder' (geng chun geng hong). 
(RGPvol. 5, p. 1035, vol. 16 pp. 5000, 5005,5008, vol. 19, p. 6069). 
The urge to use the word 'red' in every possible context even led to the 
character for hong (,red'), hitherto nearly always adjectival, now also 
being used more often as a verb: 'let the socialist flowers redden all 
over the world' (hong bian renjian). (Chuang 1967,8, quoting People's 
Daily, 17 July 1966). 
Mao himself, as the inspiration and guide of all revolutionary 
action, was the reddest object of all, the 'sun' (taiyang). He was the 
'red, red sun' in the Chinese people's hearts and often the 'reddest red 
sun'. He was even, as people searched desperately for adequate 
superlatives, the 'reddest, reddest, red sun'. His Thought, which 
sustained all his followers, was a 'red lantern' (hongdeng) and his 
faithful followers were 'red flowers (honghua) who always turn towards 
the sun'. He was also the inspiration of a sub-theme in the imagery of 
light, for his followers were quick to note that as early as 1930 he had 
used the Chinese proverb 'A single spark can start a prairie fire' to 
argue that small acts of rebellion would rapidly develop into mighty 
revolutions (Mao 1930, 118, 121). Borrowing the metaphor, they 
vowed to 'spread the sparks of revolutionary rebelling', they threatened 
their enemies with 'the blazing flames of revolution', they lit 'the flames 
of criticism' and they spoke of how revolutionaries were steeled and 
matured in 'the furnaces of the great Cultural Revolutionary ... 
crucible'. (Dittmer 1987, 83). 
The dominance of the colour red in the imagery of light. provided . 
a new context of interpretation for the old figure of speech ben se 
('original colour', 'pure colour'). Traditionally, young Chinese had 
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been warned not to 'forget their original colour' (wang ben), meaning 
that they should not forget their ancestors and the values associated 
with them. Under Mao, however, the phrase was used repeatedly to 
warn young people from red-class families that they should not forget 
the revolutionary values appropriate to their class origin. The 
dominance of class and revolutionary values created a context of 
interpretation in which the figurative ben se, which had not referred 
literally to any part of the colour spectrum, now referred to an actual 
colour, red, and this in turn was a metaphor for something which was 
not a colour at all - revolutionary character. 
The 'capitalist-roaders' whom Mao named as the principal targets 
of the Cultural Revolution were accused of plotting to make the 
Communist Party and China bien yan se ('change colour'). Within the 
context of interpretation which existed by the 1960s everyone knew 
that China's existing colour was red, and that this was a metaphor for 
the country's socialist character. Similarly, everyone knew that the 
colours to which China was in danger of changing were white and black 
- metaphors for the opposite pole of Chinese politics. 
The evolving linguistic construction of 'white' and 'black' will 
repay further analysis. Before the communist takeover, 'white' (bal) 
was the antonym of 'black' (hei), symbolizing purity and goodness as 
opposed to darkness and evil. Under Mao, however, it gained a new 
meaning as the antonym of 'red'. In this context, it stood for the side of 
counterrevolution - for the Guomindang and for all who sought its 
return. Co-existence of the two meanings, the traditional one and the 
new political one, could sometimes trap the politically naIve. Zhai 
Zhenhua records an argument in which one student said 'You are black! 
I am white!' ('You are evil! I am good!') only to be crushed when her 
opponent shot back 'You are white! I am red!' ('You are anti-
revolutionary! I am revolutionary!'). (Zhai 1992, 59-60). 
From the outset of the Cultural Revolution, however, 'black' 
displaced 'white' as the antonym of 'red' in most contexts. There were 
good linguistic reasons for the change. The term 'white' had been 
applied mainly to openly declared class enemies like the Guomindang, 
but the Cultural Revolution was intended to expose and destroy a 
hidden menace - enemies who had secretly 'wormed their way into the 
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Party' and now threatened its 'red colour'. In this context 'black' was 
the perfect antonym for 'red', for it was an established metaphor 
representing evil which involved treachery or hidden designs and it 
had already been pressed into service against the Anti-Rightists in 
1957. From the outset of the Cultural Revolution, the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group, the official press and the Red Guard newspapers 
referred to their targets as 'black gangs' (heibang), who conspired in 
'black inns' (heidien), and who sought to draw a 'black veil' (heimu) 
over the 'black line' (heixian) which they secretly followed. These 
conspirators constituted an 'underground black party' (dixia heidang), 
which held 'black meetings' (heihUl) in 'black headquarters' 
(heisilingbu). They spoke 'black words' (heihua), issued 'black 
instructions' (heizhishi), and they published 'black books' (heishu) and 
'black documents' (heiwenjian) whose poisonous influence was a 'black 
wind' (heifeng). Though waving a 'red flag' (hongqi), they owed 
allegiance to a 'black flag' (heiqi), and from their 'black lairs' (heiwou) 
they manipulated 'black backstage supporters' (heihoutal). {All terms 
are taken from the Red Guard press in RGP, for example, vol. 5, pp. 
1035, 1040, 1042, 1138, 1095, 1138, 1181; vol. 16, pp. 5001, 5006; 
vol. 17, pp. 5435, 5436, 5438, 5439; vol. 18, pp. 5441, 5855, 5857). 
As Dittmer has pointed out, linked to the dichotomy of light and 
darkness was another crucial polarity: that between appearance and 
reality (Dittmer 1987, 83-90). The inhabitants of the World of 
Darkness were the class enemies, who appeared to be human beings 
when they masqueraded in the World of Light, but who in reality were 
demons, spirits and savage beasts. The official press, as usual, gave the 
revolutionary ma,sses their cue: 
The enemy in daylight look like men, in darkness devils. To your 
face, they speak human language, behind your back, the 
language of devils. They are wolves clad in skins of sheep, man-
eating smiling tigers .... The enemies without guns are more 
hidden, cunning, sinister and vicious than the enemies with guns. 
[Liberation Army Daily, 23 Aug. 1966, quoted Dittmer 1987, 83]. 
Such enemies disguised their deadly intent with 'sugar-coated bullets' 
(tang yi paodan). They were 'poisonous snakes' (du she) and 
'poisonous lizards' (du xiezl) who had to be 'lured from their holes', 
'foxes' (hull) who sought to go unrecognised by hiding their tails, 
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'jackals and wolves' (chailang) who emerged from their 'lairs' to savage 
unwary revolutionaries, 'parasitic worms' (ji sheng chong) and 
'injurious vermin' (hai ren chong) silently sapping their victims' 
strength. Lesser enemies were 'small insects' (xiao pa chong), 'harmful 
insects' (hairen chong) and 'flies' (cangying), as well as the 'talons and 
fangs' (zhaoya) of people like Liu Shaoqi who stayed behind the scenes. 
All of these images were used to suggest deceit. Those who had no 
chance of hiding their villainy, such as members of the black categories 
or rival Red Guards, were often called 'dogs' (gou), creatures not known 
for deception. Rebel Red Guards called pro-Party opponents 'Loyalist 
dogs' (baohuanggou), and all types of Red guards said that their 
enemies had 'dogs' heads' (goutou), became 'mad dogs' (kuang gou or 
[eng gau) when cornered and would end up as 'dead dogs' (sigau). 
Red-class Red Guards referred to children of the black categories as 
'whelps' or 'sons of bitches' (gau zaizi). In all cases, the descriptions 
were intended to degrade and dehumanize those to whom they were 
applied. (All terms are taken from Red Guard tabloids, leaflet-s and 
posters in RGP, for example vol. 5, 1035, 1040, 1168; vol. 17, 5438, 
5441, 5574; vol. 18, 5855, 5858; vol. 19, 6077). 
These terms built on the animal imagery in Mao's own writings. 
One of his most famous sayings, of course, was 'All reactionaries are 
paper tigers.' But everyone who read the Little Red Book knew that Mao 
also said that these reactionaries had once been 'real tigers' which 
'devoured people by the millions and tens of millions.' It was only after 
bitter struggle by the exploited that they became 'paper tigers, dead 
tigers, bean-curd tigers.' (LRB,72-5). The tiger image was a recurrent 
one in Mao's writings, even in his poetry: 'Only the hero can drive 
tigers and leopards away' (Wang 1996). The tigers here were open 
enemies, but the Cultural Revolution was directed more at secret 
enemies - at those whom Mao called 'enemies without guns' (LRB, 16). 
So the symbol-makers now had to make the tigers smile and conjure up 
the images of the more traditionally deceitful inhabitants of Mao's 
revolutionary menagerie - creatures like snakes and insects. All types 
of snakes, Mao said, whether ones which showed their 'poisonous fangs' 
or ones which changed themselves into 'beautiful women', had 'felt the 
threat of the coming winter'. He warned, however, that they were 'far 
from frozen stiff.' (Liberation Army Daily, 22 July 1967, quoted in 
Wang 1996). The insects were just as capable of deceiving the unwary. 
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Flies could be devils in disguise and in Chinese tradition political 
enemies were denigrated as 'poisonous insects' which played magic 
tricks. Their weak point was that they showed their true natures when 
cursed, and it was Mao who gave to the Cultural Revolution its standard 
imprecation against insects: 'Sweep all harmful insects away!' (Wang 
1996). 
Although the Cultural Revolution was directed, on one level, 
against feudal tradition, on another level it utilized feudal superstitions 
to foment hatred of class enemies, identifying them with the whole 
pantheon of evil spirits mentioned in folklore and Buddhist mythology. 
The official press led the way, calling class enemies 'devils' (muogui), 
'demons' (guiguai), 'vampires' (xixie), 'apparitions and spectres' 
(wangliang guimei) , 'monsters' (muoguai) and Yama (yanwang ye) - the 
King of the Dead. To hide their identities they had 'painted skin' 
(huapi), they operated through others who were their 'devils' claws' 
(mUD zhao), and they deceived their opponents with 'ghostly'trickery' 
(gui huazhao), 'black magic' (yaofeng), and by speaking 'ghost 
language' (guihua) (Chuang 1967,22-3). The most common 
description of class enemies, however, was niugui sheshen. Literally 
this means 'cow-ghosts and snake-gods', but it is usually translated 
freely as 'monsters and demons' or 'ghosts and monsters'. In Chinese 
mythology, niugui sheshen were evil spirits who took human shapes to 
perform evil tricks, but when unmasked reverted to their ghostly forms. 
The term niugui sheshen was popularized by Mao when he used it in a 
speech in 1957: 'All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all ghosts 
and monsters, must be subjected to critiCism; in no circumstances 
should they be allowed to spread unchecked.' (Mao 1957b, 496). This 
theme was taken up during the Anti-Rightist Campaign, when 
intellectuals were described as niugui sheshen who had pretended to 
support the Party, only to be unmasked when they launched a barrage 
of criticism during the Hundred Flowers Campaign (Cheng 1986, 14). 
The term niugui sheshen epitomised the dichotomy between 
appearance (human form) and reality (demonic nature). It also 
pOinted to the necessity of publicising what had been concealed: the 
demonic (anti-socialist) natures and activities of those whom the 
revolutionary masses were supposed to unmask. The slogan 'Expose all 
monsters and demons!' was a perfect tool for fostering the climate of 
paranoia and hatred which fuelled the Cultural Revolution. 
230 
Mao not only personally contributed niugui sheshen to the 
Chinese political vocabulary, but also muogui ('devils'). Indeed, he was 
responsible for the revival of demonic symbolism as a whole. No one 
would have dared to bring back feudal superstitions without his express 
permission, and he actively promoted their return. He took a special 
interest in this type of imagery and in fact edited a book called The 
Story of Not Afraid of Devils. Its purpose was to define the devilish 
nature of the people's enemies both in China and abroad, and to rally 
the people against those enemies (Wang 1996). So Mao was well 
equipped to turn China's feudal past to advantage during the Cultural 
Revolution. 
As well as popularizing the imagery of ghosts, devils and animals 
with supernatural powers, Mao and his symbol-makers revived the art 
of curse sorcery (Wang 1996). It had been developed in ancient times 
when people believed that they were surrounded by mysterious and 
powerful supernatural forces which could not be controlled by natural 
means. It involved attacking the demons with curses which were verbal 
representations of a ferocious physical onslaught. The intention was to 
frighten the devils so badly that they revealed themselves, then wasted 
away from terror and eventually died. As creatures of the World of 
Darkness, they suffered from the light and heat, so curses like 'Deep fry 
the Devils!' were used frequently. That exact same curse was used 
during the Cultural Revolution, along with variants like 'Deep fry the 
Black Gangs!' or 'Set fire to the black city government!' Many of the 
curses were deliberately cruel. 'Smash the dog's head!' revolutionaries 
cried as they forced a hapless victim's head to the ground. Red Flag 
told those struggling against Wu Han to 'strip off his skin and cut his 
bones', while a Red Guard ballad warned Liu Shaoqi 'We will ferret you 
out, pull out your tendons, strip off your skin and kick your head like a 
ball.' (Quoted Wang 1996, 130). Many of the curses were in the spirit 
of a passage from Lu Xun endorsed by Mao, urging people to 'Beat the 
[mad] dog even when it has fallen into the water' and telling them 
'Once you start beating it, beat it to death'. A popular curse was 'Foster 
the spirit of beating the dog which has fallen into the water! Hit the 
class enemies to the ground then trample them with tens of millions of 
feet!' Such curses, it was felt, would make the demons throw off their 
disguises and would drive them to their deaths. Both of these things 
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happened often enough to inspire faith in the cursing: many class 
enemies revealed their demonic natures by confessing to 
counterrevolutionary crimes, and still others foresaw a future with 
endless suffering and took their own lives. 
Confidence in the curses depended, too, on confidence in the 
spirit which inspired them. In ancient times, people invoked the 
support of the god~. During the Cultural Revolution, however, their 
confidence in victory over the demons rested on their faith in Mao. 
Traditionally, people had used fire, water, brooms and mirrors - or 
words describing the action of these things - to make devils show their 
true shape, and during the Cultural Revolution they used similar 
language (Wang 1996). Metaphors of 'sweeping away' pervaded Mao's 
work (e.g. LRE 10-11,119), and when revolutionaries swore to 'Sweep 
away all monsters and demons!' or to 'Sweep them into the rubbish bin 
of history!' they had the reassurance that they were using words 
uttered by Mao himself to express his invincible Thought. Similarly, 
when they brought demons to light with the 'flames of criticism' or 
washed away their disguises with a 'red torrent' of revolutionary 
activity, their inspiration was Mao's Thought. That Thought ('the sun') 
was a light powerful enough to reveal all the counterrevolutionary 
secrets of the world of darkness, it was the criterion or mirror against 
which everything could be scrutinized. As they themselves put it, 'Mao 
Zedong's thought is the mirror which can reveal demons' true natures' 
(Mao Zedong si xiang shi zhao yiao jing). Victory was certain. 
People who used the language of the official press and called 
class enemies savage beasts, poisonous snakes or monsters and demons 
used words which stripped their opponents of all humanity. It reduced 
the class struggle to a battle between polar opposites - between 
antagonists who did not share even a common human nature. It was a 
language which implied that those who were its referents were class 
enemies by nature -- that they always had been anti-socialist and 
always would be. So when Liu Shaoqi, for example, was labelled a 
'poisonous snake' and a 'renegade, traitor and scab' (pantu, neijian 
gongzei), his self-criticisms were dismissed as insincere and his 
personal history was re-written to prove that he had always secretly 
opposed the Party: 
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Liu was born in sin and grew to manhood as a 'filial scion of the 
landlord class'; he 'wormed' his way into the Party at the time of 
its founding to 'speculate on revolution,' and he 'usurped every 
office he ever held .... Liu's essential guilt was immutable, its 
appearance opportunistic; his intention to do mischief was 
constant, his ability dependent on circumstances. [Dittmer 1974, 
312 n.19]. 
So Liu, the loyal communist, was a class enemy by his very nature, 
condemned never again to be called 'comrade'. His fate, like that of 
other especially useful class enemies, was to be criticised time after 
time as a 'negative example' (Dittmer 1974, 313). If the people needed 
to be warned against something, then Liu was said to have advocated it. 
Even after he was left to die, his illnesses untreated, half naked in a 
cellar in the north of China, news of his death was suppressed and the 
newspapers continued to remind people of 'the towering crimes' of Liu 
Shaoqi. The immutability of his black nature, the impossibility of 
genuine repentance on his part, served the purposes of the symbol-
masters who 'educated' the people by making him stand for everything 
they attacked during the Cultural Revolution. 
Many Red Guards internalised the message of the language which 
they learned from the newspapers. They accepted the doctrine that 
revolutionaries and class enemies had different natures. They accepted 
that there was no middle road between the 'red' and the 'black', 
between socialism and revisionism, between revolution and 
counterrevolution, between the World of Light and the World of 
Darkness. As well as using language which implied these claims, they 
articulated them explicitly and sought to convert others to them. One 
Red Guard newspaper called upon its readers to 'Fire the moderates', 
then argued: 
[M]ildness (wen) is the biggest weak point of our Cultural 
Revolution movement and our most dangerous enemy at the 
moment ... Being mild is being afraid, it is being weak. It means 
that one does not hate the enemy of the revolution, that one is 
inadequate in the struggle against the counterrevolutionary line, 
and that one does not have a clear political stand when the 
critical moment comes. Being mild is being slow and lacking 
political sharpness. It is being weak in one's sense of class 
struggle. To be mild is to lack initiative and be overcautious. In 
short, mildness is a Right deviation and is conservative ... 
Mildness is a manifestation of the bourgeQis world outlook, and it is 
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the reflection of the vacillating and compromising nature of the 
petty bourgeoisie in our revolutionary ranks. Mildness is only 
the surface, the real nature is selfishness. The struggle against 
mildness is a struggle to fight selfishness and foster public spirit. 
Every revolutionary comrade must let the struggle touch his soul 
and resolutely seize power over the selfishness in his own mind. 
[Xin Beida, 14 march 1967. RGPvol. 5, p.1301, emphasis added]. 
This was an attempt to engineer semantic change. It operated on two 
levels. On the one hand, the passage sought to change the referents of 
the word wen ('mildness') through an argument which, given the 
assumptions of Mao's Thought, was perfectly rational. On the other 
hand, the passage also operated on a non-rational level, activating 
mechanisms of higher order conditioning by repeatedly associating the 
word wen with the negative terms underlined in the passage above. 
Most important, it said explicitly what the dichotomous language of the 
Cultural Revolution implied: that there was no middle road - that the 
whole conflict was between polar opposites of Good and Evil. .. In that 
case, there could be no negotiations, no compromise, no peace. Such a 
conflict could only be discussed in the language of war. 
5.2 The Language of War 
Military terms and metaphors, we saw in chapter 2, had always been 
prevalent in Mao's China, reflecting the fact that the Communist Party 
had won power through over two decades of warfare. They had been 
used in the rhetoric of class warfare, but often they were directed at 
foreign enemies or used to rally the Chinese people in the battle to 
increase production. During the Cultural Revolution, however, people 
spoke the language of war as never before, and it was directed 
overwhelmingly at human targets within China - the capitalist-roaders, 
revisionists, monsters and demons, and all the other victims of the 
Cultural Revolution. As always in matters of linguistic form, the lead 
came from the top. Mao himself had called on the revolutionary 
masses to 'Bombard the Headquarters' of the capitalist-roaders within 
the Party; Jiang cnng had opened the attack on Deng Tuo and Three 
Family Village with an article under the title 'Open Fire at the Black 
Anti-Party and Anti-socialist Line!' (Liberation Army Daily, 8 March 
1966, quoted Chuang 1970, 19, emphasis added); and Lin Biao's 
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rhetoric rang with martial metaphors: ' ... literary criticism must 
reinforce its militancy, turn literary criticism into dagger and grenade' 
(Lin Biao tongzhi weitua liang Qjng tangzhi zhaokai de budui wenyi 
gongzuo zuatanhui jiyao. RGP, vol. 16, p. 5003, emphasis added). This 
language reflected his view that 'Struggle is life - if you don't struggle 
against them, they will struggle against you .... if you don't kill them 
they will kill you.' (Quoted in Dittmer 1987,117, emphasis added). 
The Maoist-controlled official press rammed home the message that the 
Cultural Revolution was a war: 
The struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the 
area of the superstructure is like a battle between two armies -
always one wins and one loses. Either we wipe them out or they 
eliminate us. We can't cease fire in ideological and cultural battle 
... otherwise we surrender to bourgeois thought and culture. 
[People's Daily, 29 May 1967, reprinted in RGP, vol. 16, p. 5007, 
emphasis added]. 
The Red Guards were not slow to take their cue. Most~Rebel units 
adopted names which incorporated military terminology: '8.28 
Fighting Squad', 'First Brigade of the First Army Division of the Red 
Guards of Number Four School', '8.29 Revolutionary Rebellion-Making 
General Headquarters', and so on. They labelled their tabloid 
newspapers zhan bao ('battle news') and they saw themselves as Mao's 
xiao jiang ('little generals') fighting a deadly war: 
'Bombard the Headquarters' is like a bugle call directing mighty 
revolutionary contingents ... We'll follow your [Mao's] great 
strategic plan, galloping ahead with swords drawn, carrying all 
before us ... [Xin Hui Baa, 8 March 1968. RGP, vol. 5, p. 1146]. 
To defend Mao and Mao's revolutionary line, we, Chairman Mao's 
most loyal Red Guards, dare to climb a mountain of swords or 
plunge into a sea of flames. We must ... hit them all at one 
attempt (yi da er guang). We must ignite a blazing prairie fire of 
the people's war, bury the entire the 'Uu Dynasty'! [Xin Beida, 12 
April 1967. RGP, vol. 5 p. 1149]. 
The 'Summary of the Forum' is an battle order from Chairman 
Mao's proletarian headquarters. It is a mobilization order calling 
for us to take up our pens and hold tight our guns to protect 
proletarian power. It betokens the coming of the red storm of 
the proletarian Cultural Revolution. [jie Pang lun Baa, 29 May 
1967, RGPvol. 16, p. 5008]. 
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Aiming at the heads of the capitalist roaders, fiercely hack! 
Aiming at their throats, shoot! We must give them a deadly 
blow. [Zhi Nong Hong Qj, no. 7, Jan. 1968, RGPvol. 3]. 
We want gunpowder and the smoke of gunpowder, and we don't 
want rosy colour! We want violence! We want to seize power! 
We are against reconciliation and compromise. Down with 
eclecticism! II [Zhan Di Wen Yi, no. 8, RGPvol. 2]. 
The cultural front should fight its way out! Fight! Fight! Fight! 
Fight until the enemy is utterly routed. Fight till the end and 
never return! Fight until a new and bright red cultural field of 
Mao Zedong Thought comes! [Hong Yi Zhan Bao, 15 March 1967. 
RGPvol. 7, p. 1828]. 
The Capital Red Flag Red Guard is born in the gunfire and smoke 
of gunpowder of the life-and-death battle between the two lines. 
[Shoudu Hangqi Chiweijun Xuanyan, 21 January 1967. RGP vol. 
19, p. 6084]. 
The Cultural Revolution, like a thundering storm, is s\Veeping 
away one by one the bourgeoisie's obstinate blockhouses. [Fan 
Xiu Baa & Geming Zaofan jun Bao, 23 May 1967, RGPvol. 4]. 
These extracts and others like them are packed with terms which will be 
taken, in default of contextual evidence to the contrary, to have 
military referents: headquarters (siJingbu), contingents (xiaofendui), 
swords Uian), war (zhanzheng) , foe (diren) , battle order (zhandou hao 
ling), battle front (zhanxian), weapon (WUql), guns (qiang), gunpowder 
(zhayao), gunfire (paohuo), bombard (paohong), encirclement 
(baowei), mobilization (dongyuan), blockhouse (diaobao), fortress 
(baolei). Nearly all these words are nouns invented to describe 
specifically military organization, technology or tactics as they have 
developed over the years. They are used as martial metaphors for non-
military things, but that is a secondary function. 
The deSCription of war requires many other terms whose prima 
facie reference is less definite, but which have military referents in the 
context of the passages in which they occur. The Red Guard 
newspapers are packed with such terms, and they are nearly all verbs: 
zhansheng (,vanquish'), xiji ('strike'), maizang ('bury'), fensui 
(,shatter'), pi ('hack'),kan ('hack'), paaji (,batter'), daji (,hit'), bodou 
(,fight'), qianmie ('annihilate', 'wipe out'), xiaamie ('exterminate', 
'liquidate'), qingchu ('liquidate'), jikui ('rout'), dabai ('defeat'), saochu 
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('sweep away'), fensui ('crush'), zhuiji ('pursue'), duoqu ('seize'), 
wuzhuang ('arm'), cuihui ('destroy'), shengli (,victory'), zhanlue bushu 
('strategic plan'), hanwei ('defend'), baowei ('defend', 'guard'), baohu 
(,protect'). These words are equally applicable to many types of 
aggression, for specifically military forms of attack require hardly any 
specialized verbs. The words are positive from the point of view of the 
aggressor, so they are mostly used with reference to the actions of 
'revolutionary' forces. If they are used to describe the actions of . 
'reactionaries', they are almost invariably qualified by words such as 
'attempt to .. .' or 'seek vainly to .. .'. Finally, very few of the verbs have 
defensive meanings - hanwei (,defend'), baowei ('defend', 'guard') and 
baohu (,protect ') being the only common exceptions. Both Chinese 
and English have more verbs for attack than for defence, but the 
disparity is not nearly as great as in the Red Guard newspapers, which 
had the positive and aggressive outlook of revolutionaries seeking to 
conquer the World for Mao's Thought. 
A further characteristic of the language of war is that it includes 
many metaphors based on descriptions of the forces of nature. 'Red 
storm', 'thundering storm' and 'blazing prairie fire' are stock metaphors 
linked to the actions of the revolutionary masses in the passages above. 
Other metaphors include 'the fury of a hurricane', 'the power of 
thunder and lightning', 'a mighty red torrent', 'surging waves', 'blazing 
flames', and 'the momentum of an avalanche and the force of a 
thunderbolt'. Most of these metaphors originated in Mao's own 
writings, and many were reproduced in the Little Red Book (Mao 1927, 
21-2; 1930,118-21; LRB, 119). Their purpose was to suggest the 
invincible power of the forces of revolution. They were far more 
imposing than equivalent metaphors used to describe the activities of 
class enemies - metaphors characterised by less striking nouns and 
negative adjectives. 'Black wind', 'black cloud', 'black mist' and 
'adverse current' were typical metaphors for anti-revolutionary activity. 
Finally, in the language of war the conflict was not between 
humans sharing a common human nature. It was between 
revolutionary soldiers (human but ultimately invincible) and class 
enemies whose nature was that of savage animals and demons from the 
world of darkness: 
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The handful of diehard capitalist-roaders become more and more 
isolated, but they will not reSign themselves to defeat. They 
pounce again and again on the revolutionary masses, and launch 
desperate counter-attacks on Mao's revolutionary line and on the 
proletarian revolutionary headquarters - the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group - with ten times more frenzy and a hundred 
times more hatred. They make threatening gestures with their 
bare fangs and claws, vainly attempting to swallow all the 
revolutionaries, fully revealing their wolves' natures! [Shoudu 
Hongqi Chiweijun Xuanyan, 21 January 1967. RGP, vol. 19, 
p. 6084, emphasis added). 
r
:n the language of war, the conflict was between groups so 
fundamentally different that no compromise, no armistice, no peace 
was possible. It was a war to the death between the forces of light and 
I the forces of darkness. In such a war, any cruelty was possible. 
5.3 Language and Violence 
No one knows how many people died as a result of the Cultural 
Revolution. J.K. Fairbank cites an estimate of 400,000 (Fairbank 1988, 
320); another scholar, who has a reputation for caution, puts deaths at 
one million (Shalom 1984, cited White 1989,7); and some estimates 
are far higher (e.g. Liu 1986,48, 56 n.16). Whatever the true figure, it 
represents only a fraction of the violence of the Cultural Revolution. 
Beatings, torture and the denial of medical treatment to sick and 
injured enemies were systematic and widespread. Wang (1995) 
interviewed hundreds of people from 76 schools and discovered not a 
single school in which no teachers were beaten. Outside the schools, 
universities and intellectual circles, the main victims were people of 
'bad class' background, who were traumatized by the 'Red Terror' 
during the campaign against the Four Olds and who were persecuted 
periodically thereafter; and the cadres, of whom 60-80 percent were 
purged (Dittmer 1987, 96), often with accompanying violence. And, of 
course, many died or suffered cruel beatings as opposing factions of 
Red Guards and rival factions of workers fought in bitter struggles for 
power, using fists, clubs, stones and eventually guns as China 
descended into low-level civil war. 
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Scholars have explored the political, institutional and social roots 
of the violence (Solomon 1971; Liu 1976; Lee 1978; Chan, Rosen & 
Unger 1980; Rosen 1982; Chan 1985; Thurston 1988; White 1989; 
Wang 1995; Gong 1996). Their analyses, and the argument of chapters 
2-4 above, suggest several explanations of the violence which are not 
specifically linguistic. First, Mao had organized China around the 
conflict of artificially created 'classes' or 'categories'. He created 
inequalities betweep these classes and pitted them against each other in 
competitive purging, encouraging people to avoid suspicion by acts of 
revolutionary extremism and exaggerated Mao-worship. This created 
rivalry and class hatred which the Party manipulated to Mao's 
advantage until July 1966. When he then removed the Party's control 
and gave the 'revolutionary masses' their head, the artificially created 
hatreds exploded, with the initial victims being the groups principally 
targeted in previous campaigns - the intellectuals, the bourgeoisie and 
members of the black categories. Indeed, these were precisely the 
groups which the Party's work teams had victimised while they were 
still in charge of the Cultural Revolution. If violence erupted easily, it 
was because people had been taught to hate anyone who was called a 
class enemy, and because there were official precedents for violence. 
Second, the system of tight Party control which existed until 1966 
created bitter resentment against many cadres. In particular, cadres 
who headed work units (danwel) had such powers to give or deny 
permission, to dispense or deny patronage, to mobilize criticism and to 
force self-criticism that even the best of them made enemies. We have 
seen how Mao placed the cadres in a false position by switching the 
context of interpretation so that those who had implemented Party 
policies suddenly became 'anti-socialist' opponents of the Cultural 
Revolution. As a result, when he called upon people to criticise the 
Party, those who had grievances against particular cadres or against the 
whole system of Party control were able to take a savage revenge. 
Third, while the Central Cultural Revolution Group and Mao 
himself sought to prevent the violence from getting out of hand, they 
encouraged it when it contributed to revolutionary fervour or to the 
defeat of a faction which they opposed. Two policy statements were 
crucial. In late August 1966 the Minister of Public Security, Xie Fuzhi, 
gave the Red Guards a free hand to do what they liked with members of 
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the black categories: 'Should the Red Guards who kill others be 
punished? My view is that if people are killed, then they are killed; it's 
no business of ours .... I do not approve [the] masses killing people, but 
if the masses hate bad people so much that we cannot stop them, then 
let us not insist on [stopping them] ... The people's police should stand 
on the side of the Red Guards .... ' (Quoted Yan & Gao 1996, 76). Then 
in 1967 the Central Cultural Revolution Group told the army to 'arm 
the Rebels for self-defence'. When different army units adopted their 
own interpretations of who the 'Rebels' were, both sides ended up 
acquiring arms and the bloodshed escalated. In this context of 
qualified approval from the top, violence became a revolutionary act, 
and excesses of violence became a mark of superior revolutionary 
virtue. Mao himself never unambiguously promoted violence in his 
public statements and he called for peace when it suited him; but he 
praised the Red Guards after some of their most bloody excesses, and 
when violence helped his cause it did not concern him in the least. 
Indeed, as China descended into turmoil, he summed up his ,. 
indifference by saying, 'It is not a bad thing to let the young have some 
practice in using arms - we haven't had a war for so long.' (Chang 
1992,471), 
Fourth, with the breakdown of established authority, an anarchic 
situation emerged in which Red Guards, workers and cadres who did 
not use violence could not compete in the battle for survival with those 
who did. Successful use of force to gain power in one's own city or 
province was the key to personal safety, Those who succeeded were 
able to control the process of reference assignment and label their 
opponents as 'counterrevolutionaries'; those who failed were 
suppressed, humiliated, beaten and sometimes killed. The rationally 
self-interested pursuit of violent strategies of survival by people 
belonging to different factions created a situation in which no one was 
safe. So individual rationality produced collective insanity and China 
descended into civil war until Mao unequivocally called for an end to 
the violence and used the Army to restore order. 
What has not been systematically investigated is the role of 
language in promoting violence. The hate-filled character of the 
language has been readily acknowledged, but most writers have seen 
this as a reflection of the social and institutional tensions which 
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produced the violence. They have implicitly and sometimes explicitly 
discounted the view that language had any independent role in 
generating those tensions. Lynn T. White, for example, notes briefly the 
dichotomous and warlike character of the linguistic symbols which we 
have discussed, then suggests: 
People chose these symbols to express the intensity of their 
frustration at having been manipulated by government 
categories, bosses, and threats. They were mad. Pastels would 
not do; so they chose red. Quiet sutras and relaxed muscles 
could not let out enough of their anger, after their lives had been 
exploited so egregiously for years; thus they shouted loud 
slogans and clenched their fists, instead. A formal consistency of 
many symbols in the Cultural Revolution is evident. This pattern 
came not because uniformity is natural, or because such things 
are random, but because of the need for a language to express 
intense motives among people who felt sharp pain at specifiable 
kinds of state coercion. 
These symbols were just options. Different, quietistic 
emblems have been sometimes chosen by Chinese people. 
Symbols do not cause events. Their selection is a thing to be 
explained ... not an explainer. Their availability tells us nothing, 
because their oppOSites were also available. [White 1989, 270-1]. 
This passage occurs near the beginning of a chapter called 'Conflict 
among Local Symbol Makers, 1966-68' - a chapter which says only a 
little more about symbols but a great deal about the conflicts which led 
people to 'choose' them. In the remainder of this chapter I will argue 
for a more positive view of the role of language in promoting violence. 
It is an argument which is compatible with what we might term a 'weak 
Whorfian' pOSition in which language is seen as one influence on 
thought and through thought on action. It is also an argument which 
suggests that a 'strong Whorfian' position, in which language is seen as 
the determinant of thought, is untenable. 
White's account of linguistic symbols depends upon his view that 
the Chinese people 'chose' the symbols which they used when 
denouncing their opponents. This is a simple historical error. As we 
have seen in chapters 2 and 4 and in the earlier sections of this 
chapter, the last thing which the Chinese people were free to choose 
was their linguistic symbols. Speaking the official language of Mao-
worship and class warfare was something which everyone had to do 
simply to survive. Until August 1966, that language was dictated to 
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them from above by the Party and by the official press; after August 
1966, when the Party was made to bow to mass criticism, the symbols 
were promulgated by the official press alone, now in the hands of the 
Maoists. These symbols were used even by people who hated what they 
stood for. So the people did not 'choose' red as the colour of class war 
and revolution, but had it dictated to them by the Party long before the 
Cultural Revolution; they did not 'choose' the hate-filled and 
empowering linguistic formulae which we discussed in chapter 4, but 
learned them from the official news media, school teachers and study 
groups; and they did not 'choose' the linguistic dichotomies, the 
animal and demon imagery or the language of class warfare, for this 
was all given to them by the official press. Everyone spoke the same 
language because it was Mao's language, because using it showed a 
revolutionary spirit, and because a refusal to use it was a suicidal, 
counterrevolutionary act. 
Mao and his supporters policed the linguistic symbols 'so 
rigorously because they knew that they were not mere reflections of 
people's needs, passions and desires, but independent influences on 
thought. We saw in chapter 1 that control of language influences 
thought partly through what Petty and Cacioppo (1986, 9) call 'rather 
primitive affective and associational processes'. These processes are 
especially powerful when people are exposed repeatedly to persuasive 
scripts and when they lack alternative sources of information. Every 
one of the processes discussed in chapter 1 operated through the 
scripts copied from the official press by revolutionaries who needed to 
know the correct terms of abuse for the class enemy. When people 
whom others admired said repeatedly that Uu Shaoqi was a 'spy, traitor 
and scab', for instance, this tended to persuade by producing a strong 
modelling effect amongst the admirers. When members of a student 
group said that the biology teacher was a 'monster and demon', this 
produced a reference group effect which tended to sway the views 
of those who sought the group's acceptance. When an accused person's 
name or face was repeatedly juxtaposed with words like 'revisionist', 
'vermin', 'vampire' and 'devil', then higher order conditioning 
transferred the negative connotations associated with those words to 
the accused, especially when the general public had little or no 
personal knowledge of the accused to offset the effect. And when 
people were rewarded by group acceptance for cursing a class enemy, 
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operant conditioning made them more inclined to accept the 
propositional content of the curse. 
One of the most interesting and important sources of attitude 
change was the cognitive dissonance which the language of 
condemnation produced in those who thought of themselves as good 
and kind people, and who often were good and kind. Caught up in the 
passion of the Cultural Revolution, seeking to demonstrate their 
fervour, they condemned their victims using the only legitimate words 
- the terms of abuse laid down in the official press. The consequences 
of labelling someone with those words, however, were devastating: they 
were words which inspired fear and ruined lives. Callous people 
experienced no dissonance when they cursed their victims - no 
psychological discomfort caused by a discrepancy between a humane 
self-image and cruel behaviour. Those who experienced dissonance 
were people who were ordinarily kind and who wanted to think of 
themselves as kind. Few of these people had ever done anything half so 
harmful to others as when they cursed their victims in language which 
stripped them of their dignity, denied their humanity and labelled 
them class enemies. The easiest way they could justify this terrible act 
was to believe that those whom they condemned really were class 
enemies, that they had all the vile characteristics attributed to them by 
the curses, and that they therefore deserved their fate. When kind 
people voluntarily directed the official language of condemnation 
against another human being, dissonance shifted their attitudes in the 
direction of the language. They began to hate their victims. 
The effects of language on thought can be illustrated from the 
shift in attitudes recorded in the honest and reflective autobiography of 
Zhai Zhenhua, a red-class Red Guard in the early stages of the Cultural 
Revolution (Zhai 1992). A modest girl whose best friend came from a 
non-red background, she was well liked and respected. When she 
became a Red Guard she promised 'to make more friends and to unite 
all students.' But once she became a revolutionary leader she was 
subjected to new pressures and new linguistic influences. The Red 
Guards at this time were all of red-class origin, and the arrogant and 
class-conscious spirits among them invented a duilian or three line 
stanza which asserted the red categories' hereditary revolutionary 
heroism and the black categories' hereditary baseness. Taking 
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inspiration from the duilian, they composed a song which became the 
Red Guard anthem. It began like this: 
The old man a true man, the son is a hero, 
The old man a reactionary, the son is an asshole. 
If you are revolutionary, then step forward and come along, 
If you are not, damn you to hell. 
And it ended like this: 
Damn you to hell! 
Depose you from your fucking post! 
Kill! Kill! Kill! 
All the Red Guards in Zhai's school learned it, and she did too. At first 
she sang it softly, embarrassed by the crude words, but soon she was 
singing it confidently with other Red Guards while 'marching on the 
streets, riding in trucks, and at every available opportunity.' Every 
time she sang, she associated students from bad class backgrounds with 
--
the words 'reactionary', 'asshole', 'damn', 'hell', 'fucking' and 'kill'. 
Every time she sang, she saw that members of her reference group 
seemed happy to denigrate the black categories. Every time she sang, 
she experienced positive reinforcement from a 'high' as she 
participated in identity-building self-entertainment in the company of 
her reference group. So higher order conditioning, reference group 
effects and operant conditioning were all at work. Within a couple of 
weeks, she recalls, the duilian 'had already begun to take root in me. 
My sympathy towards students from non-revolutionary families was 
rapidly disappearing.' Soon she was intimidating and abusing students 
from the black categories, menacing them with her belt as they sat with 
their heads bowed before her: 
This is called the "proletarian dictatorship!" It is the opposite of 
the "capitalist dictatorship" your parents imposed on the working 
people before Liberation .... Let's imagine how it would have been 
if we were still in the evil old society. How would you have 
treated us? ... You would ride roughshod over us, starve us, and 
make us child labourers! 
'My imagination carried me away and aroused a strong indignation in 
me', she recalls in her autobiography. 'I liked that because I really 
wanted to prove that our actions were justified.' Her need to persuade 
herself that her actions were 'justified' stemmed from the dissonance 
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caused by her hate-filled words and her menacing demeanour, and that 
is why she 'liked' the 'strong indignation' which she felt as her 
imagination brought her ideas into line with what she had said. As she 
continued her harangue, her language became even more extreme, her 
face contorted, she swung her belt ferociously towards her audience, 
and she began to make herself distraught. This produced more 
dissonance, which was resolved by an even more extreme attitude shift. 
'Oh, how I hated my classmates at that moment', she said, 'only because 
of my own flights of fancy.' In the short space of a month, a popular 
and mild-mannered student had become the 'fierce enemy' of her bad-
class fellow students, 'vilifying them and trampling their dignity.' She 
was now ready to start proving her political consciousness and valour 
by beating people from the black categories, and once again the need to 
remove dissonance produced an attitude shift: 
In the beginning I dared not look at the person under my feet. I 
had to stiffen myself mentally to continue. I kept thinking, 
"These are class enemies, bad people .... They're only getting what 
they deserve. I shouldn't feel sorry for them. In class struggle, 
either you die or I do." ... After a few beatings, I no longer 
needed to rehearse the rationale behind them. My heart 
hardened and I became used to the blood ... The Cultural 
Revolution had transformed me into a devil. (Zhai 1992, 79-82, 
96-7, 105-6). 
Zhai was just one of countless idealistic and kind young people who 
were transformed into 'devils' by the Cultural Revolution. And a 
crucial element in that transformation was the language promoted by 
the symbol-makers - a language which 'took root' in their hearts 
through the 'primitive affective and associational processes' which we 
have explained. 
The most violent language of denunciation was intended to 
inform its victims and all who heard it that the accused were class 
enemies, that they were evil by nature, that they had to be ostracised 
and that they deserved the most severe punishments. Like all attempts 
at communication, it came with the speakers' guarantee of relevance, so 
that the assumptions which it conveyed were put forward as true. 
People who loved the victims or knew them well sometimes rejected the 
assumptions as irrelevant because they contradicted existing 
assumptions which seemed more likely to be true. However, most who 
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heard the condemnations had no personal knowledge of the accused, 
and such people were unlikely to possess opposing assumptions so 
deeply entrenched that the message could not attain relevance. For 
example, if the official press, the Central Cultural Revolution Group and 
all those who spoke for Mao said that Liu Shaoqi was a 'capitalist 
roader', a 'reVisionist', 'a spy, traitor and scab' with the nature of a 
'poisonous snake', they were the people who were in a position to know. 
Their message cam~ with a guarantee of relevance, their authority 
enhanced that relevance, and poli'tically nalve young people often 
accepted the message as true. Similarly, if Red Guards backed by Mao 
used information supplied by the police to accuse countless members of 
the black categories of being 'monsters and demons', this strongly 
reinforced the existing assumptions of most members of non-black 
classes. In their eyes, it was therefore highly relevant and widely 
accepted as true. I myself remember how, as a young girl, I heard the 
standard language of abuse levelled at people whom I did not know. 
My reaction was always 'They must have done something. Why else 
would people say these things?' Faith in the guarantee of relevance 
which makes people attend to communicative utterances was a 
powerful aid to persuasion during the Cultural Revolution. 
The invective of the Cultural Revolution not only produced 
attitude shifts in those who used it, but it had a shocking impact on 
those at whom it was directed. Indeed, use of such language was itself a 
form of violence: it degraded its victims, dehumanised them, 
threatened them and terrified them, just as it was intended to do. It 
was not only the imagery of the language which terrified, but its 
substantive message: those who were cursed in the strongest terms 
were thereby labelled as class enemies. They would become outcasts 
with no rights, no future, no friends; their families would be 
persecuted and pressured to disown them; 'the people' would 'struggle 
militantly' against them (wu dou), a process which involved physical 
coercion; and finally, they knew that class enemies were thought 
worthy of death and that large numbers had in fact been killed in the 
early 1950s. They knew that if they themselves were not killed, they 
would still be treated as enemies with the natures of snakes, vermin, 
flies, jackals, vampires, monsters and demons. They knew that no 
matter how many times they confessed their crimes and swore 
allegiance to Mao, no one would believe in their sincerity because 
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deceit was their special skill. They had been labelled, and the label had 
set their fate. Many concluded that they were better off dead. At 
Nankai University, where I lived, about a dozen professors and highly 
placed academic administrators committed suicide. In every memoir of 
the Cultural Revolution, the authors mention people who killed 
themselves after being labelled. No one who lived through those times 
is puzzled about why they did it. 
When the language of denunciation inflicted such torture on its 
victims, resort to physical violence was not a big step. It was just the 
natural concomitant of the language with which they had been 
condemned. When revolutionaries beat, kicked, tortured and even 
killed their Victims, they were simply carrying out their proclaimed 
intention to 'strike down', 'crush', 'trample' and 'exterminate' class 
enemies. They took the language of their curses fairly literally. This is 
not surprising, for one context of interpretation which was readily 
available to them consisted of assumptions detailing the systematic and 
state-sanctioned violence meted out to class enemies since 1949. Once 
the Maoist media had made the language of war against the class enemy 
the official language of the Cultural Revolution, it was inevitable that 
many people would interpret that language in the context of 
assumptions detailing the previous treatment of class enemies. If they 
did that, they could only interpret the curses as a call to violence. 
If it was easy and natural for many people to interpret the official 
language of condemnation as a call to violence, other interpretations 
were available to people who were not anxious to heed that call. In 
particular, the language could be defused by ignoring contextual 
assumptions detailing the previous treatment of class enemies, selecting 
instead assumptions like the following: 
1. The Sixteen Points say, 'When there is a debate, it should be 
conducted by reasoning, not by coercion or force.' (CCP 
Documents, 46-9). 
2. Mao himself says, 'Conduct civil struggle and refrain from 
physical violence.' 
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These assumptions led a lot of people to defuse the official language of 
condemnation, interpreting it figuratively as an attempt to arouse 
enthusiasm for a campaign based on non-violent criticism and self-
criticism. In any debate with the militants, however, they were 
handicapped, for Mao could be quoted on both sides, and defending 
those who had been labelled class enemies was dangerous. Consider 
jung Chang's account of her attempt to stop Chian, an army officer's 
son, from administering a merciless beating: 
Now I murmured, trying to control the quaking in my voice, 
'Didn't Chairman Mao teach us to use verbal struggle [wen-dou] 
rather than violent struggle [wu-dou]? Maybe we shouldn't ... ?' 
My feeble protest was echoed by several voices in the 
room. But Chian cast us a disgusted sideways glance and said 
emphatically: 'Draw the line between yourselves and the class 
enemy. Chairman Mao says, "Mercy to the enemy is cruelty to 
the people!'" If you are afraid of blood, don't be Red Guards!' 
His face was twisted into ugliness by fanaticism. The rest of us 
fell silent ... we could not argue with him. We had been taught to 
be ruthless to class enemies. Failure to do so would miike us class 
enemies ourselves. I turned and walked quickly into the garden 
at the back. (Chang 1992,407-8). 
Why did some people choose contexts of interpretation which led 
to the intended fairly literal interpretation of the language of 
denunciation, whereas others chose contexts which enabled them to 
interpret it figuratively? One obvious reason, of course, is that some 
individuals had a consistent predisposition to humanity and others a 
predisposition to brutality, and they chose contexts of interpretation 
which justified a reading of the curses which suited their respective 
inclinations. Indeed, the memoirs of revolutionary activists and their 
victims contain a lot of evidence both that some people were deeply 
unhappy with the violence and that others found in the Cultural 
Revolution a perfect opportunity to indulge in sadistic or criminal acts 
which were normally suppressed (Chang 1992,407-8,411-12,436-7, 
479-80; Ling 1972, 250-1, 309, 324-6, 333-4). More common than 
simple sadism was the extremism generated by a competitive system in 
which people were pressed to surpass each other in displays of 
revolutionary enthusiasm. Those who were determined to prove 
themselves the most committed revolutionaries could succeed only if 
they chose interpretive assumptions which legitimized violence. 
Similarly, those who had a special hatred of the groups under attack 
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were more motivated to choose assumptions which yielded a literal 
interpretation of the curses, for they could then claim official 
justification for assault and murder. Chian, the army officer's son 
whose violence sickened Jung Chang, probably fell into both these 
categories. By contrast, people who were less revolutionary, who were 
less ambitious, or who did not hate the groups under attack were no 
doubt more inclined to select assumptions which turned the most 
savage curses into innocuous figures of speech. Finally, some people 
were simply opportunistic: when threatened, they preferred 
assumptions which defused the violent language, but when on the 
attack they chose assumptions which gave the language its full, literal 
force and justified the vilest acts. 
It is clear, then, that we cannot explain the violent attitudes and 
actions of the Cultural Revolution as a simple product of the violent 
language given to them from on high. That language could be read as 
an incitement to actual physical violence only with the aid of-contextual 
assumptions which some people selected and others ignored. Those 
assumptions must count as co-determinants of the contrasting 
meanings which people gave to the language. This constitutes a 
compelling objection to full linguistic determinism, which has to place 
exclusive emphasis on language as the determinant of meaning and 
hence of thought. Such a stance ignores the fact that the referents of 
semantic categories vary according to the context of interpretation - a 
context of interpretation which is not given, but chosen by everyone 
who undertakes the process of reference assignment (cf. Sperber & 
Wilson 1995, 132-151). In choosing the appropriate context, we select 
the assumptions most consistent with the principle of relevance - and 
this very often means assumptions which are accessible because they 
suit our preconceptions, interests and prejudices. So the 'patterning' of 
our thoughts by semantic categories is always incomplete, mediated as 
it is by contextual factors which often vary from person to person as a 
result of different experiences, different interests and different biases. 
As a result, during the Cultural Revolution everybody used language 
which was semantically violent, but in many people this did not 
produce violent attitudes because they disarmed the language with 
interpretive assumptions which reduced it to a harmless metaphor. So 
uniformity of language did not produce uniformity of thought. That, 
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from a linguistic point of view, is one significant lesson of the Cultural 
Revolution. 
A second lesson of the discourse of violence during the Cultural 
Revolution is that a 'weak Whorfian' position - that the language we use 
influences our thought - is thoroughly sustainable. In the first place, 
many people did interpret the violent language as a call for actual 
physical violence. They did this because they chose particular 
contextual assumptions. However, because those contextual 
assumptions led them to take the language literally, and because they 
had no strong moral assumptions which made them resistant to its 
message, their thought reproduced the violence of the semantic 
categories. In the absence of significantly obstructive moral 
assumptions, language and interpretive context together were able to 
'pattern' thought along the lines of the semantic categories. 
This translation of semantic categories into patterns of-thought 
operated through the rational, if largely unconscious, mechanisms of 
language processing. 'Patterning' by this rational route affected only 
those who interpreted the semantic categories literally, making them 
refer to actual physical violence. We have seen, however, that 
'primitive affective and associational processes', not at all rational, also 
affected people's attitudes. These processes influenced not only the 
attitudes of people who understood the violent curses literally, but also 
the attitudes of many who saw the curses as metaphors for enthusiastic 
but non-violent criticism. Mechanisms of higher order conditioning, 
operant conditioning, modelling, reference group identification and 
cognitive dissonance tended to increase hostility to the accused, even 
amongst people who interpreted the violent language metaphorically. 
Strong personal loyalties to the accused sometimes frustrated these 
mechanisms, but even here they could have an effect. When parents 
were accused, for example, their own children sometimes came 
eventually to doubt them, demanding that they confess their crimes. 
Mao and his fellow symbol-makers in the Central Cultural 
Revolution Group knew that language was a potent tool of persuasion 
and control. Indeed, when they incited the masses against the Party, 
destroying the established mechanisms of coercion, they gambled on 
their ability to direct the Cultural Revolution by issuing instructions 
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and manipulating linguistic symbols through the official press. At first, 
their faith in the power of language to communicate and persuade paid 
off. With great success, they mobilized the masses to attack the school 
teachers and intellectuals, to destroy the Four Olds, to dethrone the 
Party, and to mount a witch-hunt for class enemies which promoted 
unprecedented displays of devotion to Mao and his Thought. They also 
invented a language of condemnation, based on the ancient practice of 
curse sorcery, which fostered sometimes hysterical hatred of class 
enemies and led many to torture them, beat them mercilessly and even 
kill them. Eventually, however, the limitations of an attempt to 
manipulate the population through controlling language became 
apparent. Loyalty and fear could make everyone use the same 
language, but nothing could ensure that the masses who were 
'mobilizing freely' shared a common context of interpretation. People 
gave the same words different referents: one person's 'revolutionary' 
was another person's 'counter-revolutionary', and one person's call to 
physical violence was another person's call to strong but reasoned 
criticism. Language influenced people's attitudes, but semantic 
uniformity did not translate into uniformity of thought or action. The 
Cultural Revolution therefore descended into chaos. 
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III 
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 1968-76: 
~-
CENTRALIZING CONTROL OF 
LANGUAGE AND INTERPRETATION 
CHAPTER 6 
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: 
CREATING REFERENTS, CONTROLLING THE WORD, 
POLICING INTERPRETATION 
6.1 Re-building the Institutions of Centralized Control 
Chairman Mao's 'free mobilization' of the revolutionary masses had 
been intended to teach the Party a terrible lesson and to enforce 
conformity to his Thought. He had never had any intention of 
liberating the masses more than briefly from hierarchical control, or of 
instituting the people's democracy on the model of the Paris Commune 
which he had promised in the 'Sixteen Points'. Once the rebel Red 
Guards and revolutionary workers had overwhelmed the Party, Mao 
quickly sought to reassert control through the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) and through Revolutionary Committees which were usually 
dominated by the PLA but included rehabilitated cadres and 
representatives of the revolutionary masses. Many Red Guards and 
some workers, however, resisted the new hierarchy, and anarchy 
continued in many parts of China. Finally, in July 1968 Mao personally 
and unequivocally ordered an end to all violence and subdued the 
dissidents using Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams consisting of 
workers or PLA members who had not been involved in the fighting, as 
well as regular PLA units and a specially created Central Support the 
Left force. Disorder still erupted periodically in some regions, but the 
country as a whole was progressively brought under centralized control 
(Liu 1976, 173-183; Lee 1978, 276-87). 
The new hierarchy effectively neutralised one source of disorder 
by expelling most of the former Red Guards to the countryside. There 
they were to work as agricultural labourers, reforming their thoughts 
under the supervision of the poor and lower-middle peasants. Nearly 
all former Red Guards of middle or bad class origin - the backbone of 
the Rebels who had led the attack on the Party - suffered this fate. 
Those who escaped were almost entirely of red class origin - workers' 
children assigned to factories, or revolutionary cadres' children who 
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joined the PLA (Unger 1982, 134-5). One way or the other, all the 
former Red Guards lost their freedom of action and all were 
subordinated directly to hierarchical structures whose ultimate 
authority was Chairman Mao. 
The Chinese people were placed under a system of 'centralised 
segregation' like that which had operated before the Cultural 
Revolution. 'Cross-trade alliances' between students and workers were 
banned and all independent organization was strictly forbidden. 
Unauthorised travel was prohibited and people lived out their lives 
under the care and control of their work units and neighbourhood 
committees. In the cities, the whole process was supervised by the PLA, 
with military men filling most of the crucial positions. After the death 
and disgrace of Lin Biao in 1971, however, the army became less 
influential, and rehabilitated or newly recruited cadres progressively 
regained their power. By then, the Revolutionary Committees had long 
become moribund, with reconstituted Party Committees resuming their 
former role after 1969. So the old structures of authority had 
reasserted themselves as the enforcers of Chairman Mao's new 
revolutionary order (Liu 1976, 176-83; Kahn-Ackermann 1982, 77; Liu 
1986, 149-50; Dittmer & Chen 1981, 31; Dittmer 1987, 175-83; 
Lieberthal 1995, 117-8). 
Consolidation of the new order was promoted by a massive 
campaign to Purify the Class Ranks which lasted from 1967 to 1969, 
conducted by special teams under the control of the Revolutionary 
Committees, Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams and the PLA. The 
campaign was intended to root out cadres who were unreformed 
bourgeois power holders, renegades and spies, or who were members of 
the five black categories. The masses were called upon to expose and 
condemn these targets, and as before were particularly hard on cadres 
who had earned their enmity by rigorously carrying out Party policy 
before the Cultural Revolution. However, popular anger was now 
tightly controlled, and upper level leaders ultimately decided the fate 
of the accused (Lee 1978,287-96), As the campaign developed 
momentum, it ruined the lives of millions of people, including many 
who were not cadres. Members of the black categories were hauled out 
for yet another round of persecution, and the hunt for spies and 
renegades caused countless false accusations and terrible punishments. 
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The death toll reached at least the tens of thousands (Yan & Gao 1996; 
Chang 1992, 496). 
The Campaign to Purify the Class Ranks was only the most far-
reaching and savage of a succession Of campaigns through which the 
Maoist leadership mobilized the masses against alleged class enemies, 
against leading comrades who had committed serious mistakes, or 
against 'revisionist' beliefs like the doctrine of 'bourgeois rights'. Such 
campaigns induded the One Strike and Three Antis Movement, the 
Anti-Lin Biao Campaign, the Campaign to Criticise Lin Biao and 
Confucius, the Campaign to Study the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, 
the Campaign to Criticise the Water Margin and the Campaign to 
Criticise Deng Xiaoping. All these campaigns were seen, officially, as a 
continuation of the Cultural Revolution, institutionalizing its processes 
of criticism, self-criticism and class conflict. The difference now was 
that the revolution was conducted in accordance with instructions 
issued by the Party Centre. The era of 'free mobilization' of tbe masses 
was over. 
6.2 Creating Referents: The 'New Born Things' and the 
Context of Interpretation 
The institutional phase of the Cultural Revolution was intended to 
construct a society consistent with the revolution's rhetoric - or at least 
with the ruling Maoists' interpretation of that rhetoric. That society 
featured none of the Paris Commune-style democracy which the Rebels 
had thought the rhetoric portended. Instead, its most striking features 
were the 'New Born Things of the Cultural Revolution'. These, it was 
now officially determined, were the referents of Mao's demand that the 
revolutionaries, having 'destroyed the old', should also 'create the new'. 
The 'New Born Things' were the official fulfilment of the 'anti-
power holder' rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. They were the 
cornerstones of a new social order designed to prevent the emergence 
of a new bureaucratic and Party elite. Their purpose, however, was not 
to substitute 'rule by the people' for 'rule by the power-holders', as the 
Rebel Red Guards had hoped. It was to prevent the emergence of any 
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group powerful enough to frustrate the wishes of the greatest power-
holder of all - Mao Zedong himself. The New Born Things included: 
(a) Workers' Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams. These 
were Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams consisting of 
workers, rather than members of the PLA. Early in the 
institutional phase of the Cultural Revolution, they were placed 
in charge of schools, universities, theatres and the entire realm of 
literature and culture. Their task was not only to restore order 
and to ensure that teaching, writing, painting and the performing 
arts conformed to Mao's Thought. It was also to put the 'experts' 
in their place, to subordinate them to red-class supervisors with 
no relevant skills. Mao thereby hoped to prevent the re-
emergence of a revisionist elite whose claims sometimes rested on 
criteria independent of his Thought. In the ideology of the 
Cultural Revolution, this elite had conspired with Liu Shaoqi to 
pursue a 'seventeen year Black Line' between 1949 and 1966, 
poisoning the minds of a generation. The Workers' Mao Zedong 
Thought Propaganda Teams were intended to ensure that China's 
intellectuals never again had the power to propagate a 'Black 
Line'. They were amongst the most important officially 
designated referents of the Cultural Revolution's egalitarian 
rhetoric. 
(b) Educated youth become workers and peasants. Education 
had played a vital part in elite formation in China, even after the 
Communist victory in 1949. The obvious way to prevent 
intellectuals from regaining the positions of power from which 
they had been driven early in the Cultural Revolution was to 
break the connection between academic success and subsequent 
career paths. Accordingly, examination results were disregarded 
when students were assigned to jobs on leaving school. Many of 
the most brilliant students ended up as manual workers in 
factories and on farms. In all, somewhere between 12 million 
and 18 million young urban Chinese were sent to the countrySide 
(For varying estimates, see Bernstein 1977, 2; Unger 1982,168, 
169; Yan & Gao 1996,279). Children from 'bad' class or middle 
class families, who were generally the most able students, nearly 
all ended up in manual occupations. However, with academic 
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criteria irrelevant, children from red-class families sometimes did 
better, especially the children of revolutionary cadres who used 
family connections to secure better positions or join the PLA (cf. 
Unger 1982, 1965-6). This assault on meritocratic tendencies in 
Chinese society was another officially designated referent of the 
egalitarian rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution. 
(c) Worker-peasant-soldier students. Students no longer 
entered university directly from school, but were nominated by 
their urban work units or rural brigades and communes. 
Academic performance was entirely irrelevant to the selection 
process, which was based officially upon class background and 
political behaviour. These criteria favoured red-class students 
and ensured the exclusion of students belonging to the black 
categories. Those chosen sometimes had limited education and 
little academic ability. They were called 'worker-peasant-soldier 
students', and they were normally expected to return to their 
work unit or commune on graduation and to do their share of 
manual labour. Again, this was an attempt to prevent the re-
emergence of the meritocratic and technocratic elite which Mao 
believed had blocked the implementation of his policies and 
prevented China's transition to full socialism. It was of course 
represented as the fulfilment of the Cultural Revolution'S 
egalitarian rhetoric. 
(d) Barefoot doctors. During the Cultural Revolution, doctors 
shared the fate of other intellectuals. They were especially 
vulnerable because Mao publicly blamed them and the Health 
Ministry for the shortage of doctors in rural areas (conveniently 
ignoring the fact that after 1962 the overwhelming majority of 
new graduates were sent to rural areas). (Ce111977, 66-7; Chang 
1992,568; Unger 1982, 232). Red Guards drove many doctors 
from 'bureaucratic elitist' hospitals and incarcerated them with 
other niugui sheshen in 'cow pens'. The doctors were then 
subjected to manual labour and thought reform in May 7 Cadre 
Schools, and eventually sent to practise amongst the workers and 
peasants, treating ailments 'at the front'. There was, however, 
still an acute shortage of doctors in rural areas - partly because 
the Cultural Revolution had disrupted the medical schools and 
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health system (cf. Chang 1992,574). Mao's solution was to give 
peasants or rusticated urban youth a brief course of instruction, 
or perhaps just a copy of A Barefoot Doctor's Manual, then call 
them 'barefoot doctors'. 'It is not at all necessary to have so 
much formal training,' he said. 'They should mainly learn and 
raise their standards in practice.' (Chang 1992, 568). This was 
entirely consistent with his scorn for the bureaucratic, 
intellectual and technical elites against whom the Cultural 
Revolution was principally directed. 'The more books you read, 
the more stupid you become', he once said (Chang 1992, 568). 
So the barefoot doctors became an internationally famous 'New 
Born Thing of the Cultural Revolution' - an officially designated 
referent of its egalitarian rhetoric. 
(e) May 7 Cadre Schools. Named after a well-publicized letter from 
Mao to Lin Biao of May 7, 1966, these schools proliferated from 
October 1968 when the People's Daily published a directive from 
Mao saying that 'The rustication of great numbers of cadres is an 
excellent opportunity for them to study new things. This should 
apply to all cadres with the exception of the elderly and infirm. 
Cadres on duty should be sent down for labour by turns.' (Yan & 
Gao 1996,272). The cadre schools were rural labour camps 
supervised by PLA Propaganda Teams which 're-educated' 
government officials and intellectuals by compelling them to 
work like peasants while undergoing criticism and self-criticism. 
Their only reading matter was Mao's works, and even the writings 
of Marx and Lenin were banned (Yan & Gao 1996,275). Those 
who 'graduated' from the cadre schools were regarded as 
rehabilitated and were then able to resume their normal duties. 
Cadres and intellectuals regarded as recalcitrant were refused 
graduation and kept in the camps. By the beginning of 1969 
there were nearly 300 camps in Guangdong province alone, and 
over 100,000 cadres had been sent to them for re-education 
(Dittmer 1987, 178). The cadre schools were justified as a means 
of keeping cadres in touch with the lives of the peasants, and in 
that way were portrayed as a referent of the Cultural Revolution's 
anti-bureaucratic rhetoric. In reality, the schools were just a 
means of keeping the cadres nervous, obedient and politically 
correct. In the words of Wang Hongwen, a close associate of Mao 
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and Jiang Qjng, 'All who disobey get sent to May 7 Cadre schools 
for labor.' (Yan & Gao 1996, 274). Neither Wang himself nor 
any other top official who remained in Mao's favour was ever 
sent down to the countryside or a May 7 Cadre School to get in 
touch with the lives of the peasants. 
The New Born Things involved massive social restructuring 
designed to create the referents which the Maoist leadership saw as the 
fulfilment of the Cultural Revolution'S stated goals. Once those 
referents were in place, they introduced a wide range of new, highly 
accessible assumptions into people's cognitive environments. It was 
now much simpler for cadres or soldiers to explain what Chairman Mao 
had wanted, for what he had wanted was now part of their lives. 
Assumptions associated with the New Born Things also increased 
the relevance of the flood of propagandistic messages which all people 
were required to study, discuss and accept as part of Mao's process of 
continuing revolution. The interpretation of these messages was 
carefully controlled by the revival of centrally directed study, criticism 
and self-criticism. Indeed, this centrally controlled group activity was 
the key to restoring uniformity of interpretation. The revolutionary 
committees ensured that in the cities every neighbourhood committee 
set up study groups and that every work unit did likewise. In extreme 
cases, people spent half their working hours on political study and 
discussion. More often they spent two or three afternoons a week. 
After that, there were sometimes political meetings organized by the 
neighbourhood committees at night. There were strenuous attempts to 
extend the system to the villages, but these were only partly, and often 
temporarily, successful (Whyte 1974). 
As before the Cultural Revolution, during study sessions cadres 
often explained the latest document, then people were required to say 
that they agreed with its message and suggest ways in which it could be 
applied to their own lives. They were also required to make self-
criticisms in the light of the document, and they were pressed to 
criticise others whose behaviour did not measure up. This method of 
communicating a message is admirably calculated to elicit the feedback 
required to ensure uniformity of interpretation. If people had 
misinterpreted the document, this would emerge when they tried to 
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explain its implications for their lives. Their understanding of the 
document could be corrected, and if they needed new assumptions to 
understand its message, these could be supplied. 
Communicating the message through study groups had the same 
persuasive effects as it had before the Cultural Revolution: 
(a) It enabled cadres to elicit strong 'reference group effects' by 
manipulating the process of comment, criticism and self-
criticism. By giving their own interpretation of the document, 
then inviting influential and politically reliable individuals to 
confirm that interpretation, cadres were able to establish the 
views of the reference group whose acceptance was an absolute 
precondition of good treatment. 
(b) It ensured that the persuasive message was thoroughly 
processed, so that people formed schemas which conn~cted it 
with other aspect of their thought and with their everyday lives. 
This aided recall of the message. It also forged connections with 
other assumptions which formed part of the Maoist world view, 
making them more accessible. They therefore became more 
likely to influence the selection and interpretation of later 
messages and experience, so that if other things were equal 
people saw the world increasingly through Maoist eyes. 
(c) Prompting or example from others sometimes led people 
voluntarily to express 'correct' Maoist views. Expression of such 
views then tended to shift people's attitudes in the direction of 
the views expressed, as people inferred their attitudes from their 
words. In this way, the study groups mobilized the processes of 
'persuasion through self -perception' which we discussed in 
chapter 1. 
(d) In the study groups, people who made politically correct 
statements experienced the approval of cadres and political 
activists. Through processes of positive reinforcement, this 
tended to promote their belief in what they had said. At the 
same time, people who made incorrect statements were criticised. 
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Their faith in what they had said therefore tended to diminish as 
a result of negative reinforcement. 
The effectiveness of these mechanisms of persuasion, of course, 
depended on whether there were countervailing influences. They could 
fail utterly to convert people to views which too brutally negated their 
own experience or damaged their own interests. And their effectiveness 
could be reduced if the Maoist message was not the only message - if it 
was undermined by voices which preached other doctrines. We shall 
see in chapter 9 that these are important qualifications. The new 
Maoist hierarchy was very successful, however, in ensuring that in all 
public discourse its message predominated over all others. As we shall 
see in the remainder of this chapter and the following two chapters, 
that message was delivered in a voice which was loud, insistent and, 
especially in the lives of urban Chinese, close to all-pervasive. 
6.3 Controlling the Written Word: (1) the Press 
During the 'free mobilization' phase of the Cultural Revolution, 
everyone used the same revolutionary language because linguistic 
conformity was a sign of revolutionary thought. However, 
revolutionary language could be used to preach revolutionary doctrines 
quite at odds with Mao's current line, and such doctrines were 
repeatedly espoused in the Red Guard press. As we saw in chapter 3, 
when Mao wanted to stress conformity to this Thought as the criterion 
of revolutionary virtue, 'Royalist' publications stressed the 'blood 
pedigree' theory as a way of preserving themselves and their families 
from attack. When Mao wanted to stress class origin as a way of 
bringing the 'Rebels' back under control, Rebel publications stressed 
conformity to his revolutionary line. And when Mao at last denounced 
armed struggle, some Red Guard publications continued to advocate 
force, choosing interpretive assumptions which led them to 
misinterpret or misrepresent his message. 
Some Red guard publications were highly influential and had an 
extensive national readership. For a few months in 1967, for example, 
Qi.nghua University's Jingangshan had a circulation second only to the 
People's Daily (Dittmer 1974,318). In part, this was because the Red 
260 
Guard tabloids had more real 'news' and less pure fiction than official 
publications. They printed rumours, informed gossip and information 
leaked by factions within the Party elite. They also practised some 
effective investigative journalism, printing and analysing information 
seized from Party records which the Maoist leadership would have 
preferred to keep secret. They were, on the whole, far more accurate 
and informative than the official press, and while they practised self-
censorship they ignored official attempts to limit their number and to 
muzzle them. To the annoyance of the Party Centre they were the 
closest thing to a free press that China had had since 1949. Their fate 
when Mao decided to end the 'free mobilization' of the revolutionary 
masses was no surprise. They were one of his first targets, and in 
August 1968 Workers' Mao Thought Propaganda Teams occupied their 
offices and shut them down (Dittmer 1974, 318 n.7; Liu 1976, 117-8). 
Once the 'January storm' in 1967 had broken the power of the 
Party, the official press began to emphasise Mao's Thought as the focus 
of a new revolutionary order. This was reflected in the rise in the 
number of quotations from Mao in the People's Daily. To plot the 
trend, I have counted the number of Mao-quotes on the first two pages 
of the newspaper on the first day of every month from 1950 to 1976. 
Table 6.1 gives the annual totals of those quotes. 
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TABLE 6.1 
Quotations from Mao Zedong on First Two Pages 
of People's Daily on First Day of Each Month: 
(Yearly Totals 1950-1980) 
Year Quotes (no.) Year Quotes (no.) 
1950 0 1966 18 
~1 7 1~ ~ 
1952 11 * 1968 136 
1953 6 1969 131 
1954 3 1970 207 
1955 4 1971 198 
1956 2 1972 90 
1957 1 1973 78 
1958 6 1974 61 
1959 4 1975 85 
1960 7 1976 138 
1961 6 1977 138 
1962 6 1978 3 
1963 8 1979 4 
1964 7 1980 1 
12m 11 ." 
* Qne issue devoted three pages to printing the entire text 
of Mao's On Contradiction. This has been counted as a single 
quotation. 
The trends revealed in the table can be summarized and explained as 
follows: 
1. Mao-quotes were rare before the Cultural Revolution, and 
only a little more common in 1966 when there was more 
emphasis on attacking 'capitalist roaders', 'monsters and demons' 
and other class enemies than on spending lengthy periods 
studying and memorizing Mao's word. 
2. The number of quotes rose sharply in 1967 as Mao, Lin Biao 
and the Central Cultural Revolution Group sought to restore 
order and to consolidate their Victory over the Party by 
constructing a new revolutionary order in which Mao's word was 
the symbol of unity. The quotations reached their peak between 
1968 and 1971 as peace was restored and full-scale 
institutionalised Mao-worship was instituted throughout China. 
In those years, indeed, a typical issue of the People's Daily quoted 
Mao 32 times more often than did a typical issue in the period 
1950-64. 
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3. Mao was quoted less from 1972 to 1975 partly because the 
death and disgrace of Lin Biao in late 1971 discredited the 
excesses of Mao-worship with which he was associated. 
Moreover, after Lin Biao's death the moderate Zhou Enlai gained 
great power at the People's Daily, partially breaking the 
monopoly which Jiang Qj.ng, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao and 
their radical colleagues had enjoyed over China's media (Dittmer 
1987, 188). However, despite Zhou's influence the number of 
quotes remained far greater than before the Cultural Revolution, 
and the radicals remained influential in other media. 
4. When Zhou Enlai died in January 1976 and his ally Deng 
Xiaoping lost power soon after, Mao-quotes returned to the same 
high level as in 1968-69. This reflected the fact that Jiang Qjng 
and her colleagues had regained full control of the People's Daily. 
The great increase in Mao-quotes in the People's Daily during the 
Cultural Revolution occurred despite the fact that from 1966 to 1973 
and again in 1976 the front page was sometimes devoted in whole or in 
part to a portrait of Mao. It was matched by an increase in the extent 
to which the media incorporated Mao's words without quotation marks 
into articles, editorials and broadcasts, although this is more difficult to 
quantify. What is clear is that during the institutional phase of the 
Cultural Revolution the media strengthened the trend towards quoting 
Mao and speaking in pidgin-Mao which had emerged in the years of 
'free mobilization'. 
Un Biao and the cultural radicals around Jiang Qj.ng promoted 
Mao's word not only as a symbol of unity, but also in the belief that the 
word somehow spoke for itself and that if everyone learned it by heart 
this would somehow bring uniformity of interpretation and even of 
action. Un even proposed that people could get around difficulties in 
understanding what Mao wanted 'by simply memorizing isolated 
quotations, even entire sections, from his writings, and carrying them 
out to the letter.' (Dittmer 1987,118). This was, of course, 
linguistically naive, for it neglected the vital role of the context of 
interpretation in reference assignment. However, the cult of quotations 
emphasised that Mao's word, whatever it meant, was the criterion of 
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good and bad. Constant exposure ensured that a quotation from Mao 
often came to mind as people made moral and political decisions. 
When that happened, the semantic meaning of the quotation combined 
in the process of reference assignment with whatever interpretive 
assumptions were most readily available. In that indirect way, Mao-
quotes sometimes influenced decisions. What must be emphasised is 
that they influenced decisions in the direction desired by the Maoist 
leadership only when those who interpreted the quotations shared their 
leaders' interpretive assumptions. This is why the resurrection of 
institutions of centralized control was vital. Only then could people's 
interpretive assumptions be influenced by social engineering such as 
the implementation of the 'New Born Things'; and only then could 
those assumptions be monitored and corrected in study groups and 
meetings devoted to criticism and self-criticism. Control of the word 
had to be supplemented by control of the interpretive context to 
produce uniformity of thought. The new institutions of centralised 
control went a long way, but by no means the whole way, towards 
supplying the necessary supplement. 
6.4 Controlling the Written Word: (2) Dictionaries 
If the People's Daily quoted Mao more than ever before, so did 
everything else printed in China. This extended even to dictionaries. 
To illustrate this, I will compare entries in the 1965 edition of A New 
English-Chinese Dictionary with matching entries in the new edition 
published after six years of revision in 1976, then reprinted with minor 
corrections until Deng Xiaoping's reforms consigned it to oblivion in 
the 1980s. Both dictionaries were the standard medium-sized English-
Chinese reference works of their day, large enough to include sentences 
and phrases illustrating the use of English words whose meaning they 
explained. The two columns on the next page compare illustrations of 
word use in the 1965 edition with those in the 1976 edition. 
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1965 EDITION 
learn v. He learns very fast / I 
am yet to learn / I learnt it from 
him / learn by rote. 
1976 EDITION 
learn v. Learn from Comrade Lei 
Feng [a model of revolutionary 
. self-sacrifice] / learn from past 
mistakes to avoid future ones / 
learn warfare through warfare 
[Mao quote] / learn to swim [Mao 
quote]. 
apply v. Apply a rule to a case / apply v. It is necessary to master 
apply a plaster to a wound / apply Marxist theory and apply it, master 
money to the payment of a debt. it for the sole purpose of applying 
it [Mao quote] / apply oneself to 
teach v. Teach a child to read / 
this will teach you to speak the 
truth/ teach a dog to beg. 
intellectual n. The intellectuals 
of a country. 
line n. Just a line to tell you that 
... / I am in the grocery line / what 
line (of business) are you in? / 
know when to draw a line. 
team n. Football team / team 
spirit / inspection team. 
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studying Chairman Mao's works. 
teac h v. the principle of officers 
teaching soldiers, soldi~rs teaching 
officers and soldiers teaching each 
other [Mao quote] / Chairman Mao 
teaches us to serve the people 
heart and soul/practice in 
struggle has taught us that unity 
means strength. 
intellectual n. Intellectuals must 
integrate themselves with the 
workers and peasants. 
lin e n. The Party line / draw a 
clear line of demarcation between 
the enemy and ourselves / 
resolutely wipe out any aggressors 
who dare to cross the line into our 
territory / struggle between the 
two lines 
team n. A Workers' Mao Zedong 
Thought Propaganda Team. 
The 1965 edition, it is clear, generally illustrated its entries with 
sentences and phrases typical of the spoken and written language of 
native speakers of English. The 1976 edition, by contrast, frequently 
translated into English the Mao-quotes, slogans and cliches which 
dominated Chinese political life. When it failed to find revolutionary 
illustrations of word use, it was not for want of trying. 
The 1976 dictionary drummed into its users assumptions 
systematically linked to core concepts in the Maoist world vieW. 
Consider the lessons on the nature of capitalist society contained in 
illustrative examples attached to words as diverse as 'capital', 'sweep', 
'unemployed', 'western', 'weary' and 'what': 
capital n. Capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every 
pore, with blood and dirt / the antagonism between labour and 
capital. 
exploit v. The workers in capitalist society are cruelly-explOited 
by the capitalists. 
wha t pron. They are what is called "the lowly" in capitalist 
society. 
unemployed a. Unemployed workers in capitalist society. 
unemployment n. Unemployment is increasing in the capitalist 
countries. 
sweep v. Another storm of economic crisis has swept over the 
capitalist world. 
western a. The decaying Western capitalist society. 
weary a. Many young people in capitalist countries are weary of 
the way of life there. 
These illustrations associated capitalism with a series of inter-related 
attributes, suggesting to dictionary users a schematic model of 
capitalist society in which every term carried a negative evaluation: 
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Capitalist Society 
cr el exploitative anti-worker crisis-ridden decaying 
This was in fact precisely the schema-stereotype of capitalist society 
suggested by the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda from the time 
of its foundation in 1921. The schema conditioned people to hate 
capitalist society by linking it with opprobrious terms. Moreover, the 
schema was linked to a body of theory explaining the nature of 
capitalist exploitation, the role of capitalism in world history~ and the 
inevitability of its destruction at the hands of the proletariat: So 
regular users of the 1976 dictionary were not only being subjected to 
higher order conditioning, but were being systematically reminded of 
the theoretical assumptions of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theory. Through 
a process of 'spreading activation', the dictionary entries repeatedly 
placed those assumptions 'on call', making them more accessible when 
they were required to interpret the world or understand political 
utterances. In this way the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist world view was 
strengthened by linguistic engineering. 
It is instructive to compare what the 1976 dictionary says about 
capitalist society with what it says about the Communist Party. The 
qualities of that Party are stated or implied in sentences illustrating the 
use of words as diverse as party, live, attribute, what, whateverand 
wherever. 
party n. Ours is a great Party, a glorious Party, a correct Party. 
[This was a Mao-quote]. 
live v. Without the Party and Chairman Mao I could not have 
lived to see today's happiness. 
attribute v. We attribute all our successes to the wise 
leadership of the Communist Party of China. 
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what pron. To fulfil the task requires of us great efforts, and, 
what is more important, loyalty to the Party. 
whatever pron. We'll do what the Party calls upon us to do. 
wherever adv. We will go wherever the Party directs us. 
These attributes had a consistent pattern, suggesting to dictionary users 
a schema-stereotype of the Communist Party in which all the terms 
carried positive evaluations: 
great glorious 
Communist Party of China 
wise source of 
success & 
happiness 
deserves 
loyalty & 
obedience 
These uniformly positive attributes reflected the fact that the 
Communist Party was once again regarded, officially, as a pliant tool of 
Mao Zedong's Thought. The Party machinery at the national level had 
resumed its normal functions in October 1968 when the Twelfth 
Plenum of the Ninth Party Congress had been held. Liu Shaoqi - who 
had been kept technically in office to justify continued attacks on the 
Party's 'revisionism' - was expelled, and a revised draft of the Party 
Constitution was adopted. By that stage, too, the Campaign to Cleanse 
the Class Ranks - aimed in the first instance at purifying the Party - was 
well advanced, so for the first time since the beginning of the Cultural 
Revolution Red FJagwas able to proclaim that 'Our Party is a great, 
glorious and correct Party', describing the Party's infiltration by 
bourgeois power holders as a thing of the past (Lee 1978, 301). By the 
time the revision of the English-Chinese dictionary began in 1970, the 
Party was once more charged with gUiding the masses' revolutionary 
activism. So the language of English-Chinese dictionaries, like 
everything else printed in China, revived the positive schema of the 
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Communist Party which had been presented before the Cultural 
Revolution. As always, official language served politics. 
6.5 Controlling the Written Word: (3) Private Letters 
Control of the written word extended, less formally, systematically and 
effectively, to private correspondence. Letters to and from foreign 
countries were frequently opened by the Public Security Service, and in 
any case were relatively rare b~cause people with foreign connections 
were suspected of being spies. Domestic mail was monitored less 
systematically by the central authorities, but the Party secretaries who 
controlled the work units sometimes exercised their right to inspect 
incoming and outgoing correspondence. They could also, if they 
suspected that something was amiss, order a search of people's private 
belongings for hidden correspondence or anything else. Some people 
still, of course, put imprudent words on paper, and they sometimes 
paid the price. One young man interviewed by Lowell Dittmer told his 
girlfriend in a letter that he was putting on a false show of 
revolutionary virtue in an attempt to get to college, but the letter was 
intercepted. His future was ruined, so he escaped to Hong Kong 
(Dittmer 1987,159-60). 
Most people very sensibly ensured that everything which they 
wrote could withstand scrutiny. One way of doing this was to follow 
very carefully the prescribed revolutionary formulae. Letters always 
began with 'Long live Chairman Mao', with a quotation from his works, 
or with a revolutionary slogan. Every letter also had to end on a 
revolutionary note. Sometimes this was done with another slogan, such 
as 'Long live the success of Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line!' 
Frequently, though, the revolutionary tone was achieved by adapting a 
traditional formula. Before 1949, the following formula was commonly 
used at the end of a letter addressed to a person who was old or of 
higher social status than the sender: 
ci zhi jingJi 
here extend salute 
'With high respect'. 
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This formula lingered on after the Communist victory, but during the 
Cultural Revolution it was abandoned entirely. The reason was, of 
course, that the Cultural Revolution was amongst other things a revolt 
of the young against the old and of the 'revolutionary masses' against 
'persons in authority following the capitalist road'. In this context, the 
formula expressed precisely those values against which the Cultural 
Revolution was directed. As argued by Ji, Kuiper & Shu (1990), the 
formula was adapted to make it properly revolutionary in three ways: 
( 1) ci zhi geming jingli! 
here extend revolutionary salute! 
'With revolutionary greetings!' 
(2) ci zhi wuchanjieji jingli! 
here extend proletarian salute! 
'With proletarian greetings!' 
(3) ci zhi wuchanjieji geming jingli! 
here extend proletarian revolutionary salute! 
'With proletarian revolutionary greetings!' 
When geming (revolutionary) and wuchanjieji (proletarian) form part 
of its context of interpretation, jingJi loses the connotations of 'respect' 
associated with its use in the old formula. It means simply 'salutations' 
or 'greetings', and has nothing to do with 'saluting' or 'greeting' a 
superior. So age and social status were irrelevant to the employment of 
the new formulae. Instead, political standing or class status determined 
who could use these greetings and whom they used them to address. 
People who used the first formula ('With revolutionary greetings') had 
to be recognized as possessing a genuinely revolutionary ideology. This 
generally excluded those with 'bad' class backgrounds, for they were 
widely regarded as unpromising revolutionary material. Those who 
used the second and third formulae had in addition to be classified as 
workers to justify the adjective wuchanjieji (,proletarian'). Finally, 
these formulae were used to address only 'comrades' - those who 
belonged to 'the people' rather than 'the enemy'. Those with bad class 
backgrounds were usually suspected of being secret class enemies, so 
they were addressed with the new formulae only in those rare cases in 
which they managed to establish their revolutionary credentials. For 
the most part, they were addressed with standardised terms of abuse. 
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So while the formulae expressed and consolidated revolutionary 
solidarity, they were also a weapon in the class war. 
Equally pervasive were the revolutionary formulae analysed by 
Ji, Kuiper & Shu (1990) which replaced traditional deference formulae 
incompatible with the new political climate. Before 1949 educated 
Chinese had sometimes used an idiomatic expression as a deference 
formula to end a formal speech or letter: 
qing yu haihan 
'Please be magnanimous enough to forgive' 
or 
qing duo baohan 
'Please be magnanimous enough to tolerate'. 
As Ji, Kuiper and Shu (1990) have pointed out, semantically these 
formulae implied that their user had made errors or had shortcomings 
and was asking to be excused; however, they were not neces§arily 
apologetic expressions in a pragmatic sense. They simply showed the 
user's modesty and were thus a form of deference behaviour. In Mao's 
China, however, mock modesty was not enough. Nor was error to be 
tolerated or forgiven: 'things which are wrong and erroneous must be 
criticised and corrected.' In small group meetings, individuals were 
regularly forced to express their views, invite criticism, then criticise 
the views of others. Always, the criterion was whether the views 
expressed were in accordance with the latest Party directives and Mao's 
Thought (Whyte 1974). So the traditional deference formulae were 
replaced by three new ones more in keeping with the practice of 
revolutionary criticism: 
(1) qing piping bangzhu 
please criticise help 
'Please criticise and help' 
(2) qing piping zhizheng 
please criticise correct 
'Please criticise and correct' 
(3) huanying piping 
welcome criticism 
'I welcome criticism' 
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These new formulae were well established by 1966, but because the 
Cultural Revolution stirred up a frenzy of criticism and self-criticism 
they popped up more frequently than ever before. Like their 
predecessors, they were used at the end of a speech or letter to indicate 
the user's modesty. However, they not only implied semantically that 
the person who used them may have made errors, but they did so 
pragmatically. Moreover, as Ji, Kuiper & Shu (1990, 65) point out, the 
user of the new formulae took a different attitude towards the implicit 
errors or shortcomings. Instead of asking to be excused, the user asked 
for criticism. In revolutionary China, all were expected to invite 
criticism to ensure that their words and their lives were faithful to the 
letter and the spirit of Mao's Thought. 
Correspondents had not only to observe revolutionary 
conventions when opening and closing letters, but to censor the letters' 
contents and ensure that they were larded with stock expressions of 
revolutionary piety. Correspondents who had been locked up for 
political mistakes were particularly careful, for they knew that all their 
letters would be inspected. The following letters, written by the same 
man, were typical of those written by prisoners: 
WISHING CHAIRMAN MAO LONGEVITY! 
LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO! 
Dear Father and Mother, 
I hope you are well. 
August 7, 1968 
As I didn't pay attention to the revered Chairman Mao's 
teaching and didn't act according to his directives, I have 
committed serious crimes and made very bad errors. The 
revolutionary masses, in order to rescue me, have sent me to the 
Public Security Bureau for reeducation. Now I'm studying and 
going through ideological reform in the Mao Zedong Thought 
Study Course under the leadership of the People's Liberation 
Army. Do not worry. I'm determined to turn over a new leaf .... 
[Feng 1991,118]. 
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Chairman Mao teaches us: 
THE CHANGE IN ONE'S OUTLOOK 
IS A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE. 
Dear (wife's name), 
March 8, 1975 
Your two letters this month have reached me. I understand 
that you're worried I haven't reformed myself conscientiously 
enough. I feel very contrite towards you and our son. I have 
realized the seriousness of my mistakes in humble gratitude to 
the reeducation given me by the chief warden. I'm determined to 
deepen my understanding of my guilt though studying the 
theory of proletarian dictatorship .... 
Please do not worry. I won't do anything to hurt you in the 
future. Each time I see your tearstains on the envelope and the 
letter brings your image to me .... 
I wrongly refused to see the seriousness of my crimes. I 
wouldn't open my heart and soul to our leaders, but instead 
confided my true feelings secretly to some individuals .... I failed 
our Party, the chief warden, you, and our son. From now on I 
will always heed the chief warden's teachings. I have realized 
that the Party is my true family. They will guide me on the 
ideologically correct path. For as Chairman Mao has said, "There 
will always be a bright future for those who have seen the error 
fth . " o elr ways .... 
One of my major problems is my lack of a clear 
understanding of my crimes. Under the guidance of the chief, I 
will study official documents and papers including Yao 
Wenyuan's "On the Social Basis of Lin Biao's Anti-Party Clique" to 
discover the social root causes of my guilt .... [Feng 1991, 119-
20]. 
The only sincere sentiments in these letters were their author's 
expressions of concern for his family. Reflecting on what he wrote, he 
told Feng Jicai, 'You see what I mean about writing for the chief 
warden? I was asked to trace the class roots of my crimes. I'm a 
worker, how in hell can I find a bourgeois root? I had to admit to 
crimes I didn't do and criticise myself .. .' (Feng 1991, 120). 
Even people who had never been in trouble usually 'put politics 
in command' of their correspondence. They knew that anything they 
wrote might one day be held against them. Besides, they were 
sometimes genuinely concerned to impress even family members with 
their revolutionary ardour. Take the following letter from a student 
sent to the countryside: 
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September 15, 1969 
LONG LNE CHAIRMAN MAO 
Hi Dad! 
I got your letter and have read it carefully. I'd like to 
share a few of my own thoughts with you below, and hope 
you'll criticize and correct my errors. 
At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, our great leader Chairman 
Mao Brilliantly pointed out that on the basis of Marxist-Leninist 
theory on class and class struggle, the 'four existences' would 
remain during the entire transition period in a socialist society. 
He stressed that we must discuss the 'two-line struggle' every 
year, every month, every day. [There follows a long discussion of 
Mao's Thought and current political developments] . 
... There are many intellectuals in the company, and hence 
many problems. I want to constantly strengthen my ideological 
reform and endeavour to season myself so that I will become a 
person who will give Chairman Mao no worries. 
Take care of your health, Dad! 
Long live the success of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line! 
Your son, 
XX 
P .S. I received the things you asked my classmate to bring. 
P.P.S. It's harvest time already and we're busy again. And it's 
beginning to get cold here. [Feng 1991,9-11]. 
Looking back in the 1980s, the author of this letter said, 'Don't 
you think that letter's weird? That's how we students wrote back then. 
Every last one of us. And those things weren't written for outsiders, but 
for our own families. Revolution became part of everything.' (Feng 
1991, 11). Nearly all Chinese people who retain letters from the years 
of the Cultural Revolution now regard them as 'weird'. But they all 
know why they wrote like that. Quite apart from the fact that some 
were enthusiastic revolutionaries, they all knew something else: that to 
write a 'non-political' letter was to commit the bourgeois error of 
subordinating the political to the personal. So almost everyone who 
wrote letters communicated through the discourse of Maoism, using 
'correct' political language to express 'correct' political sentiments. 
People who wanted to extract personal information from the 
correspondence often had to read between the lines. Only a few brave 
souls wrote letters which flouted the conventions. The ostensible 
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political correctness of the written word during the Cultural 
Revolution's institutional phase was very nearly complete. 
6.6 Orchestrating the Spoken Word: Linguistic Rituals 
and Mao-Worship 
The linguistic rituals of Mao-worship were associated with a great 
campaign called the Three Loyalties and the Four Boundless Loves. The 
Three Loyalties were loyalty to Chairman Mao, loyalty to his Thought 
and loyalty to his revolutionary line, while the Four Boundless Loves 
were love for Chairman Mao, love for his Thought, love for his 
proletarian revolutionary line and love for his proletarian 
revolutionary headquarters. People had repeatedly to show their 
boundless love and loyalty towards all these things. Lin Biao himself 
set the example, showing his loyalty to Mao's Thought by saying that 
even though he could not at times 'follow the Chairman's th6ughts', he 
still acted in accordance with them: 'we must carry out not only those 
instructions [whose rationale] we understand, but also those [whose 
rationale] we fail to understand for the moment, and must try to 
understand them in the course of carrying them out.' There was no 
danger in blind obedience, for Lin was convinced, or so he said, that 
'Every sentence of Chairman Mao's works is a Truth, one single 
sentence of his surpasses ten thousand of ours.' (Quoted in Dittmer 
1987,118). 
Under Lin's influence the Mao cult was expressed in massive 
projects which helped to raise the prominence of Mao-worshipping 
assumptions in the cognitive environments of most Chinese. Massive 
statues of Mao began to appear in public places. I was one of the 
millions of Chinese children photographed in front of such statues, 
clutching the Little Red Book to my breast. All over China, places 
associated with Mao's life were sanctified, becoming shrines visited by 
pilgrims who took perhaps 'a bit of earth or bottle of water as 
mementos.' (Dittmer 1987,119). Worship of Mao was also encouraged 
by numerous exhibition halls, facing towards the revolutionary east, 
which told the story of his life. Some of these were huge. In Tianjin, 
for example, the railway station became a Mao Zedong Thought lecture 
hall. It was dominated by a huge statue of Mao, together with over a 
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hundred portraits and hundreds of quotations and posters. Like 
countless other children, I was taken to visit it, paying homage to 
China's saviour. 
These changes to the physical environment reminded people 
constantly about Mao and his teachings, increasing the accessibility of 
assumptions which formed the context of interpretation of the verbal 
rituals which proliferated during the institutional phase of the Cultural 
Revolution. On getting out of bed in the morning, people were 
supposed to set the tone of the day by saying something like 'Carry the 
revolution through to the end!' or 'Fight selfishness!' For the Chinese 
people, well drilled in the assumptions of Mao Zedong Thought, this 
latter slogan did not mean what it would have meant to a Christian or a 
Buddhist. Within the context of interpretation fostered by Mao's 
writings, as well as by the novels, revolutionary model operas and other 
propaganda of the Cultural Revolution, it meant something far more 
specific: that they had to fight any tendency to fulfil merely--personal 
needs or desires, rather than devoting all their energies to the 
revolution. In other words, educated youth working as peasants, 
factory hands or dockers had to stop hankering after 'better' jobs; the 
peasants had to stop supplementing their incomes with private 
production, rather than devoting themselves wholeheartedly to 
collective labour; young men and women had to contract marriages 
which would foster revolutionary commitment, rather than entering 
into relationships out of selfish, bourgeois love; and once married, they 
had to set aside merely personal feelings, accepting cheerfully any 
instruction that they live most of their lives apart, building socialism in 
different parts of China. 
When people went to bed, they were meant to affirm their 
continuing commitment to the revolution with a slogan like 'Think of 
Chairman Mao Day and Night!' or 'Never forget class struggle!' Again, 
the interpretation of these slogans depended upon assumptions made 
instantly accessible by repeated exposure to Mao's writings, to 
revolutionary model operas and novels, to the stories which people had 
heard in 'speak bitterness' sessions, to what they had seen in class 
education exhibitions halls, and to the experience of 'struggle and 
criticism sessions' against alleged class enemies. 'Remembering 
Chairman Mao' did not mean remembering his benevolent face, but 
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keeping his teachings constantly in mind while recalling how he had 
saved the workers and peasants from oppression and made them the 
masters of their own country. 'Never forgetting class struggle' meant 
recalling the 'bitter past', hating unreformed members of the black 
categories, scrutinizing one's associates for signs that they might have 
links with class enemies or might themselves be class enemies, and 
struggling ruthlessly against those who took the enemy's side. 
Almost everyone knew what these slogans meant. It would have 
been nearly impossible not to know, given that they were repeatedly 
explained, used in numerous contexts, and reinforced by the carefully 
contrived structures of daily life and by myriad cues from the physical 
environment. It was another thing altogether to get people to 
incorporate them into their private lives. Try as they might, the Maoist 
leaders could not make people into ciphers, mouthing every slogan on 
cue. Within the family and amongst friends, sloganeering could be 
embarrassing if it was too ostentatious, or if it took place in -' 
inappropriate contexts. Those who actually uttered these slogans first 
thing in the morning or just before bed at night were probably a 
minority. Mao's totalitarian ideal had a devastating impact on the 
Chinese people, but at no stage did the practice fully match the ideal. 
Verbal rituals became part of the routine of everyday life. The 
model was often the army, where the rites of worship had gone to 
extraordinary lengths. In Chen Village, for example, peasant families 
adopted the military custom of worshipping Mao before every meal. 
Led by the family head, they bowed to his portrait, recited Mao-quotes, 
sang 'The East Is Red' then recited a 'Maoist grace-before-meals'. The 
following 'grace' was the most common: 
We respectfully wish a long life to the reddest red sun in our 
hearts, the great leader Chairman Mao. And to Vice Chairman 
Lin Biao's health: may he forever be healthy. Having been 
liberated by the land reform we will never forget the Communist 
Party, and in revolution we will forever follow Chairman Mao! 
[Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984, 170]. 
The 'Maoist grace' was recited only in some regions, and was 
almost unknown in the predominantly academic community in which I 
lived in Tianjin. However, an attempt was made to ensure that other 
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rituals did become universal. Throughout China, for instance, 
Revolutionary Committees sought to impose the custom of greeting 
comrades with a shared revolutionary quotation. To give an example, if 
the person initiating the greeting said 'Sailing the seas depends on the 
helmsman ... ', the person addressed was supposed to complete the 
quotation by responding, 'Making revolution depends on Mao Zedong's 
Thought.' (Cf. Chang 1992, 531). This made loyalty to Mao the 
common currency of social relationships, and it placed pressure on 
people to ensure that they knew all the common Mao-quotes by heart. 
However, the ritual did not have as much impact as the Maoist 
leadership desired, for amongst family and friends most people 
continued the traditional ni haa ('how are you?') or chi fan Ie rna ('have 
you eaten?'). They saved the 'quotation greeting' for more formal 
contexts or for encounters with people who might expect it. In this 
way, the 'public language' of the Chinese people diverged ever more 
markedly from their private language. 
The Cultural Revolution also had an impact on greeting formulae 
in the schools. Before the Cultural Revolution, when the teacher 
entered the classroom the class monitor told the students to stand up. 
Teacher and student then exchanged greetings using the following 
fixed, formulaic expressions: 
Teacher: tangxuernen haa! 
students well 
'How do you do, everybody?' 
Students: Iaashi haa! 
teacher well 
'How do you do, teacher?' 
Semantically, there was no difference between the 'haa' which greeted 
the teacher and the 'haa' which greeted the 'students'. Pragmatically, 
however, there was a great difference. The 'haa' uttered by the 
students had as its context of interpretation the fact that the students 
were standing as a mark of respect, the fact that the accompanying 
word Iaashi ('teacher') still carried some of its traditional prestige, and 
the fact that the teacher was the only person in the room who was 
greeted as an individual. In this context, the words uttered by the 
students were not only a greeting but a mark of respect. 
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When the schools reopened in late 1968, however, the situation 
of the teachers had changed. Most had been labelled 'monsters and 
demons', 'bourgeois reactionary authorities', and so on. They were 
also, by definition, 'intellectuals' in the Chinese sense of the term, and 
had been added to a revised and extended version of the 'black 
categories', which now included not only landlords, rich peasants, 
counterrevolutionaries, bad elements and Rightists, but also renegades, 
enemy agents and capitalist roaders, with intellectuals ninth and last. 
To show the contempt in which they were held, they were designated 
the 'stinking ninth category'. It was therefore inappropriate for 
students to greet teachers in the traditional respectful manner. The 
problem was solved by abolishing greetings at the beginning of the 
class altogether. 
Before the first class of each day, both students and teachers 
engaged in the ritual of 'asking for instructions in the morning'. This 
ritual was also practised in offices, factories, and even amongst 
peasants in the villages. Students and teachers, like workers or 
peasants, stood in front of Mao's portrait and raised their Little Red 
Books head-high; then, in response to introductory words from a 
revolutionary leader, they chanted a litany whose first part went like 
this: 
Leader: 
People: 
rang women jing zhu Mao zhixi ... 
let us respectfully wish Mao chairman .. . 
'Let's respectfully wish Chairman Mao ... ' 
... wanshouwuqiang! (Said three times). 
... ten thousand years without limit! 
' ... an infinitely long life!' 
The expression wanshouwuqiang was a traditional idiom once used 
only as a form of greeting for the Chinese emperors, whose elevated 
status Mao had by now far surpassed. It was followed immediately by 
the second part of the litany, which paid a less imperial tribute to Mao's 
'good student' and designated successor, the sickly Lin Biao: 
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Leader: zhu Lin fu zhuxi shenti jiangkang ... 
wish Lin vice chairman body healthy .. . 
'Wish Vice-chairman Lin good health ... ' 
People: ... yongyuan jiankang! (Said twice). 
... always healthy! 
' ... Good health forever!' 
Those present then sang 'The East Is Red' or perhaps 'Sailing the Seas 
Depends on the Helmsman' and read quotations from the Little Red 
Book to guide their actions during the day. Significantly, in schools, it 
was the student monitor who led the proceedings. The teacher was 
reduced to the status of one worshipper amongst many, reflecting the 
lowered status of the traditional intellectual and bureaucratic elites 
which Mao blamed for the frustration of his plans. 
People in a lot of urban workplaces, some schools and many rural 
areas supplemented the ritual of 'asking for instructions in the 
morning' with the practice of 'reporting back in the evening' (Chang 
1992,530-31; Liang & Shapiro 1983, 179-80; Min 1993,54; Feng 
1991,96; Gao 1987,317-318). After completing the day's activities, 
they assembled in front of Chairman Mao's portrait, sang songs of Mao-
worship, then confessed their shortcomings in the light of the 
principles of Mao's Thought: 'Chairman Mao, today I did this and made 
such and such a mistake ... .' (Feng 1991, 96). Most people of course 
tried to avoid confessing anything really serious, and the politically 
correct confession became a well-practised art. But even when people 
just went through the motions they gave public consent to the idea that 
in all their actions they were responsible to Mao, and that his Thought 
was the criterion of right and wrong. 
Most of the verbal ritual of Mao worship gave religious 
satisfaction to devoted revolutionaries but provided little excitement. 
However, at schools, universities, workplaces, and even on the streets, 
worship became fun for the nimble-footed as teachers and cadres 
popularized loyalty dances. Before work, after work, during the 
morning break, at political meetings, or whenever they felt like it, 
people formed a big circle and danced while singing a hymn of love 
and praise: 
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Beloved Chairman Mao, beloved Chairman Mao, 
You are the Red Sun in our hearts. 
We have so many words in our hearts 
Which were want to tell you. 
Tens of thousands of red hearts 
Turn towards Beijing. 
Tens of thousands of smiling faces 
Turn towards the Red Sun. 
We wish our Great Leader Chairman Mao 
A long long life, a long long life. 
The loyalty dance was taught even to the peasants in the south of 
China, where there was no tradition of rural dancing. Clumsy and 
embarrassed, they performed the dance and sang the accompanying 
song at their evening political meetings (Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984, 
169). 
Once the Cultural Revolution was over, many people were quick 
to describe these forms of Mao-worship as part of a deificatien 
movement (zaoshen yundong). They were right, of course, but the 
rituals and formulae which deified Mao and legitimated his rule were 
much more than this. From the point of view of the rulers, the scripts 
were a way of telling 'the people' what to think - those same 
revolutionary masses in whose name the Maoist leaders ruled and 
whom in fact they despised. Anchee Min, chosen to star in the film 
version of the revolutionary opera Red Azalea, attributes the following 
sentiments to the film's director, who was both her lover and a senior 
cultural official close to Jiang Qing: 
Who do you think people are? They are walking corpses. What 
do people know? The only thing they know is fear. That is why 
they need authority. They need to be told what to do. They 
need a wise emperor. It's been that way for five thousand years. 
They believe what rulers make them believe. That is why there 
are intellectual formulas. The operas are a way to shape their 
minds, to keep their minds where they should be. 
[Min 1993, 237]. 
What applied to the operatic formulae, of course, applied to all the 
formulae of the Cultural Revolution. Formulae were simple, they could 
be learned by heart, they were easily transmitted to China's hundreds 
of millions of illiterates, and anyone who refused to speak in the proper 
formulaic fashion could be identified instantly as a potential class 
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enemy and punished. So the formulae, as well as influencing minds, 
were a powerful instrument for controlling behaviour. And behaviour, 
through modelling effects and reference group effects, in turn exerted 
still more influence on minds. 
Formulae, too, were an agent of persuasion and control which 
abetted Mao's purpose of chastening and controlling the pre-Cultural 
Revolution elites. University professors, school teachers, writers, 
doctors, scientists and bureaucrats could easily have coped with more 
sophisticated methods of ideological instruction. Instead, they were 
forced to memorize the same formulae as everyone else, then recite 
political platitudes and worship Mao in the same words as illiterate 
peasants. Under Mao, all Chinese were equal, subject to his will. This 
universal fact, which explains the sycophancy of Lin Biao and the 
forbearance of Jiang Qjng, was expressed and enforced by the universal 
recitation of the formulae. 
From the point of view of the ruled, the formulae represented the 
hope of safety. In a country where everything was political, the only 
totally safe political action was to promote and recite the formulae of 
Mao-worship. Incantation of the formulae started at the top, where 
Mao's immediate subordinates and the highest Party officials set the 
example. Under them, the Revolutionary Committees discovered that 
'the safest and most rewarding course of action was to do nothing, 
except promote the worship of Mao - and, of course, continue to engage 
in political persecutions.' (Chang 1992,531). For ordinary people, the 
formulae could be a safe way of expressing a genuine devotion to Mao -
a mode of worship with none of the risks associated with improvised 
expressions of commitment. For believers, they were a satisfying 
currency of social interchange, a reassurance that others were believers 
too. For unbelievers, they were a mask, hiding deviant thoughts. For 
everyone, they were a passport which had to be presented many times 
a day - a passport to continued survival. 
It was easy to make people recite the formulae, at least in public. 
It was much more difficult to determine, without further guidance, 
what their implications were. When those who performed the loyalty 
dance told Mao 'We have so many words in our hearts / Which we want 
to tell you', they were uncertain whatwords, outside the formulae, were 
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politically acceptable. When the peasants of Chen Village vowed at 
mealtimes that 'in revolution we will forever follow Chairman Mao', 
they had many conflicting ideas about what direction to take. So often, 
in their lives, a later policy had contradicted an earlier one, with the 
earlier policy condemned as 'revisionist' or 'left adventurist', or 
whatever. The problem arose from the fact that both policies had been 
promulgated in Mao's name. So the formulae had no definite 
implications for action, and once the 'free mobilization' phase of the 
Cultural Revolution was over.ordinary people did not dare decide for 
themselves what road Chairman Mao wanted them to travel. They had 
all, at various times, been proved wrong. To follow their Great Leader, 
they needed explicit instructions for every step they took, and they still 
had to be watched and corrected because they so often misinterpreted 
those instructions. The Maoist dream of a revolutionary people 
programmed by formulae, propaganda and directives to follow the 
correct path remained a fantasy. Words could be translated into action 
only under the supervision of a coercive hierarchy. This was· the reality 
which underpinned the new structures of authority during the 
institutional phase of the Cultural Revolution. 
283 
CHAPTER 7 
CONTROLLING CULTURE: 
LITERATURE AND DRAMATIC ART 
7.1 Literature and Art in Maoist Theory and Cultural 
Revolution Practice. 
In the field of literature and art, the Cultural Revolution extended the 
dominant line of thinking in Mao's celebrated 'Talks at the Yenan 
[Yan'an] Forum on Literature and Art', delivered in May 1942 (Mao 
1942b). I say 'the dominant line of thinking' because Mao, in 
characteristic fashion, wanted to have it both ways. On the one hand, 
he argued that 'Revolutionary literature and art should create a 
variety of characters out of real life', that they should be based on 
familiarity with 'the rich, lively language of the masses' and that they 
should avoid 'the "poster and slogan style" which is correct in 
political viewpoint but lacking in artistic power.' (Mao 1942b, 254, 
266, 276). On the other hand, most of what Mao said fostered 
precisely the 'poster and slogan style' which he abhorred: 
There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that 
stands above classes, art that is detached from or independent 
of politics. Proletarian literature and art are part of the whole 
proletarian revolutionary cause; they are, as Lenin said, cogs 
and wheels in the whole revolutionary machine. Therefore, 
Party work in literature and art ... is subordinated to the 
revolutionary tasks set by the party in a given revolutionary 
period. [Mao 1942b, 271]. 
He argued that 'each class in every class society has its own political 
and artistic criteria' and that 'all classes in all class societies 
invariably put the political criterion first and the artistic criterion 
second.' Accordingly, he condemned reactionary works with artistic 
merit as particularly 'poisonous', he directed proletarian writers to 
'eulogize not the bourgeoisie but the proletariat', and he announced: 
All the dark forces harming the masses of the people must be 
exposed and all the revolutionary struggles of the masses of the 
people must be extolled; this is the fundamental task of 
revolutionary writers and artists. [Mao 1942b, 275, 278, 278]. 
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These views fostered a literature which depicted a world in which the 
only important thing was the struggle between righteous 
revolutionaries and evil reactionaries. The simplistic dichotomy 
between these two camps was reinforced by Mao's denial that 
oppressors and oppressed shared a common human nature, or that 
there was a 'love of humanity' which transcended class boundaries. 
'In class society', he said at Yan'an, 'there is only human nature of a 
class character; there is no human nature above classes.' As for 'love 
of humanity', he decreed that 'in a class society there can only be 
class love' and that 'We cannot love enemies'. (Mao 1942b, 256, 276-
7). 
This line of argument in the Yan'an talks had devastating 
implications for literature and art. Writers who took it seriously were 
confined to narrow, revolutionary themes; they had to caricature 
class enemies as one-dimensional embodiments of evil; and they had 
to eulogize the workers and peasants as ideologically uniform 
repositories of revolutionary virtue. No one took it more seriously 
than Jiang Qjng, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao and the other 
'cultural radicals' who rose to power during the Cultural Revolution. 
Having achieved supremacy in the cultural sphere during the period 
of 'free mobilization', they used that supremacy during the Cultural 
Revolution'S institutional phase to create a 'new' literature. They 
claimed that this new literature was based on Mao's 'Yan'an Talks' 
and on 'the combination of revolutionary realism and revolutionary 
romanticism' which Mao had commended in 1958. For them, 
'revolutionary realism' implied that what was 'real' was what agreed 
with current revolutionary theory, not what matched misleading, pre-
theoretical observations of so-called 'real life' (cf. MoWry 1973, 59; 
Yang 1996b). From late 1962 until 1975, Mao was prepared to give 
the cultural radicals his full support. Only as death approached did 
he complain 'People are afraid to write articles or plays, and we have 
no novels and no poems.' (Leys 1978, xiv). He himself, reading and 
re-reading the Chinese classics, had no taste for the 'new literature' of 
the Cultural Revolution, which was more ideological, more purely 
political and more stereotyped than revolutionary writing in earlier 
years. 
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The 'new literature' was in fact very slow in coming. Fear 
silenced writers and publishers alike, for nearly all pre-Cultural 
Revolution literary works had been declared 'poisonous weeds' and 
most writers had been persecuted as 'monsters and demons'. From 
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 until early 1972 not 
a single novel was published in China (Yang 1996a). Indeed, for a 
time few books of any sort were published except for Mao's own works 
(Uu 1971, 149). When new literary and cultural works began to 
emerge, they did so in a carefully controlled trickle, a mere fraction of 
China's pre-Cultural Revolution output. In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, for example, the country had produced scores of feature films 
every year, but between 1966 and the end of 1976 only some half a 
dozen new feature films were approved for release (Uu 1971, 157-67, 
200; Dittmer 1987, 246). Similarly, although in 1960 about 1330 
official periodicals had been publishedin China, in 1973 there were 
only about 50 (Siu & Stern 1983, xlv-xlix). This was partly a result of 
the fact that many talented people were afraid to write. Iralso 
reflected the caution of publishers, who judged manuscripts according 
to strict criteria. Those laid down by a Guangdong journal were 
typical: 
Our publication welcomes all manuscripts which fulfil the 
following conditions: 
A. All novels, essays, articles, works of art which present 
in a healthy way a revolutionary content. They must: (1) exalt 
with deep and warm proletarian feelings the great Chairman 
Mao; exalt the great, glorious and infallible Chinese Communist 
Party; exalt the great victory of the proletarian revolutionary 
line of Chairman Mao; (2) following the examples of the 
Revolutionary Model operas, strive with zeal to create peasant 
and worker heroes; (3) on the theme of the struggle between the 
two lines, reflect the people's revolutionary struggle, which has 
lasted for half a century under the leadership of our Party, and, 
especially, the unbroken revolutionary struggle fought under 
the aegis of the dictatorship of the proletariat; reflect the 
unanimous struggle of the population of our province following 
the direction given by Chairman Mao, and the unfolding of that 
struggle in its victorious progression. 
B. In artistic and literary theory: we welcome texts that 
have a mass, revolutionary, and militant character ... [etc., 
etc.] [Guangdong Wenyi, no. 1, 1973, quoted Leys 1978, xxvii, 
n.5]. 
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All fiction and literary criticism conformed rigorously to these 
criteria, which affected not only content but also language. Yang 
(1996a) has demonstrated this convincingly with respect to the 
meagre total of 120 novels published during the Cultural Revolution --
all of which appeared between February 1972 and the downfall of 
Jiang Qjng and her allies in October 1976. Comparing a carefully 
matched sample of Cultural Revolution novels with their pre-Cultural 
Revolution counterparts, he discovered the following: 
1. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao's own language 
dominated novels as never before. Cultural Revolution novels 
quoted Mao directly 11 times as often as their predecessors, and 
they referred to him or his Thought (often using his own words 
without quotation marks) 6.2 times as often. 
2. Cultural Revolution novels used generalised words 
associated with class struggle (,the bourgeoisie', 'class -enemy' 
and so on) 5.5 times as often as their predecessors, and they 
used ideological words ending with the phoneme -zhuyi ('-ism' 
as in 'socialism') 3.9 times as often. These changes matched the 
wider politicization of language during the Cultural Revolution 
and reflected the novels' more exclusive focus on class conflict 
and ideological struggle. 
In his 'Talks at the Yenan Forum on Uterature and Art' Mao 
had argued that 'life as reflected in works of literature and art can 
and ought to be on a higher plane, more intense, more concentrated, 
more typical, nearer the ideal, and therefore more universal than 
actual everyday life.' (Mao 1942b, 266). With Mao's support, Jiang 
Qjng pushed this argument to the limit during the Cultural 
Revolution. It justified the creation of peasant and worker heroes who 
transcended the imperfections of people in everyday life - heroes who 
embodied the ideal of selfless revolutionaries empowered by total 
dedication to Mao's invincible Thought. These heroes were models for 
emulation, and both novels and dramatic productions had to 
highlight their role in accordance with Jiang Qjng's doctrine of the 
'three prominences' (san tuchu): 'among all characters, emphasise 
the positive personalities; among the positive, portray the heroic 
ones; and among the heroic, single out the central heroic figure.' 
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(Dittmer & Chen 1981, 55). These 'positive and heroic figures' 
(zhengmian renwu) had to be perfect - 'tall, great, and complete' (gao 
da quan). They engaged in ultimately victorious class struggle 
against 'villainous characters' (fanmian renwu), whose unredeemed 
wickedness reflected their class allegiance. The villains, however, were 
never to be the focus of attention. Jiang Qjng made this clear in her 
doctrine of the 'three accompaniments' (san peichen), which 
prescribed that the villain's role was to highlight the virtues of the 
central heroic figure (cf. Dittmer & Chen 1981, 55). 
These literary doctrines had a big impact. In Yang's (l996a) 
sample, for example, words uttered by the central heroic characters 
took almost up twice the proportion of text in the Cultural Revolution 
novels as in the pre-Cultural Revolution ones. Moreover, as Table 7.1 
shows, these heroic characters, as standard bearers of the revolution, 
used more ideological words than anyone else: 
TABLE 7.1 
Ideological Words per Thousand Words 
Uttered by Main Types of Character 
Hero, 
Heroine 
Leading 
Young Woman 
Represen tative 
Old. Poor Peasant Villain 
43 31.5 26.2 17.4 
Source: Yang 1996a, tables 3.2.1, 3.2.2 
The heroic characters, in accordance with the doctrine of the 'three 
prominences', were an example to the other 'good' characters - the 
leading young women and the old, poor peasants - in the use of 
ideological language as in everything else. The villains, by contrast, 
conformed admirably to the specification of the 'three complements', 
acting as a foil for the central heroic characters. They showed their 
bad politics by using ideological language less than anyone else. 
Moreover, while 'good' characters collectively mentioned Mao over a 
hundred times in a typical novel, the villains never quoted or 
mentioned him. They did, however, occasionally quote the 'Number 
One Capitalist Roader', Liu Shaoqi. In literature, as in life, language 
was the badge of the revolutionary and the mark of the class enemy. 
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7.2 Dramatic Art: the Modern Revolutionary Opera 
The most influential literary texts of the Cultural Revolution were not 
the novels, but the scripts of Jiang Qi,ng's model revolutionary operas 
(yangbanxi). From as early as 1966 stories and songs from the operas 
were broadcast on radio, and 1970 saw the beginning of an especially 
energetic campaign to popularize them. Indeed, in 1971/72, the 
winter-spring schedule of the Central People's Broadcast Station 
suggested that at least two hours a day be devoted to teaching the 
songs of the operas (Mowry 1973, 22). In workplaces and residential 
areas throughout most of China, millions of loudspeakers brought 
radio broadcasts of the ideologically charged songs to the Chinese 
people. Party committees in schools, workplaces and neighbourhoods 
encouraged people to learn the songs and sing them frequently. Since 
most traditional songs were banned, many people were grateful to 
have something new to sing. Nearly all Chinese heard the songs and 
most could sing some of them. Most people also saw filmed versions 
of the operas in picture theatres, on portable screens in halls or village 
squares, and in some cases on television. Finally, operatic troupes 
gave countless live performances in cities and sometimes even 
villages. 
The revolutionary model operas had their cultural origins in 
forms of revolutionary theatre dating from the Yan'an period. Their 
political inspiration, though, came from Mao and Jiang Qi,ng. As 
early as 1944, Mao had complained that 'the old opera (and all the 
old literature and art which are divorced from the people) presents 
the people as though they were dirt, and the stage is dominated by 
lords and ladies and their pampered sons and daughters.' (Quoted in 
Goldman 1981, 76-7). Then in 1963 he returned to the attack, 
complaining that 'Operas abound in feudal emperors, kings, generals, 
ministers, scholars, and beautiful women, but the Ministry of Culture 
doesn't care a bit.' He ordered the Ministry to 'conduct investigations, 
and put things right in real earnest.' (Quoted in Goldman 1981, 77). 
At the same time, he gave his full support to Jiang Qi,ng's attempts to 
produce model revolutionary operas based firmly on the principles 
laid down in his 'Yan'an Talks on Literature and Art' (cf. Mackerras 
1975, 168-9), 
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Jiang Qjng's model revolutionary operas took the place of the 
traditional Beijing Opera (jingju), which was banned. As the new 
Beijing Opera, they had one big thing in common with the old: both 
forms of opera used stereotyped characters and plots to dramatize the 
confrontation between good and evil, teaching moral lessons for the 
benefit of the audience. The lessons which they taught, however, were 
very different. Whereas the traditional operas defined 'good' and 
'evil' in Confucian terms, the model revolutionary operas defined it in 
Maoist ones. In the latter, the 'good' characters were heroes from the 
ranks of the workers, peasants and soldiers, and the 'bad' ones were 
class enemies - evil landlords, Guomindang bandits, Japanese and 
American imperialists, along with their henchmen, collaborators and 
puppets. The revolutionary operas were also less symbolic and less 
bound by unrealistic conventions than the traditional ones, using 
more natural stage settings and dressing the actors to resemble the 
types of people whom they played. They employed a lot of ordinary 
speech in addition to the singing, and they dropped the stylized sing-
song which was the substitute for speech in the traditional operas. 
The aim was to make the operas easier to perform, to make them 
accessible to a wider audience, and to facilitate the transmission of 
revolutionary ideology. 
The eight model revolutionary operas conformed perfectly to 
Jiang Qjng's doctrines of the 'three prominences' and the 'three 
accompaniments'. Each opera put the spotlight, literally and 
figuratively, on a single figure - five heroes and three heroines in the 
eight operas - who embodied all the revolutionary virtues. These 
leading characters were physically perfect, their only loyalty was to 
the Party and the Revolution, and their political consciousness and 
revolutionary insight were an inspiration to all the other 'good' 
characters. The lesser 'good' characters were, at heart, true 
revolutionaries, but they highlighted the virtues of the main character 
by making occasional mistakes, letting their vigilance slacken, or 
being deceived by a class enemy. Above all, they lacked that perfect, 
Mao-inspired understanding of the nature of revolutionary struggle 
which ensured that the main characters always made the right 
decisions. 
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The villains were living representations of absolute evil. They 
were cruel, malevolent and cunning, with no hint of redeeming virtue. 
They were not even particularly intelligent, being driven by their base 
instincts to commit foul crimes which were ultimately their undoing. 
Their sly natures, cruelty and treachery were simply no match for the 
invincible intelligence of revolutionary heroes and heroines armed 
with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. The villains all had 
evil natures stemming from their class backgrounds as landlords, 
Guomindang reactionaries, foreign imperialists and their lackeys. 
They were never capable of reform: as Dittmer has pointed out, 'in 
not one of these dramas does a villain succeed in making an 
acceptable repentance; a villain's participation in activities of 
redemption, such as labor or thought reform, serves only to evince his 
utter mendacity.' (Dittmer & Chen 1981, 102). 
Most of the operas were set in the pre-liberation period when 
the class struggle involved warfare against 'enemies with guns'. This 
provided excellent material for lessons in revolutionary heroism, but 
it gave no guidance on how to engage in class struggle against 
'enemies without guns'. Much more useful for that purpose was On 
the Docks, an opera of 'everyday life' dealing with the attempt to 
unmask a saboteur through Party-directed class struggle in 1963. It is 
also more useful for the purposes of this thesis, since its theme and 
language were intended to serve as models of class struggle and verbal 
behaviour during the institutional phase of the Cultural Revolution. I 
will therefore examine it in some detail, paying particular attention 
to the characteristics of its language. 
On the Docks was adapted from a Huai opera which Jiang Qjng 
attended in 1964. She liked the 'internationalism embodied by the 
dockers' and asked the Beijing Opera Troupe of Shanghai to re-write it 
into a Beijing Opera. After 'numerous struggles' it made its debut as a 
Beijing Opera and it was soon acclaimed as a yangban or 'model' 
(Mowry 1973, 76). Like all the model operas, it was constantly revised 
so that it served the current purposes of the Maoist propagandists. 
For example, the January 1972 script, which I use here, has added an 
episode in which the heroine joyously reads the communique of the 
Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Central Committee in which 
'Chairman Mao told us that there are still classes and class struggles 
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and that we must remind ourselves of this every year, every month 
and every day.' (OTD, 16-17). This was part ofa wider attempt to 
give more emphasis to the theme of 'class struggle in the socialist era' 
and to the 'heroic image of the proletarian worker armed with Mao 
Zedong's Thought.' (Mowry 1973, 76). The opera was also intended 
to persuade people that manual labour was an ennobling and vital 
form of revolutionary activity. 
The opera develops these themes through a stunningly boring 
plot, totally devoid of the danger, bravery and violence which enliven 
the other operas. The story revolves around the attempt by the 
villain, Qjan Shouwei, to do two things: first, to delay a shipment of 
seed rice to Africa, thereby sabotaging the African people's struggle 
against imperialism; second, to destroy China's international trading 
reputation by (a) hiding a broken sack of wheat contaminated with 
fibre-glass amongst the bags of rice and (b) including a sack of rice in 
a shipment of foreign-aid wheat. The heroine Fang HaizheIi~ however, 
is armed with Mao's Thought and aware that in socialist society there 
are 'enemies who are disguised'. Through her superior awareness of 
class struggle she uncovers the plot. The villainous Qjan flees but is 
seized offstage. We are told that he was clutching a dagger and letters 
of recommendation from foreign imperialists and the Guomindang. 
It was no accident that the plot was so boring. The opera was 
intended to persuade people that class struggle was relevant to their 
day-to-day tasks, and that maintaining the highest standards in the 
workplace was a matter of vital political importance. The opera 
made these points by applying dramatic revolutionary language to 
conspicuously undramatic activities. Consider, for example, the lyrics 
as the Party Secretary and heroine, Fang leads the dockers in song 
before they undertake the revolutionary task of searching for the 
spilled sack of wheat: 
Fang: Comrades! (Sings.) 
One spilled sack is extremely serious, 
A severe test awaits us ahead. 
True gold is to be tempered only in the flerce flre, 
True flgh ters never shirk. 
Determined, we'll tackle the task again, 
Search the warehouse by night, 
And leave no stone unturned. 
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Gao (sings): 
Our arms and our shoulders are tempered steel, 
They can move mountains and fill seas. 
Zhao (sings): 
Strictly we'll guard the quality of foreign-aid goods, 
Find the sack first, then load the ship. 
M a (sings): . 
Let this old soldier go to the fron t. 
Men Dockers (chorus): 
We young should be in the foremost ranks. 
Women Workers (chorus): 
Girl workers boldly take up the challenge. 
Dockers (chorus): 
The spilled sack shall not leave this port. 
Fang (sings): 
This is a political battle, 
United we'll work to untangle the trouble. 
Strike hard at imperialism, revisionism and reaction, 
Firmly, thoroughly, make our search. 
Dockers (chorus): 
Strike hard at imperialism, revisionism and rea,.ction, 
Firmly, thoroughly, make our search. 
Strike hard at imperialism, revisionism and reaction, 
Firmly, thoroughly, make our search. 
Fan g: Search the warehouse! 
Dockers: Search the warehouse! 
(All, bold in spirit, strike a pose.) 
[OTD 21]. 
The lyrics are packed with words which, in context, have martial 
meanings: 'fighters', 'soldier', 'front', 'ranks', 'battle', 'strike'. Such 
terms were intended to bring to the search for a single sack of wheat 
the excitement and importance of revolutionary battles against the 
Guomindang or the Japanese and American imperialists, not to speak 
of the battles against class enemies during the 'free mobilization' 
phase of the Cultural Revolution. The application of martial and 
heroic language to everyday tasks pervades the whole opera, with one 
character even proclaiming that he doesn't mind carrying sacks of 
grain because 'To support the world revolution, our Chinese working 
class will do our utmost even if it means climbing mountains of 
knives and going through seas of fire.' (OTD, 4). 
The lyrics of the dockers' song also suggest that the main 
problem is not that someone might swallow flbreglass, but that the 
loss of the sack has political implications: the effect on China's 
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reputation and the possibility that a saboteur is behind it all. Fang, 
always the first to see the political aspect, calls the search a 'political 
battle' and a blow to 'imperialism and reaction'. Elsewhere, she 
suggests that while swallowing fibreglass could be 'Very dangerous', 
'The political effect would be worst of all'. In her eyes, the 'Search for 
the spilled sack is a very sharp struggle' - meaning, of course, a class 
struggle. Other 'good' characters say 'We'll be letting down our 
people and our Party / Unless we find that sack' and 'The working 
class has entrusted us with this task. We won't let them down. We 
will not disappoint Chairman Mao!' (OTD, 14, 26, 30). 
In the opera, the dockers' work is always described in political 
terms. Fang says that every sack of rice and wheat 'will playa part in 
the African people's struggle against imperialism', and Gao uses the 
usual grand metaphors to describe the dockers' struggle to build 
revolutionary links with the oppressed peoples of the world: 
Neither moun tains nor seas can block 
Our revolutionary fervour. 
We send our sincere friendship 
To all parts of the globe. 
[OTD, 2, 4]. 
When the dockers 'Show their strength, do a good job', they 'win glory 
for our land'; and when they discover that the spilled sack is being 
carried on a lighter to a waiting freighter Gao sings heroically: 
Our country's honour is on that lighter, 
We can't let the enemy's treachery succeed. 
The revolutionary friendship that lighter carries 
Must never be besmirched by the spilled sack. 
Though the th under crashes in a deluge of rain, 
Though the tide rises high in the deep of the nigh t, 
Though the waves are wild and the current SWift, 
I shall brave them all and set out in pursuit. 
Neither mountains of knives nor seas of flames 
Can stop a communist from doing his duty. 
[OTD,30-1]. 
Then Gao shows his determination to protect his country's 
revolutionary gift of seed rice by removing his jacket and covering a 
sack of rice threatened by the pouring rain. A selfless deed 
complements the bold words, which are replete with images of 
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crashing thunder, torrential rain, wild waves, swift currents and, of 
course, the inevitable 'mountains of knives' and 'seas of flames'. This 
was the standard language of heroic metaphor, used here to make the 
pOint that perfection in the workplace is as important to the class 
struggle as heroism on the field of battle. 
The application of heroic language to the mundane work of the 
docks evoked correct revolutionary implicatures only because the 
audience already possessed assumptions which associated that 
language with episodes of heroic struggle. The audience could be 
expected to derive the required implicatures as follows: 
( 1 ) Existing assumption: communists engaged in class struggle 
against 'enemies with guns' must be brave and determined 
enough to climb 'mountains of knives' and go through 'seas of 
fire'. 
(2) Assumption introduced by opera: communists engaged in class 
struggle against 'enemies without guns' must be brave and 
determined enough to climb 'mountains of knives' and go 
through 'seas of fire'. 
(3) Implicature: the struggle against 'enemies without guns' 
requires as much courage and determination as the struggle 
against 'enemies with guns'. 
The implicature was especially easy to derive because the opera 
constantly reminded the audience of the existing assumption by using 
similar language to recall the violent struggles of the past: 
Fang: The words of our forbears are written in blood: 
"Avenge us. Seize the ownership of the docks." 
When the P.L.A. bugles blared the call to charge, 
Our heroes fearlessly drove out the wolves .... 
Dockers' work has significance, 
Why do you say it's demeaning? 
The blood of martyrs dyes our docks .... 
[OTD, 36]. 
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In using language which linked the work of the docks with the 
romantic struggles of the violent past the opera ennobled class 
struggles against hidden enemies within socialist society and against 
imperialists in distant lands. Moreover, as audiences made sense of 
the dialogue, they were required constantly to use assumptions linked 
to the Maoist world view. This made them aware that those who had 
written the opera, with the full approval of the Maoist leadership, 
expected everyone in the audience to possess and accept those 
assumptions. Many people found it difficult to resist these 
expectations. In this way, the process of interpretation tended to 
have persuasive effects through what Sperber and Wilson (1995, 115-
17) have called 'retroactive strengthening'. 
The language of the opera also evoked the dichotomy between 
the World of Light and the World of Darkness (cf. Dittmer 1987 and 
ch. 5 above). It thereby conditioned the audience by associating the 
revolutionary cause with the positive imagery of the World of Light 
and by associating class enemies with the negative imagery of the 
World of Darkness. Consider the lyrics which Fang sings as she reads 
the Communique of the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eight Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: 
Reading the Communique stirs me deeply. 
Outside a rainbow arches across rain-washed sky. 
A great future has our land, pretty as a picture. 
How can we allow monsters here to wreak havoc? 
No matter how quickly the devil changes his wiles, 
We are prepared and well on our guard. 
[OTD, 36]. 
Immediately before this scene, the audience was treated to dark 
clouds, thunder, lightning and torrential rain. Now, as Fang draws 
enlightenment from the Communique, clouds and rain are 
inappropriate. So the weather suddenly clears and the stage 
instructions have Fang study the Communique against a backdrop of 
a 'very blue' sky washed clean by the rain, a few flimsy white clouds, 
and a 'fresh rainbow'. The lyrics of her song contrast this idyllic scene 
with the threat from 'monsters' and 'the devil' - the inhabitants of 
the World of Darkness who are, of course, associated with words like 
'havoc' and 'wiles'. Almost immediately, inspired by the 
Communique as the source of light, she suspects that 'An acute and 
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complex class struggle may lie behind' the incident of the spilled sack, 
with Qjan as the most likely culprit. 
The villainous, black class Qjan briefly leads astray a young red-
class docker, Han. When Han sees the error of his ways, he naturally 
comes to see the conflict as one between a monster from the World of 
Darkness, on the one hand, and the Party as the source of light, on the 
other: 
I've been infected by bourgeois ideas, 
How wrong of me to look down on dockers' work. 
I should not have let down my elders' hopes, 
Nor lightly believed that black-hearted wolf. 
Now I've brought trouble to us all, 
I can hardly be forgiven, hardly be forgiven! 
Thanks to the help of the Party, 
I've come to see light. 
[OTD, 37]. 
Han is quickly forgiven and regains his comrades' trust, for his red 
class background makes him a natural inhabitant of the World of 
Light. Qjan, on the other hand, was suspected in the first instance 
largely because, as a former accountant who had helped the 
Americans, the Japanese and the Guomindang to oppress the workers, 
he belonged to the black categories. Fang, armed with insight into the 
nature of class struggle after reading the Communique, knows that 
Qjan is 'an enemy who is well disguised, mouthing sweet words', that 
he 'pays lip service to socialism but in his heart he does not forget his 
foreign masters.' (OTD, 35). In all the model revolutionary operas, 
members of the black categories were presumptive inhabitants of the 
World of Darkness - always the first suspects. And, as everyone knew, 
the operas were scripts which people were expected to live by. Their 
message of class hatred was backed by the Party; it was reinforced by 
countless other scripts during the institutional phase of the Cultural 
Revolution; and it suited the interests of members of other classes 
who were glad to see suspicion diverted from themselves. Not 
surprisingly, the black categories were always the first suspects in real 
life. In the China of Mao, Jiang Qjng and the cultural radicals, life 
was made to imitate art. 
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In On the Docks, as in all the model revolutionary operas, the 
characters conformed to the formula prescribed by Jiang Qjng's 
doctrines of the 'three prominences' and the 'three accommodations'. 
Fang is distinguished from everyone else by her awareness of the class 
struggle in socialist society, by her reliance on Mao's Thought, and by 
her consequent success in unmasking the class enemy. More 
politically advanced than everyone else, popular and a natural 
leader, she sets a perfect example to otherwise 'good' characters who 
have let their vigilance slacken, allowing the class enemy to tamper 
with the rice and the wheat. She also plays a leading part in the 
salvation of young Han, who was almost seduced from his red class 
roots by the evil, black class Qjan. Her starring role is reflected in the 
fact that she is given the lion's share of the script. 
TABLE 7.2 
Words Spoken or Sung by Characters 
Character 
Fang Haizhen (heroine) 
Gao Zhiyang 
Ma Hongliang 
Han Xiaoq iang 
Zhao Zhenshan 
Minor characters 
Chorus 
Oian Shouwei (villain) 
TOTAL 
No. 
3219 
1049 
927 
831 
531 
308 
188 
664 
7717 
Words 
% of Total 
41.7 
13.6 
12.0 
10.8 
6.9 
4.0 
2.4 
8.6 
100.0 
Fang speaks or sings fully 41.7 percent of the words in the script. The 
second largest roles are allotted to Gao, team leader of the dockers' 
brigade, and Ma, a retired docker well equipped to give lessons in class 
hatred because he remembers the cruel oppression before the 
Communist Party liberated the workers. These two characters are 
exceeded only by Fang in their revolutionary virtue. Somewhat fewer 
words are allotted to Han, the young red class docker who is almost 
lured away by Qjan, and to Zhao, an old communist who has let his 
revolutionary vigilance slacken. By the end of the opera, Fang has 
restored both Han and Zhao to revolutionary virtue. 
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Qjan, as the villain, occupies precisely the role prescribed by the 
'three accommodations'. The plot revolves around his act of 
sabotage, but he is allotted relatively few words and, as a character, he 
is simply a foil to Fang - malevolent, sly, but no match for the 
heroine. He is not even allowed to .impress the audience with his 
voice. As Table 6.3 shows, Qjan is the only person on the stage who 
sings not a single word. 
TABLE 7.3 
Amount Sung by Characters & Chorus 
Character 
Fang Haizhen (heroine) 
All other 'Good' characters 
Chorus 
Oian Shouwei (villain) 
TOTAL 
Lines Sung 
No. % of Total 
140 
168 
13 
o 
321 
43.6 
52.3 
4.0 
0.0 
100.0 
During the Cultural Revolution, as never before, language was a 
badge of revolutionary virtue. A true revolutionary was supposed to 
imitate Lin Biao and the official press by quoting Mao, by referring 
frequently to him or his Thought, and by using the correct political 
terminology at every opportunity. We should therefore expect to 
find that the number of references to Mao and quotations from his 
works is a reliable index of revolutionary virtue. And so it is, as Table 
6.4 demonstrates. 
TABLE 7.4 
Mao-references and Mao-quotes 
Character Mentions of Mao Quotes from Mao 
Fang Haizhen (heroine) 
Other 'Good' characters 
Chorus/workers in unison 
Oian Shouwei 
TOTAL 
299 
No. % No. % 
8 53 
4 27 
3 20 
o 0 
15 100 
3 
o 
1 
o 
4 
7S 
o 
2S 
o 
100 
Fang displays her superior political consciousness by being the only 
individual character to quote Mao, and she does so three times. The 
only other Mao-quote is by the chorus, which is led by Fang (OTD, 5). 
Fang also mentions Mao eight times, twice as often as all the other 
individual characters combined, and she is the only character to 
quote a Party document. The workers collectively or in chorus, who 
have the role of expressing the revolutionary solidarity of the dockers 
under Fang's wise leadership, mention Mao three times as they shout 
'Long live chairman Mao!' and express their commitment to his 
Thought in the final scene. Qjan, as the villain, neither mentions 
Mao nor quotes him. In this respect, the opera conforms precisely to 
the pattern of the novels written during the Cultural Revolution. 
The distribution of ideological terms is in most respects 
predictable. As expected, Fang stands out from all the other 
individual characters. Terms like 'class struggle', 'class enemy', 
'compradors', 'revisionism', 'communism', 'internationalism~, 
'revolutionary', 'anti-imperialist' and, of course, 'Marxism-Leninism-
Mao Zedong Thought', trip lightly from her tongue. Table 7.5 shows 
that she uses ideological terms at over twice the rate of other 'good' 
individual characters. 
TABLE 7.5 
Frequency of Ideological Terms 
Character Ideological Terms 
No. No. per 1000 Words 
Fang Haizhen (heroine) 86 
Gao Zhiyang 12 
Ma Hongliang 6 
Han Xiaoqiang 16 
Zhao Zhenshan 6 
Minor characters 3 
Chorus 14 
Qian Shouwei (villain) 6 
All 'good' characters exc. Fang 43 
ALL CHARACTERS & CHORUS 149 
26.7 
11.4 
6.5 
19.3 
11.3 
9.7 
74.5 
9.0 
11.8 
19.3 
The table, however, has two figures which are at first sight surprising. 
First, the chorus uses ideological terms far more frequently than Fang. 
This results from the fact that the chorus has no ordinary dialogue, 
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but functions as an echo and a megaphone for the correct political 
sentiments expressed by major characters, especially Fang. So when 
Fang sings 'Strike hard at imperialism, revisionism and reaction', the 
chorus chimes in and repeats the line twice, thereby adding six 
ideological words to its total (OTD, .21, quoted above). The chorus 
does not surpass Fang's level of ideological consciousness, but 
reproduces and broadcasts it. 
Second, the villainous Qjan uses ideological terms only a little 
less frequently than the average of all the 'good' individual characters 
excluding Fang. He actually outscores old Ma, the retired docker who 
helps Fang to save young Han from Qjan's clutches. This result 
emphasises the limitations of mere word counts, divorced from any 
context of interpretation, as a measure of ideological consciousness. 
In fact, Qjan's use of ideological terms is almost invariably counter-
revolutionary in intent, as when he says venemously, 'Fang Haizhen, 
the sight of Communists like you makes me see blood', using the 
ideological term 'Communists' as a term of counter-revolutionary 
abuse (OTD, 23). Similarly, when he addresses the dockers using the 
ideological 'Comrades, comrades!', he is making a hypocritical 
attempt to persuade the dockers to trust him (OTD, 20). By contrast, 
old Ma's low percentage of terms which are semantically ideological 
takes no account of the fact that he uses an exceptional number of 
terms which are pragmatically ideological. Consider the following 
passage, in which he tries to bring young Han back to the path of 
revolutionary righteousness as he shows him relics of the 'bitter past': 
Who snarled and bared their claws like wolves? 
Who worked like horses and toiled like oxen? 
Who set up the steep and narrow 'high plank? 
Who trudged on endlessly in sheer exhaustion? 
Compare before liberation and after, 
Look at the carrying pole, 'high plank' and tattered clothes, 
The foreman's whip and manacles .... 
Look carefully, at each and every one. 
[OTD,32]. 
The only word in this passage which is semantically ideological is 
'liberation', a term which all people in China link semantically with 
the Communist Party's victory in 1949. The whole passage, however, 
is pragmatically ideological, since almost every noun and adjective 
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has a pragmatic reference to a quintessentially ideological 
phenomenon - class oppression. So old Ma's language is appropriate 
to his revolutionary message and to his staunch, proletarian status. 
Like everything else in the revolutionary operas, it is carefully 
calculated to teach a political lesson- in this case a lesson in 'class 
education'. 
The message of the operas is paradoxical: it enjoins both 
outstanding initiative and total conformity. The paradox is most 
acute in the case of the main characters, who are at once dashing 
architects of revolutionary victories and robots programmed by 
Maoist scripts - scripts not only in the literal sense, but also in the 
figurative, academic sense of 'schemas which provide models for 
speech and action'. Fang, for example, is intelligent and full of 
natural authority, but she owes her success entirely to her script-
driven fidelity to Mao Zedong's Thought. Her goal, she says, is one 
which she learned from 'steel-strong heroes tempered in a b1aze': 
From them we must learn 
To dedicate ourselves to world revolution, 
To be a never-rusting cog 
In the great revolutionary machine. 
This is the grand ideal, brilliant youth, 
Of every revolutionary. 
[OTD, 38, emphasis added]. 
The ideal was to live in total conformity to the Maoist scripts and to 
be empowered by them. It was an ideal which could be attained only 
on paper and in theatrical performance. In part, this was because the 
Maoist scripts sometimes offered unworkable advice - they were a 
flawed guide to reality. But a further problem was that while the 
scripts could be given a single, 'correct' reading by the main character 
in a work of fiction, their pragmatic referents were less determinate in 
real life. A script-writer can ensure that a fictional hero always 
chooses the correct interpretive assumptions, but there is no way of 
ensuring that real life heroes will do the same. So people who sought 
to demonstrate the script-inspired initiative of Fang and other leading 
characters ran the risk of interpreting the scripts 'wrongly'. When 
that happened, interpretations and actions intended to be 
'revolutionary' were denounced by the Maoist hierarchy as 
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'counterrevolutionary'. Even the Red Guards discovered that to their 
cost. 
The Maoist leaders hoped that by making people learn scripts 
they could control their behaviour, and the model revolutionary 
operas, whose songs most Chinese learned by heart, were intended as a 
rich source of such scripts. Having observed and learned the scripts, 
people were supposed to act them out. Life was supposed to imitate 
art. The scripts alone, however, were insufficient, because their 
implications varied with the context of interpretation. As a result, 
the institutional phase of the Cultural Revolution saw not only mass 
learning of Maoist scripts, both literal and figurative, but also the re-
building of a coercive apparatus to guide interpretive assumptions, 
monitor interpretation and correct or crush those who adopted 
deviant readings. Even then, we shall see, it was impossible to achieve 
full uniformity of thought, in part because the context of 
interpretation remained to some extent intractable. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EDUCATING REVOLUTIONARIES: 
THE CASE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING 
8.1 The Cultural Revolution and School Curricula 
The Cultural Revolution had a devastating impact on Chinese 
education. From mid-1966 to late 1968 the schools and universities 
virtually ceased to function except as revolutionary headquarters. 
Nearly all their staff were subjected to harrowing criticism, large 
numbers were beaten and many were locked up for months or years in 
improvised campus gaols popularly called niu peng ('cow sheds') after 
the niugui sheshen ('cow ghosts and snake spirits' alias 'monsters and 
demons') imprisoned there. When the schools re-opened, under the 
control of 'workers-peasants-soldiers propaganda teams', theIr teaching 
was at first confined largely to supervised study of Mao's works and 
Maoist newspaper editorials, together with talks by old workers or 
peasants who 'recalled the bitter past' which they had experienced 
before Mao and the Communist Party saved them. The function of 
schooling was now to ensure that students 'became participants in the 
great struggle to transform the old world and create the new' (Beijing 
Review, no. 1,4 Jan. 1974). 
In 1969 and 1970, however, new curricula and textbooks at last 
appeared, together with enough teachers (many released from the 'cow 
pens' or returned from 're-education' under the peasants) to provide at 
least some formal classes. The new curricula and textbooks bore the 
unmistakable stamp of the Cultural Revolution. In Canton, for example, 
the textbook used to teach Chinese literature and language contained 
mostly quotations from Mao, together with newspaper editorials on the 
latest political campaign and occasional readings from the new 'model 
revolutionary plays' sponsored by Jiang Qjng (Unger 1982, 176). 
Sciences, criticised as 'academic' and irrelevant to revolutionary 
concerns, were dropped as distinct disciplines in favour of a course on 
'Industrial-Agricultural-Military Studies' which mentioned scientific 
principles only in relation to production techniques and never 
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explained them coherently. Even the arithmetic textbook 'contained 
mainly Mao quotes.' (Unger 1982, 158, 175). So in both content and 
linguistic form, the new textbooks were subordinated to Maoist 
discourse. 
In this context, it is at first sight surprising that the study of 
English survived the Cultural Revolution. It was even less use than 
physics and chemistry to the workers and peasants; no one, except a 
few people in high places, was going to be able to use it to talk to 
foreigners or to read English newspapers or books; it was the main 
language of the imperialists, and its diplomatic uses were limited 
because China's foreign relations had almost ceased to eXist; and it was 
not even going to be of much use to scientists and technicians, 
hamstrung by attacks on expertise, the policy of technological self-
reliance and the cult of the untutored worker-peasant inventor. The 
whole logic of the Cultural Revolution implied that mass instruction in 
the English language was not only unnecessary, but perhaps anti-
revolutionary. That, indeed, is precisely the view which prevailed in 
the heartland of the Cultural Revolution, Shanghai, where English was 
eliminated from the curriculum until 1971 when China began to 
emerge from diplomatic isolation (Unger 1982, 283, n.6). Shanghai's 
stand, almost certainly, reflected the influence there of Zhang 
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, who were leaders of the 
Central Cultural Revolution Group, Jiang Qing's firmest allies, and close 
to Mao himself. All from Shanghai, they dominated the city during the 
Cultural Revolution and enforced extreme revolutionary purity. 
In China as a whole, however, the teaching of English underwent 
what looked like a boom. The reason was that Mao had said, when 
talking to some Red Guards in 1968, 'It's good to know English. I 
studied foreign languages late in life. I suffered. One has to learn 
foreign languages when one is young .... One cannot study geology 
without a foreign language. It's good to learn English. Foreign 
language study should be started in primary school.' (Unger 1982, 283 
n.S). Only self-confident revolutionaries close to Mao, who did not 
have to rely on newspaper reports of his chance remarks in order to . 
know how far they could go, could afford to take any chances. So while 
Zhang, Yao and Wang for a time excluded English from Shanghai, it was 
taught as soon as possible in almost all secondary schools elsewhere. 
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However, it had to be taught in a way consistent with the discourse of 
the Cultural Revolution. This resulted in remarkable pedagogical 
innovations, all designed to ensure that centralized control of the word 
applied even to the teaching of the English language. To clarify the 
nature of these innovations, I will briefly outline the aims and 
pedagogy of foreign language instruction in China before the Cultural 
Revolution. I will then examine 22 English Language textbooks 
published between 1969 and 1976 to show how the very different aims 
of foreign language instruction during the Cultural Revolution led to 
the adoption of new pedagogical principles which affected the teaching 
of vocabulary, cultural background and even grammar. 
8.2 Foreign Language Teaching: Aims and Pedagogy 
China has a long tradition of foreign language education. The first 
foreign language school opened in the thirteenth century, arro when 
China suffered defeats at the hands of imperialist powers in the 
nineteenth century the need for foreign languages became urgent. 
Western languages, especially English, were seen as the key to 
modernization, and both the imperial government and the republican 
administrations which followed it after 1912 founded many language 
schools. Thousands of students went abroad, including the future 
Communist leaders Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Their influence 
ensured that when the Communists gained power in 1949 they, too, 
promoted foreign language education. Russian soon displaced English 
as the most widely taught language because the Soviet Union was 
China's main source of diplomatic, military, economic and 
technological support. Then, with the Sino-Soviet split in the early 
1960s, the demand for Russian speakers declined and English regained 
parity (Fu 1986, 1-83). 
Until the Cultural RevolUtion, the purpose of teaching foreign 
languages was always to facilitate communication with foreigners for 
diplomatic or commercial purposes, or to gain access to useful aspects 
of their science, technology or culture. This aim had implications for 
pedagogy, reflected in the approach to grammar, vocabulary and 
cultural context in China in the early 1960s: 
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Grammar. Where possible, simple grammatical principles were 
explained before complicated ones, frequently used rules before rarely 
used ones, and regular forms before irregular ones. These pedagogical 
principles are, of course, common to all the main approaches to 
language instruction in the West. As Cook (1991, 25-6) points out, 
even functionally based language courses which are ostensibly 
organized around topics of everyday importance ('Asking permission', 
'Going shopping') employ this order of presentation - dealing with the 
present tense before the past tense, the past tense before the past 
perfect tense, and so on. 
Vocabulary. Under the seven year plan initiated by Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai in 1964, high school language students were to acquire a 
vocabulary of 3,000 words, enabling them to read simple foreign books 
and newspapers and to conduct uncomplicated conversations. To 
facilitate this aim, the words selected were 'basic' ones essential for 
communicating with native speakers (Fu 1986,147). This ap-proach 
was like that of Western course designers who compile vocabulary lists 
with the help of research on how frequently native speakers use 
particular words, and who also take into account criteria such as a 
word's coverage - its ability to define other words, to take their place, 
and to combine with them to make new words (Nation 1990). Relative 
to the aim of communication with foreigners, this is elementary good 
pedagogy. 
Cultural context. Chinese language students were required to study the 
present situation, history, geography, culture and customs of the 
country whose language they were acquiring. Their textbooks also had 
to include fables, short stories, myths and extracts from Original works 
by native speakers (Tang n.d. [19837],43). Again, relative to the goal 
of communication, this was pedagogically sound, for communicative 
competence in a foreign language requires understanding of the 
culturally specific contextual assumptions which guide reference 
assignment and determine the social significance of utterances (Saville 
Troike 1996; Cramsch 1993; Cook 1991, 54-7; Widdowson 1990; and 
on context and reference assignment in general, Sperber and Wilson 
1995). 
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But what if enabling students to talk with foreigners or 
understand their books is not the only aim of language instruction, or 
even the main one? Under these circumstances, quite different 
pedagogical principles may be in order. In the West, for example, 
theorists like Curran (1967) have seen language classes in part as a 
means of fostering student self-expression and personal development. 
This has led them to recommend radical student-centred approaches in 
which the teacher becomes merely a facilitator who gives no direct 
instruction and corrects neither grammar nor pronunciation (Cook 
1991, 148-50). 
In China during the Cultural Revolution the traditional goal of 
communicating with foreigners was even more thoroughly eclipsed. 
Instead, school students were subjected to courses of language 
instruction whose imperatives were largely political. The remainder of 
this chapter explores the effects of these imperatives on English 
language teaching in China, taking as its major source textbooks used in 
high school language classes. The books were all published in 
important centres and formed a model for those published elsewhere, 
so my conclusions about their contents, grammatical pedagogy and 
vocabulary can be extended to China as a whole. 
8.3 The Textbooks: (1) Maoist Discourse 
The Maoist cadres who controlled education were not going to expose 
language students to a discourse which reflected the assumptions of 
Western society. Amongst those assumptions was the belief that there 
was a sphere of 'private life', separated from politiCS, which could be 
analysed in non-political terms. For the Maoists, everything was 
political, and that 'fact' had to be reflected in the contents of the 
textbooks. Table I summarizes the contents of the 25 lessons in a 
textbook which became a model for introductory texts in many parts of 
China. 
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TABLE 8.1 
Contents of English. vol. 1, Beijing 1969 
Contents of lesson Number Percent 
Political 25 100 
Moral Ed. & Ch. Trad.1 0 0 
Science 0 0 
Foreign Stories 0 0 
General 0 0 
TOTAL 25 100 
The lessons, it can be seen, were entirely political. They consisted 
mainly of English translations of political slogans, quotations from 
Chairman Mao, Lin Biao's inscriptions, and revolutionary songs. Their 
main theme was Mao worship. The first thirteen lesson, in fact, 
consisted of nine lessons praising Mao and four quoting him. In lesson 
six, for example, the only thing they learned was 'Chairman l'1ao is the 
red sun in our hearts'; in lesson seven, their only task was to study 
Mao's statement that 'Our Party is a great Party, a glorious Party, a 
correct Party'; and in lesson ten, they confined their attention to Lin 
Biao's inSCription: 
Long live the great teacher, great supreme commander and great 
helmsman Chairman Mao! A long life to him! A long, long life to 
him! 
The early textbooks, especially, were dominated by the scripts of 
Mao worship, but these were always complemented by scripts 
expressing other themes of Maoist discourse. One of the most common 
themes was 'the bitter past of the labouring people', which was always 
contrasted with the happiness and prosperity of the present (English, 
vol. 11, Shanghai 1974). It had several standard variants, but a 
particularly useful one stressed the hunger which had stalked the land 
before Liberation: 
1 'Moral Education and Chinese Tradition'. 
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I am fifteen. 
And Grandpa is sixty-three ... 
I have bread and rice for meals. 
But he had only husks and weeds ... 
Why are things so different? 
Because the times are different. 
Thanks to the Party and Chairman Mao, the former slaves are the 
masters of the country now. [English, vol. 8, Shanghai 1973]. 
Students were made to say this, of course, partly because most of them 
had been hungry during the Great Leap Forward and were still very 
poor. They had to be convinced that they were actually well off - or at 
least better off than their grandparents. 
Another theme of the discourse was class struggle, which 
dominated lessons as never before. Its form can be exemplified from 
the textbooks themselves: 
It is half past two in the afternoon. The pupils of Class One are 
sitting in the classroom. They are having a lesson in class 
struggle. On the blackboard there is a quotation from Chairman 
Mao, 'never forget classes and class struggle'. An old worker is 
telling the pupils about his bitter past and his happy life today. 
From time to time the pupils shout, 'Never forget class bitterness! 
Always remember class hatred! Long live the Communist Party of 
China!' [English, vol. 1, Henan 1973]. 
Recitation of the scripts of class hatred was intended to perpetuate 
hostility to surviving members of the old exploiting classes, who played 
a useful role as targets of competitive displays of revolutionary fervour. 
To justify continued struggle against them, the scripts had to claim that 
they could never be trusted. One textbook, for example, told the story 
of 'The Farmhand and the Snake'. It tells how a farmhand took pity on 
a snake dying of cold. He picked it up and warmed it in his bosom. 
When the snake revived it gave the farmhand a deadly bite. The story 
ends like this: 
Chairman Mao teaches us: 'Who are our enemies? Who are our 
friends? This is a question of first importance for the revolution. 
Class enemies are just like snakes. We should never expect them 
to change their nature. We should always be on our guard 
against them and carry the revolution through to the end. 
[English, vol. 10, Shanghai 1973]. 
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Similar stories warning students against the cunning and treachery of 
class enemies were a feature of many volumes (e.g., English, vol. 5, 
Henan 1972; English, vol. 8, Henan 1974; English, vol. 6, Henan 1973; 
English, vol. 6, Tianjin 1973). 
A third prominent theme of the discourse was reverence for 
workers, soldiers and especially the poor and lower-middle peasants: 
The working class is the leading class. [English, vol. 1, Beijing 
1969]. 
Workers, peasants and soldiers are our good teachers. [English, 
vol. 1, Henan 1975]. 
Two weeks' labour in the countryside has really done me a lot of 
good .... I worked with the poor and lower-middle peasants and 
learned a lot from them. [English, vol. 6, Henan 1973]. 
The poor and lower-middle peasants care for and help .. us. They 
teach us how to cut wheat. They teach us how to bind it. They 
are our good teachers. We learn a lot from them. [English, vol. 3, 
Henan 1972]. 
[My sister] is a barefoot doctor. ... She serves the poor and lower-
middle peasants heart and soul. In her letters she says: "The 
countryside is a good classroom. The poor and lower-middle 
peasants are my good teachers. I will serve them all my life." 
[English, vol. 2, Beijing 1972]. 
We are educated young people. We receive re-education in the 
Red Flag People's Commune .... The poor and lower-middle 
peasants are our good teachers. They help us study Marxism-
Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. They often give us lessons in 
class struggle and the struggle for production .... We are 
determined to make revolution in the countryside all our lives. 
[English, vol. 8, Henan 1974]. 
Making students recite these standardised scripts served two main 
purposes. It subordinated them to the workers and the poor and lower-
middle peasants, lest they show any tendency to develop into an 
educated elite; and it forced them to praise what most of them dreaded 
- exile to the countryside, where they would spend the rest of their 
days working hard under the tutelage of the poor and lower-middle 
peasants. In other words, the discourse of the textbooks reinforced the 
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social engineering of the 'New Born Things' of the Cultural Revolution 
which we discussed in chapter 6. 
A fourth theme of the discourse was summed up by the Maoist 
slogan 'Serve the people!' One textbook included an abridged version 
of Mao's essay which bore that title, and nearly all textbooks had stories 
which exemplified its theme. Characters in the books not only burned 
with desire to sacrifice themselves for the people in general, but 
actively searched for ways to sacrifice themselves for individuals, 
especially old people from good class backgrounds. Invariably, they 
were inspired by Chairman Mao who taught them: 'All people in the 
revolutionary ranks must care for each other, must love and help each 
other.' (English, vol. 5, Henan 1972). 
After Lin Biao died in the wake of an alleged attempt at a coup in 
1971, people saw that Mao's best friend, hand-picked as his successor, 
was now officially described as a 'bourgeois careerist, conspirator, 
double-dealer, renegade and traitor'. However, the Party's ultra-left 
guiding principles remained largely intact, and those who sought to 
preserve the 'gains' of the Cultural Revolution retained great influence 
in the party's leadership. So revolutionary momentum remained strong 
and most educational innovations were retained. This continuity was 
reflected in the contents of the textbooks, such as those published in 
Henan in 1972: 
TABLE 8.2 
Contents of English, vols 2, 3, 5, Henan 1972 
Contents of lesson Number Percent 
Political 23 88.46 
Moral Ed. & Ch. Trad. 1 3.85 
Science a 0.00 
Foreign stories 1 3.85 
General 1 3.85 
TQTAL 26 100.00 
The table shows that after Lin Biao's death the percentage of lessons 
categorized as mainly 'political' remained nearly as high as in 1969. If 
anything, the table understates the pervasiveness of political content, 
for throughout the Cultural Revolution nearly all the lessons in other 
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categories had political content too. For example, in a 1974 textbook a 
lesson on knowledge of the earth, which we would classify under the 
heading 'General', had a conclusion which attacked the discourse of 
race and expressed the discourse of class and revolution: 
A. ... What are the five races on the earth? 
B: They are the red, the yellow, the brown, the white and 
the black races. But it is nonsense to divide mankind 
according to the colour of the skin. 
A: How would you divide mankind, then? 
B: They may be divided into two classes, the exploiters 
and the exploited. 
c: You are right They may also be divided into the 
revolutionary and the reactionary. [English, vol. 8, Henan 
1974]. 
The main difference in the content of textbooks after the death of 
Lin Biao was that they were purged of Lin's own Mao-worshipping 
slogans and inscriptions, so prominent in earlier years. In their place 
were lessons which reflected the vicious campaigns to discredit Lin 
himself. Their technique was simply to direct at Lin the standard 
discourse used to condemn enemies - the very discourse which he 
himself had once used against people like Liu Shaoqi. One textbook, for 
example, has a former coal miner say: 
Before liberation this coal-mine was owned by the Japanese 
aggressors. I was a coal-miner here. How I suffered in those 
miserable days! .... But Lin Biao attempted to restore capitalism 
and sell out our country to the socialist-imperialists. He wanted 
to make us suffer under the imperialists' rule once again. We will 
never allow such a thing to happen. We will further strengthen 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and smash any plot for 
capitalist restoration. [English, vol. 2, Tianjin 1974]. 
The discourse did not change, but the textbooks always kept in step 
with the latest political line simply by attaching different referents to 
the terms of praise and condemnation. It was possible to predict the 
contents of the books if one knew the current political situation, and 
one could understand the current situation simply by reading the 
books. 
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Textbooks whose over-riding aim was to teach correct political 
thought could not afford to waste time putting the English language in 
its cultural context. Nor could they afford to contaminate the students' 
minds by introducing them to stories by Western writers, for even 
stories which were totally apolitical were by that very fact politically 
incorrect - manifestations of the bourgeois doctrine that literature 
could be separated from politics. So the only 'foreigners' in the books 
were stereotyped imperialists or stereotyped clones of revolutionary 
Chinese. Consider, for example, the characterization of a foreigner in 
the story 'Eager to get a Chairman Mao Badge': 
The black sailor comes to China for the first time ... He loves 
Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao is the ever-red sun in his heart. 
He is eager to get a Chairman Mao badge. 'How happy I am!' 
Tears in his eyes, he shouts: 'Long live Chairman Mao! A long, 
long life to him!' [English, vol. 1, Beijing 1969]. 
The sailor simply expressed the politically correct sentiments of a 
model Mao-worshipper. This served the purpose of propagandists who 
wanted to encourage young Chinese to believe that Mao was an 
inspiration to all the oppressed peoples of the world. Children who 
believed their textbook, though, would have been nonplussed had they 
ever met a real worker from an English speaking country. And if they 
had tried to engage in conversation, they would almost inevitably have 
made statements which were miSinterpreted, or which gave offence, 
caused embarrassment or sounded unintentionally comical. They 
simply had too many false assumptions about the values and 
background knowledge of the people whose language they were trying 
to learn. In short, the contents of the textbooks supplied the students 
with the standard assumptions required for the correct interpretation 
of political messages in China. They supplied none of the very different 
interpretive assumptions which were a pre-requisite of effective 
communication with foreigners. 
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8.4 The Textbooks: (2) Vocabulary 
People studying a new language cannot use it effectively as medium of 
communication unless they know the most commonly used words. We 
can ascertain whether the textbooks provided a suitable grounding in 
the English language's 'essential nucleus' by comparing their 
vocabulary with the first and second word lists compiled by Paul Nation 
(Nation 1983). The first list consists of the thousand words (apart from 
purely structural words like prepositions) which it is most necessary for 
students to master if they are to use English as a system of 
communication. These words occur very frequently, they are used in 
many different contexts, their inflections and syntax are relatively 
regular, and they are extremely useful in defining and explaining other 
words. The basic vocabulary in any well designed course of instruction 
in English will consist mainly of these words. The second list consists of 
another thousand words which, while less essential, figure prominently 
in the vocabulary of native speakers. Students who can recognise these 
words, and the thousand somewhat more advanced words in Nation's 
third list, will be able to read a good deal of everyday English material 
without frequent use of a dictionary. 
The first of our textbooks, published in Beijing in 1969, is an 
introductory text for students who had never learnt English before. It 
has a total vocabulary of only 179 words which are not purely 
structural. According to the pedagogical principles used in most 
textbooks, a large majority of these words should come from the 
thousand basic words in Nation's first list. Table 8.3 shows that only 
33.5 percent of words are in the first list, and only another 2.8 percent 
in the second list. Most of the words, in fact, are not part of the 
everyday vocabulary of native speakers of English. 
TABLE 8.3 
Frequency of Occurrence of Basic Vocabulary in 
Introductory Textbook, English, vol. 1, Beijing 1969 
Total In Nation's First List In Nation's Second List 
No. % No. % No. % 
179 100 60 33.5 5 2.8 
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If only 36.5 percent of the 179 non-structural words in this 
introductory textbook are amongst the 2000 most basic words in the 
English language, what principles governed their selection? They were 
not chosen according to linguistically oriented pedagogical principles, 
but according to political ones. They were the words required to 
translate the slogans of the Cultural Revolution. Students could say 
'Chairman Mao leads us in the socialist revolution and socialist 
construction, and in the struggle against imperialism and revisionism', 
but few native speakers of English had more than the haziest idea of 
what this meant. And the students still had not learned how to say 
'hello', 'good-bye', or ask for a cup of tea. 
The influence of politics on vocabulary was particularly obvious 
in 1969, but it remained strong throughout the Cultural Revolution. As 
Table 8.4 shows, just over 40 percent of the non-structural words in 
two middle level school textbooks published in Henan in 1972 and 
1973 occur in Nation's list of the thousand most basic words, and only 
six or seven percent can be found can be found amongst the next 
thousand. 
TABLE 8.4 
Frequency of Occurrence of Basic Vocabulary in 
Intermediate Level School Textbooks, 1972 and 1973 
Details of 
Textbook 
English, vol. 5 
Henan 1972 
English, vol. 4 
Henan 1973 
Total 
Vocabulary 
No. % 
124 100 
129 100 
In Nation's 
First List 
No. % 
51 41 
56 43 
In Nation's 
Second List 
No. % 
7 6 
9 7 
Many of the words in the textbooks used the phonetics of the 
English language to code the content of the Chinese political 
vocabulary. As a result, native speakers of the English language, 
unfamiliar with Chinese political terminology, would frequently not 
have known what the textbooks were talking about. Few, for example, 
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would have known that the term 'socialist-imperialists' referred to the 
leaders of the Soviet Union; that the term 'traitors', when used with 
reference to people's activities after 1949, referred exclusively to 
people of 'good' class origins who had betrayed their origins by 
opposing the revolutionary line; or that the term 'class' referred to a 
multitude of 'good' and 'bad' groups which often had nothing to do 
with classes in any Western sense, Marxist or non-Marxist (cf. chapter 
2). Other words in the textbooks which had different meanings for 
Chinese students than for native speakers included 'reactionary', 'the 
people', 'landlord', 'model', 'secretary', 'instructor', 'renegade', 'bad 
element', 'scab', 'intellectual', 'advanced' and 'correct'. 'Correct', for 
example, did not mean, as it did to native speakers of English in the 
1960s or 1970s, 'true' or 'proper', but 'politically correct' in the sense 
of 'conforming to the current revolutionary line'. No attempt was made 
to teach Chinese students the meanings which these terms had in the 
English speaking world. So even on narrowly political topics they 
would have found it difficult to get their message across. In the words 
of one language teacher, 'The English in the textbooks was not the 
English of any English-speaking country.' (Tang n.d. [19837],44). 
Because so many non-structural words in the textbooks were 
rarely used outside the specialized formulae which dominated Chinese 
political discourse, students had no chance to learn that solid core of 
constantly recurring words which must be understood if language is to 
be used as a medium of general communication. It is through 
understanding such words that we are able to construct a context which 
sheds light on the meaning of words which are new to us. Students who 
lack such words will frequently find that they can understand 
individual phrases, but that the meaning of a whole text remains 
obscure. Moreover, because most of the words taught in the texts were 
very narrow in their application and had little defining power, the 
students were not able to build on them to ascertain the meaning of 
other words. So in relation to the goal of teaching English as a means 
of communication with native speakers, the vocabulary in the textbooks 
was a disaster. In relation to the rival goal of political indoctrination, 
however, the vocabulary which the students learned was entirely 
appropriate. It was the language of revolutionary discourse, and the 
students used it to say all the right revolutionary things. 
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8.5 The Textbooks: (3) Grammar 
In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, the politicized pedagogy 
of the textbooks extended to the teaching of grammar. Most language 
courses, we have seen, start with grammar which is simple, frequently 
used and regular in form. They introduce pOints which are difficult, 
rare or irregular only at more advanced levels. The pedagogy of 
textbooks early in the Cultural Revolution, however, was based on quite 
different principles. The first English sentence which students met in 
the 1969 Beijing textbook, for example, was 'Long live Chairman Mao!' 
This is a conventional expression with irregular grammar, and using 
purely linguistic criteria it would not have been considered for 
inclusion at the outset of an introductory text. The criteria employed, 
however, were not linguistic but political. The most important sentence 
in the English language, as in any language, was 'Long live Chairman 
Mao!', so it had to come first. 
If students were to recite many of the slogans of the Cultural 
Revolution, they had to be introduced to the imperative mood. So the 
second sentence in the textbook was an imperative: 'Let's wish our 
great leader Chairman Mao a long, long life!' This laid the groundwork 
for a later lessons in which students were expected to say things like 
'Down with U.S. imperialism!' and 'Down with the renegade, traitor, and 
scab, Liu Shaoqil' 
Having learned to recite slogans in the imperative mood, students 
were introduced to the indicative mood and the present tense. They 
were then able to recite other slogans such as 'Workers, peasants and 
soldiers love Chairman Mao best.' In this sentence, however, they met 
their first adverb, and it was not a simple adverb but the superlative 
'best'. No attempt was made to explain the use of adverbs in English, 
or to situate the superlative form 'best' in the context of the 
comparative 'better' or the simple 'well'. From a linguistic pOint of 
view, this was poor pedagogy, but from a political point of view it was 
natural. The language of Chinese politics was a language of extremity 
based around unbridgeable dichotomies between the most extreme 
good and the most appalling evil, so adjectives and adverbs frequently 
took the superlative form (see ch. 5 above). And in talking about 
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Chairman Mao, the temptation to use superlatives like 'best' was 
especially great, for his virtues and the love of his faithful followers 
were 'boundless'. 
At this stage of the Cultural Revolution, it was necessary not only 
to participate in the cult of Mao-worship but to acknowledge the 
authority of the cult's high-priest, party Vice-Chairman Lin Biao. This 
involved the recitation of Lin Biao's inscriptions, which sometimes 
featured advanced grammatical forms. Students who knew almost no 
English were required to say: 
Sailing the seas depends on the helmsman, 
Making revolution depends on Mao Tse-tung's thought. 
[English, vol. 1, Beijing 1969]. 
Here they met the gerundive use of 'sailing' and 'making'. Since 
Chinese verbs are not inflected, and there are no gerunds, these English 
words would have puzzled students who thought about them. 
Fortunately, the book does not add to the confusion by attempting to 
explain gerunds. Its concern was not the grammar, but the political 
necessity of worshipping Mao in the words of Lin Biao. 
Mastery of the tenses of the English language presents particular 
problems to Chinese students, for the verbs in their own language have 
no tense. It is very important, from a linguistic point of view, to 
introduce the tenses in a clear and systematic way. Left to themselves, 
Chinese teachers of English would have dealt first with the present and 
past tenses, leaving the rather confusing present perfect and past 
perfect till later. In the 1969 textbook, however, the second tense 
which students met was the present perfect. This was not because the 
textbook's authors were experimenting, as language experts, with 'way 
paving' or some other linguistically motivated pedagogical technique, 
but because it was politically imperative to teach students to sing 'The 
East Is Red' early in their studies: 
The East is red, the sun rises, 
China has brought forth a Mao Zedong. 
[Emphasis added]. 
It would be hard to think of a more confusing way of introducing the 
present perfect tense, for 'bring/brought' is an irregular verb, and 
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students had not yet been introduced to verbs like 'start/started' which 
follow the standard form. Moreover, 'to bring forth' is a rather 
uncommon expression, unlikely to be used except when singing 'The 
East Is Red'. And finally, this lapse into the present perfect tense was 
accompanied by no attempt to explaip or illustrate the principles which 
govern its use. 
Later in the Cultural Revolution, however, linguistic criteria 
became far more important in determining the order in which 
grammatical points were presented. Students still had to learn how to 
say 'Long live Chairman Mao!' at the beginning of their studies, and 
they were still given an early introduction to the imperative so that 
they could recite the more inflammatory slogans. Thereafter, however, 
the textbooks reverted to a traditional order of presentation based on 
linguistic principles, not political ones. By 1972, for example, the 
textbooks in Beijing, Henan and elsewhere were drilling students 
thoroughly in the present tense, then moving systematically through 
the other tenses before presenting the present perfect and past perfect 
tenses last. 
Why, when the textbooks' vocabulary lists remained politicized 
throughout the Cultural Revolution, did the textbooks so quickly 
discard most political criteria in teaching grammar? The crucial 
difference is that while the presentation of revolutionary content was 
impossible without a specialized political vocabulary, it could easily be 
reconciled with orthodox teaching of grammar. Even introductory 
textbooks restricted to the present tense had ample scope for Mao 
worship: 
Chairman Mao! 
You are the red sun in our hearts! 
We are sunflowers. 
Sunflowers always face the red sun. 
We think of you day and night. 
We wish you a long, long life. 
[English, vol. 2, Beijing 1972]. 
If the textbooks so often ignored linguistically oriented pedagogical 
principles in 1969, it was because Mao worship and disdain for experts 
were more extreme than in the later stages of the Cultural Revolution. 
Revolutionary discourse proclaimed that Mao Zedong's Thought was, in 
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Lin Biao's words, 'an inexhaustible source of strength and a spiritual 
atom bomb of infinite power' (Urban 1971,44). Mao's Thought, rather 
than mere technical expertise, was said to be the secret of success in all 
fields. When Chinese scientists successfully observed a solar eclipse, it 
was because they had been 're-educated by workers, peasants and 
soldiers' and were 'Armed with the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung'; 
and when fishermen made big catches, it was because 'They put 
revolution in command of fishing and set up thousands of Mao Tse-
tung thought study classes on their fishing vessels ... repudiat[ing] the 
revisionist fallacies peddled by the renegade, hidden traitor and scab 
Liu Shaoqi, such as IImaterial incentives", "skills first" and II profits in 
command".' (New China News Agency, 23 jan., 11 june 1969, in Urban 
1971, 46-48). In this context, it was difficult to press the claims of 
linguistically oriented pedagogy, for that could bring accusations of 
putting 'skills first' from revolutionary ideologues. 
By 1972, however, some of the more irrational excesse's of the 
Mao cult had passed. Lin Biao, the leading exponent of Mao worship, 
was disgraced and dead, while Premier Zhou Enlai was battling Jiang 
Qjng and the more extreme Maoists, re-building the bureaucracy and 
searching for practical solutions to China's problems. Moreover, China 
was re-emerging in world politics. The People's Republic replaced 
Taiwan in the United Nations in 1971; the American President, Richard 
Nixon, visited China in 1972; and 31 countries established diplomatic 
relations with China in those two years. Under these circumstances, 
Mao agreed with Zhou Enlai and Vice-Premier Li Xiannian to re-
emphasise the teaching of foreign languages. At the same time, Mao's 
allies in promoting the Cultural Revolution, the extreme radical around 
Jiang Qjng, interpreted the slogan 'politics in command' to mean that 
the textbooks should be dominated by translations of Mao's quotations 
and by political material reflecting the current Party line (Fu 1986, 84-
5). The result was a compromise, weighted in the radicals' favour. The 
textbooks retained their revolutionary content, but that content was 
now graded carefully to ensure that it was largely consistent with the 
proper teaching of grammar. So students received a thorough 
grounding in grammatical principles while being taught a vocabulary 
selected according to political criteria, not linguistic ones. 
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8.6 Language Teaching, Discourse and World View 
From the perspective which dominated during the Cultural Revolution, 
it mattered little that the teaching of foreign languages in China did not 
equip students to communicate with foreigners. What mattered was 
that young people should saw the world through the lens of Mao 
Zedong's Thought. Indeed, it was to ensure faithfulness to his message 
and destroy those whom he suspected of subverting it that Mao 
launched the Cultural Revolution. His primary targets were 
bureaucrats, teachers and intellectuals who emphasised technical 
proficiency rather than ideological purity. Their destruction required a 
discourse which damned those who were 'white and expert' rather than 
'revolutionary and red'. In terms of that discourse, traditional language 
teaching pedagogy was grossly deficient since it put technical 
proficiency before revolutionary politics. This way of thinking carried 
all before it until 1971-2, and through Jiang Qing and the radicals it 
exercised a profound although more selective influence thereafter. 
The subordination of English language instruction to Maoist 
political discourse ensured that learning a foreign language was not 
going to open up a window onto another world, or give students access 
to other patterns of thought. Prescribed terms such as 'reactionary', 
'capitalist roader', 'revisionist, 'traitor' and 'scab' categorized and 
judged the world in particular ways, as did 'revolutionary', 'socialist', 
and 'proletarian'. The insistence that they, and they alone, constituted 
the language of social, political, moral and aesthetic appraisal severely 
limited what could be said. And, insofar as constant use made these 
terms more accessible than alternatives, they influenced what could 
most easily be thought. Because descriptions of Western societies, for 
example, used only the technical vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong Thought, nothing positive could be said about them, except that 
their workers loved Chairman Mao. The result was a one-dimensional 
picture which reduced Western societies to sources of class exploitation 
and imperialist aggression which were ripe for revolution. Anyone who 
wanted to add other dimensions to the picture had to make the effort 
to break away, inwardly, from the enforced language of public 
discourse. This was not impossible, but in Mao's China few had any 
incen tive to try. 
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Because the language of the textbooks was based on standard 
Maoist formulae, it had all the persuasive effects associated with such 
formulae which we have discussed in earlier chapters. Moreover, we 
might suggest that translating the content of revolutionary formulae 
into the linguistic form of a foreign language had two additional 
advantages. First, it involved intensive mental processing which fixed 
their content even more firmly in students' minds. Second, translating 
Maoist formulae into a foreign language helped to universalize their 
message, implying that it was a matter of prime importance, not just for 
the Chinese people, but for the whole world. This point was made 
explicit in several textbooks. One textbook, for example, quoted a 
fictitious Soviet sailor: 
Comrade Mao Tse-tung is the Lenin of our era. He is the ever-red 
sun in the hearts of the people of the world. He is the great 
leader of the world's revolutionary people. He leads us in the 
struggle against imperialism and revisionism .... We vow to follow 
him and make revolution forever. [English, vol. 1, Beijing 1969]. 
Such passages told the students that Maoist discourse, irrespective of 
the linguistic code through which it was expressed, was the universal 
language of the revolutionary masses. 
During the Cultural Revolution 'real' English was kept out of the 
classroom, confined to a tiny elite whose services were required as 
diplomats and interpreters. Instead the English which most students 
were taught was oriented towards translations of Maoist scripts and 
Chinese political terms. These were the scripts and the terms required 
for the correct analysis of the world. They would one day be 
understood and accepted in the West, as capitalism crumbled. In the 
meantime, China had a mission to disseminate Maoist discourse by 
translations and propaganda, and to safeguard the revolutionary purity 
of her own population. In the discourse of the Cultural Revolution, 
China was a model for the rest of the world, but the world could teach 
China nothing. 
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IV 
ASSESSMENT 
CHAPTER 9 
MAO'S EXPERIMENT IN LINGUISTIC ENGINEERING: 
SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
By the time Mao died in 1976, the Chinese people had been 
subjected to 27 years of linguistic engineering. For all but two of those 
years (mid-1966 to mid-1968) a centralized hierarchy had monitored 
not only language but also interpretation, in an attempt to ensure that 
'correct' words were matched by 'correct' thought. At the end of this 
period, what had been achieved? Was Maoist language matched by 
Maoist thought? We are now in a position to reflect, systematically, on 
the evidence - to balance the successes of Mao's great experiment 
against its failures. 
9.1 Success 
Linguistic engineering in China had some undoubted successes. 
The most obvious was, or should have been, apparent to anyone who 
visited China and listened to people talk: the fact that everyone knew 
how to use 'correct' language to say 'correct' things in all public 
contexts. The following model conversation, published by the New 
China News Agency in 1966, was no more 'correct' than many actual 
conversations with foreigners: 
A Japanese youth asked: "Have you ever thought of 
travelling abroad? Where would you like to go?" 
A Tientsin middle school Red Guard answered: "I have not 
thought about it; we do not think of sightseeing, but if I had the 
chance I would like to go to Vietnam and fight at the side of the 
fraternal Vietnamese people to wipe out the U.S. invading 
gangsters. " 
When the Japanese friends asked about their aim in life, a 
Red Guard from the Peking Aeronautical Engineering Institute 
said: "We are young people in the era of Mao Tse-tung. 
Chairman Mao has taught us 'The world is yours as well as ours, 
but in the last analysis it is yours. You young people, full of 
vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight 
or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you .... ' The fact 
that two-thirds of the oppressed people in the world are not 
liberated comes to mind." [Quoted in Liu 1971,181]. 
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Often, such words reflected people's true feelings. Even when they did 
not they served a purpose, for the discrepancy between rebellious 
thoughts and conformist words was a lesson in the realities of power. 
Believers and unbelievers alike adopted forms of speech which 
legitimated Mao's imperial sway. 
Throughout this thesis, we have stressed that verbal conformity 
is linked to powerful mechanisms of persuasion. Verbal conformity 
made even Mao's secret enemies model correct attitudes; it made 
worship of Mao and his Word a condition of acceptance by most 
reference groups; it linked positive words with Mao and his policies 
and negative words with everything which he opposed; it ensured that 
'correct' views gained credibility through repetition and the validity 
effect; it led people to say Maoist things which changed their attitudes 
through dissonance or self-reference; it made people say things which 
consolidated Maoist assumptions in their audience through retroactive 
strengthening; and it ensured the activation of concepts and schemas 
which made the Maoist world view more accessible and therefore more 
'natural' than its rivals. 
These mechanisms of persuasion worked best when there were no 
countervailing influences, and this meant that they were especially 
effective amongst those who had not suffered from Mao's rule but who 
benefited from it. In the early 1950s, we have seen, peasants who stood 
to benefit from land reform overwhelmingly adopted revolutionary 
attitudes after cadres persuaded them to call for the dispossession, 
punishment and even execution of the landlords. The new, 
revolutionary ideology not only justified the peasants' violent and 
revolutionary words, reducing dissonance, but it suited their interests. 
It was only when the revolutionary ideology began to damage the 
peasants' interests that they became selectively resistant to persuasion 
through the manipulation of discourse. 
The peasants who profited most from revolutionary discourse 
over the whole course of Mao's rule were the poor and lower-middle 
peasants. By inverting the status hierarchy, the discourse made them 
the most prestigious group in the rural class structure. They were the 
class upon which the cadres were always told to 'rely', the class from 
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which educated youth 'sent down' to the countryside were told to 
'learn', the 'Zhuge Uangs' whose wisdom the Party was supposed to tap. 
Moreover, the discourse of their class superiority conferred advantages. 
It justified giving them preference in recruitment into the Party and 
positions of responsibility; it justified giving them further education 
when their academic qualifications were poor; it justified giving them 
more work points, and hence higher incomes, than members of the 
'black categories'; it meant that they could be, politically, just a little 
'incorrect', for they were less likely than others to be accused of lack of 
revolutionary consciousness; and it meant that they were less likely to 
be blamed when something went wrong, for the discourse made 
dispossessed 'landlords and rich peasants' the scapegoats for almost 
everything. They may mostly have rejected the discourse of the Party's 
superior wisdom and the discourse of collectivism, which damaged 
their interests, but there is every reason to believe that they accepted 
the discourse of their own superiority and the unrepentant wickedness 
of the black categories (cf. Unger 1984; Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984). 
The discourse of collectivism may have hurt the peasants, but it 
had great appeal to others. It conferred immense power on the cadres, 
who dominated the structures of collective power and directed and 
manipulated collective activities. So most of the cadres, even in rural 
areas, retained faith in the discourse long after it should have been 
discredited by its failures. The urban working class, too, benefited 
from the discourse, which justified their 'iron rice bowl' of permanent 
employment, as well as the security of health care, pensions, and 
education for their children. They often developed a culture of loafing 
on the job. While this made a mockery of the discourse of sacrifice in 
the cause of socialist construction, it wedded the workers to the 
collectivist discourse which made their 'feather-bedded' employment 
possible. When it became possible in the 1980s for them to leave state 
employment and seek their fortunes on the market, few took the 
opportunity. They saw talk of the closure of money-losing state 
industries as a threat, preferring to take it easy at their collective work 
then 'moonlight' at other jobs after hours. 
During the 'free mobilization' phase of the Cultural Revolution 
from 1966 to 1968, Mao was at first very successful in a form of 
linguistic engineering which involved manipulating the meaning of the 
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discourse by changing its context of interpretation. The tactic worked 
so long as he could still find sufficiently powerful groups who were 
prepared to accept each suggested switch in the context. At first, it was 
easy. Mao used his immense prestige and an obedient Party to organize 
the switches which brought down 'Three Family Village', Peng Zhen, the 
Beijing Party Committee and the central Propaganda Department. He 
was then able to get the middle-class dominated 'Rebel' Red Guards and 
the less privileged workers to accept the sWitch which condemned the 
Party as a whole as anti-Revolutionary. But when, after January 1967, 
Mao switched the context yet again, turning the discourse against 
'Rebels' who hoped for a more consultative and democratic form of 
government, they deflected or ignored his message. Thereafter, he lost 
control of the context of interpretation, and with it control of the 
Cultural Revolution. He had to abandon the attempt to manipulate 
events through discourse and re-impose a coercive apparatus to 
monitor and correct interpretation. 
Although language eventually proved ineffective at controlling 
the course of 'free mobilization', it maintained its power to motivate 
and intimidate. Red Guards and workers fought each other with a 
common stock of linguistic symbols which inspired loyalty to comrades, 
created a sense of righteous conviction, and empowered those who 
wielded them with hopes of ultimate victory. At the same time, the 
symbols used to vilify and curse opponents increased hostility towards 
them and, when interpreted literally, were an important contributor to 
violence. So language increased the savagery of the Cultural 
Revolution, even when its referents were so disputed that it ceased to 
influence the patterns of mobilization. 
When centralized control was restored after 1968, revolutionary 
discourse was particularly persuasive amongst those who did well out 
of the institutionalized phase of the Cultural Revolution. Such people 
included the host of new cadres whom Jiang cnng and her allies 
recruited and promoted in the hope of building a power base within the 
Party. These 'helicopter cadres', as they were called, knew who their 
patrons were, and they were not disposed to look critically at 'correct' 
responses or at simplistic Maoist formulae. Self-interest created no 
barriers to the message of the revolutionary language which they spoke 
and enforced, and they were easily persuaded by it. 
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Similarly, the New Born Things of the Cultural Revolution, which 
were implemented in this period, gave many members of the red 
classes, young and old, a vested interest in accepting a world view 
linked to Maoist formulae. It was thered classes who benefited from 
the emphasis on class background and political virtue at the expense of 
expertise and ability when it came to education, job assignment and 
promotions. Reducjng competition from more able members of the 
'bad' classes and the middle classes had always been an objective of 
many red-class youths, because hopes of upward mobility created fierce 
competition for a restricted number of places. Revolutionary cadres' 
children, especially, relished the implications of a Maoist discourse 
which justified the creation of an almost caste-like social pyramid with 
themselves at the top (cf. Unger 1982, 134, 172, 178). In the case of 
talentless but ambitious members of the red classes, self-interest and 
linguistic manipulation worked in harmony. They found many things 
to like in the revolutionary discourse which consolidated their class 
superiority and praised the New Born Things. 
The ignorance of youth was a great help to language-based 
persuasion. By 1976, most young people knew non-Maoist world views 
almost entirely through Maoist discourse, which caricatured and 
condemned capitalism, liberalism, revisionism, feudalism, Confucianism 
and so on. At best, young people were given a few non-Maoist texts to 
read for the purposes of criticism, like those distributed during the 
anti-Confucius campaign, but these texts were never enough to allow 
them to develop an understanding independent of Maoist categories 
and judgments. The young were vulnerable in other ways, too. When 
they learned and recited stories about revolutionary heroes, model 
workers and model soldiers, they were less likely than their parents to 
know that these models were too good to be true; they had not lived 
long enough to know how frequently the Maoist message had 
contradicted itself over the years; and they had not yet accumulated a 
wealth of bitter experience to make them appreCiate the gulf between 
discourse and reality. It is not surprising that early in the Cultural 
Revolution students were the most ardent Mao-worshippers - the well-
indoctrinated storm troopers whom Mao used to attack the intellectuals 
and teach the Communist Party a lesson. Nor is it surprising that, 
between 1968 and 1976, centrally directed indoctrination and 
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institutionalised Mao-worship had produced another generation of 
young Chinese who revered him. If young people had fears about their 
own futures as a result of his policies, if they were increasingly cynical 
about aspects of the socialist system, they tended to level the blame at 
others, whose faults they could observe and whose images were not 
sanctified by the formulae of worship. As so often in China's past, the 
emperor might have been surrounded by 'bad advisers', but he himself 
escaped criticism. 
Adults were less vulnerable to linguistic engineering than 
children, but on many topics they, too, lacked sources of information 
independent of the discourse. For example, adults rarely had 
alternative sources of information on life in the West, so when they 
were told that 'the workers in capitalist countries are haunted by the 
threat of starvation', most of them believed exactly that. And, when 
asked about the situation of Western workers, they repeated what they 
had been told, actively reproducing the discourse. Similarly;- when city 
dwellers heard peasants 'speak bitterness' against pre-Liberation 
landlords, they were in no position to say 'these peasants are lying or 
exaggerating.' Only a generalized scepticism about the discourse of 
bitterness could impede acceptance of the message, and that was hard 
to sustain when all the peasants, in the presence of outsiders whom 
they did not trust, stuck to the script. 
Lack of opposing beliefs not only aids acceptance of the message, 
but it facilitates higher order conditioning. Most people had no real 
knowledge of the phenomena designated by the terms 'capitalism', 
'imperialism' and 'revisionism', so negative conditioning was easily 
accomplished by ensuring that the discourse linked these terms with 
words like 'starvation', 'exploitation' and 'oppression'. The term 
'socialism', by contrast, nearly always brought a favourable response, 
because it was repeatedly linked with positive terms and described an 
ideal form of society which, in its full sense, was known only through 
discourse. I can still remember my surprise when I came to New 
Zealand in the mid-1980's and for the first time in my life heard people 
use the word 'socialist' as a term of abuse. Within China, most of those 
who were disappointed at the tum which the Cultural Revolution had 
taken still thought that socialism as such was a good thing. Some of 
them hankered after a democratic socialism on the model of the Paris 
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Commune, while others studied the Marxist classics in an attempt to 
find a socialist alternative to the Maoism which existed in China. For 
most peasants, perhaps, the socialism which they wanted was still the 
'socialism' which had won their hearts at the time of the land reform of 
the early 1950s: peace, prosperity and a good piece of land which they 
could call their own (cf. Friedmann, Pickowicz & Selden 1991). People 
had many different 'socialisms', all of them good. Even those who 
escaped to Hong Kong because they had no future in Mao's China 
frequently retained socialist ideals, of a sort, for years after their arrival 
(Chan 1985, 193-94, 198; Nathan 1986, 212; Bennett & Montaperto 
1971,234-6; Dittmer 1987,105-7; Zhai 1992, 148). 
The effect of linguistic engineering on the concepts and schemas 
with which people analysed the political world was also clear. On the 
basis of interviews with Chinese who escaped or migrated from China 
in the 1970s, Dittmer has concluded that 'The language of cultural 
radicalism became generalized to the whole public sector so that 
everyone who participated in that sector moved within its categories .... 
[T]he belief in the abstract verities professed in the [Maoist] polemics 
seems to have survived, at least until the death of Mao Zedong and the 
arrest of his most ardent supporters allowed the language itself to be 
reconsidered.' (Dittmer 1987, 107). For example, people continued to 
believe that class was fundamental to society and that struggle 
(douzheng) was both inexorable and essential to progress. Typically, 
Dittmer's respondents said 'If you want progress, you have to have 
struggle' or 'Without struggles, contradictions cannot be resolved. With 
a large territory, a large population, and complicated problems, it is 
impossible to have no struggles.' (Dittmer 1987, 106-7). 
Finally, belief in Mao himself remained widespread, even as 
resentment at the policies implemented in his name grew. In part, this 
was because Mao's own words could be interpreted in different ways, 
depending on the interpretive assumptions of those who heard or read 
them. This made it possible for people to retain their belief in Mao's 
wisdom by blaming, say, Jiang Qjng or the Party for misinterpreting his 
words. It also made it possible for Mao to blame his subordinates for 
misunderstanding his instructions whenever their attempts to 
implement his apparent wishes resulted in disaster. So Mao was 
protected from blame by the difficulty of knowing exactly what he 
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meant. He was also protected by the fact that few people ever met him 
and that even fewer knew him personally. He was a remote figure, his 
vices largely unpublicized, his personal responsibility for China's ills 
known only to a few. He existed for most people only through his 
writings, and through images conjured up by media propaganda and 
the formulae of Mao-worship. Few people knew enough about him to 
resist the effects of conditioning produced by the constant 
juxtaposition of the title 'Chairman Mao' with positive terms like 'Great 
Leader', 'Great Helmsman', 'the red, red sun in our hearts', and so on. 
As a result, even those who had come to hate the Cultural Revolution 
and many features of Communist Party rule were often slow to blame 
Mao. Jung Chang, for example, detested the Cultural Revolution as 
early as 1966 and became progressively more alienated from the 
Chinese political system, but it was not until 1974 that she blamed Mao 
himself, rather than Lin Biao or Jiang Qjng. Even then, she connected 
Mao with China's ills only because through a friend she read the first 
foreign magazine which she had ever seen - a copy of Newsweek which 
linked Mao to Jiang Qjng by describing her as his 'eyes, ears, and voice.' 
This hint from a rival discourse struck her 'like a flash of lightning', 
crystallizing her thoughts and letting her see that 'It was Mao who had 
been behind all the destruction and suffering.' (Chang 1992,631). The 
'blind spot' which the discourse of Mao worship had created in her 
understanding of the world been at last been removed. 
9.2 Failure: (1) Language versus Experience 
It is likely that it was in the early 1950s that the discourse of Maoism 
came closest to representing what most of the Chinese people really 
thought. Millions of landlords and 'counterrevolutionaries' had 
suffered terribly, capitalists had been pillaged and humiliated, but 
these were small minorities. In the cities, most people were relieved 
that the Japanese had been defeated, that the terminally corrupt 
Guomindang had fled, that peace had been restored and that mainland 
China had at last been re-unified. Then, when the Korean War seemed 
to pose yet another imperialist threat, Chinese armies drove the 
American-led United Nations forces out of North Korea. At long last, 
China stood tall in the world, victorious over the foreign imperialists 
who had subjected her to humiliations ever since the Opium War of 
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1839-42. It was a time of hope, and many intellectuals returned from 
overseas to help in the creation of the New China. There were many 
elements of the discourse of Maoism, in the form which it took in the 
early 1950s, which matched this mood: its nationalism, reflected in the 
great campaign to 'Resist America - Ajd Korea'; its purity and 
opposition to corruption, reflected in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti 
campaigns; its emphasis on the great task of national reconstruction; 
the promise that there would be a long period of 'new democracy' 
before the establishment of socialism; and the insistence, in the 
language of the 'mass line' and the 'united front', that the Party must 
always seek to unite with at least 90 percent of the people and refrain 
from forcing policies on an unwilling majority. 
Over 80 percent of Chinese people, however, were peasants. We 
saw in chapter 2 that most of them at first accepted revolutionary 
discourse, in part because it justified the condemnations of the 
landlords which the Party manipulated them into making, and in part 
because it justified redistribution of the landlords' possessions amongst 
individual peasant families. From 1955, however, the discourse 
changed as the Party justified forcing the peasants to surrender their 
land to collectives controlled by the cadres. The new discourse of 
collectivism was unpopular with many peasants from the start, and 
when it helped to cause the disaster of the Great Leap Forward it was 
largely discredited. When the Party relaxed its poliCies in 1961-62, 
many peasants reverted to private production as far as they were able, 
only to lose most of their gains when Mao used the Socialist Education 
Movement of 1963-65 to force them back to collective farming. In 
1967, the destruction of Party authority during the 'free mobilization' 
phase of the Cultural Revolution saw another surge in private 
production, but this was suppressed after 1968 when the Maoists 
reimposed centralized control (Zhou 1996,48-53). 
From 1955, the peasants were compelled to mouth the slogans of 
collectivist Maoism, but they were not persuaded by a discourse whose 
disadvantages they knew from their own experience. In particular, they 
knew that the Party, not the peasants, controlled the land; that the 
Party was ignorant of farming, but forced the peasants to obey 
instructions which were often misguided; and that the Party extorted 
as much production as it could from the peasants, leaving the 
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overwhelming majority in poverty. The peasants were undoubtedly the 
group which suffered most as a result of collectivist discourse, and they 
were almost certainly the group most strongly opposed to it. 
If the peasants were by far the largest aggrieved group, many 
others joined them, for Mao's policies of class struggle and social 
upheaval continually claimed new victims. Like the peasants, they 
seldom blamed Mao himself, but they directed silent hostility at those 
around him whom they held responsible for their woes. They included, 
according to official Party estimates in the 1980s , over 20 million 
people who suffered because they were labelled 'landlords, rich 
peasants, counterrevolutionaries, or bad elements' in the early 1950s; 
more than half a million people who were branded as 'Rightists' in 
1957; several million peasants and other rural residents who were 
declared 'anti-socialist elements' during the popular backlash against 
collective farming and Party incompetence in the early 1960s; three 
million cadres who had been involved in 'unjust and erroneous cases' 
during the Cultural Revolution; and more than 300,000 who had been 
wrongly convicted, mostly as counterrevolutionaries, during the 
Cultural Revolution. According to Hu Yaobang, who headed the 
investigation into their cases, the total number affected was a hundred 
million people including the primary victims' families - who were of 
course persecuted as well (Nathan 1986, 7), 
The catalogue of victims above makes no explicit mention of the 
large number - perhaps 400,000, perhaps 1,000,000, or perhaps more-
actually killed during the Cultural Revolution, and of the bitterness of 
the families and friends whom they left behind (cf. ch. 5, above). Nor 
does it explicitly mention the countless millions of others who were 
persecuted, beaten, tortured or locked in 'cow pens' during the Cultural 
Revolution without ever being 'convicted' of anything. But the list of 
those who were scarred and at least partly alienated does not stop 
there. They included the red-class Red Guards, who had always 
thought of themselves as natural 'revolutionary successors', who felt 
betrayed when the Maoist leadership turned on them and their families 
in late 1966 as it mobilized the predominantly middle class 'Rebel' Red 
Guards and revolutionary workers against the Party. One former red-
class Red Guard recalled: 
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It was a head-on blow .... I was changed from a leader of the 
revolution to its target overnight! I never dreamed this could 
happen to me .... 
Suddenly my faith in Mao and the party centre fell away. I 
sawall the flaws of the Cultural Revolution: there were no 
revisionists or capitalist roaders in the school, the working group 
didn't push a capitalist reactionary line, the home raids were 
nonsense, and fighting the Sons of Bitches [the 'bad' classes] was 
totally insane. If anyone had made a mistake, it was Mao and the 
party by starting this damnable revolution in the first place. 
[Zhai 1992, 119-20]. 
Then, as we saw in chapter 3, both the 'Rebels' and the revolutionary 
workers were betrayed once they had done what the Maoists wanted -
virtually destroyed the Party which Mao no longer trusted. They knew 
that they had been 'used', and their political naivete vanished. Their 
concern was now to protect themselves by manipulating Maoist phrases 
and symbols, and by defeating their opponents militarily (cf .. Ling 
1972). 
Disillusionment was followed by desocialization. Red Guards and 
former Red Guards often began to indulge in precisely the 'bourgeois 
habits' which they had tried so strenuously to eradicate during the 
Cultural Revolution. Zhou Enlai complained early in 1968 that one elite 
Red Guard unit had lost two-thirds of its members and that 'The bad 
ones turn to lovemaking, playing poker, leading a dissipated life, 
having the ideas of the United Action Committee, writing reactionary 
handbills, etc.' (Quoted in Liu 1976, 184). Western novels and the 
Chinese classics became prized, if carefully concealed, possessions, and 
a black market in books developed with the highest prices paid for 
'yellow books' with romantic themes and references to sex. The black 
market dealt in many other things, too, including Mao badges; and 
with the breakdown of Party control gangs and lineage groups emerged 
to fill the void. (Chang 1992,488-96; Liu 1976,184-5; Liu 1986,330-3; 
Ling 1972; Liang & Shapiro 1983, 149-52, 191). The reimposition of 
centralized control after 1968 suppressed these activities and forced 
the younger students back to school, although it took some time to 
overcome widespread truancy and disorder amongst children who for 
two years had run free (Unger 1982,149-52,158-9,186-7). Nothing, 
however, could restore the faith of the Cultural Revolution generation 
in those whom they blamed for their betrayal- Lin Biao, Jiang Qjng and 
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her faction, and occasionally even Mao himself. Instead, the restoration 
of control increased their bitterness, for most of the former Red Guards 
were exiled to the countryside to undergo re-education through labour 
at the hands of the peasants. 
Finally, if the New Born Things of the Cultural Revolution won 
the loyalty of those who benefited from them, they aroused resentment 
amongst those wholP they disadvantaged: the teachers, academics and 
other intellectuals who now took their orders from sometimes illiterate 
workers in the Workers' Mao Zedong Thought Propaganda Teams; the 
millions of urban high school graduates who were sent to the 
countryside to become, in effect, peasants; the brilliant students of 
non-red background who were denied further education because 
political criteria gave preference to 'worker-peasant-soldier students' 
who were sometimes scarcely literate; and the cadres, doctors and 
intellectuals who suffered in rural labour camps under the supervision 
of PLA Propaganda Teams. All of these had experiences which cast 
doubt on the philosophy which informed at least some of the 
revolutionary formulae which they, like everyone else, recited. They 
had great difficulty in accepting all the claims of a discourse which 
praised policies which ruined their dreams and, quite deliberately, 
destroyed their self-esteem. 
The appeal of Maoist ideology had always been its promise that 
with a few years of self-sacrifice and ideological rectitude the Chinese 
people would create a prosperous and fully socialist society, then move 
rapidly to the utopia of communism. 'Three years of struggle, a 
thousand years of communist happiness', Mao had told them (Dittmer 
1987, 41). However, the failure of the Great Leap Forward buried all 
hope of a rapid transition, and the trauma of 'free mobilization' of the 
revolutionary masses between 1966 and 1968 left most Chinese with a 
bad case of revolutionary burnout. They wanted to feel safe, they 
wanted an end to hardship, and they wanted peace and order. Instead, 
they got continuing revolution: a new social order which systematically 
assaulted pre-Cultural Revolution elites, and an endless succession of 
campaigns under the banner of class struggle. At the end of it all, the 
Chinese people were still no closer to the rich and happy society which 
they had been promised. Indeed, according to Mao, neither they nor 
their children would gain any benefit. He had abandoned the goal of 
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material betterment, saying that it impeded the transition to socialism, 
and he had concluded that 'nothing is certain except struggle .... it is 
quite possible the struggle will last for two or three hundred years.' 
(Quoted in Dittmer 1987,41, 134). This new message of endless 
revolutionary turmoil to support an uncertain and distant utopian 
vision was almost too much for most people to bear. Maoism was no 
longer an ideology of hope, but a growing and sometimes intolerable 
burden. People kept on mouthing the revolutionary formulae, but in 
many cases their revolutionary commitment was ebbing. They were 
beginning to lose the faith (cf. Ci 1994). 
When people thought that their own revolutionary words 
sometimes had a hollow ring, they became increasingly suspicious of 
revolutionary rhetoric from the mouths of others. This accentuated a 
perennial problem in Mao's China: the inherent instability of a 
'virtuocracy' in which, in theory and often in practice, people received 
promotion, power and honour for saying and doing all the right things. 
Everyone knew that people whose words and behaviour were morally 
unacceptable ('incorrect') would not be allowed to succeed, and that 
the most politically virtuous tended to receive the biggest rewards. 
However, the problem with virtuocracies, as Susan Shirk (1984) has 
argued so well, is that they destroy the reign of virtue and create 
suspicion of the apparently virtuous by producing opportunism, 
sycophancy, patronage, avoidance of activists, and privatization. When 
people are conspicuous for saying all the right revolutionary things, it 
is often assumed that they are just trying to advance themselves; when 
they say what their superiors want to hear, it is taken for granted that 
they are merely attempting to please or flatter potential patrons; and 
when they obey the rules of the virtuocracy by making more than the 
usual innocuous criticisms of erring colleagues, their words are 
interpreted as self-serving declarations that political principles are 
more important than friendship. As a result, the language of 
revolutionary self-sacrifice is widely regarded as a manifestation of self-
serving ambition; activists who use that language to criticize others 
cease to be models, and are feared and avoided lest they betray their 
friends to prove their virtue; and true friends, who put personal 
loyalty above revolutionary self-advancement, become especially 
valued (Shirk 1984). 
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China was not, of course, a pure virtuocracy. In some periods, 
merit was an important criterion of advancement, although it was 
heavily discounted during the Cultural Revolution. Class background, 
too, played a big role, partly because it suited Mao to keep class 
tensions alive, and partly because the Party regarded class background 
as a simpler and more reliable test of political virtue than revolutionary 
language or political activism. China came closest to being a pure 
virtuocracy during the Cultural Revolution, when the words and deeds 
of intellectuals, cadres and all 'persons in authority following the 
capitalist road' were subjected to scrutiny against the mirror of Mao's 
Thought. Indeed, all sections of the population were forced, more than 
ever before, to protect themselves by verbal displays of revolutionary 
conformity, as well as practical ones. Practical displays had some 
credibility because they demanded self-sacrifice, but words were cheap 
and everyone knew it. So while everyone understood, and respected, a 
normal level of conformity to the norms of linguistic virtue, those who 
excelled often became, not models, but objects of scepticism.~-Living in 
a society where virtue was rewarded made most people suspicious of 
virtue - especially linguistic virtue. So Mao's linguistic virtuocracy 
undermined respect for the very norms which it attempted to inculcate. 
People understood not only the idealistic words, but the selfishness 
which so often motivated them. The realities of life in a virtuocracy 
promoted cynicism about language and undermined the effectiveness 
of linguistic engineering. 
If personal experience caused most people to doubt some of the 
claims of revolutionary discourse, comparatively few people rejected 
that discourse wholesale while Mao was still alive. Often, they disliked 
particular leaders, particular policies, or particular aspects of the 
system which they were forced to praise, but they liked other leaders, 
other policies, other aspects of the system. Their acceptance and 
rejection of the discourse was selective. Moreover, a lot of people who 
suffered at the hands of the system believed that it should be reformed 
and run better, rather than abandoned. The most obvious example of 
continued belief in the basic soundness of the system, despite an 
intimate acquaintance with its faults, is the veteran cadres who were 
victimized during successive Party rectifications and the Cultural 
Revolution. Most of them kept the socialist faith, and even when in 
disgrace they usually remained confident that their punishment was all 
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a 'mistake' - that Mao or the Party would remedy the situation and 
redress the wrongs which they had suffered. Cadres were, of course, 
more highly motivated than most people to believe that the system was 
fundamentally sound, but there were many others who wanted only 
system-preserving reform and who clung on to as much of the 
discourse as they could. This was often because they not only suffered 
under the system but benefited from it, whether as members of the red 
classes who enjoyed their status, or as workers who valued their 'iron 
rice bowl', or as members of the middle classes who, through talent and 
political virtue, had overcome the disadvantage of 'non-red' origins. At 
times, however, something deeper than self-interest lay behind their 
desire to internalize as much of the discourse as they could, rejecting 
only those themes which damaged their interests or were discredited by 
their experience. The attraction of the discourse lay precisely in the 
fact that it embodied a world view which related past, present and 
future - a philosophy which seemed to explain much of what happened 
in the world, and which gave a purpose to many of life's struggles. In 
the case of a good many Chinese, Maoism was the only coherent world-
view which they knew. They were reluctant to give it up completely 
until they found an alternative world view, or had learned to find 
meaning without one. 
9.3 Failure: (2) Language versus Itself 
If language is to mould thought, then it helps if the message which it 
delivers is consistent. DUring the Cultural Revolution, however, the 
tactical requirements of the power struggle led to contradictions so 
blatant that few people could ignore them. We saw in chapter 3 how 
Mao, by switching the context of interpretation, repeatedly changed the 
content of crucial terms like 'revolutionary', 'counter-revolutionary' 
and 'revisionist' so as to turn the attack first against one group then 
against another. Every time he did this, he changed his revolutionary 
message. By 1968, most people were totally unsure of what that 
message was: they guessed, and hoped that they were right, or they 
suited themselves. The confusion continued during the institutional 
phase of the Cultural Revolution, as the message moved from the far 
left (1968-70), to a more moderate stance (late 1970-72), then back to 
the left (1973-74), before renewed moderation (1975) and a final swing 
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to the left (late 1975 and 1976). These switches reflected the power 
struggle between more radical and moderate factions within the 
Chinese leadership, which Mao played off against each other to ensure 
that no one faction ever became too powerful and threatened his 
dominance (Cf. Dittmer 1987, 108-40, 172; Joseph 1984). All the 
switches were supported by political campaigns in which the Chinese 
people were required to condemn, alternately, the 'revisionism' of the 
moderates or the 'ultra-leftism' of the radicals. The result was 
widespread confuSion, even amongst cadres, about what the proper 
revolutionary line really was. In the words of one of Dittmer's 
informants, 'Before the Cultural Revolution, I would believe that Mao 
could reform people's thinking. After the Cultural Revolution, I did not 
know what kind of thinking Mao wanted to reform.' Or as another said, 
'If it was me, my thinking would change back and forth many times. I 
was afraid, therefore I would change.' (Dittmer 1987, 173). 
For many people, a turning point came with the disgra:te of Lin 
Biao in 1971. Most had been prepared to accept that Liu Shaoqi was a 
traitor whom Mao had been waiting to expose, but when Lin Biao - the 
high priest of Mao-worship - was revealed as yet another traitor and a 
secret ally of Liu's, the strain on most people's credulity was too great. 
Mao's 'close comrade-in-arms', his deSignated successor, had allegedly 
all long been plotting against Mao and the revolution, and Mao had just 
been waiting for the correct moment to expose him! If this were true, 
then for many years the press and the Communist Party had misled the 
Chinese people by portraying Lin as Mao's most loyal follower. If it 
were false, then the newspapers and the Party were misleading the 
people now. In either case, the official media and the Party had no 
credibility, and Mao himself was either fallible or guilty of deception. 
Moreover, the downfall of Lin Biao was a lesson in the nature of politics 
amongst the Chinese elite. All but the most naIve observers began to 
suspect that when the press and Party mobilized the people to condemn 
a particular leader, the intention was not to defend the revolution but 
to use the people as a weapon in a ruthless struggle for power. One 
young peasant in Chen Village spoke for many: 'I had felt faithful to 
Mao, but that Lin Biao stuff affected my thinking. Things always 
seemed to be changing at the top. You couldn't trust everything they 
said.' Another youth said bluntly: 'We came to see that the leaders up 
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there could say today that something is round; tomorrow, that it's flat. 
We lost faith in the system.' (Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984, 231). 
Cynicism grew when the latest change in the Party line resulted 
in the sudden condemnation of leaders who distanced themselves from 
Maoist policies emphasising revolutionary struggle. When Deng 
Xiaoping came under criticism and was dismissed for the second time in 
1976, his speeches were distributed for criticism - speeches in which 
he called for more intellectual freedom and an end to victimization, 
and in which he emphasised economic development and improved 
living standards rather than class struggle. We had to study those 
speeches and condemn them, using them as evidence that 'The 
capitalist roader is still on the road!' As Jung Chang records (1992, 
654-56), most of us went through the motions of criticizing Deng, but 
we felt sympathy with his words, not our own. Then, when an 
earthquake shattered Tangshan and my own city of Tianjin, and we had 
to sit amidst the ruins criticizing Deng rather than trying to restore our 
lives, the anti-Deng discourse seemed irrelevant to our needs and a 
complete waste of time. 
The struggle against Deng was spearheaded by Mao's wife, Jiang 
Qjng, and her clique. By late 1975 they had gained almost total control 
of the media, and they used it not only to criticise respected politicians 
like Deng and Zhou Enlai, but to attack the very popular policies with 
which they were identified. The discourse which they promoted, 
however, was counterproductive: it identified Jiang Qjng and her 
supporters with unpopular policies, and people made cynical by the Lin 
Biao affair resented the politically motivated attacks on leaders whose 
reputations far exceeded those of their critics. The attacks further 
discredited the media, whose monopoly on information began partially 
to disintegrate. Eager to know what lay behind the official mask of 
Chinese politics, people in the cities increasingly resorted to 'sidestreet 
news' (xiaodao xiaoxi) - gossip and rumour - in an attempt to get more 
reliable information. The most common targets of these stories were 
Jiang Qjng and her entourage. Stories about her love life before she 
met Mao, about her liking for foreign movies, about her alleged 
baldness, and about her desire to succeed Mao as a de facto empress all 
circulated amongst people who hoped that they could trust each other 
not to betray the confidence. In some circles people even began to 
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whisper that Mao was senile and to say that the young women who 
were seen with him in pictures and on newsreels were actually his 
mistresses, procured by his bodyguard Wang Dongxin. On the other 
side, stories were told which reflected well on Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping, the leaders who represented the best hope for stability, 
prosperity, and .an end to revolutionary turmoil. Zhou was depicted as 
wise, clever and humane, while the stories about Deng focused on his 
intellectual mastery, his shrewdness and his quick wit (cf. Nathan 
1986,175-7; Liu 1986, 272-5). 
Many people who were disillusioned with the extreme Maoists 
and their policies began to believe that they could not be the only ones 
with doubts. Tentatively, at first, they began to share their 
dissatisfaction with friends. Soon they were speaking privately in 
subversive discourses which contradicted some of the things which they 
said in public. People who valued education began to mutter about 
the sad state of the universities: 'college in name, middle school 
teaching materials, and elementary school level' (daxue mingtang, 
zhongxue jiaocai, xiaoxue chengdu) (Dittmer & Chen 1981, 64). 
Workers, who heard and were sometimes forced to repeat claims about 
how the abolition of material incentives had boosted productivity, knew 
the reality in their own factories: 'low efficiency, sharing the common 
bowl of rice, and a job as permanent as iron' (di xiaoiil, da guofan, 
tiefanwan). They could mouth the idealistic rhetoric about the superior 
efficiency of work based purely on moral incentives, but many did as 
little work as possible, for 'Work or no work, the result is the same' (gan 
bu gan, yige yang). (Dittmer & Chen 1981,49). 
The peasants had long been the main exponents of subversive 
discourses. They were the economic group most sorely oppressed, they 
were often emboldened by 'good' class backgrounds, and they were 
only rarely subjected to the rituals of small group criticism and self-
criticism which made people in the cities fear betrayal by so-called 
'friends' if they used a word out of place (cf. Whyte 1974). Many of the 
peasants had been grumbling amongst themselves ever since 
collectivization, and their cynicism and complaints had by no means 
abated by the 1970s. One rural saying went like this: 'The public work 
is slowly done, following the crowd. Everyone gets ten work points. 
Why should I work harder?' (Zhou 1996,30). In Chen Village, some of 
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the younger peasants composed sardonic doggerel about cadre 
corruption and their own casual attitude to collective labour: 
A feast is not mine to eat, 
"Spoils" are not mine to grab. 
Only labouring day in and out, 
Why not go to the fields for a rest? 
[Chan, Madsen & Unger 1984, 259]. 
Kate Zhou, who lived with the peasants during the institutional phase of 
the Cultural Revolution, learned that they called the Party secretaries at 
the brigade and commune levels 'local emperors' (tuhuangdi ) and that 
cadres in general, adept at fleecing the peasants for the benefit of the 
state, were known as 'cadres with scissors' Uiandao ganbu). She even 
heard outright condemnation: 'The state is like a crazy man, always 
picking those things that will hurt us most.' (Zhou 1996, 29, 31, 33). 
As always, the peasants were the ones furthest down what Maoists 
called the 'capitalist road'. 
The development of counter-languages was a sign that, by Mao's 
final years, the system of linguistic engineering had begun to self-
destruct. The institutional supports for the system were more 
formidable than ever and the Maoist leaders' passion for linguistic 
uniformity was undiminished, but attempts to impose that uniformity 
were less and less effective. People in the cities, following weakly in the 
peasants' wake, had often developed a cynicism which at times crept 
into the language of familiar discourse. Moreover, although people 
continued to say the right things in the company of cadres, activists 
and strangers, their faith in a good deal of what they said was 
collapsing. The underlying cause of this loss of faith was that Maoist 
discourse was applied in ways which discredited it: people were made 
to say things at variance with their own experience, they were made to 
say things which denied deeply entrenched preferences, and they were 
made to say things today which contradicted what they were made to 
say yesterday. In part, this enforcement of counter-productive 
discourses occurred because the linguistic engineers gave the Chinese 
people too little credit for intelligence, regarding them as machines who 
could be programmed and re-programmed. But in part, it was because 
persuasion was not the only goal. If people could be made to say, 
repeatedly, things which they knew to be untrue, then this 
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demonstrated the extent of their submission. To that extent, it did not 
matter if people silently resisted the anti-Deng discourse in which they 
publicly participated, for if Deng's secret supporters could be induced 
to join the chorus of condemnation, this demonstrated to them and to 
all the world that Jiang Qj.ng and her friends were the ones in charge. 
Linguistic engineering was not just a mechanism of revolutionary 
conversion, but a weapon which could be used to intimidate, to 
legitimate and to control. 
9.4 Failure: (3) After Mao 
Mao Zedong died on 9 September 1976. Some people wept out of 
genuine grief; some, like myself, were relieved when the tears came, 
helped along by the grief of others; some cried because they feared 
that, with Mao gone, his wife Jiang Qj.ng and her cronies would have a 
free hand; and some buried their heads and pretended to cry, hoping 
they would not be discovered. 
The grief and pseudo-grief of many Chinese turned into rejOicing 
when it was learned that Jiang Qj.ng and her supporters, now dubbed 
the Gang of Four, had been arrested on 6 October. In Tianjin, there was 
intense excitement and relief amongst the intellectuals, and many 
people from all social groups joined eagerly in the huge, officially 
organized demonstration which celebrated the Gang's downfall. In 
Beijing, a young Canadian-Chinese student, Jan Wong, watched the 
public reaction in astonishment: 
People literally danced in the streets. Firecrackers exploded all 
night. Liquor store shelves were emptied as people rushed to 
drink toasts ... Everywhere, I saw people wandering around with 
broad smiles and big hangovers. It seemed that the entire capital 
was marching deliriously to Tiananmen Square. Artists who had 
suffered under Madame Mao's cultural fascism sketched 
devastating caricatures and pasted them up in the square. 
Ordinary people took turns spitting on them to see who could 
score the most direct hits. [Wong 1997, 177]. 
Not everyone was happy. There were cadres, identified with the Gang's 
policies, who had reason to be nervous about their futures; and there 
were members of the red classes, particularly 'worker-peasant-soldier 
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students', who soon began to worry that the Gang's demise might bring 
new, meritocratic policies which would harm their futures. But these 
voices were silenced by fear, and by the genuine elation of the majority. 
With the departure of the group blamed for the worst repression, 
most people felt much more free to speak openly. What they now 
began to say sometimes shocked Western admirers of Mao who had 
taken the Chinese people at their word, thinking that they believed all 
the formulae which the linguistic engineers compelled them to mouth. 
One such admirer was Jan Wong, who after four years in China still 
thought that people meant it when they declared their enthusiasm for 
the Cultural Revolution and the New Born Things. She was shattered 
when everyone she knew celebrated the downfall of the Gang of Four, 
then told her that 'the Cultural Revolution had been a bad, bad thing' 
and that 'they had been waiting for years for the madness to end.' 'I 
felt betrayed,' she recalls, 'like the victim of a massive practical joke. 
Everyone had lied to me - my classmates and teachers, my friends and 
relatives. I knew it was not personal. They had had no choice.' She 
had learned what most Chinese adults already knew - that 'the sets 
were fake and people were just speaking their lines with less and less 
conviction.' 'Nobody believed in the revolution anymore', she said with 
pardonable exaggeration. 'They hadn't for a long time, and I had been 
too stupid to see it.' (Wong 1997, 178, 185-6). 
At this stage, the only revolution which most people rejected was 
Mao's 'continuous revolution', with its endless convulsions, its periodic 
crackdowns on small-scale private production by the peasants, and its 
indefinite postponement of the rewards which were supposed to come 
from revolutionary endeavour. This was the revolution which was 
extolled in the distinctive discourse of the Cultural Revolution - the 
revolution which made people's lives miserable and which they blamed 
on the Gang of Four. But most people's attachment to any sort of 
revolutionary politics or utopian vision was now fragile, and a more 
general disillusionment was soon to come. One of its agents was Mao's 
successor, Hua Guofeng, who had ordered the Gang's arrest. Hua 
claimed Mao's mantle, and he continued to manipulate revolutionary 
discourse in the traditional Maoist fashion. Everyone was now 
expected to accuse the Gang of Four of being revisionists bent on 
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restoring capitalism. As usual, school English textbooks were pressed 
into the attack: 
A: The Gang of Four Anti-Party clique wanted to usurp 
Party and state power and restore capitalism. We 
Red Guards, never allow them! 
B: That's right. The struggle against the Gang of Four is a 
life-and-death struggle between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie, between socialism and capitalism and between 
Marxism and revisionism. We must fight against them. 
[English, vol. 3, Henan n.d. [1977?]]. 
Members of the Gang were now condemned in precisely the same terms 
as they had used to attack Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and all the other 
capitalist-roaders. Indeed, they were described in the same terms as 
Lin Biao. The targets changed, depending on who was in or out of 
power, but the discourse remained the same. Even people wllo were 
delighted to see the last of the Gang were unconvinced by the way in 
which they were required to condemn the 'Gang of Four Anti-Party 
clique'. Cynicism about linguistic engineering, already far advanced, 
became all-pervasive. 
To bolster his frail claim to legitimacy, Hua also sought to 
appropriate Mao's legacy and to make himself the star of a new 
personality cult. People were supposed to say the sorts of things which 
they read in the Party press and the school textbooks: 
The whole Party, the whole army and the whole people love 
Chairman Hua. Following Chairman Hua, we will carry out 
Chairman Mao's behests and make revolution for ever. [English, 
vol. 4, Henan 1978]. 
The sudden creation of a personality cult around a relative nonentity 
like Hua again made many people cynical, and the prospect of 
'revolution forever' filled them with despair. 
Materialism, which had begun to fill the void as utopian hopes 
faded in the later Mao era, now became rampant. In December 1976, 
Mao's article 'On Ten Major Relationships' was republished in the Party 
press and set for serious study and discussion in all work units. 
However, these 'ten major relationships' were soon transformed by 
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popular doggerel into 'ten major requirements' which women 
demanded of prospective suitors: 
Yi fang jiaju dai shafa, 
Er lao jian zai neng kan wa. 
San gulu yi xiang dai kacha, 
Si ji yifu chuan kuaiba. 
Wu guan duanzheng yi mi ba, 
Liu qin bu ren wu qiangua. 
Qjshi yuan gongzi dai fujia, 
Ba mian linglong hui shuohua. 
Jiu yan bu zhan zhi he cha, 
Shifen manyi jiu jian tao 
(One room full of furniture with sofa, 
Two parents healthy enough to baby sit. 
Three turns and one sound 1 plus camera, 
Four seasons' clothes with wool. 
Five features2 good looking and body tall, 
Six relationships denied. 
Seventy dollars in wages plus a bonus, 
Popular and articulate with all. 
No alcohol, no cigarettes, only tea, 
I'll see him if the above are satisfactorily met.)3 
The rapidity with which this verse spread throughout urban China was 
a manifestation of popular revulsion against demands for revolutionary 
self-sacrifice. It was also a sign that people were losing their fear, and 
that subversive discourses were no longer confined to discreet 
communication amongst people who trusted each other. 
People's loss of fear was greatly assisted by the political 
resurrection of Deng Xiaoping. The Party's 'left' was weakened by the 
purge of the Gang of Four and its supporters, and this enabled Deng's 
supporters to persuade a reluctant Hua to restore him to his former 
positions in July 1977. Hua clung to the trappings of office unti11981, 
IThe 'three turns' were three things which had parts which turned: a bike, 
a sewing machine and a watch. The 'one sound' was a radio. The phrase 
'three turns and one sound' was used to summarise the material aspirations 
of the later Mao years. 
2'Five features': the features of the face. 
3The translation is a slightly modified version of the one in Dittmer & Chen 
1981,51. 
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but Deng achieved dominance fairly quickly after his return and 
shattered both the discourse of praise for the Cultural Revolution and 
the discourse of denial with which the Party had sought to erase 
memories of the sufferings which so many had endured under Mao's 
rule. What Deng did was seize on Mao's maxim 'seek truth from facts' 
and promote it as the essence of Mao's Thought. People had learned, 
under Mao, that the only 'facts' which they were allowed to discover 
were those consistent with Mao's Thought, but now Deng said that Mao 
himself had made mistakes and that his Thought required them to 
'make practice the sole criterion of truth' (Lieberthal1995, 129-33). In 
this way, Deng adroitly manipulated Mao's own words to destroy the 
worship of his Thought. He also made people less afraid to talk about 
'the facts', as they saw them, and he destroyed the basis for any 
continued attempts to re-make people's minds by enforcing wholesale 
recitation of scripts from official discourse. 
Once people lost their fear, there followed an outpouring of 
bitterness against the wrongs which millions of people had suffered 
under Mao's rule: from those declared Rightists in 1957 in a campaign 
which Deng himself, as the Party's General Secretary, had directed; 
from people who had been persecuted for trivial or non-existent 
offences by over-zealous or vindictive superiors; and, most numerous 
of all, from the victims of the Cultural Revolution. They wrote letters or 
travelled in person to Beijing, where 200,000 cadres were given the job 
of investigating their grievances (Nathan 1986, 29); they plastered 
walls, including the famous 'democracy wall' in Beijing, with posters 
which spelled out their complaints; and they told their stories, and the 
stories of others who had suffered, in a torrent of 'wounded literature' 
(e.g., Barme & Lee 1979; Feng 1991). Much of this was actively 
encouraged by the Party, which was concerned both to remove a 
dangerous accumulation of bitterness, and to direct the blame away 
from Mao and the Party and towards against individual wrongdoers, Lin 
Biao and the Gang of Four. But no one in China thinks that the millions 
who raised their voices were simply following the new Party line. They 
spoke from the heart, and when in 1978 and 1979 some began to argue 
that the root cause of the injustices was a continuing lack of democracy 
and accountability, they were crushed (Nathan 1986). 
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By the time Mao died, many people had lost faith in the official 
media. Interviewing a sample of 69 people who left China, mostly in 
the late 1970s or early 1980s, Andrew Nathan (1986, 173-5) divided 
them into three groups on the basis of their attitudes towards the 
media. Members of one group read newspapers and listened to 
broadcasts because they needed to know what the Party wanted them to 
believe, but they remained agnostic about the accuracy of what they 
were told. Members of the second group openly scorned the reliability 
of the media, dismissing most news stories as untrue or distorted. 
Members of the third group agreed that the official press was 
unreliable, but felt that they could often decode it to ascertain the truth 
if they studied it carefully and interpreted it with the help of 'side-
street news', occasional access to 'internal publications' intended for 
cadres, and information illicitly obtained from foreign radio broadcasts. 
Not one person in Nathan's sample believed that the official media were 
generally reliable (Nathan 1986, 180). 
The Party realized that the media were widely scorned, and when 
Deng Xiaoping gained the ascendancy he took steps to restore the 
media's credibility. The result was a significant increase in reliable 
reporting. However, in 1982 a survey of readers in Beijing still found 
that only 24 percent regarded the newspapers as 'believable', while 21 
percent saw them as 'often or always untruthful'. The remaining 55 
percent described the newspapers as 'basically believable', which 
presumably meant that they had no reason to misreport most things, 
but distorted or invented some stories for political purposes. In a 
survey in Tianjin, many readers accused the papers of 'swaying and 
swinging' for political motives, while a critique published in 1984 
reported that 'many readers disbelieved on principle 20 to 50 percent 
of what they read in the press' - a finding which the author blamed on 
the fact that "'the propaganda flavour is still too thick."'(Nathan 1986, 
191). 
If faith in the official media had been shaken, so had faith in 
socialism. People already knew that after years of 'socialist 
construction' China was still very poor, and they were now able to 
contrast that poverty with the achievements of the West because Deng, 
to strengthen his hand in pushing China down the road of the 'Four 
Modernizations', allowed television to show honest reports about the 
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outside world. Increasingly, socialism seemed like a nice ideal which 
had not produced the material progress which people so desperately 
wanted. Disillusionment was particularly strong amongst members of 
the younger generation. In 1979/80, students at the elite Fudan 
university in Shanghai were asked anonymously what they believed in. 
Only a third said 'communism', nearly a quarter said 'fate' and a 
quarter said 'nothing at all' (Dittmer 1987, 260 n.134). In another 
college, students in,one class were asked to indicate whether they 
believed in socialism, capitalism, religion, atheism or fatalism. Eighty-
five percent chose fatalism; not one chose socialism (Shirk 1984, 56). 
And in Guangdong province, when a rumour started in 1979 that the 
government would not longer stop people from crossing to Hong Kong, 
a swarm of young people from villages near the border overwhelmed 
the guards and went to seek their fortunes in the capitalist colony. By 
the time Hong Kong took measures to stem the exodus, Chen Village, 
for example, had lost nearly all its young men - some 200 of them -
including the two sons of the Party secretary (Chan, Madsen & Unger 
1984,265-67). The exodus stopped only when the Hong Kong 
government refused to issue the new immigrants with identity cards 
and imposed heavy fines on employers who hired workers who could 
not produce a card. All these disillusioned young people had recited 
the formulae of Mao worship and socialist self-sacrifice throughout 
their school years. 
Once people had lost their revolutionary faith, what remained 
was the threat of nihilism - a threat which could be kept at bay only by 
some other ideology or by the determined pursuit of wealth and 
personal rewards (Ci 1994). Political liberalism has filled the void for 
some people, especially in the cities (Nathan & Shi 1993), and it has 
been crushed whenever it seems to pose a challenge to the Party's 
monopoly of power. For many other people, however, Deng Xiaoping's 
slogan 'To get rich is glorious!' is the key to life's meaning. Table 9.1 
summarizes the results of a social survey in Zhejiang: 
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Table 9.1 
Do You Agree That the Goal of Ufe Is to Make Money? 
(percentages) 
Occupation Agree Don't Care Disagree 
Cadre 40 19 41 
Worker 66 5 31 
Farmer 81 6 13 
Private Business Qerson 59 15 26 
Source: Li Qjan, Yu Xianyan & Shi Xilai, 'Studies on Elements That 
Influence Social Values and Social Behaviour', Sociology and Social 
Investigation, 5, (1992),11-20, reproduced in Zhou 1996, 165. 
The results of the survey would probably shock most Westerners, whose 
materialism is more muted. Two results stand out. First, even the 
cadres have been heavily corrupted by materialistic values, with about 
as many agreeing with the statement that 'the goal of life is tQ make 
money' as opposing it. Second, the most materialistic of all are the 
farmers, as we should call the post-Mao peasants, whose attitudes are 
easy to understand because for so long the Party kept them poor. 
During the Mao era, the peasants were compelled to recite 
formulae praising collectivism, condemning individualism and 
abhorring private profits, but most remained determined to 'travel the 
capitalist road' once they thought they could get away with it. Their 
opportunity came when power struggles within the Chinese leadership 
after Mao's death created uncertainty amongst cadres about the future 
direction of agricultural policy, and when the cadres' waning 
ideological commitment to collectivization made them susceptible to 
bribes and pressure. As early as 1977, peasants in a few areas secretly 
arranged with local cadres to abandon collective farming and restore 
family production and the practice spread from 1978. The peasants at 
first acted spontaneously, without any organization or leadership, and 
without explicit encouragement from reformers within the Party. They 
were able to get away with it because they bribed local cadres with a 
share of the profits, and because many cadres were reluctant to 
confront them. Senior Party leaders at first condemned what was 
happening, but they were unwilling to take the decisive and ruthless 
action required to stop it - perhaps in some cases because they secretly 
350 
sympathised with the peasants. Their vacillation lasted long enough for 
family production to become established in large areas of China and 
demonstrate its superiority to collective production. Then reformers 
like Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang used its success to argue that it 
should be adopted generally. After 1982, the 'household responsibility 
system', as it was called, was extended by government decree to the rest 
of the country. Although peasants in some areas felt that the form 
which decollectivization took did not suit their needs, a large majority 
either accepted it happily or adopted it eagerly (Zhou 1996; Kelliher 
1992; Watson 1983, 1984/5). 
Within eight years, according to one estimate, real incomes in the 
countryside trebled (Zhou 1996, 71). This not only reflected the 
enormous increases in agricultural productivity, but the fact that the 
China's new class of market-oriented farmers began to put their labour 
and capital into commercial enterprises and rural-based secondary 
industry. Moreover, despite harassment from the police, they began to 
flout the restrictions on residence which since 1956 had kept peasants 
in the countryside. They have flooded into the cities, setting up 
numerous businesses and supplying much of the labour for the 
spectacular growth of new, large-scale industries. Some have become 
millionaires. In bursting the chains with which the Party bound them 
to collective poverty, the one-time peasants have emerged as the most 
dynamic force in China's market economy (Zhou 1996). 
And what of linguistic engineering after Mao? From 1978, with 
the rise of Deng Xiaoping, China fairly rapidly ceased to be a state in 
which the rulers had totalitarian ambitions. The state retreated from 
its goal of controlling all aspects of life, and it abandoned its attempt to 
bring about a comprehensive reform of human consciousness through 
linguistic engineering. Totalitarian goals were abandoned in favour of 
an authoritarianism which allowed people to say pretty much what they 
wanted in private, but crushed those who said in public anything which 
called into question the Party's right to rule. Moreover, the change to 
private production in the countryside and the much slower rise of 
private enterprise in the cities progressively undermined the power of 
the collective economic institutions through which the Party coerced, 
rewarded and manipulated the people. The institutional control of 
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people's lives which is required for a fully-fledged programme of 
linguistic engineering simply no longer exists. 
What remains is an authoritarian Party with a socialist language 
inherited from the Maoist era - a language which is completely out of 
step with the realities of modern China. The incongruity is resolved by 
linguistic manipulation. China's emerging capitalist economy, in 
current Newspeak, is 'Chinese style socialism' (you zhongguo tese de 
shehuizhuyi), so called to distinguish it from classical socialism in 
which the state controls production. The fact that Mao Zedong was in 
this sense a classical socialist, not a 'Chinese style one', is conveniently 
forgotten, for Mao continues to be invoked as the Party's patron, his 
successes officially far more significant than his 'mistakes'. The 
continued use of the language of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
Thought in official contexts masks the fact that a non-Maoist ideology 
now dominates the Party. That ideology seeks to combine dedicated 
pursuit of individual wealth with 'spiritual values' of civic 
responsibility and personal morality; and, despite the re-emergence of 
genuine economic classes and capitalist exploitation, it ignores the 
existence of class conflict altogether. 
Mao's injunction 'Never forget class struggle!' was officially laid 
to rest in 1979, when virtually all members of the 'black' classes were 
pronounced 'reformed' and had their 'class hats' removed. The 
prejudice against them quickly subsided and in Chen Village by 1982 
class origins no longer mattered much even in marriage decisions. 
Popular hostility had rested largely on official policies of discrimination 
which most 'red' and middle class people endorsed in order to avoid 
criticism, boost their own status and eliminate 'black' competition for 
education and jobs. Once official discrimination disappeared, so did 
the motive for popular prejudice. The new discourse of harmony 
within socialist society quickly triumphed, for most people wanted 
peace and the observed behaviour of the 'black categories' had nearly 
always been 'correct' and submissive. Thirty years of ritual vilification 
now counted almost for nothing. 
And what of Mao himself? He continues as the father figure of 
the Party which has destroyed his legacy, and he retains much of his 
popularity with the masses. His portrait can still be found on altars in 
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some peasant homes, where it is worshipped along with the other gods, 
beneficent and malevolent, whom the peasants propitiate. In the cities, 
from the late 1980s, there developed a Mao-craze in which the Great 
Leader became a teenage icon, a fashion statement, an artistic motif 
and the object of commercial exploitation (Barme 1996). In part, the 
craze fed off the success of linguistic engineering in endowing Mao, 
while he lived, with almost supernatural attributes. Popular ignorance 
of the real Mao was essential to the creation of the image, and popular 
ignorance sustains it to this day because the Party still conceals the 
enormity of his crimes. But the Mao-craze has roots, too, in the 
economic and social dislocations of the 1980s and 1990s. Mao is used 
as a symbol of a purer age to criticise the development of rampant 
corruption within the Party. He is invoked, too, by nervous workers in 
inefficient state enterprises who fear that the rise of the market might 
cost them their jobs. (Barme 1996). 
The appropriation of Mao by the people is a striking 
manifestation of the decline of linguistic engineering and of the rise of 
new discourses, uncontrolled by the Party. As a commercialized icon, 
as a symbol of anti-corruption, and as an enemy of the market, Mao has 
been appropriated by unofficial but highly visible discourses and used 
to embarrass the Party. So his continuing popularity is proof that the 
China which he created, with its centrally directed manipulation of a 
monolithic public discourse, is dead. The Party's leaders still control 
the language of Party and state, and most people still need to speak 
that language at times - especially in the cities, where the state sector 
remains large and most people still belong to Party-controlled danwei 
(work units). However, the engagement which most people have with 
the Party and the state has been drastically reduced, and it is still 
diminishing. In most contexts, public or private, people use language 
which has evolved free of state direction, and they invent and 
appropriate new linguistic forms as they see fit. One small example 
makes the point perfectly: the word 'comrade' - once the standard, 
revolutionary title of address - has dropped from common use, and this 
has cleared the way for it to render service in more restricted contexts. 
It has been appropriated by Beijing's gay and lesbian communities - a 
fate which is eminently fitting in view of recent revelations about Mao's 
private life. The Party has lost control of how people use the Chinese 
language, and Mao's great experiment in linguistic engineering is over. 
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CHAPTER 10 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LINGUISTIC ENGINEERING 
Mao's great experiment in linguistic engineering is worth studying in its 
own right. However, reflection on its successes and its failures can tell 
us something about linguistic engineering in general. This chapter will 
explore the implications of the Chinese case for theories of linguistic 
persuasion and for 'strong' and 'weak' versions of the Whorf 
hypothesis. It will also venture some generalizations about conditions 
which help or hinder attempts at persuasion through the manipulation 
of language and the control of discourse. 
The Chinese case certainly demonstrates that linguistic 
engineering can affect people's beliefs, for we have seen that there was 
often - although by no means always - a striking correlation between 
what people were compelled to say and the beliefs which they came to 
hold. This much is obvious. What is more challenging is to specify the 
causal mechanisms which enabled the carefully scripted words of the 
linguistic engineers so often to produce the desired beliefs. In this 
thesis, I have used a variety of psychological theories, well tested in 
experimental and sometimes real-life contexts, to isolate the causal 
mechanisms, explaining why control of discourse had its profound, 
though uneven, impact on thought. That attempt at explanation could, 
in principle, have failed: we could have found that attitudes did not 
change when the theories said they should, or that the people whose 
attitudes changed the most were those whose attitudes should have 
changed the least. In fact, the attempt to explain attitude change in 
terms of the theories did not fail, but succeeded admirably. When the 
persuasive mechanisms identified by the theories were present, they 
resulted in attitude change unless there were strong countervailing 
tendencies from other sources. This case study of language-based 
persuasion therefore adds to the weight of evidence in support of the 
theories. It may be useful to illustrate this with examples: 
• If increased familiarity with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology had 
made that terminology more distasteful, this would have counted 
against the theory of 'mere exposure', which predicts that familiarity 
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will produce more favourable attitudes. In fact, the prediction is 
borne out by the Chinese case, for the new terminology quickly ---? 
became natural and ~e, although it had at first seemed 
obscure, unnatural and un-Chinese. (See ch. 2). 
• If the repetition of unsupported statements had not tended to make 
people believe them, this would have counted against the 'validity 
effect'. In fact, repetition of such statements did tend to produce 
belief. It failed only where there were strong countervailing 
tendencies, as when the statements were inconsistent with personal 
experience. (See chs 2, 9). 
• If people had come to think well of things associated with negative 
words and badly of things associated with positive words, this would 
have counted against the theory of higher order conditioning. In 
fact, there was a strong tendency for people to think well of things 
associated with positive words and to think badly of things 
associated with negative words. This tendency prevailed except 
when there were strong countervailing influences, as when the 
experience of starvation offset the influence of verbal conditioning 
in favour of the 'Great Leap Forward'. (See chs 2, 9). 
• If people had not tended to adopt the attitudes modelled by 
individuals and reference groups, this would have counted against 
modelling theory and reference group theory. In fact, attitudes were 
adopted as predicted by the theories except when there were strong 
countervailing influences - as when the attitudes modelled were 
clearly inconsistent with the audience's experience or interests. (See 
chs 2, 9). 
• If people had suffered dissonance as a result of making uncoerced 
revolutionary statements, but did not shift their attitudes in the 
direction of those statements, this would have counted against the 
theory of cognitive dissonance. In fact, attitudes did tend to change 
in the direction of counter-attitudinal but uncoerced statements. 
Moreover, the recalcitrance of political prisoners and many higher 
intellectuals corroborates the theory's prediction that little attitude 
change would result from dissonance caused by counter-attitudinal 
statements made under coercion. (See ch. 2). 
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• If people with hitherto unformed views had not tended to adopt the 
attitudes which they expressed in revolutionary discourse, this 
would have counted against the theory of self-perception. In fact, 
such people - for example the young - showed an unusually strong 
tendency to adopt the attitudes expressed by the things which they 
said. (See chs 2, 3, 8, 9) 
CD If the constant repetition of revolutionary formulae had not made 
the political concepts and schemas to which they were linked more 
accessible than rival political concepts and schemas, this would have 
counted against what we said in chapter 1 about associative priming, 
spreading activation and the 'interference effect'. In fact, the 
concepts and schemas linked to revolutionary formulae achieved 
clear predominance, being used to classify and analyse social reality 
even by refugees who had fled to Hong Kong. (See chs 2,9). 
Taken together, the theories listed above identify an impressive 
list of mechanisms through which language can lffect thought -
mechanisms which operated powerfully in Mao's China. Mao's success 
in activating these mechanisms and using them to bring about massive 
attitude change broadly confirms the intuitions behind 'weak' Whorfian 
claims that language influences thought. This judgment must be 
qualified, however, by pointing out that Whorf himself considered 
directly only one of the mechanisms of linguistic influence discussed in 
this thesis: the effect of habitually used semantic categories on 
thought. He did not mention mechanisms which are activated by 
habitually used expressions with propositional conten~ and indeed 
most of them were identified only after his death. Partly for this 
reason, the controversy surrounding the 'Whorf hypothesis' has not 
mentioned the validity effect, modelling, the verbal behaviour of 
reference groups, operant conditioning, dissonance and self-perception. 
Habitually used expressions with propositional content, however, can 
properly be considered 'linguistic', and their manipulation was central 
to the form of linguistic engineering practised in China. Our case study 
strongly reinforces other evidence that their persuasive effects can be 
very powerful. 
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If we treat habitually used propositional expressions as relevant 
to the Whorf hypothesis, then the claim that 'language influences 
thought' is both incontrovertible and highly significant. We would, 
however, still have no grounds for accepting the 'strong' version of the 
Whorf hypothesis - for accepting that we are trapped within the 
categories of our spoken language, that concepts which are nameless 
are unimaginable, or that different languages produce 
incommensurable world views. The arguments against such 'strong 
Whorfian' claims were considered in chapter 1 and they seem to me 
conclusive. Moreover, not one of the mechanisms of linguistic 
persuasion identified in this thesis is deterministic in the sense that it 
produces its effects under all circumstances. Indeed, we have seen that 
their persuasive effects can always be over-ridden by an encounter with 
more powerful tendencies which work in the opposite direction. Our 
examination of linguistic engineering in China gives as much evidence 
of the power of these countervailing tendencies as it does of-the 
persuasive power of linguistic manipulation: when no countervailing 
tendencies are present, linguistic engineering is remarkably effective; 
when such tendencies are present, its effectiveness declines. Our case 
study reveals that countervailing tendencies are associated with five 
major obstacles to persuasion: 
1. The existence of deeply en trenched beliefs opposed to the 
linguistic engineers' message. Such beliefs are strongly 
supported by a wide framework of schematically organized 
beliefs·. They can be changed, if at all, only by argument or 
evidence which weakens those supporting beliefs. Linguistic 
engineering did not convince higher intellectuals that they were 
worse judges than the Party of what was true and what was false 
within their areas of expertise; and slogans did not convince the 
peasants that cadres armed with Mao's Thought knew what they 
were talking about when it came to deep ploughing, close 
planting and trying to grow wheat and cotton in sub-tropical 
Guangdong province. (See chs 2, 9). 
2. Experience which contradicts the linguistic engineers' message. 
Most people in rural areas knew that the 'Great Leap Forward' 
was actually a 'Disastrous Leap Backward'; they knew from their 
own experience that the 'people's' communes were not controlled 
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by 'the people' but by the cadres; and if they were sentenced to 
a labour camp for promoting decollectivization, they knew that 
the 'revolutionary humanitarianism' which spared them the 
death penalty but let them starve was based on revolutionary 
indifference to their suffering. (See chs 2, 9; on 'revolutionary 
humanitarianism' see Wu 1994,88-174). 
3. Interests which are adversely affected by the linguistic engineers' 
message. People of 'bad' class origins might shout 'Never forget 
class struggle!' along with everyone else, but as the principal 
targets of class struggle they hardly ever meant what they said; 
intellectually gifted 'non-red' children might sing the praises of 
'worker-peasant-soldier students', but they nearly always 
believed that more able students like themselves were the ones 
who should go to university; and school children might say 
pious things about how 'educated youth' should 'serve the 
people' in the countryside, but only an idealistic minority were 
willing to leave the cities and live out their lives as peasants. (See 
chs 2, 6, 9). 
4. Contradictions within the linguistic engineers' message. Such 
contradictions, of course, tend to shake people's faith in the 
discourse as a whole. They are a particular problem if, as in 
China, the discourse is used as a weapon in battles amongst 
members of the political elite, so that the impeccably 
revolutionary leader of yesterday becomes the class enemy of 
today. The problem is even worse if, as in China, a stark dualism 
of good and evil, recognizing no shades of grey, requires the 
discourse to depict the fallen leader as bad from the start. This 
makes it impossible to say that a once-good leader turned bad at 
the end. Rather, the leader's entire history must be blackened, 
and this discredits the discourse during the entire period in 
which it had portrayed the leader as a model of revolutionary 
virtue. (See chs 5, 9). 
5. The emergence of subversive discourses. If the discourse 
becomes sufficiently discredited, people begin to suspect that 
others must share their doubts. Tentatively, they seek to ease the 
gUilt aroused by their doubts by confiding in friends, seeking to 
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confirm that they are not alone. If they are not betrayed, 
subversive discourses develop which engender cynicism about 
the official discourse, even if they do not directly attack it. This 
had begun to happen in China by the time Mao died in 1976. 
(See chs 2, 9). 
When none of these obstacles to persuasion is present, linguistic 
engineering is generally very effective. People are easily swayed by a 
dominant discourse if they are at least open-minded towards its 
message, if the message does not come into conflict with their 
experience, if it does not damage their self-esteem or interests, if it is 
internally consistent, and if there are no rival discourses. During Mao's 
rule, these conditions were often met, for many themes in the dominant 
discourse offered unity, hope and empowerment, and they dealt with 
matters on which people had few sources of information outside the 
discourse. The utopian vision which inspired the discourse was not 
destroyed in the countryside until the disaster of the Great L~ap 
Forward, and it lingered on in the cities until Mao's final years when it 
was weakened by elite factionalism, accumulating failures, and the 
indefinite deferment of the promised happiness. It was extinguished 
completely, perhaps, only with the death of Mao, the revolution'S God, 
whose still favourable public image was itself the finest creation of 
linguistic engineering. 
When a discourse loses its power because it contradicts people's 
experience, damages their interests or discredits itself with 
inconsistency, linguistic engineers with totalitarian aspirations 
customarily try to remedy the situation by intensifying their efforts to 
make people say 'correct' things. They do this because they have an 
exaggerated belief in the power of a centrally controlled discourse. 
They put such faith in the power of words because they make four 
crucial mistakes. First, they underestimate people's intelligence, for 
any fully-fledged programme of linguistic engineering is based on 
something like Lenin's assumption, which we met in chapter 2, that 
'People for the most part ... don't know how to think, they only learn 
words by heart'.' (Quoted in Young 1991,208)). The fact is that even 
in a society with many illiterates, most people know a lot about a few 
matters; they have entrenched beliefs on rather more; and they are 
perfectly capable of critical (if not always intelligent) thought when 
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they are told to say things which contradict entrenched existing beliefs. 
They are equally capable of spotting contradictions between what they 
were compelled to say yesterday and what they are compelled to say 
today. Linguistic engineers with totalitarian ambitions are in one 
respect the most likely to run into trouble, for they presume to meddle 
in the details of everyday life and at times reveal their ignorance even 
to the most isolated peasants. 
Second, the more ambitious linguistic engineers overestimate the 
effectiveness of 'top-down processing' and underestimate the 
effectiveness of 'bottom-up information'. Even if we were able to think 
only in the categories given to us by the linguistic engineers, we could 
still contradict their message as long as the language still possessed a 
term for negation. We could, for example, deny that the 'Great Leap 
Forward' was either 'great' or a 'leap forward'. In fact, our thought can 
never be limited to the categories licensed by linguistic engineers, for 
as we saw in chapter 1 the language in which we think is influenced by 
the language which we speak but is not identical with it. This will 
always give us the potential to transcend the categories of the linguistic 
engineers, reclassifying reality in the 'language of thought'. Such 
reclassification is not simply the product of a brain working in 
isolation, but a process in which our perceptual and cognitive 
apparatus, honed by Darwinian processes over millions of years, grasps 
aspects of reality which are relevant to our current purposes. In this 
way, the 'language of thought' responds to observations and 
experience, providing 'bottom up information' which corrects our 
concepts and schemas. That is why linguistic engineers so often fail 
when they try to conceal reality by making people say things which 
contradict what they have seen, heard, felt or otherwise learned 
through personal experience. 
Third, linguistic engineers with totalitarian aspirations often 
underestimate the resilience of the human ego. Linguistic engineering 
works best when it serves people's interests and self-image. In China, 
formulae praising the poor and lower-middle peasants as a leading class 
worked well amongst members of that class, and slogans which 
celebrated class struggle and revolutionary invincibility inspired and 
empowered Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. However, 
revolutionary discourse was far less successful amongst those whom it 
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denigrated or those whose interests it damaged. Members of the black. 
categories who were ritually cursed on account of their class origins did 
not accept that they deserved their fate; nor did the millions of people 
persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, or the intellectuals 
condemned as Rightists after the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign. Self-
interest and self-respect led intellectuals to resent their subordination 
to workers or semiliterate cadres; and a desire to control their own 
lives and better themselves fuelled the peasants' dissatisfaction at their 
subordination to the cadres and their exploitation by the state. 
Linguistic engineering failed to persuade any of these groups to like 
policies which kept them poor, which discriminated against them, 
which damaged their self-esteem, or which punished them unfairly. 
They rejected those parts of the discourse which praised such policies. 
Fourth, linguistic engineers have never grappled effectively with 
the self-destructive tendencies inherent in a linguistic virtuocracy. In 
China, as in other virtuocracies, the rulers were aware that opportunists 
could use virtuous words to seek advancement, and that even secret 
class enemies could 'wave the red flag to oppose the red flag'. Attempts 
to solve the problem, however, only made it worse. Mao's paranoia 
about secret opponents who hid behind linguistic virtue led to the 
Cultural Revolution, while in the Soviet Union and Cambodia the 
paranoia of Stalin and Pol Pot led to reigns of terror which destroyed 
millions, including many leading communists. In all three cases the 
hunt for traitors camouflaged by linguistic rectitude merely 
accentuated the gulf between words and attitudes: on the one hand, it 
made more people fear and even hate the regime; on the other, it made 
everyone put on an even more strenuous show of linguistic virtue in 
order to avoid suspicion. Under these circumstances, virtuous words 
became increasingly suspect, and their power to persuade through 
modelling revolutionary attitudes diminished. Often, 'correct' language 
was seen instead as modelling strategies of survival or self-
advancement. So the reign of linguistic virtue began to subvert 
revolutionary purposes, engendering cynicism rather than idealistic 
commitment. 
Although linguistic engineers with totalitarian aspirations seem 
always to over-rate the power of discourse, they rarely underestimate 
the necessity of coercion. The leader who put most faith in discourse 
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was Mao Zedong, who during the 'free mobilization' phase of the 
Cultural Revolution used discourse to mobilize the people against the 
Party, virtually destroying the coercive hierarchy which had enforced 
obedience and monitored and corrected interpretation. Mao's bold 
experiment has important lessons to. teach us about linguistic 
engineering, for it enables us to observe discourse, interpretation and 
behaviour when people have been freed from centralized coercion. 
What happened is instructive. Semantically, the discourse remained 
intact, as people more than ever before sought to justify their every 
action by quoting Mao and using 'correct' language in a constantly 
increasing range of contexts. Pragmatic interpretations of the 
discourse, however, diverged as soon as Mao withdrew the Party 'work 
teams' which had been guiding interpretation and orchestrating 
revolutionary criticism. Most 'red class' students were convinced that 
Mao was telling them to attack intellectuals and anyone connected with 
the 'bad' classes; by contrast, most middle and 'bad' class students, 
together with a minority of 'red class' class students who had got into 
trouble with the work teams, believed that Mao was appealing to them 
to attack the work teams and the Party itself. As it happened, this latter 
interpretation was the one which Mao wanted to prevail in late 1966 
and early 1967, but once the 'rebel' Red Guards and revolutionary 
workers had done his bidding and destroyed the Party Mao lost control 
of them too. Whatever he said was subject to divergent interpretations, 
for his word was always interpreted in the context of assumptions 
which reflected the opposing interests and political aspirations of 
different groups. As a result, the Cultural Revolution descended into 
chaos. (See chs 3, 4, 5). 
The chaotic outcome of 'free mobilization' demonstrates that it is 
not enough to control what people say and what their words mean 
semantically: it is also necessary to control the assumptions which 
people use in assigning real life referents to the words - the 
assumptions which they use to arrive at a pragmatic interpretation. In 
other words, linguistic engineering in any narrow sense is not enough: 
in a country where a diversity of interests and experiences gives people 
different interpretive assumptions, the control of language must always 
be supplemented by a coercive hierarchy which monitors 
interpretation, corrects errors and supplies the assumptions which 
people need if they are to avoid still more misinterpretations. In the 
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absence of such a hierarchy, unanimity of pragmatic interpretation will 
often break down: people will select the referents of terms according to 
assumptions which vary in accordance with their different experiences, 
interests and aspirations. This is preCisely what Relevance Theory 
would lead us to expect (cf. ch. 1). 
The diversity of interpretation which followed the removal of 
centralized Party control was exaggerated by the nature of Mao's 
writings and speeches. They were composed over many decades, in 
differing circumstances and for a variety of audiences. This ensured 
that they had many differing emphases which, if pressed a little, could 
yield contradictory principles. They posed, in a less extreme form, the 
same problems of interpretation as the Bible, which is read in 
startlingly diverse ways by Christians who possess different interpretive 
assumptions. In both cases, common readings across diverse 
populations are possible only with the aid of a hierarchy - of cadres or 
of clergy - which monitors interpretation and curbs heresy_ ~If the 
hierarchy fragments or is removed, then interpretations proliferate. 
The problem of differing pragmatic interpretations can be 
reduced if linguistic engineering is supplemented by a programme of 
social engineering designed to promote social homogeneity - a 
programme which eliminates as far as possible all barriers which divide 
society into groups with different experiences and opposing interests. 
The more homogeneous a society is, the greater the likelihood that its 
citizens will spontaneously bring similar assumptions to the task of 
interpretation. One reason for the emergence of such radically 
conflicting interpretations of Mao's message is that Chinese society, 
despite the misleading uniformity of dress, was far from homogeneous. 
Mao consciously promoted division and conflict, creating an artificial 
class system which kept class struggle alive long after classes based on 
real economic differences had vanished. This artificial class system was 
the most important source of the different interests and perspectives 
which shaped the contrasting interpretive frameworks of 'Royalist' Red 
Guards who could not believe that Mao was telling them that the Party 
should be their main target, and 'Rebel' Red Guards who were only too 
happy to believe that Mao wanted them to attack the Party. 
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The language of the Red Guards was heavily formulaic. In that 
respect it was typical, not only of Mao's China, but of all societies in 
which the rulers control discourse in an attempt to realize totalitarian 
aspirations (cf. Young 1991). Why should this be so? Why does the 
discourse of linguistic engineering cQnsist so largely of formulae? The 
argument of this thesis suggests some answers (see, especially, ch. 4). 
One is that formulae reduce the very considerable processing costs 
involved in propagating a world view to large numbers of people. 
They sum up key ideological points, and their repeated use makes it 
easier to recall other information related to them. Repetition, too, 
makes them so familiar that speakers find it easier to use them than to 
invent new ways of conveying the same old message, while listeners 
have heard them so often that they decode them effortlessly. 
The prevalence of formulae also reflects the fact that linguistic 
engineers make a very close connection between language and thought, 
sometimes even holding that they are one and the same thing. They 
believe that they must impose uniformity of language if they are to 
create uniformity of thought. So they pack the language with set 
phrases which people are expected to use whenever appropriate, 
believing (sometimes incorrectly) that uniform and 'correct' linguistic 
form is a sign of uniform and 'correct' content. They hope that the 
'correct' content will sink into people's brains and transform their 
consciousness. As the Nazi propagandist Eugen Hadamovsky put it, 
'Thought precedes action, and ... the word gives birth to thought.' 
(Young 1991, 120). 
Linguistic engineers are also aware that making people speak in 
formulae gives them a common linguistic identity, unites them in 
collective action, and makes each individual feel empowered through 
solidarity with countless others. At the same time, formulaic language 
repels and intimidates opponents, especially when it takes the form of 
shouted slogans. Hadamovsky describes the effect of slogans 
embodying a particular world view: 
They "beat down" on the adversary, pound him, create 
doubt, fear, repulsion and agreement. 
To those who believe in these slogans they appear as 
positive promises of a brighter future; to them they are an 
intellectual and religious salvation from the blind and purely 
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psychologically oriented struggle of everyday life. [young 1991, 
119-20]. 
Whether during the scripted theatre of the Nuremberg rallies or the 
orchestrated ritual of the public criticism meeting, slogans have been 
used to inspire the faithful and to terfify opponents. 
Finally, formulae crush those who would think for themselves. 
Intellectuals, peasants, children, believers and unbelievers must all use 
the same language to say the same things. They are bound together in 
common subservience to the dominant ideology, and in subservience to 
the source and guardian of that ideology - the ruling regime. This is 
particularly important when the discourse fails to persuade, as it did 
increasingly during Mao's final years, and as it did during Hitler's. 
People still have to recite the formulae, and if they do not believe them, 
in one sense it does not matter. They acknowledge the power of their 
rulers, they say things which legitimate their rule, and they t~ll 
potential dissidents that even unbelievers will not support them in 
public. The coercive power of an enforced discourse always exceeds its 
ability to persuade. 
It is ironic that linguistic engineering is a more effective 
instrument of coercion than of persuasion, for the most dedicated 
linguistic engineers want to re-make people's minds, to possess their 
souls, not merely to terrify them into outward consent. Mao, above all 
the others, had a genuine utopian vision which linguistic engineering 
was intended to serve. It was his misfortune that the power of linguistic 
engineering, though great, was not enough for the task. It was the 
Chinese people's tragedy that they were the intended beneficiaries of 
his utopian enterprise, and the subjects of his great linguistic 
experiment. 
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